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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-29659
24-APR-2012
09:07 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI#I,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SAMUEL WALKER, also known as Samuel Ahsan,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
NO. SCWC-29659
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(ICA NO. 29659; CR. NO. 08-1-0586)
APRIL 24, 2012
ACOBA, DUFFY, AND MCKENNA, JJ.; WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
CONCURRING SEPARATELY IN THE RESULT,
WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
AMENDED OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Samuel Walker, also
known as Samuel Ahsan, (Walker) filed a timely application for a
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writ of certiorari (Application), urging this court to review the
Intermediate Court of Appeals’ (ICA) October 18, 2011 judgment on
appeal, which vacated the January 26, 2009 notice of entry of
judgment and conviction and sentence (judgment) of the circuit
court of the first circuit (circuit court),1 and remanded the
case with instructions to dismiss Count I without prejudice. The
circuit court found Walker guilty of three offenses2 including
(Count I) Habitually Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of
an Intoxicant (HOVUII) in violation of Hawai#i Revised Statutes
(HRS) §§ 291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A) (2007 & Supp. 2008).3
1
The Honorable Michael A. Town presided.
2
The circuit court also convicted Walker of (Count II) Operating a
Vehicle After License and Privilege have been Suspended or Revoked for
Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in violation of HRS §
291E-62(a)(2) (2007) and (Count III) Consuming or Possessing Intoxicating
Liquor While Operating Motor Vehicle in violation of HRS § 291-3.1(b) (2007).
Walker’s questions presented focus solely on his conviction of HOVUII under
Count I; he does not challenge his convictions under Counts II or III.
3
HRS § 291E-61.5 (2007 & Supp. 2008) provided in relevant part:
(a) A person commits the offense of habitually operating a
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if:
(1) The person is a habitual operator of a vehicle while
under the influence of an intoxicant; and
(2) The person operates or assumes actual physical control
of a vehicle:
(A) While under the influence of alcohol in an
amount sufficient to impair the person’s normal
mental faculties or ability to care for the
person and guard against casualty[.]
. . .
(b) For the purposes of this section:
“Convicted three or more times for offenses of operating a
vehicle under the influence” means that, at the time of the
continue...
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Walker’s Application presents the following questions:
3
...continue
behavior for which the person is charged under this section,
the person had three or more times within ten years of the
instant offense:
(1) A judgment on a verdict or a finding of guilty, or a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for a violation of
this section or section 291-4, 291-4.4, or 291-7 as
those sections were in effect on December 31, 2001, or
section 291E-61 or 707-702.5; [or]
(2) A judgment on a verdict or a finding of guilty, or a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for an offense that
is comparable to this section or section 291-4, 291-
4.4, or 291-7 as those sections were in effect on
December 31, 2001, or section 291E-61 or 707-702.5;
. . .
that, at the time of the instant offense, had not been
expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside. All convictions
that have been expunged by pardon, reversed, or set aside
prior to the instant offense shall not be deemed prior
convictions for the purposes of proving the person’s status
as a habitual operator of a vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant.
A person has the status of a “habitual operator of a
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant” if the
person has been convicted three or more times within ten
years of the instant offense, for offenses of operating a
vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant.
(c) Habitually operating a vehicle while under the influence of
an intoxicant is a class C felony.
(d) For a conviction under this section, the sentence shall be
either:
(1) An indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years;
or
(2) A term of probation of five years, with conditions to
include:
(A) Mandatory revocation of license and privilege to
operate a vehicle for a period not less than
one year but not more than five years;
(B) Not less than ten days imprisonment, of which at
least forty eight hours shall be served
consecutively;
(C) Referral to a certified substance abuse
counselor as provided in section 291E-61(d);
(D) A surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the
neurotrauma special fund; and
(E) May be charged a surcharge of up to $50 to be
deposited into the trauma system special fund if
the court so orders.
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1. Did the ICA gravely erred [sic] in ordering Count 1 of the
Felony Information to be remanded for dismissal without
prejudice insofar as Count 1 adequately alleges an offense
under HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2007), and thus,
pursuant to State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai#i 411, 163 P.3d 1148
(2007), and State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i[] 227, 160 P.3d
703 (2007), the ICA must reverse the conviction in Court 1
if there was insufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2007) or remand this case
to the circuit court for entry of judgment of conviction and
resentencing pursuant to HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) if
there was sufficient evidence to convict Defendant?
2. Did the ICA gravely erred [sic] in failing to analyze and
suppress Mr. Walker’s un-Mirandized statement concerning his
alcohol consumption that was made in response to custodial
interrogation as part of a sufficiency analysis?
3. Did the ICA gravely erred [sic] in failing to analyze and
exclude the results of Mr. Walker’s performance of the
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test despite the State’s
failure to lay the proper foundation pursuant to State v.
Toyomura, 80 Hawai#i 8, 27, 904 P.2d 893, 912 (1995), and
State v. Ito, 90 Hawai[#]i 225, 244, 978 P.2d 191, 210 (App.
1999), as part of a sufficiency analysis?
Notably, Walker’s Application only challenges his conviction of
Count I, HOVUII.
We accepted Walker’s Application for the limited
purpose of clarifying and reconciling this court’s opinions in
State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i 227, 160 P.3d 703 (2007), and
State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai#i 411, 163 P.3d 1148 (2007), in light
of State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 219 P.3d 1170 (2009).
Clarification of Ruggiero and Kekuewa in the context of Wheeler
will ensure consistency among future OVUII cases. We hold that
an appellate court’s remand for entry of judgment of conviction
and resentencing for a lesser-included offense must be based on a
jurisdictionally valid lesser-included charge. Under this
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holding, Walker’s HOVUII charge did not adequately allege the
lesser-included offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII) as a first offender pursuant
to HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2007)4 because his charge
failed to allege an essential element, specifically, the
4
HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2007) provided:
(a) A person commits the offense of operating a vehicle under
the influence of an intoxicant if the person operates or
assumes actual physical control of a vehicle:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol in an amount
sufficient to impair the person's normal mental
faculties or ability to care for the person and guard
against casualty[.]
. . .
