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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-27851
27-SEP-2011
08:48 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
ROSEMARIE A. JAYLO, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALDO M. JAYLO, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
(NO. 27851)
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ROSEMARIE AGUIRRE JAYLO, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
ALDO MACAPAL JAYLO, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellee.
(NO. 28049)
NO. SCWC-27851
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(ICA NOS. 27851 and 28049; FC-DIVORCE NO. 96-1929)
SEPTEMBER 27, 2011
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, DUFFY, AND McKENNA JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Defendant-Appellant Aldo Macapal Jaylo (Father)
presents this court with a case of first impression: whether
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Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) section 580-47(a) authorized the
family court to order educational support for a disabled but
competent child age 23 or older when the 2004 Family Court’s
Amended Child Support Guidelines (2004 Guidelines) established
pursuant to HRS § 576D-7 provided that such support may be
continued only until the child attains the age of 23. The family
court answered this question “Yes”.1 We agree, for the reasons
discussed herein.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arose from the divorce between Father and
Plaintiff-Appellee Rosemarie Aguirre Jaylo (Mother). The parties
married in 1980 and had three children, including twin daughters
born on April 14, 1980. One of the twins (Daughter) has been
blind since birth, and it is her educational support which is at
issue in this case. The parties were divorced in 1996 pursuant
to the terms of the July 29, 1996 Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody (Divorce Decree). The Divorce
Decree awarded Mother full legal and physical custody over the
minor children, and Father was ordered to pay child support until
each of the children reached the age of 18, or graduated from
high school, or discontinued high school, whichever occurred
last. Father was additionally ordered to provide child support
for each child as long as they continued post-high school
1
The Honorable Karen M. Radius presided.
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education, until graduation, or until the child attained the age
of 23, whichever occurred first.
A. Mother’s Post-Decree Motion to Reestablish Child Support.
On May 24, 2005, Mother filed a post-decree motion,
which is the subject of this appeal. In her motion, Mother
sought, inter alia, an order reestablishing educational support
for the parties’ Daughter, who was 25-years old at the time the
motion was filed, and pursuing a college education. A trial was
held on September 9, 2005. The family court made the following
relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
. . .
2. Pursuant to the [Divorce Decree], Father was obligated
to pay child support for the parties’ three minor
children[.] . . .
3. Father’s child support obligation set forth in the
[Divorce Decree] was to continue uninterrupted so long as
each child continues his education post high school on a
full-time basis at an accredited college or university, or
in a vocational or trade school and shall continue until
each child’s graduation or attainment at the age of 23
years, whichever event shall first occur.
. . .
6. The parties’ daughter, [Daughter], was 25 years old at
the time of the trial in this matter. [Daughter] is legally
blind based on her absolute lack of light perception in both
eyes.
7. [Daughter] completed her high school education at
Washington State School for the Blind in the Spring of 2000
[at the age of twenty].
8. [Daughter] entered a six-month program funded by the
Washington State Department of Services for the Blind, the
purpose of which was to assist blind students such as her to
learn to live independently.
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9. After completing the foregoing program in July 2001,
[Daughter] pursued her college education by enrolling at
Edmonds College in Lynnwood, Washington . . . .
10. [Daughter] then transferred to Seattle Central
Community College in Seattle, Washington . . . .
. . .
17. [Daughter] . . . has an uncovered need of $834.00 per
month, which in the past has been paid by Mother.
. . .
21. Mother and Father’s combined monthly gross income is
$9,773.00 per month, of which 37% is attributable to Mother,
and 63% is attributable to Father.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
. . .
23. Hawai#i Revised Statutes Section 577-7(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that “[a]ll parents and guardians shall
provide, to the best of their abilities, for the discipline,
support, and education of their children.”
24. Hawai#i Revised Statutes Section 580-47(a) provides
with respect to child support that [the] “[p]rovision may be
made for the support, maintenance, and education of an adult
or minor child and for the support, maintenance, and
education of an incompetent adult child whether or not the
petition is made before or after the child has attained the
age of majority.
