No. 12021
I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
OR F F OTN
1971
ROBERT LARSON, a / k / a BOB LARSON,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
GUY P. BURNETT and M R H E.
ATA
BURNETT, h i s w i f e ,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana.
Robert E. Sheridan, Jr. argued, Missoula, Montana.
Sherman V. Lohn appeared, Missoula, Montana.
For Respondent :
Tipp, Haven and B r a u l t , Missoula, Montana.
Raymond P. Tipp argued, Missoula, Montana.
Submitted : December 3 , 1971
Decided :
~ ~ l 1972 2
1
M r . J u s t i c e Frank I. Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t s , Guy P. B u r n e t t and Martha
E. B u r n e t t , h i s w i f e , from a f i n a l judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t
of Missoula County f o l l o w i n g t h a t c o u r t ' s d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t s '
e x c e p t i o n s and motion t o amend t h e f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u -
s i o n s o f law. The c a s e was t r i e d by t h e c o u r t w i t h o u t a j u r y .
Judgment was e n t e r e d wherein t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f ,
Robert L a r s o n , had a c q u i r e d a n o n e x c l u s i v e easement f o r road pur-
poses o v e r c e r t a i n land owned by d e f e n d a n t s . Further, the court
o r d e r e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f f o r a p e r i o d of one y e a r should b e e n t i t l e d
t o t h e c o n t i n u e d u s e of a c e r t a i n e x i s t i n g roadway a c r o s s p o r t i o n s
o f d e f e n d a n t s ' land and a l s o p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d have a p e r i o d o f one
y e a r t o complete t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e roadway on h i s easement.
The sequence o f e v e n t s l e a d i n g up t o t h i s a c t i o n can b e
summarized i n t h i s manner:
I n 1966 p l a i n t i f f purchased p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n Missoula
County, Montana, s i t u a t e d d i r e c t l y n o r t h and a d j o i n i n g two p i e c e s
o f p r o p e r t y owned by d e f e n d a n t s ; p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y a b u t s t h e
B i t t e r r o o t R i v e r on t h e s o u t h . I t was s t i p u l a t e d by c o u n s e l f o r
both p a r t i e s t h a t t h e r e was no w r i t t e n g r a n t o f any i n t e r e s t o r
easement i n t h e 1966 conveyance t o p l a i n t i f f . A f t e r purchasing
the property, p l a i n t i f f i n order t o gain access t o h i s property
made s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s t o p r o c u r e a n easement over a d j o i n i n g
p r o p e r t i e s owned by o t h e r s . When d e f e n d a n t s o r i g i n a l l y purchased
t h e i r two a d j o i n i n g p i e c e s o f p r o p e r t y i n 1962, road a c c e s s t o
p l a i n t i f f ' s p r o p e r t y was accomplished by u s e of a road running
i n a n o r t h - s o u t h d i r e c t i o n through t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t owned by
defendants. This road w i l l b e r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " o l d road".
From t h e o u t s e t defendants had advised p l a i n t i f f he d i d
n o t have a c c e s s t o h i s p r o p e r t y by way of t h e "old road" through
t h e i r property. The record i s r e p l e t e w i t h testimony of defendants
f l a t l y t e l l i n g p l a i n t i f f he could n o t a v a i l himself o f a c c e s s t o
h i s p r o p e r t y by way of t h e i r s . In a d d i t i o n , "No res spas sing"
s i g n s were placed every few f e e t and a lock was placed on t h e
g a t e where t h e "old road" e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t s ' w e s t e r l y t r a c t .
It was a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t d i f f i c u l t i e s began. Plaintiff
c u t t h e lock and went on d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . The "NO Tres-
passing" s i g n s were e i t h e r broken o r t o r n down by p l a i n t i f f o r
h i s son.