(b) A person committing the offense of operating a vehicle under
the influence of an intoxicant shall be sentenced as follows
without possibility of probation of suspension of sentence:
(1) Except as provided in [paragraph] (2), for the first
offense, or any offense not preceded within a five-
year period by a conviction for an offense under this
section or section 291E-4(a):
(A) A fourteen-hour minimum substance abuse
rehabilitation program, including education and
counseling, or other comparable program deemed
appropriate by the court;
(B) Ninety-day prompt suspension of license and
privilege to operate a vehicle during the
suspension period, or the court may impose, in
lieu of the ninety-day prompt suspension of
license, a minimum thirty-day prompt suspension
of license with absolute prohibition from
operating a vehicle and, for the remainder of
the ninety-day period, a restriction on the
license that allows the person to drive for
limited work related purposes and to participate
in substance abuse treatment programs;
(C) Any one or more of the following;
(i) Seventy-two hours of community service
work;
(ii) Not less than forty-eight hours and not
more than five days of imprisonment; or
(iii) A fine not less than $150 but not more
than $1,000; and
(D) A surcharge of $25 to be deposited into the
neurotrauma special fund[.]
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attendant circumstance that he operated a vehicle on a public
road, way, street, or highway as mandated by Wheeler.
Accordingly, we affirm the ICA’s judgment and hold that the ICA
did not err in vacating the circuit court’s judgment and
remanding Walker’s case to the circuit court with instructions to
dismiss Count I without prejudice. We write separately only to
clarify and reconcile Ruggiero, Kekuewa, and Wheeler.
I. BACKGROUND
A. April 17, 2008 Incident
The charges against Walker arose out of an incident
that occurred on April 17, 2008 in the City and County of
Honolulu, State of Hawai#i. At about 11:40 p.m., while assisting
at a traffic accident near the corner of Kilani Avenue and North
Cane Street in Wahiawa, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer
Morgan Hill (Officer Hill) heard “a loud screeching of tires” and
an accelerating engine sound come from Walker’s vehicle. Officer
Hill observed Walker’s vehicle accelerate at a high rate of speed
and, based on his training and experience, believed Walker was
driving at a higher rate than the twenty-five mile per hour
posted speed limit. “Everything indicated to [Officer Hill] that
it was not a safe execution.” Based solely on his observation of
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Walker’s apparent speeding,5 Officer Hill got into his vehicle
and pursued Walker at an “extremely high rate of speed” in order
to reach him. Officer Hill activated his blue light and Walker
pulled over.
After stopping Walker’s vehicle and notifying police
dispatch of the traffic stop, location, and Walker’s license
plate number, Officer Hill approached Walker’s vehicle from the
driver’s side. Walker produced a Hawai#i state ID.6 Officer
Hill observed that Walker’s eyes were red and glassy and his
speech was slurred.7 Officer Hill also noted a strong odor of
alcohol coming from Walker’s breath when he spoke.8 Officer Hill
asked Walker if he had been drinking and Walker answered “[o]nly
about eight or nine beers. I’m okay, and I live just right over
there.” Officer Hill testified that Walker’s reported alcohol
5
During cross-examination, Officer Hill conceded that apart from
the speeding violation, he did not observe Walker breaking any other rules:
“his headlights were on[,]” “he was not weaving[,]” “he was not swerving[,]”
“he was not drifting in[,]” “he was driving in his own lane[,]” “he did not
cross the center line[,]” “he did not strike anything[,]” “he did not almost
strike anything[,]” and “he [did not] drive off the road[.]”
6
Walker was unable to produce a valid drivers license. Walker’s
license was revoked from November 10, 2006 to November 9, 2008, which included
the night of the instant offense, April 17, 2008.
7
During cross-examination, Officer Hill conceded that there are
many reasons a person’s eyes may be red outside of alcohol consumption.
8
During cross-examination, Officer Hill acknowledged that based on
smell alone, one cannot determine how much alcohol has been consumed.
Furthermore, it is possible for an individual to consume alcohol hours earlier
and not be intoxicated, but still smell of alcohol.
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consumption did not factor into his decision to arrest Walker.
He stated, “I really didn’t want to base my arrest on anything,
other than how [Walker] was going to perform the field sobriety
exercise. At that point when I was able to determine whether I
believed him to be impaired or not, then, I would make a judgment
on whether or not to arrest, because anybody can say anything.”
At this time, Officer Hill also noticed an open,
“sweating” beer bottle located in the center console of Walker’s
vehicle.9 Based on the totality of this information, Officer
Hill believed Walker could be impaired from alcohol consumption.
Accordingly, Officer Hill asked Walker if he was willing to
participate in a standardized field sobriety test (SFST) and
Walker consented.10
At the time of the incident, Officer Hill had been
employed by HPD for thirteen years and, during that time, he
handled several hundred OVUII cases “either as the initial
officer or[,] at the very least, as a participating officer of
some sort.” As part of his training with HPD, Officer Hill was
trained to conduct and evaluate SFSTs. As part of the SFST
9
Officer Hill recovered the open beer bottle and submitted it as
evidence for analysis.
10
Officer Hill testified during cross-examination: “[o]nce I had
made my observations and decided that I had reasonable suspicion that there
was a possibility [Walker] had been operating the vehicle under the influence,
then, I asked him to step out for the SFST[.]”
8
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education, Officer Hill received classroom and workshop training
to administer and evaluate the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN)
test,11 the “walk and turn” test, and the “one-leg-stand” test.
Officer’s Hill’s SFST training was conducted in accordance with
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) standards.
After Walker consented to participate in the SFST,
Officer Hill “asked him if he was wearing contacts, if he was on
any medication, if he was epileptic, diabetic, had [an]
artificial eye, fake leg, was under the care of a doctor or
dentist at that time[,]” or “had any physical defect or speech
impediments[.]” Walker indicated that he had no medical
condition.12 Officer Hill explained to Walker that his ability
to follow instructions would be included in Officer Hill’s
evaluation of the SFST.
Officer Hill administered the HGN and “walk and turn”
portions of the field sobriety exercise in accordance with his
training and NHTSA standards. The HGN test revealed that Walker
exhibited equal eye tracking and equal pupil size but lacked
smooth pursuit in both eyes, in both directions. Also, Walker
11
The HGN test measures involuntary movement (i.e. “jerkiness”) in
the eyes as related to alcohol consumption, motor skill, and muscle
impairment.
12
Later, however, Walker refused to participate in the one-leg-stand
portion of the SFST claiming that he had a rod in his left thigh.
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showed “heavy nystagmus” prior to forty-five degrees. During the
walk and turn test, Walker misstepped, or had space in between
his heel and toe, on two of the first nine steps and raised his
arms during several steps.13 Walker refused to take the one-leg-
stand portion of the SFST.
B. Walker’s Circuit Court Proceedings
On April 21, 2008, the State charged Walker by Felony
Information and Non-Felony Complaint (Felony Information):
COUNT I: On or about the 17th day of April, 2008, in the City
and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, SAMUEL WALKER, also known
as SAMUEL AHSAN, a habitual operator of a vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant, did operate or assume actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in an
amount sufficient to impair his normal mental faculties or ability
to guard against casualty, thereby committing the offense of
Habitually Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
Intoxicant, in violation of Sections 291E-61.5(a)(1) and 291E-
61.5(a)(2)(A) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.