25. In addition to the foregoing, the Court has continuing
jurisdiction over the issues of child support and the
children’s post high school, higher educational expenses, as
such continuing jurisdiction was specifically reserved in
the [Divorce Decree].
26. Applying the gross incomes of the parties to the
applicable child support guidelines, Father’s child support
obligation would be $660.00 per month, and Mother’s child
support obligation would be $390.00 per month. However,
this Court concludes that [Daughter’s] receipt of her own
income of $625.00 per month is an exceptional circumstance
warranting deviation from the parties’ child support
obligation under the child support guidelines.
27. Accordingly, the Court concludes that [Daughter’s]
current reasonable monthly need is $834.00 per month, and
that good cause exists to require Father to be responsible
to pay 63% ($525.42 per month) and Mother to be responsible
to pay 37% (308.58 per month), based on their proportionate
incomes . . . .
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28. Mother’s and Father’s obligations to pay child support
for [Daughter] shall remain in full force and effect for a
limited time, so long as [Daughter] is pursuing a bachelor’s
degree and continuing at the maximum amount of courses
prescribed by her college, taking into account her
disability.
On March 6, 2006, the family court entered an order
granting in part Mother’s post-decree motion insofar as it
reestablished educational support for Daughter. Father filed a
notice of appeal on March 31, 2006.
B. Appeal to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA).
Father filed his opening brief to the ICA on
January 10, 2007, and argued, inter alia, that the family court’s
conclusions of law were incorrect because the family court “does
not have continuing jurisdiction or legal authority to order
child support for an adult child, over the age of 23 who is not
incompetent.” The ICA concluded that the 2004 Guidelines did not
categorically prohibit the award of educational support to an
adult child beyond the age of 23. Op. at 25. The ICA stated
that although the 2004 Guidelines permitted educational support
for an adult child enrolled as a full-time student until that
child attained the age of 23, the Guidelines further recognized
that the presence of “exceptional circumstances” could justify
the family court’s deviation from the age cap and order support
for adult children over the age of 23. Id. at 26. The ICA
stated that it
[does] not read the 2004 Guidelines to allow for the greater
expenses of a disabled child younger than twenty-three but
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to forbid support to the same child because he or she could
not, because of their disability, complete their education
within the standard four years. We therefore hold that the
family court could find that an adult child’s physical
disability constitutes exceptional circumstances resulting
in a child support award to that disabled adult child beyond
the age of twenty-three.
. . .
However, on this record, it is unclear that the family court
considered Daughter’s disability an exceptional circumstance
that excused application of the twenty-three year-old age
limit.
Id. at 28, 29-30 (emphasis added). Thus, the ICA concluded that
where there is a finding of “exceptional circumstances,” the
family court has the authority to order a parent to provide
educational support for his or her child who is beyond the age of
23. The ICA remanded for: (1) findings on the issue of whether
Mother has proved “exceptional circumstances” warranting
deviation from the age limit on support for an adult child beyond
the age of 23 and, if so, (2) the amount and duration of support.
Father’s Application for Writ of Certiorari was granted
on July 8, 2011. Oral argument was held on September 1, 2011.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Statutory Interpretation
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law
reviewed de novo.
In our review of questions of statutory interpretation, this
court follows certain well-established principles, as
follows:
First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
Second, where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
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legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when
there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness
or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an
ambiguity exists. And fifth, in construing an ambiguous
statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by
examining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to
ascertain their true meaning.
State v. Silver, 125 Hawai#i 1, 4, 249 P.3d 1141, 1144
(2011)(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)(quoting
Haw. Gov’t Employees Ass’n, AFSCME Local 152, AFL-CIO v. Lingle,
124 Hawai#i 197, 202, 239 P.3d 1, 6 (2010)).
B. Family Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Generally, the family court possesses wide discretion
in making its decisions, and these decisions will not be set
aside unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. Fisher v.
Fisher, 111 Hawai#i 41, 46, 137 P.3d 355, 360 (2006).
