No. 12892
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN
\mIGHT LWAN and HAZEL EWAN,
husband and w i f e ,
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
OLAV S. STENBERG, and GLADYS K. STEWBERG,
husband and w i f e , LOUISE BEER, and t h e
EQUITABLE LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable C h a r l e s Luedke, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Lee O v e r f e l t a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
F o r Respondents :
Longan and Holmstrom, B i l l i n g s , Montana
F r a n k l i n S . Longan a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
Submitted: A p r i l 11, 1975
Decided :
Filed :
Clerk
Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
Court.
P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l from a summary judgment e n t e r e d f o r
d e f e n d a n t s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Sweet Grass County.
P l a i n t i f f s ' amended complaint a l l e g e d a r i g h t of way
by p r e s c r i p t i o n o r a p u b l i c way a c r o s s S t e n b e r g ' s land o r ,
i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t o condemn a way of necessity. A 1 1 de-
f e n d a n t s f i l e d motions t o d i s m i s s and t o s t r i k e . Defendant
Stenberg was o r d e r e d t o show c a u s e why i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f should
ti
n o t be g r a n t e d . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t t r e a t e d t h e motions a s b e i n g
f o r summary judgment. Stenberg has f i l e d no answer. The t e s t i -
mony which was b e f o r e t h e c o u r t was t h a t adduced a t t h e h e a r i n g
on t h e motions and t h e o r d e r t o show cause. Prior t o that
h e a r i n g t h e judge, i n company w i t h c o u n s e l , viewed t h e premises.
Following t h e h e a r i n g , summary judgment of d i s m i s s a l was e n t e r e d
f o r t h e defendants. P l a i n t i f f s appeal.
The d i s t r i c t judge a t t h e time of making t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g
summary judgment f i l e d a memorandum and provided i t should
c o n s t i t u t e t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law, and
we w i l l l i b e r a l l y q u o t e from i t , s i n c e t h e c o u r t p a i n s t a k i n g l y
answered t h e c o n t e n t i o n s of p l a i n t i f f s . It reads:
"Commencing i n 1945 t h e P l a i n t i f f s o p e r a t e d
a c a t t l e and sheep ranch u t i l i z i n g two t r a c t s of non-
joining f e e land. One t r a c t , T r a c t A , i s l o c a t e d i n
t h e v a l l e y of t h e Boulder River and t h e o t h e r , T r a c t
B , i s l o c a t e d g e n e r a l l y on t o p of a h i l l which i s
s t e e p l y sloped on t h e s i d e s . T r a c t A i s t h e home p l a c e
and i s used f o r w i n t e r p a s t u r e w h i l e T r a c t B i s summer
p a s t u r e and h a s sometimes been hayed i n p a r t . The h i l l
on which T r a c t B i s l o c a t e d i s s i t u a t e d i n t h e i n t e r -
s t i c e s of a f o r k of t h e Boulder River s o t h a t t h i s h i l l
i s bounded on one s i d e by t h e main Boulder River
and t h e main Boulder road (Highway 2 9 8 ) , and on
t h e o t h e r by t h e West Boulder River and West
Boulder r o a d . Although T r a c t B l i e s between two
r o a d s , i t a b u t s upon n e i t h e r of them, i t b e i n g
hemmed i n on a l l s i d e s by o t h e r f e e land owner-
s h i p s s o t h a t i n g r e s s and e g r e s s r e q u i r e t h e t r a -
v e r s i n g of l a n d s of o t h e r owners. 9~ 7k *
"From t h e beginning of p l a i n t i f f s ' o p e r a t i o n s
of t h e s e l a n d s , a u s e exchange of 40 a c r e t r a c t s was
i n e f f e c t w i t h one of t h e landowners a d j o i n i n g , b e i n g
M. Work, a p r e d e c e s s o r i n t i t l e t o Defendants Sten-
r
berg. By v i r t u e of t h i s u s e exchange, a 40 a c r e ex-
t e n s i o n ( P a r c e l X) was tacked o n t o one end of T r a c t
9 , toward and almost r e a c h i n g t h e West Boulder r o a d ,
so t h a t T r a c t B'S i s o l a t i o n was narrowed t o w i t h i n a
m a t t e r of y a r d s and f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes made
a c c e s s t o T r a c t B from t h e West Boulder road p o s s i b l e .
However, t h e West Boulder s i d e i s t h e s i d e f a r t h e s t from
l-'laintiffsl T r a c t A home p l a c e , s o t h a t a s occasion
r e q u i r e d , t h e P l a i n t i f f s would t r a i l down t h e East s i d e
0 2 t h e h i l l t o T r a c t A , i n t h e p r o c e s s of which t h e y
were c r o s s i n g a n o t h e r p a r t of t h e Work l a n d . The g e n e r a l
p a t t e r n which developed i n p l a i n t i f f s ' o p e r a t i o n over
t h e y e a r s was t o move onto T r a c t B i n t h e Spring by
going around t o t h e West Boulder s i d e and e n t e r i n g
through Parcel X. I n t h e l a t e Fall o r e a r l y Winter,
t h e l i v e s t o c k would be brought down t h e E a s t s i d e of t h e
h i l l , a c r o s s t h e Work l a n d , through a Work g a t e and on
t o p l a i n t i f f s ' T r a c t A , t h i s b e i n g t h e s h o r t e s t and most
direct route. Because of t o p o g r a p h i c a l encumbrances
An t h e h i l l s i d e , t h e l i v e s t o c k g e n e r a l l y followed a
s i n g u l a r a n t r s e s o t h a t a t r a i l developed.