Officer Hill confirmed with HPD dispatch that Walker, under his
alias Samuel Ahsan, had three OVUII convictions within the
preceding ten years. Attached to the Felony Information, HPD
Officer Benjamin Moszkowicz submitted a declaration stating:
A check with both the Criminal Justice Information System, as well
as court records of the District Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii, revealed that on April 17, 2008, Walker had three (3)
prior convictions within the State of Hawaii for Operating a
Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant, and/or Driving Under
the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor under HPD Report Numbers 06-
408360, 03-515849[,] and 03-389761 and that these convictions
occurred between April 17, 1998 and April 17, 2008.
13
On the first nine steps, Walker raised his arms on steps one,
three, seven, and eight. On the second nine steps, Walker raised his arms on
steps five, six, and seven.
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During the circuit court proceedings, Walker filed a
Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements (Motion to Suppress)
on May 27, 2008. Specifically, Walker moved to suppress his
statement to Officer Hill that he consumed “eight or nine beers.”
Walker argued that Officer Hill obtained this statement in
violation of his constitutional rights under article I, sections
5 and 10 of the Hawai#i Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On August 12, 2008, the circuit court denied Walker’s
Motion to Suppress. The circuit court made the following
findings of fact:
1. The Court finds Officer Morgan Hill’s testimony credible.
2. Based on the credible testimony of Officer Morgan Hill, this
court finds that [Walker] revved his vehicle’s engine,
caused his vehicle’s tires to spin and screech, accelerated
to a fast rate of speed in a residential area, and traveled
at a speed well beyond the limit of 25 mph posted in that
area.
3. When Officer Hill approached [Walker’s] vehicle after
stopping [Walker] for the observed violation of the basic
speed rule and asked [Walker] for his driver’s license and
registration, Officer Hill noticed that [Walker] had red,
glassy, bloodshot eyes, strong and distinct odor of an
alcoholic type beverage coming from his breath[,] and a
slight slur as [he] spoke.
4. At about the same time as Officer Hill asked [Walker] if he
had been drinking[,] Officer [Hill] also observed an open
beer container.
5. [Walker], while sitting in his car[,] answered to Officer
Hill in response to a single question that he drank only
eight or nine beers earlier, that he will be okay and that
he lives just over here, whereas the entire interaction
between [Walker] and Officer Hill from the time of the stop
to the time of [Walker’s] response lasted about 15 seconds.
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Additionally, the circuit court entered the following conclusions
of law:
1. Based on Officer Hill’s observation of [Walker] revving
his vehicle’s engine, spinning and screeching tires[,] and
acceleration [sic] to a high rate of speed, above a safe
speed under the circumstances, Officer Hill had a reasonable
suspicion to stop Defendant for violation of the basic speed
rule under H.R.S. [§] 291C-101.
2. At the time [Officer Hill] approached [Walker’s] vehicle and
spoke to [Walker], [Walker] was not in custody under State
v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 687 P.2d 544 (1984), and State v.
Kuba, 68 Haw. 184, 706 P.2d 1305 (1985).
3. Consequently[,] because [Walker] was not in custody at the
time a question was posed to him whether he was drinking,
Miranda warnings did not have to be given to [Walker] prior
to asking the question.
4. The Court finds that [Walker’s] response that he only drank
eight or nine beers earlier and that he will be okay,
because he lives just over here was given freely,
voluntarily[,] and has a character of spontaneity, and
therefore this statement was not elicited in violation of
[Walker’s] right against self incrimination.
On October 15, 2008, Walker submitted a memorandum of
law contending, inter alia, that Count I failed to allege an
essential element of the State’s accusations. Specifically,
Count I of the Felony Information fails to allege the attendant
circumstances of [HRS] section 291E-61.5 (2007), namely that
[Walker] had three (3) prior convictions for [OVUII] within ten
(10) years of the present offense. Count I’s statement that
[Walker] is “a habitual operator of a vehicle while under the
influence of an intoxicant” is nothing more than a statutory
reference. A reader must refer to the statute itself to determine
the meaning of this phrase, and thus, it is no more useful than
the statutory citation at the end of Count I. However, statutory
references in the charging instrument do not cure the omission of
essential elements. . . . Because the State failed to allege the
attendant circumstances of [Walker’s] prior convictions, the State
has merely charged [Walker] with OVUII as a first offense pursuant
to HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (2007).
Walker waived his right to a jury trial. During
Officer Hill’s cross-examination, Walker’s counsel presented
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Officer Hill with an alleged NHTSA manual. Officer Hill
testified that he did not own a NHTSA manual and could not
testify to its contents in several respects. Based on this
testimony, before sentencing on November 6, 2008, Walker
submitted his trial memorandum in which he argued that the
circuit court should disregard Officer Hill’s testimony
“regarding the administration and results of the [HGN] test
performed on [Walker] because the evidence showed that Officer
Hill was not qualified to conduct and grade the HGN test results
and Officer Hill did not perform the HGN test properly in this
case.”
The circuit court ruled from the bench and found Walker
guilty of, inter alia, Count I, habitually operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant. Judgment of conviction and
sentence was entered against Walker on January 26, 2009. The
circuit court entered the following conclusions of law:
1. There is no defect in the charging instrument in this case.
The State has alleged all the elements of the offense
including the attendant circumstances in the complaint by
specifying that [Walker] was “a habitual operator of a
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant”. [sic]
2. “Habitual” is only used in a habitual OVUII statute, and it
clearly has a unique meaning in the Hawaii Penal Code.
Hawaii Revised Statutes, §291-E 61.5 [sic] (“H.R.S.”). The
use of the words “habitual operator” under State v. Kekuewa,
114 Haw[ai#i] 411, 418[,] [163 P.3d 1148, 1155] (2007) in
the complaint in the instant case: (1) gives notice to
[Walker] that he has a right to a jury trial and (2) gives
notice to the Circuit Court that it has jurisdiction because
the offense is a class C felony under HRS 291-E 61.5 [sic].
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3. The interaction between [Walker] and Officer Hill from the
time of the stop to the time of [Walker’s] response
regarding drinking [eight] or [nine] beers was not a
custodial interrogation under State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293,
687 P.2d 544 (1984).
4. Even without considering [Walker’s] admission of drinking 8
or 9 beers and his performance on the HGN phase of the SFST,
this Court finds that [Walker] was under the influence of an
intoxicant as he drove on a public street and was impaired
beyond a reasonable doubt under State v. Ferm, 94 Haw[ai#i]
17, 25, 7 P.3d 193, 202 (2000) and State v. Vliet, 91
Haw[ai#i] 288, 293-94, [983] P.2d[] 189, 194-95 (1999).