The family court’s [findings of fact] are reviewed on appeal
under the “clearly erroneous” standard. A [finding of fact]
is erroneous when (1) the record lacks substantial evidence
to support the finding, or (2) despite substantial evidence
in support of the finding, the appellate court is
nonetheless left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. “Substantial evidence” is credible
evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value
to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a
conclusion.
On the other hand, the family court’s [conclusions of law]
are reviewed on appeal de novo, under the right/wrong
standard. [Conclusions of law], consequently, are not
binding upon an appellate court and are freely reviewable
for their correctness.
Id.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. HRS Section 580-47(a) Authorizes the Family Court to Order
Educational Support for a Disabled But Competent Child Age
23 or Older.
HRS § 580-47(a) gives the family court broad authority
to make “just and equitable” orders compelling a parent “to
provide for the support, maintenance, and education of the
children of the parties.”
§ 580-47 Support orders; division of property. (a)
Upon granting a divorce, or thereafter if, in addition to
the powers granted in subsections (c) and (d), jurisdiction
of those matters is reserved under the decree by agreement
of both parties or by order of court after finding that good
cause exists, the court may make any further orders as shall
appear just and equitable (1) compelling the parties or
either of them to provide for the support, maintenance, and
education of the children of the parties[.]
HRS § 580-47(a) (2006). The statutory language of HRS § 580-
47(a) does not contain any age limit on the family court’s broad
authority to make “just and equitable” orders compelling a parent
to provide educational support for his/her child. Father
acknowledges the absence of such a statutory age limitation, but
bases his argument for the age limitation of 23 on four primary
grounds: (1) ICA case law, (2) the 2004 Guidelines, (3) the
legislative history of amendments to HRS § 580-47, and (4) the
legislature’s failure to act in response to the ICA case law
shows that the legislature tacitly approved the ICA decisions,
giving them the effect of legislation. We will discuss each of
these arguments in turn.
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B. ICA Case Law
Father cites footnote 3 in Nabarrete v. Nabarrete, 86
Hawai#i 368 (App. 1997):
3. An adult-student-son/daughter is defined as a son or
daughter who is under age 23 and attending college or
another post-high school educational institution on a full
time basis. Mack v. Mack, 7 Haw. App. 171, 180, 749 P.2d
478, 483 (1988).
Nabarrete, 86 Hawai#i at 371 n.3, 949 P.2d at 211 n.3. There is
no discussion in Nabarrete regarding HRS § 580-47(a).
With respect to the Mack case, cited in footnote 3 in
Nabarrete as the source of the age limitation of 23 for
educational support, HRS § 580-47 is mentioned but there is no
discussion regarding the source of the age 23 limitation on
educational support:
In his answering brief father states in relevant part as
follows: “[T]he support duty owed by Husband to Laura and
Danielle is far different from the duty owed to them when
they were minors.” We disagree. Under HRS § 580-47 (1985)
and the May 13, 1982 consent decree of divorce, the duty
owed by Father to Laura and Danielle since they became
adults and while they are under age 23 and attending college
or another post-high school educational institution on a
full time basis is basically the same as it was when they
were minors. (Emphasis added).
Mack, 7 Haw. App. at 180, 749 P.2d at 483. The cited ICA case
law is not persuasive as it does not inform us of the source of
the purported age limitation of 23 for educational support, and
is contrary to the broad discretion given the family court in
HRS § 580-47(a).
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C. 2004 Guidelines
Section E of the 2004 Guidelines expressly states,
inter alia: “Support for an adult child who is a full-time
student may continue until the child attains the age of 23.”
The origin of the 2004 Guidelines is found in
HRS § 580-47(a):
In establishing the amounts of child support, the court
shall use the guidelines established under section 576D-7.
Provision may be made for the support, maintenance, and
education of an adult or minor child and for the support,
maintenance, and education of an incompetent adult child
whether or not the petition is made before or after the
child has attained the age of majority.