A t about t h i s time, defendants e n t e r e d i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s
w i t h a t h i r d . p a r t y , one K o e s s l e r , t o s e l l t h e i r w e s t e r l y t r a c t
over which t h e "old road" r u n s . Deiendants, i n o r d e r t o g a i n a c c e s s
t o t h e i r remaining e a s t e r l y t r a c t , then b u i l t a road running i n a
n o r t h - s o u t h d i r e c t i o n a c r o s s t h e lower o n e - t h i r d p o r t i o n of t h e i r
remaining e a s t e r l y t r a c t , s o t h a t i t would n o t be necessary t o use
t h e road on t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t being s o l d . I n t h e meantime t h e
d i s p u t e between p l a i n t i f f and defendants i n t e n s i f i e d u n t i l on
May 1, 1968, t h e p a r t i e s f i n a l l y e n t e r e d i n t o a w r i t t e n agreement,
t h e f u l l t e x t of which follows:
"I Guy P . B u r n e t t , a g r e e t o l e t Bob Larson go
thru m p r o p e r t y i f h i g h water i s on h i s e n t r a n c e
y
road and he cannot g e t t h r u . This agreement e x p i r e s
July 1, 1968. A f t e r t h a t permission must be obtained
from new owners t o pass t h r u p r o p e r t y .
"/s/ Bob Larson
Bob Larson
" / s / Emanuel Rohrbach
Witness
" / s / Guy P. Burnett
Guy P . B u r n e t t
" / s / Emanuel Rohrbach
witness"
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n a d j u d i c a t i n g t h i s m a t t e r , was
unable t o f i n d s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o warrant the establishment
o f a n easement by a d v e r s e u s e . Nevertheless, the d i s t r i c t court
d i d g r a n t p l a i n t i f f a "non-exclusive" easement upon t h e "new road"
over and a c r o s s t h e lower p o r t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y t r a c t .
The judgment f u r t h e r g r a n t s p l a i n t i f f a p e r i o d of one y e a r t o
complete c o n s t r u c t i o n of a road which would r u n a l o n g t h e upper
two-thirds of defendants e a s t e r l y t r a c t , n o road i n t h a t l o c a t i o n
p r e s e n t l y being i n e x i s t e n c e . The r e c o r d a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t
a t t h e t i m e p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s p r o p e r t y , no road was i n e x i s -
t e n c e a l o n g t h e upper t w o - t h i r d s o f d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y t r a c t .
On a p p e a l d e f e n d a n t s r a i s e t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r review:
1. Does a d v e r s e u s e f o r l e s s t h a n t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y
p e r i o d c o n f e r any i n t e r e s t upon t h e p l a i n t i f f ?
2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g o r a l t e s t i -
mony t o modify t h e w r i t t e n agreement d a t e d May 1, 1968?
3. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e w r i t t e n
agreement d a t e d May 1, 1968, g r a n t e d a n easement f o r roadway
purposes t o p l a i n t i f f ?
p l a i n t i f f ' s p o s i t i o n i s simply tha t t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d
a t t h e t r i a l c l e a r l y s u p p o r t s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s and
judgment. P l a i n t i f f contends d e f e n d a n t s b a r g a i n e d w i t h him t o
r e l o c a t e t h e easement and r o a d . He r e l i e d on t h e b a r g a i n , changed
h i s p o s i t i o n , and gave v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Plaintiff further
contends t h a t he i s t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r e l o c a t e d easement
and r o a d , and t o deny him s u c h r e l o c a t e d easement and r o a d , which
he b a r g a i n e d f o r , would p e r m i t a g r o s s i n j u s t i c e and wrong a t t h e
hands of d e f e n d a n t s who t o b e g i n w i t h c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n .
This Court has many times s t a t e d i t s f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l
i n a nonjury c a s e i s t o determine whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l
evidence t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t ,
and we w i l l n o t r e v e r s e such f i n d i n g s of f a c t u n l e s s t h e r e i s a
c l e a r preponderance of evidence a g a i n s t such f i n d i n g s . Spencer
v . Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 445 P.2d 48, and c a s e s t h e r e i n c i t e d ;
Smith v. K r u t a r , 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459.
A g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of t h e a p p l i c a b l e l e g a l precedents t o
t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y appears d e s i r a b l e . It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law
i n Montana t h a t a p a r t y claiming t o have a c q u i r e d any easement o r
-.
i n t e r e s t by p r e s c r i p t i o n must show open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e ,
a d v e r s e , continuous, and u n i n t e r r u p t e d use of t h e easement claimed
f o r the f u l l s t a t u t o r y period. S c o t t v . J a r d i n e Gold Min. & M i l l .
Co., 79 Mont. 485, 257 P. 406; Cope v. Cope, Mon t . 2-
P.2d , 28 St.Rep. 1120.