The circuit court sentenced Walker to a five-year indeterminate
term of incarceration for Count I. Walker appealed.
C. ICA Appeal
As related to this Application, Walker argued on appeal
to the ICA that the circuit court’s judgment should be reversed
or vacated because:
1. The Felony Information charging [Walker] with Habitually
Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant is
defective in failing to allege attendant circumstances --
that [Walker] had three convictions for operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant within ten years before
the present offense;
2. The circuit court reversibly erred by failing to suppress
[Walker’s] un-Mirandized statement concerning his alcohol
consumption that was made in response to custodial
interrogation, and this error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt;
3. The circuit court reversibly erred by admitting and
considering evidence of [Walker’s] performance of the [HGN]
procedure despite the [State’s] failure to lay proper
foundation for such testimony, and this error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.]
Walker primarily advanced the argument that the State’s failure
to allege the statutory definition of “habitual offender” in the
Felony Information rendered his HOVUII charge deficient under
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State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 219 P.3d 1170 (2009).
In a published decision, the ICA majority14 agreed that
Count I of the Felony Information failed to allege an essential
element, an attendant circumstance, of the charge of HOVUII;
Chief Judge Nakamura dissented. State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011
WL 4537771 (App. 2011).15 The ICA majority vacated and remanded
the case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss Count
I without prejudice. Id. at *12.
1. The ICA Majority Opinion
The ICA majority examined Walker’s charge16 and
explained that “[t]he minimum requirements for a criminal charge
14
Judges Fujise and Leonard comprised the ICA majority.
15
Pinpoint citations to State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771
(App. 2011) are based on the hard copy opinion attached to Walker’s
Application.
16
Because Walker first objected to the sufficiency of the HOVUII
charge prior to the circuit court finding him guilty, the ICA did not apply
the Motta/Wells liberal construction rule in evaluating the sufficiency of his
charge. State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at *3 (App. 2011). Under
the Motta/Wells rule,
there is a “presumption of validity,” [State v.] Sprattling, 99
Hawai#i [312,] 318, 55 P.3d [276,] 282 [(2002)], for charges
challenged subsequent to a conviction. In those circumstances,
this court will “not reverse a conviction based upon a defective
indictment [or complaint] unless the defendant can show prejudice
or that the indictment [or complaint] cannot within reason be
construed to charge a crime.” [State v.] Merino, 81 Hawai#i [198,]
212, 915 P.2d [672,] 686 [(1996)] (citation omitted).
State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i 383, 399-400, 219 P.3d 1170, 1186-87 (2009)
(some brackets in original). The ICA’s analysis in Walker is consistent with
this court’s principle that the “liberal construction standard is limited to
construing indictments[] when the issue is only raised after trial.” State v.
Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 94, 657 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1983) (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
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are set by statute[]” in HRS § 806-34:
In an indictment the offense may be charged either by name or by
reference to the statute defining or making it punishable; and the
transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and
circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any)
against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the
offense was committed, as are necessary to identify the
transaction, to bring it within the statutory definition of the
offense charged, to show that the court has jurisdiction, and to
give the accused reasonable notice of the facts.
Averments which so charge the offense and the transaction shall be
held to be sufficient.
Id. (quoting HRS § 806-34 (1993)). In State v. Stan’s
Contracting, Inc., 111 Hawai#i 17, 31, 137 P.3d 331, 345 (2006),
this court construed HRS § 806-34 as containing mandatory
requirements for a charge. Id. The ICA majority’s analysis
explained that “the factual description of the transaction has a
jurisdictional component and is in addition to the requirement of
giving the defendant ‘reasonable notice of the facts.’” Walker,
No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at *6 (citing HRS § 806-34 (1993)).
Furthermore, the ICA majority also examined Hawai#i
Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7(d) and noted that the rule
“reflects a similar distinction between the requirements for the
description of the offense charged and the facts giving rise to
the charge.” Id. The majority explained:
With respect to the identification of the charge, HRPP Rule 7(d)
requires that “[t]he charge shall state for each count the
official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation[,]
or other provision of law[.]” With respect to the description of
the transaction, HRPP Rule 7(d) requires that “[t]he charge shall
be a plain, concise[,] and definite statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged.”
Id.
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Beyond HRS § 806-34 and HRPP Rule 7(d), the ICA
majority acknowledged that in some circumstances, “compliance
with the requirements for identification of the charge . . . does
not necessarily satisfy the requirements for the allegation of
the transaction.” Id. at *7. In such a situation, a mere
“citation to the statute would not cure the failure to allege an
element of an offense.” Id. For example, in Wheeler, “[t]he use
of the phrase ‘operate’ [in the charge] did not provide adequate
notice to [the defendant] that the State was required to prove
that [the defendant’s] operation of the vehicle occurred on a
public way, street, road, or highway.” Id. (quoting Wheeler,
121 Hawai#i at 395, 219 P.3d at 1182). The ICA analogized Walker
to Wheeler: “[j]ust as the word ‘operate’ does not suggest
operation on a public road, ‘habitual operator’ does not convey
the narrow definition that the person charged had three prior
convictions within the previous ten years[]” as required for a
conviction under HRS §§ 291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). Id. at
*8.
State v. Mita, 124 Hawai#i 385, 245 P.3d 458 (2010), a
case involving an animal nuisance charge pursuant to the Revised
Ordinances of Honolulu (ROH), also provided guidance to the ICA
majority’s opinion. Id. at *9-10. Two significant factors
distinguished Mita from Wheeler. First, in Mita, the definition
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of “animal nuisance” as used in the ROH did not create an
additional element of the offense of animal nuisance as the
definition of “operate” created an additional element of the
offense of OVUII in Wheeler. See id. at *10 (citing Mita, 124
Hawai#i at 391, 245 P.3d at 464). Second, the definition of
“animal nuisance” as used in the ROH is consistent with the
commonly understood meaning of the term unlike the definition of
“operate” in Wheeler that carried a narrow, statutory definition.
See id. (citing Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391, 245 P.3d at 464).
Ultimately, Mita’s charge “sufficiently alleged all of the
essential elements of the offense of animal nuisance[]” by
tracking the language of the ROH. Id. (quoting Mita, 124 Hawai#i
at 391, 245 P.3d at 464).