HRS § 580-47(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
HRS § 576D-7 is entitled “Guidelines in establishing
amount of child support” and provides as follows:
(a) The family court, in consultation with the
agency, shall establish guidelines to establish the amount
of child support when an order for support is sought or
being modified under this chapter. The guidelines shall be
based on specific descriptive and numeric criteria and
result in a computation of the support obligation.
The guidelines may include consideration of the
following:
(1) All earnings, income, and resources of both parents;
provided that earnings be the net amount, after
deductions for taxes, and social security. Overtime
and cost of living allowance may be deducted where
appropriate;
(2) The earning potential, reasonable necessities, and
borrowing capacity of both parents;
(3) The needs of the child for whom support is sought;
(4) The amount of public assistance which would be paid
for the child under the full standard of need as
established by the department;
(5) The existence of other dependents of the obligor
parent;
(6) To foster incentives for both parents to work;
(7) To balance the standard of living of both parents and
child and avoid placing any below the poverty level
whenever possible;
(8) To avoid extreme and inequitable changes in either
parent's income depending on custody; and
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(9) If any obligee parent (with a school age child or
children in school), who is mentally and physically
able to work, remains at home and does not work,
thirty (or less) hours of weekly earnings at the
minimum wage may be imputed to that parent's income.
(b) The guidelines shall be:
(1) Applied statewide;
(2) To simplify the calculations as much as practicable;
(3) Applied to ensure, at a minimum, that the child for
whom support is sought benefits from the income and
resources of the obligor parent on an equitable basis
in comparison with any other minor child of the
obligor parent;
(4) Established by October 1, 1986; and
(5) Transmitted to the agency and all family court judges
when available or updated, and shall be considered by
the judges in the establishment of each child support
order.
(c) The family court, in consultation with the agency,
shall update the guidelines at least once every four years.
(d) The establishment of the guidelines or the adoption of
any modifications made to the guidelines set forth in this section
may constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to permit
review of the support order. A material change of circumstances
will be presumed if support as calculated pursuant to the
guidelines is either ten per cent greater or less than the support
amount in the outstanding support order. The most current
guidelines shall be used to calculate the amount of the child
support obligation.
(e) The responsible or custodial parent for which child
support has previously been ordered shall have a right to petition
the family court or the child support enforcement agency not more
than once every three years for review and adjustment of the child
support order without having to show a change in circumstances.
The responsible or custodial parent shall not be precluded from
petitioning the family court or the child support enforcement
agency for review and adjustment of the child support order more
than once in any three-year period if the second or subsequent
request is supported by proof of a substantial or material change
of circumstances.
HRS § 576D-7 (2006) (emphasis added). It is clear from the
statutory language of HRS § 580-47(a) and HRS § 576D-7 that the
guidelines were intended to establish the amount of child support
rather than to establish the child’s eligibility for such
support. To the extent that the 2004 Guidelines purport to set
an age limitation of 23 on the family court’s authority to
continue educational support for an adult child, they are invalid
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as they exceed the statutory mandate of HRS § 580-47(a) when they
purport to limit eligibility for such support. Where there well
may be valid policy reasons to support a statutory age limitation
of 23 (or other age) for educational support, the imposition of
eligibility requirements for educational support is a policy
determination within the purview of the legislature, and
HRS § 580-47(a) imposes no such age limitation. As Father
candidly admitted, “the legislature cannot delegate the authority
to establish or amend the eligibility criteria for child support
that are set forth in HRS § 580-47(a) because it cannot delegate
its legislative authority.” Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle,
120 Hawai#i 51, 69-70 (2008).
The 2004 Guidelines thus do not support Father’s
argument for the age limitation of 23 for educational support.
D. Legislative History of Amendments to HRS § 580-47(a)
Father argues that, despite the broad language of
HRS § 580-47(a), 1992 legislative amendments were intended to
limit the broad language by facilitating termination of child
support when an adult child is no longer in school, quoting the
legislative history of the 1992 amendments that “[c]urrent
statutes do not clearly specify that child support payments
terminate when the child becomes eighteen years old unless the
child is enrolled in an acceptable form of secondary education.”