An "exclusive'' use means t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t ' s r i g h t t o
use t h e right-of-way i s independent of a l i k e right-of-way i n
another. S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 374 P.2d 91. F u r t h e r ,
any use which i s permissive i n i t s i n c e p t i o n cannot r i p e n i n t o a
prescriptive right, t h e r e has been a d i s t i n c t and p o s i t i v e
a s s e r t i o n by t h e c l a i m a n t owner o i a r i g h t h o s t i l e t o t h e owner
of t h e s e r v i e n t l a n d s . Drew v. Burggraf, 141 Mont. 403, 378 P.2d
232. F i n a l l y , t h e presence of g a t e s t h a t must be opened by t h e
u s e r i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o be s t r o n g evidence of a mere
personal l i c e n s e t o pass over t h e right-of-way. Peasley v. Trosper,
103 Mont. 401., 64 P.2d 109.
I n Montana, i t i s e q u a l l y a s c l e a r t h a t any a d v e r s e use f o r
l e s s than t h e f u l l s t a t u t o r y period o f f i v e y e a r s can i n no way
c o n f e r any r i g h t s o r i n t e r e s t whatsoever upon t h e person a t t e m p t i n g
t o e s t a b l i s h such a d v e r s e use. S e c t i o n 93-2507, R.C.M. 1947.
T h i s Court i n S c o t t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 534, 560, 374
P.2d 91, s t a t e d :
"To e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a n easement by
p r e s c r i p t i o n , t h e p a r t y s o c l a i m i n g must show
open, n o t o r i o u s , e x c l u s i v e , a d v e r s e , c o n t i n u o u s
and u n i n t e r r u p t e d u s e o f t h e easement f o r t h e
f u l l s t a t u t o r y period. *** By ' c o n t i n u o u s and un-
i n t e r r u p t e d ' u s e i s meant u s e n o t i n t e r r u p t e d by
t h e a c t of t h e owner o f t h e land o r by v o l u n t a r y
abandonment by t h e p a r t y c l a i m i n g t h e r i g h t . I I
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d )
Applying t h e f o r e g o i n g g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e r e l e v a n t
f a c t s h e r e , t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t p l a i n t i f f d i d have such
i n t e r e s t s o a s t o constitute valid consideration for the alleged
t r a n s f e r t h e r e o f t o t h e upper t w o - t h i r d s of d e f e n d a n t s ' e a s t e r l y
tract.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t was u n a b l e t o f i n d t h a t p l a i n t i f f had
i n f a c t o b t a i n e d a n easement by a d v e r s e u s e . L o g i c a l l y i t would
t h e n f o l l o w t h a t p l a i n t i f f a c q u i r e d no r i g h t t o a t r a n s f e r o f a
roadway easement when h e had n o t h i n g t o b e g i n w i t h . To h o l d
o t h e r w i s e would c o n f e r upon a t r e s p a s s e r r i g h t s and i n t e r e s t s which
would p l a c e t h e owner a t a s e r i o u s d i s a d v a n t a g e and i n f r i n g e upon
t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s a c c r u i n g t o land ownership. Indeed, t h e
r e a s o n i n g behind p l a i n t i f t ' s argument would e l e v a t e a t r e s p a s s e r
on land t o t h e u n f a i r p o s i t i o n of b e i n g a b l e t o demand compensation
i n r e t u r n f o r a r e l i n q u i s h m e n t o f " i n t e r e s t " t h e t r e s p a s s e r had
o b t a i n e d by " p a r t i a l a d v e r s e use1', when t h e u s e had been f o r a
period considerably s h o r t e r than t h e f i v e year required period
p r e s c r i b e d by s t a t u t e . W a r e c e r t a i n t h e l e g i s l a t u r e never in-
e
tended s u c h r e s u l t , when e n a c t i n g o u r a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n s t a t u t e .
Our examination o f t h e r e c o r d c l e a r l y r e v e a l s t h e p e r -
m i s s i v e n a t u r e o f p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o go a c r o s s d e f e n d a n t s ' l a n d .