Following Wheeler and Mita, the ICA majority concluded
that “the charge of HOVUII is essentially a recidivist offense
and virtually the only difference between it and the offense of
[OVUII] under HRS § 291E-61 is the number of previous convictions
required for an HOVUII conviction.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he
term ‘habitual,’ or even ‘habitual operator,’ does not convey the
specificity of the term for HOVUII purposes.” Id. at *10-11.
Therefore, the ICA majority determined that the terms “habitual”
and “habitual operator” do not qualify as terms that may be used
in a criminal charge under their commonly understood definitions
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as allowed by HRS § 806-31 (1993).17 Id. at *9.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker was a “habitual
operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant”
as that phrase might be understood given the words usual meaning
(see HRS § 1–14 (2009)),[ 18] would not necessarily result in a
conviction. A conviction would only lie upon proof that Walker
“has been convicted three or more times within ten years of the
instant offense, for offenses of operating a vehicle under the
influence of an intoxicant” as prescribed in HRS § 291E–61.5(b).
Thus, the three prior convictions are attendant circumstance
elements of the offense. See Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i at 239, 160
P.3d at 715.
Id. at *12. For the ICA majority, “[s]ince proof of each element
of the offense is required for a conviction (HRS §
701–114(1)(a)),[19] the proof of three or more convictions within
the previous ten years is an element of the offense and therefore
should have been included in the charge.” Id. Accordingly,
based on this analysis alone, the ICA majority vacated the
circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions
to the circuit court to dismiss Count I without prejudice. Id.
The ICA majority’s opinion is silent as to Walker’s other points
17
HRS § 806-31 (1993) provides:
No indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient
for the reason merely that it alleges indirectly and by inference
instead of directly any matters, facts, or circumstances connected
with or constituting the offense, provided that the nature and
cause of the accusation can be understood by a person of common
understanding.
18
HRS § 1-14 (2009) provides that “[t]he words of a law are
generally to be understood in their most known and usual signification,
without attending so much to the literal and strictly grammatical construction
of the words as to their general or popular use or meaning.”
19
HRS § 701–114(1)(a) provides: “(1) Except as otherwise provided in
section 701-115, no person may be convicted of an offense unless the following
are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (a) Each element of the offense[.]”
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of error presented in his opening brief. Id. at *1-12.
2. Chief Judge Nakamura’s Dissent
Chief Judge Nakamura dissented; in his view, Count I of
the Felony Information adequately apprised Walker of the charges
he faced so as to adequately prepare his defense. State v.
Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at *1 (App. 2011) (Nakamura,
C.J., dissenting).20 In the charge at issue, Chief Judge
Nakamura believed that “[t]he habitual offender phrase [(i.e., “a
habitual operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an
intoxicant”)] tracked the language of the statute proscribing the
offense and is statutorily defined to mean a person with three or
more prior OVUII convictions within ten years of the charged
offense.” Id. (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
explained:
As used in the context of the criminal offender, the term
“habitual” is commonly understood to mean a recidivist, a person
with multiple convictions for the same offense. In my view, the
Habitual OVUII charge gave Walker, who was represented by counsel,
fair notice of the attendant circumstances element regarding his
habitual offender status . . . and adequately apprised him of what
he must be prepared to meet.
Id. at *1-2 (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Nakamura also examined State v. Mita and
noted:
20
Pinpoint citations to State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771
(App. 2011) (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) are based on the hard copy opinion
attached to Walker’s Application. In hard copy format, Chief Judge Nakamura’s
dissent pagination restarts at *1.
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Wheeler does not require that the State provide statutory
definitions in every charge which tracks the language of a statute
that includes terms defined elsewhere in the code. Requiring the
State to do so would render charges unduly complex, in
contravention of the policy reflected in HRPP Rule 7(d) that
“[t]he charge shall be a plain, concise[,] and definite statement
of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Rather,
as this court concluded in Wheeler, the State need only allege the
statutory definition of a term when it creates an additional
essential element of the offense, and the term itself does not
provide a person of common understanding with fair notice of that
element.
Id. at *9 (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(quoting Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391-92, 245 P.3d at 464-65).
Generally, “where the statute sets forth with reasonable clarity
all essential elements of the crime intended to be punished, and
fully defines the offense in unmistakable terms readily
comprehensible to persons of common understanding, a charge drawn
in the language of the statute is sufficient.” Id. at *7
(Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 393,
219 P.3d at 1180). According to Chief Judge Nakamura,
[u]nlike in Wheeler, the statutory definition of the habitual
offender phrase [in Walker’s case] does not create an additional
essential element for the Habitual OVUII offense. The habitual
offender element is already embodied in the habitual offender
phrase which is part of the offense statute. The statutory
definition of the habitual offender phrase simply elaborates on
the meaning of that phrase with details that are consistent with
the phrase’s commonly understood meaning.
Id. at *9 (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting).
Furthermore, in the dissent’s view, neither of Walker’s
additional arguments (i.e., that the circuit court erred by
declining to suppress his statement to Officer Hill that he
consumed eight or nine beers and that the circuit court erred by
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admitting evidence of his HGN test performance) entitled him to
relief. Id. at *2 (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). For these
reasons, inter alia, Chief Judge Nakamura would have affirmed
Walker’s HOVUII conviction. Id. (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting).
D. Application for Writ of Certiorari
Walker filed the instant, timely Application on January
17, 2012. The State filed a response on January 27, 2012.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Sufficiency of a Charge
“Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements
of a charged offense is a question of law, which [this court]
review[s] under the de novo, or right/wrong, standard.” State v.
Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 390, 219 P.3d at 1177 (citation, internal
quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).
B. Motion to Suppress Evidence
“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence is reviewed de novo” under the right/wrong standard.
State v. Spillner, 116 Hawai#i 351, 357, 173 P.3d 498, 504 (2007)
(quoting State v. Kaleohano, 99 Hawai#i 370, 375, 56 P.3d 138,
143 (2002)).
III. DISCUSSION
Notably, Walker does not challenge the ICA majority’s
determination that the language of Count I is defective for
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failing to allege an essential element, the attendant
circumstance that Walker was convicted three or more times within
ten years of OVUII, as required for a conviction of HOVUII under
HRS §§ 291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A). Rather, Walker contends
that the ICA improperly remanded his case to the circuit court
with instructions to dismiss Count I without prejudice. Walker
first argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him
of HRS §§ 291E-61(a) and (b)(1), and that the circuit court’s
judgment should be reversed. In the alternative, Walker argues
that if there was sufficient evidence to convict him, “the
circuit court judgment pursuant to Count [I] . . . must be
vacated and this case remanded to the circuit court for entry of
judgment of conviction and resentencing pursuant to HRS §§ 291E-
61(a) and (b)(1).”