Conf. Comm. Rpt. No. 19, 1992 Senate Journal at 739. The 1992
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amendments basically required that educational support may be
suspended for an adult child unless the child provides proof of
enrollment as a full-time student in school or has been accepted
and plans to attend as a full-time student for the next semester.
Father then argues that the 1992 amendments, combined with the
subsequent Nabarrete decision, show a legislative intent to limit
the broad language of HRS § 580-47(a) with respect to educational
support for an adult child.
We do not find Father’s argument persuasive. We
previously discussed the infirmities of Nabarrete herein. With
respect to the statutory amendments, where the statutory language
is plain and unambiguous, we give effect to the statute’s plain
and obvious meaning. State v. Silver, 125 Hawai#i at 4, 249 P.3d
at 1144. In our view, the 1992 statutory amendments to HRS
§ 580-47(a) do not in any respect limit the family court’s broad
authority to provide educational support for an adult child.
E. The Legislature’s Failure to Act in Response to the ICA Case
Law Shows That the Legislature Tacitly Approved the ICA
Decisions, Giving Them the Effect of Legislation.
Father cites two cases in support of his argument that
the legislature’s failure to act in response to the ICA decisions
in Nabarrete and Mack shows that the legislature tacitly approved
the ICA decisions, giving them the effect of legislation. Both
of these cases are easily distinguishable.
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In State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 837 P.2d 776
(1992), we addressed the statutory language of HRS § 712-1200(4),
a prostitution statute which contains its own mandatory
sentencing scheme. This mandatory sentencing scheme provided
that “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary,” for any
subsequent offense, “a fine of $500 and term of imprisonment of
thirty days, without possibility of suspension of sentence or
probation.” Id. at 80, 837 P.2d at 778 (emphasis in original).
In State v. Rice, 66 Haw. 101, 657 P.2d 1026 (1983), we
interpreted “[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary” in
HRS § 712-1200 as language taking away the trial court’s power to
grant deferred acceptance of guilty (DAG) pleas. Id. at 102, 657
P.2d at 1026. In Dannenberg, we found that while defendant’s
argument that the mandatory sentencing provisions of HRS § 712-
1200 only apply where the defendant is actually “convicted” and
that a DAG plea is not a conviction is well taken, to permit a
trial court to defer the entry of a plea in order to avoid a
conviction permits the court to avoid the sentencing scheme
created by the legislature specifically for prostitution cases
would be repugnant to legislative intent. Dannenberg, 74 Haw.
at 80, 837 P.2d at 778-79. It was in this context that the
Dannenberg court stated that the legislature’s failure to react
in response to its holding in Rice concerning statutory
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interpretation of HRS § 712-1200(4) must be considered to have
the tacit approval of the legislature.
In the second case cited by Father, State v. Hussein,
122 Hawai#i 495, 229 P.3d 313 (2010), we discussed multiple
issues in the sentencing of criminal defendants, and ultimately
imposed a new requirement that sentencing courts must state the
reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. The dissent in
Hussein objected to the imposition of the new requirement on
several grounds, one of which was that the sentencing judge would
be placed at risk of violating HRS § 806-73 (Supp. 2008), which
states that “[a]ll adult probation records shall be confidential
and shall not be deemed to be public records.” Id. at 540, 229
P.3d at 358 (Moon, C.J., concurring in part, and dissenting in
part, joined by Nakayama, J.). In responding to this specific
point, the majority opinion noted that the dissent’s concerns
have already been considered by the legislature when it amended
the statute in 2006 to “add persons and entities to the list of
those who are allowed access to adult probation records.” Id. at
529, 229 P.3d at 347. The majority opinion further noted that
the legislature’s decision to increase the availability of PSI
reports came long after this court had addressed the importance
of stating sentencing reasons on the record in Lau, Sinagoga,
Leesary, and related cases, and that the legislature had not
responded to this court’s admonition to sentencing courts to give
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reasons for their sentence by altering the language in either HRS
§ 806-73 or HRS § 706-604. Id. It was in this context that we
stated that the legislature’s failure to act in response to our
statutory interpretation must be considered to have the tacit
approval of the legislature. Id. (citing Gray v. Admin. Dir.,
84 Haw. 138, 143 n.9, 931 P.2d 580, 585 n.9 (1997)(quoting
Dannenberg, 74 Haw. at 83, 837 P.2d at 780)).
