No. 12681
I N THE SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O M N A A
OR F H F OTN
1974
LEE GODFREY and VEGA GODFREY, husband
and w i f e ; MARINER B. BALLARD and GWEN
0. BALLARD, husband and w i f e ; and D I C K
NEWTON,
P l a i n t i f f s and Respondents,
GENE H. PILON and THAIS PILON,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants :
Schulz and Davis, D i l l o n , Montana
C a r l M. Davis argued and John Warren appeared,
D i l l o n , Montana
For Respondents :
Frank M. Davis argued, D i l l o n , Montana
Submitted: November 21, 1974
Decided :DEC13 974
Filed : DEC 2 3 1974
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by d e f e n d a n t s , Gene and T h a i s P i l o n ,
from a judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , County of Beaverhead,
which q u i e t e d t i t l e t o a n easement r u n n i n g a c r o s s t h e l a n d of
d e f e n d a n t s , i n t h e p l a i n t i f f s , Lee and Vega Godfrey; Mariner
and Gwen B a l l a r d ; and Dick Newton.
On J u l y 1 8 , 1972, p l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r c o m p l a i n t
a l l e g i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s had d e n i e d p l a i n t i f f s ' u s e of a r o a d
across defendants' property. P l a i n t i f f s r e q u e s t e d and r e c e i v e d
from t h e c o u r t an i n j u n c t i o n pendente l i t e o r d e r i n g t h e P i l o n s
t o remove a f e n c e from t h e r o a d and n o t t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h p l a i n -
t i f f s ' u s e t h e r e o f , pending a h e a r i n g . P i l o n s immediately com-
p l i e d w i t h t h e o r d e r and f i l e d a motion t o d i s s o l v e i n j u n c t i o n
which was d e n i e d by t h e c o u r t . The i n j u n c t i o n h a s s i n c e remained
i n effect. Following a n o n j u r y t r i a l , t h e c o u r t made and e n t e r e d
f i n d i n g s o f f a c t s and c o n c l u s i o n s of law i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s
and a g a i n s t P i l o n s . E x c e p t i o n s t o t h e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s
were d u l y f i l e d by P i l o n s , b u t r e f u s e d by t h e c o u r t . Judgment
i n f a v o r of p l a i n t i f f s was e n t e r e d , from which P i l o n s now a p p e a l .
The p a r t i e s t o t h i s a c t i o n own t r a c t s of l a n d i n S e c t i o n
5 , T . 5 S . , R. 1 2 W., M.P.M., n e a r Elkhorn Hot S p r i n g s and t h e
Rainy Mountain S k i H i l l i n Beaverhead County, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3 4
m i l e s west of D i l l o n . T i t l e t o e a c h t r a c t came from a common
g r a n t o r , John M i l l e r , who, i n 1962, commenced a program of sub-
d i v i d i n g and s e l l i n g t r a c t s o f h i s l a n d . None of t h e conveyances
i n v o l v e d i n t h i s l a w s u i t c o n t a i n any g r a n t o r r e s e r v a t i o n of a n
easement o r r i g h t of way.
On May 25, 1962, M i l l e r s o l d a t r a c t of l a n d 100 f e e t
wide by 150 f e e t d e e p t o H . J . Howard. T h i s t r a c t , which w i l l be
r e f e r r e d t o h e r e a s t h e Howard t r a c t , was bounded on t h e w e s t by
t h e N a t i o n a l F o r e s t and o n t h e n o r t h by a f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d .
On J u n e 6 , 1962, t h e P i l o n s , d e f e n d a n t s i n t h i s a c t i o n , pur-
c h a s e d by w a r r a n t y deed t h e f e e s i m p l e t i t l e t o a t r a c t o f l a n d
1 0 0 f e e t wide by 150 f e e t d e e p f r o n t i n g on t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e
road. P i l o n s ' t r a c t was e a s t of and c o n t i g u o u s t o t h e Howard
tract. A t t h e t i m e of deed t o t h e P i l o n s , M i l l e r owned o t h e r
l a n d f r o n t i n g on t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d a s w e l l a s o t h e r l a n d
s o u t h of t h e t r a c t s conveyed.