A. The ICA did not err by vacating the circuit court’s judgment
and remanding the case with instructions to the circuit
court to dismiss Count I without prejudice.
In support of his argument that the ICA was required to
remand his case to the circuit court for entry of judgment of
conviction and sentencing pursuant to HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and
(b)(1), Walker asserts that his case is “on all fours” with State
v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i 227, 160 P.3d 703 (2007) and State v.
Kekuewa, 114 Hawai#i 411, 163 P.3d 1148 (2007). While Walker
correctly characterizes Ruggiero and Kekuewa in his Application,
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his argument fails to account for more recent developments in
OVUII case law. Specifically, under this court’s decision in
Wheeler, Walker’s HOVUII charge did not adequately allege the
lesser-included offense of OVUII as a first offender pursuant to
HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1). As such, it would be improper
to remand this case for entry of judgment of conviction and
sentencing based upon a deficient lesser-included charge.
Accordingly, the ICA did not err by vacating the circuit court’s
judgment and remanding the case with instructions to the circuit
court to dismiss Count I without prejudice.
1. State v. Ruggiero Analysis
Walker analogizes his case to the remanding and
resentencing principles utilized in Ruggiero. On March 10 2004,
Ruggiero was arrested for OVUII.21 Ruggiero, 114 Hawai#i at 229,
160 P.3d at 705. The State charged him by complaint on April 19,
2004, in relevant part:
[O]n or about the 10th day of March, 2004, in the Division of
Wailuku, County of Maui, State of Hawai#i, ADAM M. RUGGIERO did
operate or assume actual physical control of a vehicle while under
the influence of an intoxicant meaning that he was under the
influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair his normal
mental faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against
casualty, thereby committing the offense of Operating a Vehicle
Under the Influence of an Intoxicant in violation of Section 291E-
61 of the Hawai#i Revised Statutes.
21
Ruggiero classifies the March 10, 2004 arrest and subsequent
charge and conviction as a “DUI.” For consistency purposes, this memorandum
uses the term “OVUII” as specified by statute.
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Id. at 229 n.3, 160 P.3d at 705 n.3 (capitalization in original,
brackets omitted). At that time, Ruggiero’s appeal from a
January 29, 2003 conviction for OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-
61(a)(1) (Supp. 2002) was pending before this court. Id. at 229,
160 P.3d at 705. On March 19, 2004, nine days after his arrest,
this court reversed his January 29, 2003 conviction on the
grounds that the State failed to prove an essential element of
the offense. Id.
The trial court convicted Ruggiero of the March 10,
2004 OVUII charge and “then proceeded to the sentencing phase of
the trial, whereupon the [State] moved for an enhanced sentence
based on the prior January 29, 2003 conviction.” Id. at 230, 160
P.3d at 706. The trial court found that this was Ruggiero’s
second offense within a five year period and sentenced him, “as a
second-time offender, to fines, fourteen days in jail, and a one-
year license suspension.” Id. at 231, 160 P.3d at 707.
Ruggiero appealed “to reduce his sentence to that of a
first-time offender.” Id. at 240, 160 P.3d 716. He conceded
that he was subject to sentencing as a first-time offender under
HRS § 291E-61(b)(1). Id. This court reasoned:
on its face, the complaint can reasonably be construed to charge
the crime of [OVUII] as a first offense, in violation of HRS §
291E-61(a) and (b)(1). It plainly states the elements set forth
in HRS § 291E-61(a) (“operates or assumes actual physical control
of a vehicle”) and -61(a)(1) (“[w]hile under the influence of
alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair the person’s normal
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mental faculties or ability to care for the person and guard
against casualty”). While the complaint is silent as to the lack
of prior [OVUII] convictions, given the unique nature of the
element -- the presence of an empty set, that is, the absence of
any prior convictions -- silence with respect to prior violations
can only betoken that their absence, i.e., the import of HRS §
291E-61(b)(1), is implicit in the charge.
Id. (internal citations and footnotes omitted; some brackets in
original). “Inasmuch as . . . the [trial] court made the
appropriate findings and conclusions to convict Ruggiero of
[OVUII] as a first time offender,” this court remanded the case
to the trial court “for entry of judgment of conviction of that
offense.” Id. at 241, 160 P.3d at 717 (citation omitted).
2. State v. Kekuewa Analysis
Walker also analogizes his case to the remanding and
resentencing principles employed in Kekuewa. In October 2004,
Kekuewa was arraigned and charged, in relevant part:
[O]n or about the 15th day of April 2004, in the City and County
of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, Island of Oahu, you did operate or
assume actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair your normal
mental faculties or the ability to care for yourself and guard
against casualty thereby violating Section 291E-61 of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes[ 22] for your second offense.
Kekuewa, 114 Hawai#i at 415, 163 P.3d at 1152 (emphasis in
22
For reference purposes, both Kekuewa and Ruggiero, as described
above, were charged with violating HRS § 291E-61 (Supp. 2004). The
legislature first created HRS § 291E-61.5 during the 2003 legislative section.
This new subsection removed sentencing “for an offense that occurs within ten
years of three or more prior convictions” of OVUII from HRS § 291E-61(b)(4)
(Supp. 2002) and created the new offense of “habitually operating a vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant.” HRS § 291E-61.5 became effective on
January 1, 2004. HRS § 291E-61.5 (Supp. 2003). Neither Kekuewa nor
Ruggiero’s actions qualified for a charge of HOVUII under HRS § 291E-61.5
(2004).
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original). At the end of the state’s case-in-chief, the trial
court admitted a certified court abstract and court calendar for
the purpose of proving Kekuewa’s prior OVUII convictions within
the previous five years. State v. Kekuewa, 112 Hawai#i 269, 272-
73, 145 P.3d 812, 815-16 (App. 2006). The trial court found
Kekuewa guilty as charged. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai#i at 415, 163 P.3d
at 1152.
On appeal, the ICA reversed Kekuewa’s conviction and
held that his charge was deficient because it failed to allege
the attendant circumstance that Kekuewa’s prior convictions
occurred within five years of the offense charged. Kekuewa, 112
Hawai#i at 277, 145 P.3d at 820. The State filed an application
for writ of certiorari, contending, inter alia, that “the ICA
erred by reversing Kekuewa’s conviction rather than remanding the
matter for resentencing under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1).” Kekuewa, 114
Hawai#i at 414, 163 P.3d at 1151. This court affirmed the ICA’s
determination that “[t]he five-year time period omitted from the
oral charge was a critical part of the HRS 291E-61(b)(2)
attendant circumstance, one with especial resonance in this case
in light of Defendant’s several prior [OVUII] convictions.” Id.
at 416, 163 P.3d at 1153. Ultimately, the absence of the five-
year time period from the State’s oral charge rendered it
defective. Id.