A t t h e o u t s e t when p l a i n t i f f purchased h i s p r o p e r t y , he was i n n o
way t o l d by a d j o i n i n g landowners o r by defendants t h a t he had a
right-of-way over d e f e n d a n t s ' land; i n f a c t , i t was only a f t e r
p l a i n t i f f had been unsuccessful i n t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h a r i g h t - o f -
way a c r o s s t h e lands o i o t h e r a d j o i n i n g owners t h a t he began h i s
a t t e m p t s t o g e t a n easement upon d e f e n d a n t s ' land.
F i n a l l y , we hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g
o r a l testimony modifying t h e w r i t t e n agreement dated May 1, 1968,
between t h e p a r t i e s .
A t t h e t r i a l p l a i n t i f f was allowed t o e x p l a i n t o t h e c o u r t
t h a t t h i s w r i t t e n agreement was intended t o g i v e him a c c e s s over t h e
e a s t e r l y t r a c t of d e f e n d a n t s ' property i n r e t u r n f o r a t e r m i n a t i o n
of p l a i n t i f f ' s a c c e s s over t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t , formerly owned by
defendants.
It i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law i n Montana t h a t , s u b j e c t t o
c e r t a i n exceptions n o t p e r t i n e n t h e r e , w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t s cannot
be v a r i e d , c o n t r a d i c t e d , nor a l t e r e d by p a r o l o r e x t r i n s i c e v i -
dence. P r i t c h e t t v. J e n k i n s , 52 Mont. 81, 155 P. 974; Leigland
v. McGaffick, 135 Mont. 188, 338 P.2d 1037; S e c t i o n 13-907, R.C.M.
1947.
Our reading of t h e w r i t t e n agreement between t h e p a r t i e s
c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h e r e was no mistake, impe r f e c t i o n , o r ambiguity
which would i n any way r e q u i r e p a r o l testimony t o e x p l a i n . The
i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s i s c l e a r w i t h i n t h e words of t h e agreement.
Defendants were w i l l i n g t o permit p l a i n t i f f t o use t h e i r e a s t e r l y
t r a c t Tor two months. A f t e r t h a t period of time, p l a i n t i f f no
longer hdd a c c e s s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' p r o p e r t y . A t best, plaintiff
was g r a n t e d a temporary permissive easement trom May 1, 1968 u n t i l
J u l y 1, 1968.
I n a d d i t i o n , i n conjunction w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e
i n a d m i s s i b i l i t y of par01 testimony t o vary t h e terms o t t h e p a r t i e s
w r i t t e n agreement, we hold t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g
t h a t t h e terms o f t h e agreement could be i n t e r p r e t e d t o g r a n t an
easement t o p l a i n t i f f .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n i t s f i n d i n g s s t a t e s , i n e r f e c t ,
t h a t t h e w r i t t e n agreement t o t e r m i n a t e t h e use of roads a p p l i e d
only t o t h a t p i e c e of p r o p e r t y which defendants were s e l l i n g , i . e .
t h e w e s t e r l y t r a c t , and n o t t o t h e road l o c a t e d on t h e e a s t e r l y
t r a c t , s t i l l owned by defendants.
Our review of t h e evidence i n d i c a t e s otherwise. The
words "my propertyf' contained i n t h e agreement can have b u t one
r e a s o n a b l e meaning. A t t h e time of t h e execution o r t h e agreement,
defendants had a l r e a d y s o l d t h e i r w e s t e r l y t r a c t on c o n t r a c t ,
and they remained only t h e owners of t h e e a s t e r l y t r a c t . The
11
phrase m property" p l a i n l y and simply means t h a t p r o p e r t y r e -
y
maining i n t h e defendants ' hands, s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e i r e a s t e r l y t r a c t .
F u r t h e r , t h e terms of t h e agreement unequivocally s t a t e t h e a g r e e -
ment e x p i r e s on J u l y 1, 1968. For t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o have found
t h a t p l a i n t i f f had any r i g h t s a f t e r J u l y 1, 1968, i g n o r e s t h e
express language of t h e agreement.
Accordingly, we f i n d p l a i n t i i f ' s use t o be permissive i n
n a t u r e and, s i n c e no easement was e s t a b l i s h e d by p r e s c r i p t i o n ,
he had no r i g h t t o t r a n s f e r any easement upon any a r e a o f de-
fendanti ' property.
Judgment i s r e v e r s e d .
Associate ~ u s t i c e
I
\
\ M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s , deeming himself d i s q u a l i f i e d ,
U o p a r t i n t h i s Opinion.