Over a y e a r l a t e r , on August 2 7 , 1963, M i l l e r s o l d a
t h i r d t r a c t of l a n d t o D r . McLaren ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s
t h e McLaren t r a c t ) . The McLaren t r a c t was a l s o bounded on t h e
n o r t h by t h e f o r e s t s e r v i c e r o a d . I t w a s e a s t of and c o n t i g u o u s
t o the Pilon tract. An e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e P i l o n deed and t h e
McLaren deed c o n f i r m s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e P i l o n s ' e a s t l i n e w a s
used a s t h e p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g f o r t h e w e s t l i n e i n t h e McLaren
deed. These b o u n d a r i e s a r e i d e n t i c a l . The McLaren deed merely
r e t r a c e s t h e metes and bounds of t h e P i l o n deed i n o r d e r t o a r r i v e
a t a p o i n t of b e g i n n i n g f o r t h e McLaren t r a c t . It then proceeds
w i t h t h e mates and bounds of t h e McLaren t r a c t , r u n n i n g s o u t h
a l o n g t h e l i n e p r e v i o u s l y e s t a b l i s h e d a s t h e e a s t boundary of
the Pilon t r a c t . Miller, a layman w i t h r e g a r d t o c i v i l e n g i n e e r i n g
matters, p r e p a r e d t h e metes and bounds d e s c r i p t i o n s t o t h e v a r i o u s
t r a c t s s o l d , and d e l i v e r e d t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s t o h i s a t t o r n e y f o r
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e d e e d s .
I n J u l y 1968, Miller s o l d a d d i t i o n a l t r a c t s o f l a n d t o
t h e Godfreys. These t r a c t s were s o u t h of t h e t h r e e t r a c t s p r e -
viously sold. I n t h e summer o f 1968, M i l l e r c a u s e d a r o a d t o be
constructed over t h e land he had s o l d t h e P i l o n s i n 1962 i n
o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a c c e s s t o t h e l a n d s he wished t o s e l l t h e Godfreys.
This road, t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s lawsuit, runs generally i n a north-
s o u t h d i r e c t i o n o v e r t h e e a s t edge of t h e P i l o n t r a c t . Prior t o
1 9 6 8 , t h e r e was no r o a d , t r a i l , p a t h o r o t h e r way a c r o s s P i l o n s t
land. The r o a d was gouged o u t of a v i r g i n t i m b e r e d h i l l s i d e by
a b u l l d o z e r o p e r a t e d by one Wayne S t o c k s a t M i l l e r ' s d i r e c t i o n
and w i t h o u t t h e P i l o n s l knowledge o r c o n s e n t . Godfreys t e s t i f i e d
they w e r e l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t a c c e s s t o t h e l a n d s they purchased
was by a r o a d o v e r a s t r i p of l a n d Miller had r e s e r v e d between
t h e McLaren and P i l o n t r a c t s . Godfreys acknowledged t h a t t h e i r
d e e d s c o n t a i n e d no g r a n t o f r i g h t of way o r e a s e m e n t s . They a l s o
acknowledged t h a t t h e y had n o t checked t h e b o u n d a r i e s n o r o b t a i n -
ed any p l a t o r s u r v e y of t h e p r o p e r t y p u r c h a s e d from M i l l e r , n o r
had any s u r v e y made t o d e t e r m i n e t h e l o c a t i o n of t h e r o a d u n t i l
a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h i s s u i t .
There i s no c l a i m o r f i n d i n g o f a n easement by a d v e r s e
u s e h e r e , a s t h e f i v e y e a r r e q u i r e m e n t of s e c t i o n 93-2513, R.C.M.
1947, h a s n o t been met. The g r e a t e s t p e r i o d of u s e p l a i n t i f f s
c o u l d c l a i m would be from J u l y 1968 t o J u l y 1 7 , 1972, when P i l o n s
f e n c e d t h e r o a d , o r a p e r i o d of f o u r y e a r s .
A f t e r i t s i n i t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e r o a d was widened by
Godfrey t o i t s p r e s e n t d i m e n s i o n s of 150 f e e t i n l e n g t h by 1 0 t o
12 f e e t i n width, again without informing t h e P i l o n s o r o b t a i n -
ing t h e i r consent. The r o a d i s w i t h i n 2 0 t o 25 f e e t of t h e P i l o n s '
cabin. P l a i n t i f f s have used t h e r o a d t o d r i v e heavy equipment
t o t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , t o o p e r a t e snowmobiles and t o d r i v e t r a i l
b i k e s and p i c k u p t r u c k s . A l l of t h e p a r t i e s have c a b i n s on t h e i r
t r a c t s which t h e y u s e a s second homes.