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This court, however, agreed with the State that the ICA
improperly remanded Kekuewa’s case to the trial court. Id. at
423, 163 P.3d at 1160. Instead of simply remanding for
resentencing as a first offender under HRS § 291E-61(b)(1) (Supp.
2004), the ICA should have remanded the matter for entry of
judgment of conviction of OVUII pursuant to HRS §§ 291E-61(a) and
(b)(1) (Supp. 2004) and resentencing in accordance therewith.
Id. This court explained:
a defect in a complaint is not one of mere form, which is
waivable, nor simply one of notice, which may be deemed harmless
if a defendant was actually aware of the nature of the accusations
against him or her, but rather, is one of substantive subject
matter jurisdiction, “which may not be waived or dispensed with,”
see [State v.] Jendrusch, 58 Haw. [279,] 281, 567 P.2d [1242,]
1244 [(1977)], and that is per se prejudicial, see [State v.]
Motta, 66 Haw. [89,] 91, 657 P.2d [1019,] 1020 [(1983)][.] Our
case law further supports the proposition that an appellate court
may nevertheless remand for entry of judgment of conviction and
resentencing as to any offense adequately set forth in the
accusation (i.e., the complaint, indictment, oral charge, or
information).
Id. at 424, 163 P.3d at 1161 (emphases added, some internal
citations omitted, some brackets in original). By analogizing
Kekuewa to State v. Elliott, 77 Hawai#i 309, 884 P.2d 372 (1994),
this court concluded that Kekuewa’s
charge contained one factual accusation that could have supported
two separate offenses. . . . [T]he prosecution’s oral charge . .
. failed to adequately set forth the essential elements of the
offense described by HRS §§ 291E-61(a) and (b)(2) (Supp. 2004).
Nevertheless, absent the phrase “for your second offense,” the
prosecution’s oral charge set forth the essential elements of the
included offense described by HRS §§ 291E-61(a) and (b)(1) (Supp.
2004).
Id. at 425-26, 163 P.3d at 1162-63 (generally citing Ruggiero,
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114 Hawai#i at 240, 160 P.3d at 716).
3. The ICA properly remanded Walker’s case to the circuit
court.
Based on Ruggiero and Kekuewa, Walker contends that
this court should similarly remand his case for entry of judgment
of conviction and resentencing under HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and
(b)(1) (2007). Walker’s argument that his original charge
adequately alleged the lesser-included offense of HRS §§ 291E-
61(a)(1) and (b)(1) is flawed in two respects. First, Walker’s
charge is distinguishable from the charges and issues presented
in Ruggiero and Kekuewa in two notable ways. Second, Walker’s
argument fails to account for recent changes in Hawaii’s OVUII
case law.
i. Walker is distinguishable from both Ruggiero and
Kekuewa.
The State correctly maintains that Walker’s case is
distinguishable from both Ruggiero and Kekuewa in two notable
ways. First, “in Ruggiero, the evidence in support of the
charged offense was insufficient, for the prosecution failed to
adduce proof of a prior [OVUII] conviction in its case-in-chief
as . . . required[.]” Second, “[i]n Kekuewa, it was the
prosecution who asked this [c]ourt to remand for an entry of
judgment of conviction as to the first [OVUII] offense if the
court found that the conviction of the greater offense could not
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stand.” In both cases, this court exercised its discretion to
remand to the trial court for entry of judgment of conviction as
to a lesser-included offense. Significantly, and as the State’s
response to Walker’s Application correctly noted, the issues
presented in Ruggiero and Kekuewa are distinguishable from those
raised in the present case:
Here, the [State] did not ask for an entry of judgment of
conviction as to any lesser-includ[ed] offense, nor was there
insufficient evidence adduced with respect to the charged offense.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the habitual
OVUII charge, the [State] proved that [Walker] was a habitual
offender, who operated a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental
faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against
casualty . . . . HRS §§ 291E-61.5(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A).
Because Walker is materially distinguishable from Ruggiero and
Kekuewa, the ICA properly remanded the case to the circuit court.
ii. Walker’s argument fails to account for Wheeler’s
contribution to Hawaii’s OVUII case law.
Two primary yet distinct functions stem from a criminal
charge. First, a charge must sufficiently allege an offense in
order to properly confer jurisdiction upon the presiding court.
The failure sufficiently to allege the essential elements of an
offense in an oral charge, complaint, or indictment constitutes a
denial of liberty without due process of law, which results from
the failure to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court. In other words, an oral charge, complaint, or indictment
that does not state an offense contains within it a substantive
jurisdictional defect, rather than simply a defect in form, which
renders any subsequent trial, judgment of conviction, or sentence
a nullity. See [State v.] Israel, 78 Hawai#i [66,] 73, 890 P.2d
[303,] 310 (quoting Elliott, 77 Hawai#i at 311, 884 P.2d at 374
(quoting Jendrusch, 58 Haw. at 281, 567 P.2d at 1244)); Elliott,
77 Hawai#i at 312, 884 P.2d at 375 (“the omission of an essential
element of the crime charged is a defect in substance rather than
form” (quoting Jendrusch, 58 Haw. at 281, 567 P.2d at 1244));
Territory v. Koa Gora, 37 Haw. 1, 6 (1944) (failure to state an
offense is a “jurisdictional point”); Territory v. Goto, 27 Haw.
65, 102 (1923) (Peters, C.J., concurring) (“[f]ailure of an
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indictment[,] [complaint, or oral charge] to state facts
sufficient to constitute an offense against the law is
jurisdictional[;] . . . an indictment[,] [complaint, or oral
charge] . . . is essential to the court's jurisdiction,” (brackets
added)).
State v. Sprattling, 99 Hawai#i 312, 327, 55 P.3d 276, 291
(2002); see HRS § 806-34 (1993) (explaining that, in a criminal
charge, “the transaction may be stated with so much detail of
time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the
person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect
to which the offense was committed,” which serves “to show that
the court has jurisdiction[] and to give the accused reasonable
notice of the facts.”).
Second, a criminal charge must inform a defendant of
the “nature and cause of the accusation” against him or her
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Hawai#i Constitution. Mita, 124
Hawai#i at 390, 245 P.3d at 463. A charge that fails to satisfy
both of these prongs is fundamentally flawed and strips the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. “[A]n appellate court has . . .
an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction over each case
and to dismiss the appeal sua sponte if a jurisdictional defect
exists.” State v. Graybeard, 93 Hawai#i 513, 516, 6 P.3d 385,
388 (App. 2000) (citing Bacon v. Karlin, 68 Haw. 648, 650, 727
P.2d 1127, 1129 (1986)).
