Meyers v. Hansen

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 35534

)
JAMES R. MEYERS and ANN T. MEYERS, ) Twin Falls, November 2009 Term
husband and wife, )
) 2009 Opinion No. 142
Plaintiffs/Respondents, )
v. ) Filed: November 27, 2009
)
GEORGE HANSEN, ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
Defendants/Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge.

The decision of the district court is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs and
fees on appeal.

Runft & Steele, LLP, Boise, for appellant. John Runft argued.

Beard St. Clair Gaffney, PA, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Julie Stomper argued.

____________________________________
W. JONES, Justice
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
George Hansen appeals from the denial of his Motion for Relief from Default Judgment.
Ann T. Meyers, the respondent, obtained a default in an action against Hansen for securities
fraud in 1993. Meyers filed for default judgment several years later in 2001. Hansen asserts that
he did not learn of the Default Judgment entered against him until long after the district court
entered an Order of Renewed Default Judgment in 2006. He contends that the default judgment
should be vacated because it was entered in violation of his procedural due process rights and his
rights to notice under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. He also argues that it would be
inequitable for the Default Judgment to have prospective effect.

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 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The respondents, Ann T. Meyers and her late husband, James Meyers, lost nearly
$300,000 in an investment scheme orchestrated by the appellant, George Hansen. George
Hansen is a former U.S. congressman from Idaho.
On February 22, 1993, Meyers filed an action against Hansen as well as Jack and
Kathleen Lott, co-investors who had allegedly violated securities regulations by inducing Meyers
into making the investment.1 Hansen was personally served on August 23, 1993, while serving a
federal prison sentence for securities fraud in Petersburg, Virginia, but did not answer or
otherwise enter an appearance. Hansen claims he does not remember receiving the personal
service. The following month, the district court entered an Order of Entry of Default against
Hansen, which was served on September 21, 1993. Hansen was released from prison in 1995.
After a trial in September of 2000, the jury found in favor of the Lotts, leaving Hansen as
the sole defendant. The Judgment on Jury Verdict stated that Meyers‘s complaint was dismissed
with prejudice. A year later, Meyers filed an Application for Default Judgment against Hansen
that did not contain his certified address and for which no notice was provided. Default
judgment was granted on September 25, 2001, without service, and an Order for Renewed
Default Judgment was granted on May 16, 2006, again without service. Both orders provide that
interest shall continue to accrue at the statutory rate.2 Meyers then initiated collection
proceedings. The Order for Examination of Debtor was personally served upon Hansen‘s wife at
their home in Pocatello, Idaho, on September 12, 2006. Hansen resisted the collection
proceedings by immediately filing two pro se Requests for Excuse from Attending Debtor‘s
Exam on September 20, 2006, and October 31, 2006.3
Despite receiving service of the Order for Examination of Debtor in 2006 and despite
filing pro se motions to resist the Debtor‘s Exam in late 2006, Hansen claims that he did not
know of the Default Judgment until April of 2007. Hansen obtained counsel in early 2007, and
on February 25, 2008, filed a Motion for Relief from Default Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
55(c), which was denied. He appeals the denial of his motion, claiming that the Default
Judgment is void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) because entering the default judgment without notice
1
The suit also stated a claim against John Scoresby, alleged to have assisted Hansen in running the scheme.
Scoresby was dismissed from the suit in 1997.
2
The 2001 Default Judgment awarded Meyers $299,350.00, along with $433,577.00 prejudgment interest, for a total
judgment amount of $732,927.00.
3
Copies of these requests do not appear in the record on appeal.

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violates his constitutional rights to procedural due process as well as his statutory rights to notice
under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). He also contends that, under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), it would be inequitable
for the default judgment to have prospective effect. Last, he argues that the default judgment
should be vacated because the district court‘s Judgment on Jury Verdict dismissed Meyers‘s
―complaint with prejudice,‖ implicitly dismissing her claims against Hansen as well.
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the default judgment is void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) for having been filed
without notice as required by I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).
2. Whether it is inequitable under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) for the default judgment to have
prospective effect.
3. Whether it was a violation of procedural due process not to serve Hansen with notice of
the default judgment, rendering it void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4).
4. Whether the Order on Jury Verdict in the trial of Hansen‘s co-defendants, the Lotts,
dismisses the claims against Hansen because it stated that it dismissed Meyers‘s
―complaint with prejudice.‖
5. Whether Meyers is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a denial of a motion to grant relief under I.R.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b) for
abuse of discretion. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d 559, 561
(1992). ―Where the trial court makes factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, applies
correct criteria pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(c) to those facts, and makes a logical conclusion, the court
will have acted within its discretion.‖ McGloon v. Glynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 P.3d 621, 623
(2004) (citation omitted). ―Because judgments by default are not favored, a trial court should
grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the case on the merits.‖ Jonsson v. Oxborrow,
141 Idaho 635, 638, 115 P.3d 726, 729 (2005).
―Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court exercises free review
over questions of law.‖ Kootenai Medical Ctr. v. Idaho Dep’t of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho
872, ---, 216 P.3d 630, 634 (2009).

V. ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Upholding the Default Judgment
Despite It Being Filed Without Notice Under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)
Hansen asserts that he did not receive the notice of the default judgment required by
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), which entitles parties that have entered an appearance to receive three-day

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notice. He contends that the default judgment is therefore void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and the
court was therefore without discretion to deny him relief.
1. Hansen Was Not Entitled to the Three-Day Notice Because He Had Not Appeared
in the Case
Under Rule 60(b)(4), ―the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding [if] . . . the judgment is void.‖ I.R.C.P. 60(b). When a party has entered an
appearance, that party must receive notice of an application for default judgment at least three
days in advance of the hearing. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).4 Hansen argues that he appeared in this case
in 1997 when he attended a deposition as a witness called by Meyers‘s attorney to prosecute her
claims against Hansen‘s co-defendants, the Lotts. Because Hansen claims he did not know
during the deposition that he was a party to the suit, he argues that he did not have a chance to
exhibit his intent to defend the lawsuit and was therefore entitled to notice of Meyers‘s
application for default judgment. There is no dispute here that Hansen did not receive the three-
day notice—the issue is whether he entered an appearance entitling him to the notice in the first
place.
Preliminarily, Hansen is incorrect when he argues that a failure to deliver three-day
notice renders a judgment void, rather than merely voidable. The district court generally has
discretion whether to vacate a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 55(c). Hearst Corp. v. Keller,
100 Idaho 10, 11, 592 P.2d 66, 67 (1979) abrogated on other grounds by Shelton v. Diamond
Int’l Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985); Omega Alpha House Corp. v. Molander Assoc.,
102 Idaho 361, 362, 630 P.2d 153, 154 (1981). Specifically, ―[a] default judgment entered
without the requisite three day notice is voidable as it has been irregularly obtained.‖ Radioear
Corp. v. Crouse, 97 Idaho 501, 503, 547 P.2d 546, 548 (1976) (emphasis added) abrogated on
other grounds by Shelton, 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699; see also Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho
57, 59, 665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983) (stating that a default judgment entered without three day‘s
notice is voidable).
The purpose of requiring notice only when the defendant has entered an appearance is to
protect plaintiffs in instances ―when the adversary process has been halted because of an
essentially unresponsive party.‖ Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 665, 672 P.2d 231, 233

4
The pertinent part of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) reads:
If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, the party (or,
if appearing by representative, the party‘s representative) shall be served with written notice of the
application for judgment at least three (3) days prior to the hearing on such application.

4
(1983) (citation omitted). The law imposes an obligation on defendants to seek counsel and does
not permit willful ignorance of the proceedings. Id. Even so, ―the appearance required to trigger
the three-day notice requirement has been broadly defined, and is not limited to a formal court
appearance.‖ Id. A defendant who merely ―indicates an intent to defend against the action‖ can
benefit from the notice requirement. Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 606, 691
P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984). To amount to an appearance, the defendant‘s actions ―must be
responsive to plaintiff‘s formal [c]ourt action,‖ so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the
dispute or to communicate to the plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief.
Baez v. S. S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (holding that there has
not been an appearance merely because the plaintiff knew the defendant intended to resist the
suit); see also Ellis v. Ellis, 118 Idaho 468, 472, 797 P.2d 868, 872 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
the defendant had not appeared when he rejected the petitioner‘s divorce settlement proposal);
Olson v. Kirkham, 111 Idaho 34, 36, 720 P.2d 217, 219 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding that preliminary
settlement discussions between the parties were not an appearance).
Testifying as a witness at a deposition is not an ―appearance‖ that triggers the notice
requirement. Such a holding would square with this Court‘s previous ruling in Newbold v.
Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 672 P.2d 231 (1983). In Newbold, this Court found that the defendant
had made an appearance by representing himself pro se at the deposition of a witness. Id. at
665–66, 672 P.2d at 233–34. However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has acknowledged,
Newbold probably marks the outer bounds of activity that can be considered an appearance. See
Olson, 111 Idaho at 36, 720 P.2d at 219 (stating that Newbold created a ―narrow exception‖ to
the requirement of making a ―formal court appearance‖); see also Marano v. Dial, 108 Idaho
680, 682, 701 P.2d 300, 302 (Ct. App. 1985) (―[W]e believe that the key event in Newbold was
[the defendant‘s] attendance at a deposition . . . .‖). The defendant in Newbold appeared pro se
as a litigant to defend a witness deposition, placing himself on the record before the court as
resisting the lawsuit. To the contrary, in this case, Hansen did not make an affirmative effort to
appear as a litigant but was subpoenaed as a witness. Hansen claimed he was not even aware
that he was still a party to the suit despite the fact that he had been personally served with
process and notice of the Entry of Default.5 Hansen also did not seem to be willing to resist his
lenders‘ attempts to recoup their investments, admitting during the deposition that he would