Sometime p r i o r t o t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of t h i s s u i t , Gene
P i l o n a d v i s e d t h e Godfreys t h a t t h e r o a d was on P i l o n ' s l a n d ;
Godfreys, however, c l a i m e d t h a t t h e y had p u r c h a s e d a r i g h t of way
between t h e P i l o n and McLaren t r a c t s from M i l l e r . F e a r i n g con-
t i n u e d u s e of t h e r o a d might r i p e n i n t o a r i g h t by a d v e r s e u s e ,
P i l o n s o b t a i n e d a s u r v e y of t h e p r o p e r t y which e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t
t h e r o a d was on t h e i r l a n d and t h e r e was, i n f a c t , no s p a c e
between t h e McLaren and P i l o n t r a c t s . Gene P i l o n t e s t i f i e d t h a t ,
p r i o r t o o b t a i n i n g t h e s u r v e y , he t h o u g h t it was o n l y p a r t i a l l y
on h i s l a n d . Originally, P i l o n d i d not o b j e c t t o t h e road. He
o n l y a p p e a r e d concerned w i t h i t s w i d t h . H e waited almost a year,
u n t i l a f t e r t h e Godfrey home was b u i l t , b e f o r e even m e n t i o n i n g
it t o h i s neighbor. P i l o n s t h e r e a f t e r p r e s e n t e d t h e Godfreys
w i t h a copy o f t h e s u r v e y and a l i c e n s e agreement t o u s e t h e
r o a d , r e v o c a b l e on 90 d a y s n o t i c e . Godfreys r e f u s e d t o e x e c u t e
t h e l i c e n s e , m a i n t a i n i n g t h e y owned t h e r o a d . After t h i s , Pilons
e r e c t e d a f e n c e a c r o s s t h e d i s p u t e d roadway s o a s t o p h y s i c a l l y
b a r i t s u s e by p l a i n t i f f s . T h i s a c t i o n ensued.
The t r i a l judge, i n company w i t h c o u n s e l , viewed t h e
property. The c o u r t concluded:
" * * * From t h a t i n s p e c t i o n i t i s q u i t e c l e a r
t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l a c c e s s t o t h e
p r o p e r t i e s h e l d i n r e s e r v e by t h e common l a n d owner
a t t h e t i m e he e x e c u t e d d e f e n d a n t s 1 deed * * *.
T h e r e b e i n g no o t h e r a c c e s s upon which a n e n t r a n c e
c o u l d be b u i l t t o p r o v i d e e n t r a n c e t o t h e l a n d h e l d
i n r e s e r v e by M r . Miller, ' n e c e s s i t y ' c l e a r l y
appears,
"The most i m p r e s s i v e e v i d e n c e was a p p a r e n t on t h e
C o u r t ' s v i s i t t o t h e p r o p e r t i e s o u t of which t h i s
l a w s u i t a r o s e . A mountain s i d e , h e a v i l y t i m b e r e d ,
is t h e s e t t i n g f o r t h e controversy. N other access o
seems r e a s o n a b l y p o s s i b l e t o p l a i n t i f f s t l a n d . "
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , i n a t t e m p t i n g t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i s p u t e ,
found t h a t John M i l l e r r e s e r v e d a n easement o f r i g h t o f way o v e r
and upon t h e P i l o n p r o p e r t y . The c o u r t f u r t h e r concluded t h a t
even i f John Miller d i d n o t i n f a c t r e s e r v e t h e r i g h t of way
easement i n q u e s t i o n , t h a t p l a i n t i f f s a r e e n t i t l e d t o t h e r i g h t
of way "on t h e e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s of n e c e s s i t y , e s t o p p e l and
easement by i m p l i c a t i o n " .
On a p p e a l t h r e e i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d : (1) Whether t h e
evidence supports t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t M i l l e r d i d
i n f a c t r e s e r v e a n easement o v e r t h e P i l o n p r o p e r t y f o r a c c e s s
to the remainder of the property he owned? (2) Whether the
evidence supports the district court's holding that there was
an implied reserved easement of necessity over the Pilon property
for access to the remainder of the property Miller owned? (3)
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to an easement on the equitable
principle of estoppel?
We find there is a total lack of evidence to support the
district court's holding that Miller did in fact reserve an ease-
ment over the Pilon property when he sold it to them in 1962. To
support this holding, plaintiffs rely on this finding of the dis-
trict court:
" * * * that at about the time Miller conveyed
the parcels to Pilon and McLaren, he placed a
marker, an MJB Coffee Can, at a point marked
'2' on the attached plat, hpproximately 15 feet
west of the Pilons' east boundary line, on the
edge of the Forest Service Road], and the Court
finds that the grantor Miller intended for this
marker to indicate a reserved right of way over
and upon which he thereafter constructed the
road for access to the property he had reserved.
That this MJB Coffee Can marker was in place
from the date of the Miller conveyance to defend-
ants Pilon, was seen and acknowledged by all
parties to this action but which disappeared on
or about July 12, 1972 ." (Bracketed material
added) .