"In t h e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 ' s t h e Work l a n d was s o l d t o
X r . Beer, who, i n a b o u t 1956, b u l l d o z e d a rough road on
t h e E a s t s i d e which had t h e same g e n e r a l b e g i n n i n g and
ending p o i n t s a s t h e o l d cow t r a i l b u t t r a v e r s e d a some-
what d i f f e r e n t r o u t e i n between i n a n e f f o r t t o make a
~rade
and r o u t e which would make some v e h i c u l a r u s e
possible. Except f o r an i n s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n where
the r o a d edged o n t o P l a i n t i f f s ' l a n d , t h e r o a d was a l l
on Beer p r o p e r t y . Plaintiffs did not participate i n
making t h i s r o a d o r i n m a i n t a i n i n g i t , b u t a f t e r i t was
b u i l t t h e y used i t i n normal c o u r s e o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s
on T r a c t B f o r c h e c k i n g on t h e c a t t l e , moving equipment
and l i v e s t o c k , e t c .
" A t a l l t i m e s , t h e r e was a n o t h e r a c c e s s r o u t e
a v a i l a b l e i n t o T r a c t B from t h e West Boulder s i d e ,
s t a r t i n g a t point 'z' and f o l l o w i n g up t h e Mason Coulee
o v e r what i s now S c h i l l i n g p r o p e r t y t o t h e s i d e o f t h e
b u i l d i n g s o f t h e Mason homestead which were s i t u a t e d
on T r a c t B . P l a i n t i f f s , however, made o n l y o c c a s i o n a l
u s e of t h i s r o u t e , i t o b v i o u s l y b e i n g l e s s c o n v e n i e n t
than t h e o t h e r s . A l s o , P l a i n t i f f s have a t t i m e s used
a r o u t e up Chokecherry S p r i n g s , which i s b u l l d o z e d b u t
i s v e r y s t e e p and a l s o t r a v e r s e s Defendant s t e n b e r g ' s
Land.
"In 1966 t h e Defendant S t e n b e r g s became t h e owners
of t h e Beer l a n d and t h e l a n d u s e exchange o f t h e two 4 0 ' s
was c o n t i n u e d a s was t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' p a t t e r n a s t o i n -
Sometime i n l a t e 1971 o r
g r e s s and e g r e s s t o T r a c t B .
a
e a r l y 1972 and a s a consequence o f / J i s a g r e e m e n t o f some
s o r t , Stenberg advised P l a i n t i f f s t h a t t h e land use
exchange would b e d i s c o n t i n u e d and t h a t P l a i n t i f f s were
n o t t o u s e t h e E a s t s i d e r o u t e t o and from T r a c t B
anymore b e c a u s e he d i d n ' t want them on h i s l a n d . Pursuant
t o t h i s n o t i f i c a t i o n Stenberg b a r r i c a d e d t h e e n t r y of
t h e r o u t e where i t e n t e r e d h i s land and each p a r t y r e -
fenced t h e i r 40 a c r e t r a c t i n t o t h e i r own u n i t s which
e f f e c t e d a d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of t h e u s e exchange. In the
F a l l of 1972 and a g a i n i n t h e F a l l of 1973, P l a i n t i f f s
n e v e r t h e l e s s used t h e East s i d e r o u t e t o b r i n g their
c a t t l e out of T r a c t B , going through s t e n b e r g ' s b a r r i -
cade t o do so.
s he evidence shows t h a t o t h e r p e r s o n s , many of
them being f r i e n d s of P l a i n t i f f s , a l s o used t h i s road
f o r h u n t i n g o r s i g h t s e e i n g purposes from time t o time
i n past years.
"There i s a s h a r p c o n f l i c t between t h e p a r t i e s
over whether t h e g a t e i n t o Defendant s t e n b e r g ' s l a n d
t o t h e Beer road was o r was n o t e v e r locked o r p o s t e d .
The P l a i n t i f f s a r e d e f i n i t e i n t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t i t
never was, w h i l e w i t n e s s e s f o r t h e Defendants s t a t e t h e i r
1
b e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n t o be t h a t l o c k s and N s re spas sing'
o
s i g n s were used d u r i n g h u n t i n g season. Such l o c k s and
s i g n s , however, were intended t o a p p l y t o t r a f f i c of
h u n t e r s and n o t t o neighbors who would be welcome t o a
key t o go through.