5
Hansen contends that he does not remember receiving process, but an affidavit of service regarding process and a
certification of notice regarding the Entry of Default both exist in the record.

5
repay them if he could. Whether Meyers‘s attorney could have informed Hansen that he was still
a party is immaterial—the law places a minimal duty on defendants to secure counsel or
otherwise respond to a suit, something that Hansen did not do until nearly a year and a half after
he received notice of the debtor‘s exam. Newbold, 105 Idaho at 665, 672 P.2d at 233. For that
reason, the district court correctly denied Hansen‘s challenge to the default judgment under Rule
60(b)(4).
2. Hansen Cannot Demonstrate a Meritorious Defense that Would Justify Setting
Aside the Default Judgment
Even if the default judgment were voidable under Rule 60(b)(4), Hansen has failed to set
forth any facts amounting to a meritorious defense:
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not
only meet the requirements of I.R.C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if
established, would constitute a defense to the action. It would be an idle exercise
for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy.
The defense matters must be detailed.
Idaho State Police v. Real Property, 144 Idaho 60, 62–63, 156 P.3d 561, 563–64 (2007) (citing
Hearst, 100 Idaho at 12, 592 P.2d at 68). Hansen nowhere attempts to plead any facts that might
indicate a meritorious defense. Accordingly, Hansen is not entitled to relief from the default
judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).
B. The District Court Was Within its Discretion in Dismissing Hansen’s Claim that the
Default Judgment Should Not Have Prospective Effect Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)
A party may also be relieved from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) if ―it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.‖ I.R.C.P. 60(b). ―To rely on
Rule 60(b)(5), a movant must show two things: (1) that the judgment is prospective in nature;
and (2) that it is no longer equitable to enforce the judgment as written.‖ Rudd v. Rudd, 105
Idaho 112, 118, 666 P.2d 639, 645 (1983). In addition, the motion for relief must be made
―within a reasonable time.‖ I.R.C.P. 60(b). Hansen argues that he made a timely motion to
vacate the default judgment, and that under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), the default judgment is a
prospective judgment that is no longer equitable to enforce against him due to Meyers‘s laches in
pursuing her claims.
1. The Default Judgment Order Is Not a Prospective Judgment
Hansen contends that the default judgment and the Renewed Default Judgment are
wholly prospective and therefore can be modified under Rule 60(b)(5).

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 Since even ordinary money judgments can prospectively affect the litigants by reducing
their available assets, the definition of a prospective judgment can be elusive and circular.6
Although there is no definitive test under Idaho law, the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia defined the test under the analog federal rule as ―whether [the judgment] is ‗executory‘
or involves ‗the supervision of changing conduct or conditions.‘‖ Twelve John Does v. District
of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court relied on Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431 (1856), and United States v. Swift & Co., 286
U.S. 106, 114 (1932). In Wheeling, the Court imposed an injunction against a bridge company,
ordering an abatement for a bridge that violated federal height regulations governing crossings
on the Ohio River. Wheeling, 59 U.S. at 429. When Congress modified the statute to
accommodate the bridge, the Court held that the injunction could be lifted, reasoning that the
injunction was ―executory‖ because it was necessary depending on whether the bridge violated
federal height regulations. Id. at 432. Similarly, in Swift, Justice Cardozo wrote for the majority
that the court could modify an anti-monopoly consent decree to adapt to changing market
conditions. Swift, 286 U.S. at 112–14. He reasoned that ―[a] continuing decree of injunction
directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may shape the need.‖ Id. at
114. In other words, any component of the order is a ―prospective judgment,‖ and can be
modified under Rule 60(b)(5), if it is susceptible to the legal or equitable rights of the parties as
they evolve due to changes in law or circumstance.
In this case, therefore, the compensatory damage award against Hansen is not a
prospective judgment. ―Compensatory damages are defined as damages that will ‗compensate
the injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more.‘‖ Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,
609, 850 P.2d 749, 760 (1993) (citing Blacks Law Dictionary 352 (5th ed. 1983)). Since
damages are only a remedy for past harm, they represent the net present debt between the parties
at the time of judgment and cannot be modified under Rule 60(b)(5). DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38
F.3d 1266, 1275 (2nd Cir. 1994); see also Wheeling, 59 U.S. at 431 (1856) (finding that the
Court could not modify a previous assessment of costs). If Hansen had a defense to the action,
he could have raised it when he received the original complaint and summons. Similarly, post-