There is absolutely no evidence of the coffee can or any other
marker at the time Miller sold to either McLaren or Pilon. Mrs.
Godfrey testified it had "been there ever since the first time
we were ever up there" and that ''Jack always told us that this
was the end of the Pilon property and that was where the road
would go in when we bought it, that's where he showed us the road
would go in that way." The evidence does not show that the coffee
can was on the Pilons' land any earlier than 1968. This certain-
ly does not support the intention to reserve a right of way across
ground sold to the Pilons in 1962.
The only other evidence having any bearing whatsoever on
whether Miller reserved an easement across Pilons' land was
the testimony plaintiffs to the effect that "Jack [Miller]
said there was no problem because he had reserved a space between
McLaren and Pilon for the road" and, it was their "impression"
or "understanding" that they had a right of way into their land.
Plaintiffs entire argument on the subject of an express reserved
easement appears to be that Miller must have reserved an ease-
ment since his failure to do so would have forever deprived him
of access to his retained property. The conclusion does not neces-
sarily follow.
Neither do we find any evidence to support the district
court's holding that there was an implied reserved easement of
necessity over the Pilon property for access to the remainder of
the property Miller owned. In Pioneer Min. Co. v. Bannack Gold
Min. Co., 60 Mont. 254, 263, 264, 198 P. 748, this Court said:
" * * * The parties are presumed to contract
with reference to the condition of the property at
the time of the sale, provided the marks are open
and visible. [Citing cases].
"'In a sense no easement or quasi easement can
well be absolutely necessary to any possible enjoy-
ment of property. The most that can be required
is that it be, in addition to being apparent and
continuous, essential to use and enjoyment of the
premises as permanently improved at the time of
the conveyance of the servient estate. And this
appears to be what is meant by the term "strict
necessity," in defining easement reserved by
implication.' (19 C.J. 920, note 75, Div.A.)
"An easement is apparent when it may be discovered
upon reasonable inspection." (Emphasis supplied).
Although there may have been "necessity" for the easement,
in the sense that Miller may have been effectively landlocked
from the land which he retained (a point which we will discuss
later), there is absolutely no evidence in the record that there
was any apparent easement, path, "roadway of sorts", trail or
"primative road" over the land sold to the Pilons until the sale
to the Godfreys in 1968, more than six years after Pilons pur-
chased their tract.
All of the land was unimproved, timbered hillside and
the witnesses all agreed and testified that the first visible
sign of a roadway over the area of the claimed easement was in
the summer of 1968. The trial court stated in its opinion:
"There was a roadway of sorts, on the easement
ground described in the Court's findings, at
the time the Pilon family purchased the same."
The only conceivable support for this statement would be the
trial judge's view of the properties. However, if this was the
case, we are unable to accept the district court's flat asser-
tion without some explanation of how he was able to observe this
"roadway of sorts" or "primative road" after a road 10 to 12
feet wide had been gouged out of the hillside by a bulldozer in
The requirement that the implied reserved easement of
necessity must be open and visible at the time of the conveyance
is further supported by Montan's statute, section 67-1607, R.C.M.
"A transfer of real property passes all easements
attached thereto, and creates in favor thereof an
easement to use other real property of the person
whose estate is transferred in the same manner
and to the same extent as such property was
obviously and permanently used by the person whose
estate is transferred, for the benefit thereof,
at the time when the transfer was agreed upon or
completed." (Emphasis supplied).
In Spaeth v. Emmett, 142 Mont. 231,237, 383 P.2d 812, we applied
the rules of that section to a situation where the servient
tenement was conveyed creating an implied easement by reserva-
tion. See also 28 C.J.S., Easements, 5 33(b), p. 693.
Plaintiffs testified repeatedly that the road in question
was "the only access" and "the only possible way" into plaintiffs'
properties. The t r i a l judge viewed t h e l a n d and s t a t e d i n h i s
opinion :
"From t h a t i n s p e c t i o n it i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t
t h e r e was no o t h e r p r a c t i c a l a c c e s s t o t h e
p r o p e r t i e s h e l d i n r e s e r v e by t h e common l a n d
owner a t t h e t i m e he e x e c u t e d d e f e n d a n t s ' d e e d " .
W e would be w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t t h a t f i n d i n g o f " n e c e s s i t y " ( i n
t h e s e n s e t h a t M i l l e r may have been e f f e c t i v e l y l a n d l o c k e d from
t h e l a n d which he r e t a i n e d ) e x c e p t f o r t h i s : A t the t i m e M i l l e r
conveyed t h e P i l o n t r a c t t o t h e P i l o n s , he r e t a i n e d t h e l a n d t o
t h e e a s t which l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . A s we previously
s t a t e d , q u o t i n g from P i o n e e r Min. Co., t h e " n e c e s s i t y " must
a p p e a r " a t t h e t i m e of t h e conveyance of t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e " .