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The question arises in the instant Application:
because Walker’s original HOVUII charge was deficient for failing
to allege an attendant circumstance, would a lesser-included
charge of OVUII as a first offender sufficiently (1) confer
jurisdiction to the circuit court and (2) apprise Walker of the
charges he must be prepared to meet? Under Ruggiero and Kekuewa,
remanding for entry of judgment of conviction and resentencing in
Walker under HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) would only be proper
if the original complaint could reasonably be construed to charge
OVUII as a first offense under that statute. See Ruggiero, 114
Hawai#i at 240, 163 P.3d 716. Walker’s charge cannot reasonably
be construed to charge the lesser-included offense of OVUII as a
first offender under HRS §§ 291E-61(a)(1) and (b)(1) because such
charging language would fail to allege that Walker “operated his
vehicle upon a public way, street, road, or highway” as required
by Wheeler, explained below.23 121 Hawai#i 383, 219 P.3d 1170.
On March 18, 2008, the State orally charged Wheeler
with OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (2007):24
[O]n or about May 31, 2007, in the City and County of Honolulu,
State of Hawaii, you did operate or assume actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in amounts
sufficient to impair your normal mental faculties and your ability
23
This court issued its decision in Wheeler in 2009, subsequent to
Ruggiero and Kekuewa.
24
HRS 2007 is the same codification of the OVUII statute that Walker
asks this court to consider.
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to care for yourself and guard against casualty, and thereby
committing [sic] the offense of Operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of Intoxicants in violation of 291E-61(a)(1) of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes.
This being your first offense without any prior convictions for
either 291E-61 and/or 291E . . . in the last five years. . . .
Id. at 386-87, 219 P.3d at 1173-74. Upon accepting certiorari,
this court determined that Wheeler’s charge was deficient for
failing to allege an attendant circumstance of OVUII under HRS §
291E-61 (2007), namely operating a vehicle upon a public way,
street, road, or highway. Id. at 393, 219 P.3d at 1180.
After reaching its conclusion, Wheeler clarified its
consistency with Ruggiero and Kekuewa and declined to overrule
those cases, noting that Ruggiero and Kekuewa presented different
issues for the court, specifically, “whether a charge that failed
to adequately allege that the defendant had a prior OVUII
conviction within the past five years was nevertheless sufficient
to charge a first-offense OVUII.” Id. at 399, 219 P.3d at 1186.
In those cases, “[n]either defendant raised the issue of whether
the proscribed conduct must take place ‘upon a public way,
street, road, or highway’ and, if so, whether it had been
adequately alleged in the charge.” Id. Accordingly, this court
declined to address that issue in Ruggiero and Kekuewa.25 Id.
25
Additionally, Wheeler distinguished itself from Ruggiero and
Kekuewa regarding the application of the Motta/Wells liberal construction
rule:
continue...
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Walker’s Application, however, requires us to clarify
Ruggiero and Kekuewa in the context of Wheeler. The current
essential elements that the State must include in an OVUII charge
differ from those required in 2007 at the time of the Ruggiero
and Kekuewa decisions. Again, post-Wheeler, OVUII charges must
now allege the attendant circumstance that the defendant operated
a vehicle “on a public way, street, road, or highway.” Id. at
393, 219 P.3d at 1180.
Notably, Walker only contested the sufficiency of his
charge on the basis that it failed to allege the attendant
circumstance of his prior convictions within the previous ten
years. Walker did not contest the sufficiency of his complaint
on the grounds that it failed to allege the attendant
25
...continue
Ruggiero and Kekuewa are factually distinguishable from the
circumstances of [Wheeler]. Unlike Wheeler, neither of those
defendants made a timely objection to the sufficiency of the OVUII
charge in the trial court. Ruggiero never challenged the
sufficiency of the complaint, including on appeal, and, according
to the plurality, even conceded that he was subject to sentencing
as a first-time offender. Although Kekuewa challenged the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s charge on appeal, he did so only
with regard to whether it adequately alleged his prior offense.
In contrast, Wheeler immediately objected to the sufficiency of
the oral charge, prior to the commencement of trial.
Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 399, 219 P.3d at 1186 (internal citations omitted).
As in Wheeler, Walker challenged the sufficiency of his charge
before the circuit court entered judgment. Accordingly, in both Wheeler and
Walker, the appellate courts correctly declined to engage in a “Motta/Wells
post-conviction liberal construction rule” (meaning that charges challenged
for the first time on appeal are liberally construed) as they did in Ruggiero
and Kekuewa. Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 399, 219 P.3d at 1186. The Motta/Wells
“rule does not apply when reviewing timely motions challenging the sufficiency
of an indictment.” Id. at 400, 219 P.3d at 1187.
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circumstance that he operated a vehicle on a public road, way,
street, or highway under Wheeler. In State v. Tominiko, the
State charged the defendant, in part, with OVUII under HRS §§
291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3) (Supp. 2009) and Driving Without
Motor Vehicle Insurance under HRS § 431:10C-104(a) (2005). 126
Hawai#i 68, 71-72, 266 P.3d at 1125-26 (2011). “The Driving
Without Motor Vehicle Insurance charge contained the allegation
that the conduct occurred on a public roadway, but the OVUII
charge did not.” Id. at 70, 266 P.3d at 1124. At trial, the
court dismissed the charge of Driving Without Motor Vehicle
Insurance. “Tominiko did not object to the charge or move to
dismiss it at any point during the district court’s proceeding.”
Id. at 72, 266 P.3d at 1126. Accordingly, the liberal
construction standard applied to this court’s review of
Tominiko’s OVUII charge on appeal. See id. at 76, 266 P.3d at
1130. “Under the liberal construction standard, when a party
raises an objection to the indictment for the first time on
appeal, the indictment is liberally construed.” Id. (citing
State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 90, 657 P.2d 1019, 1019 (1983)). By
applying the liberal construction standard in Tominiko, we held
that an OVUII charge, which did not allege the public road
requirement, was sufficient. Id. at 76-77, 266 at P.3d at 1130-
31. We explained that “Count 3 alleged that Tominiko ‘did
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operate or use a motor vehicle upon a public street, road, or
highway of the State of Hawaii. . . .’ Under the liberal
construction standard, two counts can be read together.” Id. at
76, 266 P.3d at 1130 (citing State v. Elliot, 77 Hawai