6
For example, in articulating what a ―prospective judgment‖ is, this Court has previously stated, ―It is not absolutely
necessary that the decree sought to be changed be an injunction; it is only necessary that the judgment have
prospective application.‖ Rudd, 105 Idaho at 118, 666 P.2d at 645; see also Curl v. Curl, 115 Idaho 997, 1002, 772
P.2d 204, 209 (1989) (noting that a divorce decree was not prospective because it had ―adjudicated all the rights as
between the parties as of the date of the judgment‖ (quotation omitted)).

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judgment interest is also not a prospective judgment, even though it has the prospective effect of
increasing the amount of the judgment. Post-judgment interest accrues regardless of later
changes in the law or the parties‘ circumstances because it is only designed to compensate the
plaintiff for not having control of the money he or she was rightfully owed at the time of
judgment. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 834 (1990). It is simply
an effect of a statute, not a part of the judgment itself. See I.C. § 28-22-104(2) (defining the
legal interest rate on judgments). The entire judgment against Hansen is therefore not a
prospective judgment and is not modifiable under Rule 60(b)(5).
2. The Rule 60(b)(5) Motion Was Not Timely
Regardless of whether the default judgment is wholly prospective, the district court was
within its discretion in denying Hansen‘s motion for relief from the default judgment because it
was untimely. A party challenging a default judgment under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) must do so
―within a reasonable time.‖ I.R.C.P. 60(b). Whether a motion under Rule 60(b) is timely is an
issue of fact for the district court. Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 597, 961 P.2d 1198, 1200
(1998). The district court‘s determination is subject to clear-error review. Shelton, 108 Idaho at
937, 703 P.2d at 701. When the movant challenges a judgment as void under Rule 60(b), the
court examines the length of time between the moment the judgment becomes apparent to the
defendant and the date the Rule 60(b) motion is filed. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 559,
82 P.3d 883, 891 (2003). Thus, when the movant alleges that a judgment has become inequitable
under Rule 60(b)(5), the court should examine the movant‘s delay after the moment it became
reasonably apparent that the order is inequitable due to a change in law or circumstances.
Again, the judgment in this case is at best voidable, not void. Hansen received notice of
the default judgment at the latest when the Order for Examination of Debtor was personally
served upon his home on September 12, 2006. There is no reason why Hansen could not have
reasonably ascertained the nature and extent of the default judgment against him when he
received notice of the debtor‘s exam in September of 2006. Hansen did not move to set aside the
default judgment until February 27, 2008, nearly a year and a half later. In the intervening
period, Hansen filed at least two requests to be excused from the debtor‘s exam but did not raise
any objections to the default judgment itself.
Although Hansen concedes that he received notice of the default judgment in September
of 2006, he argues that the inequity of the judgment did not become apparent until September of
2007, when ―a period of post judgment depositions and discovery . . . established that [he] is

8
without substantial assets‖ to satisfy the judgment. Hansen‘s argument strangely assumes that he
was unaware of his own assets until 2007. Moreover, there is no reason why the judgment
would become inequitable simply because the judgment debtor cannot afford to pay it.
Accordingly, given that Hansen waited over seventeen months to challenge the default judgment,
it was not an abuse of discretion to deny his motion for relief. See Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock,
134 Idaho 65, 71, 995 P.2d 835, 841 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that an unexplained delay of less
than five months was unreasonable under Rule 60(b)).
C. The Default Judgment Is Not a Violation of Hansen’s Due Process Rights
Hansen argues that he suffered a cumulative due process violation because a default
judgment was entered against him in 2001, without notice until 2006. He further contends that a
motion under Rule 60(b)(4) regarding a void judgment can never be time-barred or subject to a
laches defense.
Hansen correctly asserts that ―void judgments can be attacked at any time.‖ Burns v.
Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). Generally, the Court may declare a
judgment void only for defects of personal jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction. Catledge
v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 607, 691 P.2d 1217, 1222 (1984). However, a judgment is
also void if the ―court‘s action amounts to a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of
due process.‖ Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321, 325
(2004) (citation omitted). The issue therefore is whether Hansen‘s due process rights were
invaded.
―Procedural due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that the
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal
constitutions.‖ Cowan v. Board of Comm’rs, 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006).
―[A]n individual must be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.‖ Spencer v.
Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008). Due process is not a rigid
concept. Instead, the protections and safeguards necessary vary according to the situation.
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999). The
appellate court will evaluate the constitutionality of the proceedings as a whole. Spencer, 145
Idaho at 455, 180 P.3d at 495.
Hansen‘s procedural due process rights were not violated at any time before the court
entered the default judgment against him. Hansen personally received his initial service of
process and also a mailed notice of the Entry of Default but did nothing. Thus, Hansen had