The e a s t boundary of t h e P i l o n t r a c t i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e w e s t
boundary of what l a t e r became t h e McLaren t r a c t . The r o a d i n
q u e s t i o n i s l o c a t e d a d j a c e n t t o t h e boundary, on t h e P i l o n s i d e
of t h e l i n e . There i s n o t h i n g i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t o r i n t h e j u d g e ' s
r e p o r t i n g of h i s view t o i n d i c a t e why i t would be ' h e c e s s a r y " a t
t h e t i m e of t h e conveyance t o P i l o n , t o p u t t h e r o a d on t h e P i l o n
s i d e of t h e l i n e r a t h e r t h a n 1 0 t o 1 2 f e e t e a s t on t h e o t h e r s i d e
o f t h e boundary. From t h e p h o t o g r a p h s i n t r o d u c e d , t h e t e r r a i n
1 0 t o 1 2 f e e t e a s t a p p e a r s s i m i l a r t o t h e t e r r a i n upon which t h e
road i s b u i l t .
Because p l a i n t i f f s c o n t e n d and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t found
t h a t a n easement had been c r e a t e d by e s t o p p e l , we have a t t e m p t e d
t o s e t f o r t h a s many of t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s b e a r i n g on t h i s i n c i -
dent a s possible. S u f f i c e i t t o s a y t h a t we d o n o t f i n d any
evidence t o support t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s holding t h a t p l a i n t i f f s
a r e e n t i t l e d t o an easement on t h e e q u i t a b l e grounds of e s t o p p e l .
The r o a d w a s o r i g i n a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d and s u b s e q u e n t l y e n l a r g e d a l l
w i t h o u t t h e knowledge o r c o n s e n t of t h e P i l o n s . The most t h a t
a n be s a i d a g a i n s t t h e P ' l o n s i s t h tof four years, thinking
&fiey passively acquiesced t o r a p e r l o $
o n l y t h a t t h e r o a d m i g h t be on t h e i r l a n d , u n t i l t h e y d i s c o v e r e d
t h e i r r i g h t s and a c t e d t o p r e v e n t a n easement by p r e s c r i p t i o n
from a r i s i n g . There was no m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by t h e P i l o n s t o
t h e p l a i n t i f f s , n o r any d e t r i m e n t a l r e l i a n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e
p l a i n t i f f s , which a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r a f i n d i n g o f e s t o p p e l . Lind-
blom v. Employers' L i a b i l i t y Assurance Corp., 88 Mont. 488, 295
P. 1007.
I n t h e i r complaint, p l a i n t i f f s requested, i n t h e alter-
n a t i v e , r e l i e f under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n s 93-9923 and 32-
1401, R.C.M. 1947, f o r t h e p r i v a t e condemnation of a r i g h t of
way by n e c e s s i t y . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n d i c a t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g
on t h e i n j u n c t i o n p e n d e n t e l i t e t h a t i f h e h e l d i n f a v o r of t h e
p l a i n t i f f s a s t o t h e i r ownership o f t h e easement, t h e r e would
be no need t o make a r u l i n g on t h e condemnation c a u s e of a c t i o n .
A s a r e s u l t , no r u l i n g was made by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h i s
regard. Nothing w e have s a i d h e r e p r e c l u d e s p l a i n t i f f s from
p r o c e e d i n g w i t h a p r i v a t e condemnation a c t i o n .
P i l o n s ' answer i n c l u d e d a c o u n t e r c l a i m t o q u i e t t i t l e t o
t h e access r o a d i n t h e m s e l v e s . Finding p l a i n t i f f s ' claims t o
t h e a c c e s s r o a d t o be w i t h o u t m e r i t , t i t l e t o t h e a c c e s s r o a d i s
quieted i n the Pilons. P i l o n s a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o damages s i n c e
t h e i r p r a y e r f o r damages o n l y had r e l a t i o n t o t h e condemnation
a c t i o n and s u c h i s s u e h a s n o t been r e s o l v e d . P i l o n s have asked
f o r and a r e e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s p u r s u a n t t o s e c -
t i o n 93-4213, R.C.M. 1947, and o u r d e c i s i o n i n E l e c t r i c Co-op.,
I n c . v. Ferguson, 124 Mont. 543, 551, 227 P.2d 597.
The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and t h e
m a t t e r i s r e t u r n e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t h e f i x i n g of r e a s o n -
able attorney fees.
V Justice
, -
- -.
Wei concur:
Chief Justice