" P l a i n t i f f s contend t h a t t h e y have a right-of-way
by p r e s c r i p t i o n over t h e E a s t s i d e r o u t e because of
c o n s i s t e n t usage of i t over t h e y e a r s and, because i t has
been used by a number of o t h e r s , i t may i n f a c t be a
p u b l i c r o a d , o r , i n any e v e n t , t h a t because of t h e t o t a l
i s o l a t i o n of T r a c t B t h e E a s t s i d e r o u t e should be
decreed t o P l a i n t i f f s a s a right-of-way easement founded
upon n e c e s s i t y , 2 condemnation.
11
The b a s i c requirements t o t h e a c c r u a l of a r i g h t -
of-way easement b y ^ p r e s c r i p t i o n a r e s o w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d
b y Piontana c a s e a u t h o r i t y t h a t a review o f them i s un-
necessary. (See White v. Kamps, 119 Iqont. 102 and
~ o t v. Weinheimer, 140 Mont. 554 a s examples.)
t Suffice
LS t o n o t e t h a t one requirement i s t h a t t h e u s a g e made
a f t h e claimed r i g h t - o f - w a y be a d v e r s e and h o s t i l e , n o t
permissive. The t o t a l i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e h e r e can s u p p o r t
o n l y one c o n c l u s i o n , namely, t h a t from t h e b e g i n n i n g t h e
p l a i n t i f f s ' u s a g e of t h e t r a i l and t h e l a t e r b u l l d o z e d
road was a m a t t e r of n e i g h b o r l y c o o p e r a t i o n between
friendly ranchers. Consequently, i t was a p e r m i s s i v e
u s e and h a s remained s o u n t i l t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s d e f i a n c e
of s t e n b e r g ' s b a r r i c a d e i n 1972, which i s n o t a s u f f i -
c i e n t length of t i m e t o ripen i n t o a p r e s c r i p t i v e r i g h t .
Lhe f a c t t h a t t h e u s e h a s been p e r m i s s i v e r a t h e r t h a n
adverse i s f a t a l t o the claim of P l a i n t i f f s a s t o a
p r e s c r i p t i v e easement. (Wilson v. C h e s t n u t , 3 1 St.Rep.
606)
"The a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r o a d has become a p u b l i c
o n e , e n t i t l i n g P l a i n t i f f s t o i t s usage a s members of t h e
p u b l i c , a l s o i s n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e f a c t s a p p e a r i n g .
Occasional u s e by h u n t e r s , by s i g h t s e e i n g f r i e n d s and
by n e i g h b o r s v i s i t i n g n e i g h b o r s f a l l s s h o r t of t h e e x t e n t
dnd t y p e of usage n e c e s s a r y t o r e s u l t i n t h e a c c r u a l of
a public r i g h t .
If
The remaining ground upon which P l a i n t i f f s ' c l a i m
r e l i e f i s t h a t they a r e e n t i t l e d t o be decreed a r i g h t -
of-way by n e c e s s i t y over t h e r o u t e i n d i s p u t e . The c r u x
o f t h i s c l a i m i s t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e r e q u i s i t e
n e c e s s i t y does o r does n o t e x i s t . It i s not disputed t h a t
~ l a i n t i f f s 'T r a c t B i s e n t i r e l y surrounded by o t h e r
uwnerships. R t t h e same t i m e , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e
~ ~ r i g i n a l h i s t o r i c a l access route, the so-called
and
a as on Coulee r o a d ' , always h a s b e e n , and i s now,
a v a i l a b l e a s a way i n t o T r a c t B . It i s a l s o c l e a r
t h a t i n t h e y e a r s of 1972 and 1973, P l a i n t i f f s had a
way of g e t t i n g i n t o T r a c t B from a p o i n t o f e n t r y o f f
o f t h e West Boulder road i n t o S t a t e l a n d which t h e y have
had c o n t i n u o u s l y l e a s e d and which a d j o i n s T r a c t B.
The f a c t i s t h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s do have o t h e r ways of
a c c e s s t o and from T r a c t B. The f a c t t h a t t h e o t h e r ways
i n v o l v e l o n g e r d i s t a n c e s and more i n c o n v e n i e n c e i s n o t an
a c c e p t a b l e b a s i s upon which t o g r a n t t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d .
The c r i t e r i o n i s n o t one o f c o n v e n i e n c e , b u t o f n e c e s s i t y .
"1n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t s a p p e a r i n g , t h e r e q u e s t f o r
i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f by P l a i n t i f f s must b e d e n i e d . Further,
i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t a l l of t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t u a l i s s u e s
have been a d d r e s s e d and t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e of a m a t e r i a l
f a c t remains s o t h a t Defendants a r e e n t i t l e d t o judgment
II
a s a m a t t e r o f law.
While p l a i n t i f f s contend t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n i t s
r u l i n g s , f i n d i n g and c o n c l u s i o n s , we have c a r e f u l l y examined t h e
r e c o r d and i n o u r o p i n i o n i t f u l l y s u p p o r t s t h e f i n d i n g s and
conclusions of t h e court.
I n such a s i t u a t i o n t h e summary judgment s h o u l d b e , and
i t i s hereby, affirmed.
+ ,
.................................
/. ~,
b
Chief J u s t i c e
W Concur:
e
Justices.