9
received ―notice and an opportunity to be heard,‖ and the court could enter default judgment
against him. Id. at 454, 180 P.3d at 493.
Additionally, a due-process violation did not occur even though Hansen received no
notice of the 2001 default judgment until several years after it was entered. The party filing for
default judgment is required under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to provide the defendant‘s
address so the clerk can notify him or her of the default judgment. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).7 The
apparent purpose of Rule 55(b)(1) is to inform defendants of the judgment against them so they
can either promptly satisfy the judgment to avoid post-judgment interest or file a motion to resist
the judgment. Meyers‘s motion for default judgment, which was filed on September 25, 2001,
did not contain any address to which the clerk of court could send Hansen notice, nor is there
evidence that the clerk mailed notice of the default judgment to him. There is no indication that
Hansen otherwise received notice until nearly five years later, on September 12, 2006, when he
learned of the collection proceedings. Hansen, however, suffered no prejudice. Under the Rules,
―[l]ack of notice of entry of an order or judgment‖ does not permit the court to allow the
defending party to file late post-trial motions, ―except where there is no showing of mailing [of
notice] by the clerk in the court records and the party affected thereby had no actual notice.‖
I.R.C.P. 77(d). Again, a motion to void a default judgment must be made within a ―reasonable
time.‖ I.R.C.P. 60(b). Thus, while Hansen was entitled to notice, he nevertheless had the
opportunity to resist the default judgment. At the time he learned of the default judgment,
Hansen had all the rights he would have had if he had learned of the judgment on the day it was
entered. He instead chose not to react within a reasonable time, as described above.
Accordingly, Hansen‘s due process rights were not violated and the default judgment is not void
under Rule 60(b)(4).
D. Hansen Failed to Argue Below that Because His Co-Defendants Prevailed at Trial
the Case Against Him Was Dismissed
Hansen argues that he is dismissed from the suit because the district court stated that it
―dismiss[ed] plaintiffs‘ complaint with prejudice‖ in its Judgment on Jury Verdict, issued after
Hansen‘s co-defendants, the Lotts, prevailed at trial. This argument appeared nowhere in any of
Hansen‘s briefing before the district court and is therefore waived. ―Appellate court review is
limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented . . . below.‖ Obenchain v.
7
―Any application for a default judgment must contain written certification of the name of the party against whom
judgment is requested and the address most likely to give the defendant notice of such default judgment, and the
clerk shall use such address in giving such party notice of judgment.‖ I.R.C.P. 55(b)(1).

10
McAlvain Constr., Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, this Court will not consider the argument of whether the Judgment on Jury Verdict
released Hansen as a defendant.
E. Meyers Is Entitled to Fees on Appeal
The court must always award attorney fees to the prevailing party ―in commercial
transactions.‖ I.C. § 12-120(3). ―The term ‗commercial transaction‘ is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.‖ Id. Fees are required if
―the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the
party is attempting to recover.‖ Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784,
792 P.2d 345, 349 (1990). Although Hansen characterized the investment as a personal loan to
him, Meyers and her late husband invested nearly $300,000 in Ideal Consultants, what they
believed was a legitimate attempt to build a revenue-generating program known as the
Congressional Accountability Project. This was a fraudulent commercial transaction and Meyers
is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in recouping her losses. Cf. Blimka v. My Web
Wholesaler, 143 Idaho 723, 728–29, 152 P.3d 594, 599–600 (2007) (permitting attorney fees on
a goods-purchase fraud claim).
VI. CONCLUSION
This Court affirms the decision of the district court to deny appellant‘s motion for relief
under Rule 60(b). Costs and fees on appeal are awarded to the respondent.
Chief Justice EISMANN, Justices BURDICK, HORTON and Justice pro tem TROUT,
CONCUR.

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