The context of these two cases is far different from
the ICA cases relied upon by Father. In fact, in neither the
Nabarrete or Mack cases was the statutory language of HRS § 580-
47(a) at issue in this case even discussed, much less constitute
a statutory interpretation holding in either case. As discussed
earlier herein, the Nabarrete citation is to a footnote in an ICA
opinion which does not discuss HRS § 580-47(a) in either the text
of the opinion or in the footnote. While Mack mentions HRS
§ 580-47(a), there is no discussion of the statutory language or
the source of the age limitation of 23 for educational support.
In this context, we do not find Father’s argument that
“legislative inaction equals tacit approval” of the ICA decisions
persuasive.
F. The Family Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Ordering
Educational Support to Daughter.
Having established that HRS § 580-47(a) does not impose
an age limit for educational support of an adult child, we now
address the issue of whether the family court abused its
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discretion in this case when it ordered educational support for
Daughter.
We hold that the family court did not abuse its
discretion when it ordered educational support for Daughter. The
family court’s findings of fact include findings that Daughter
has been blind since birth, completed high school at age 20, and
is pursuing her college education, with the goal of being a flute
teacher. The number of academic credits Daughter has taken and
is taking is determined in collaboration with her school academic
counselor. Daughter anticipates attending college for
approximately two to four more years. The family court concluded
that
FOF No. 14. Based on [Daughter’s] testimony that her
curriculum is made in collaboration with her school academic
counselor, and the mobility and other classes that
[Daughter] takes, the Court finds that she is taking a
reasonable and appropriate amount of credits to complete
college in a timely fashion and is considered a full-time
student in view of her sight disability.
As conceded by Father: “There is no suggestion herein
that [Daughter] did not make a good faith effort to continue and
complete her education to the best of her ability. It was not
unreasonable under the circumstances that it was taking her
longer to complete her education than would have been the case if
she did not have a physical disability.”
Based on these findings of fact, the family court did
not abuse its discretion when it ordered educational support for
Daughter.
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G. The ICA Erred in its Analysis and Remand Order.
Based upon our analysis discussed herein, we
respectfully disagree with the ICA’s analysis and remand order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our holding that HRS § 580-47(a) does not impose an age
limit for educational support of a child age 23 or older is not
intended to be a “sea change” in the family court’s consideration
of requests for educational support of an adult child. The facts
of this case present a unique and compelling basis for Daughter’s
continuing educational support beyond the age of 23, which the
family court granted in the exercise of its discretion. It is
anticipated that family courts will continue to consider all
relevant factors when presented with a request for educational
support of an adult child, including but not limited to, the
financial conditions of the parties, the anticipated length of
the college or other educational program being pursued by the
child as a full-time student, the ability of the child to
contribute to his/her educational support by working part-time,
obtaining scholarships, grants, student loans, and other
financial assistance, and any other relevant circumstance,
including but not limited to, a child’s disability.
In light of our disagreement with that part of the
Intermediate Court of Appeals’ February 8, 2011 opinion
concerning Appellee Father’s obligation to provide educational
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support for Daughter, we vacate the Intermediate Court of
Appeals’ March 30, 2011 amended judgment on appeal, and affirm
the family court’s March 6, 2006 order reestablishing educational
support for Daughter.
Robert M. Harris /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner/
defendant-appellant/ /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
appellee
/s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.
Steven J. Kim
for respondent/ /s/ James E. Duffy, Jr.
plaintiff-appellee/
appellant /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
19