No. 14867
I N THE SUPFU3MF: COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA
1980
MARVEL BRUTE S T E E L B U I L D I N G , I N C . ,
DANTON D. WIRTH AND ROBERT DOWNS,
P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
FRANK BASS, BASS AUCTION COMPANY, INC.,
and PARKER MONTANA COMPANY,
D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
H o n o r a b l e M. J a m e s S o r t e , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For Appellants:
R o b e r t L. Johnson and T o r g e r S . O a a s , L e w i s t o w n ,
Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t s :
C a l t o n Law F i r m , B i l l i n g s , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : M a y 2 7 , 1980
s i p i l lgea
Decided: --
XEg
3
3 : I&
-
Filed:
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . S h e a d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
Defendants appeal from a judgment entered on a jury
v e r d i c t i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County a w a r d i n g $ 7 , 0 0 0 i n damages t o t h e
plaintiffs for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of
warranty in connection with the sale of a tractor. The
plaintiffs, i n a d d i t i o n t o moving t o d i s m i s s t h i s a p p e a l a s b e i n g
u n t i m e l y f i l e d , have f i l e d a c r o s s - a p p e a l . W determine t h a t the
e
defendants' a p p e a l was n o t t i m e l y f i l e d a n d , t h e r e f o r e , that the
appeal must be dismissed. Likewise, because the plaintiffs'
cross-appeal is subject to the same impediment, it, too, is
dismissed.
Just before the close of trial on April 13, 1979,
counsel for both parties agreed that any p o s t - j u d g m e n t motions
would be d e c i d e d on b r i e f s w i t h o u t a hearing. The p u r p o s e of
t h i s a g r e e m e n t was s o t h a t t h e p r e s i d i n g j u d g e would n o t h a v e t o
r e t u r n t o B i l l i n g s t o hear t h e motions. The d e f e n d a n t s ' a t t o r n e y
claims the parties stipulated that a motion would be deemed
s u b m i t t e d upon c o m p l e t i o n of briefing and that the judge would
issue a binding ruling within fifteen days thereafter. The
plaintiffs' attorney, on the other hand, claims that the
s t i p u l a t i o n was n o t h i n g more t h a n a m u t u a l w a i v e r o f h e a r i n g s of
post-judgment m o t i o n s f o r t h e c o n v e n i e n c e of t h e j u d g e . Whatever
the s t i p u l a t i o n was, however, this Court has no record of it.
F u r t h e r m o r e , a s s u m i n g t h e r e t o be a s t i p u l a t i o n i n e x i s t e n c e t h a t
a m o t i o n would be deemed s u b m i t t e d upon " c o m p l e t i o n o f b r i e f i n g " ,
as the defendants contend, the parties could not by this
s t i p u l a t i o n confer j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o d e c i d e
t h e c a s e beyond t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s e x p r e s s l y p r o v i d e d by r u l e .
Here, defendants filed their motion for a new trial
after judgment was entered, but before the clerk of court
o f f i c i a l l y g a v e n o t i c e of e n t r y of j u d g m e n t . The j u r y r e t u r n e d
w i t h i t s v e r d i c t on A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 ; j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d on A p r i l
20, 1 9 7 9 ; d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d t h e i r m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l on A p r i l
23, 1 9 7 9 ; and t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t o f f i c i a l l y s e n t o u t n o t i c e o f
entry of judgment on April 23, 1979. Pursuant to the oral
stipulation ( t h e c o n t e n t s of which are disputed), the parties
considered the matter s u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s . T h e r e was, however,
no a g r e e m e n t a s t o when t h e b r i e f s would b e f i l e d .
The d e f e n d a n t s w a i t e d for a t r i a l court ruling before
t h e y f i l e d t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l . The t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r
on May 15, 1979 d e n y i n g t h e motion for a new trial, and the
defendants filed notice of appeal on June 12, 1979. The
plaintiffs then f i l e d a motion with t h i s Court t o dismiss t h e
a p p e a l b e c a u s e i t had b e e n u n t i m e l y f i l e d . The i s s u e i s w h e t h e r
t h e time period f o r f i l i n g n o t i c e of appeal expired t h i r t y days
after the trial court order of May 15, or whether it expired
t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l was s e r v e d - - t h a t is,
t h i r t y d a y s a f t e r A p r i l 23, 1979. Under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s h e r e ,
it expired thirty days after the motion for a new t r i a l was
filed, and thus, t h e n o t i c e of appeal filed on J u n e 12, 1979
comes t o o l a t e .
Rule 5 , I'4.R.App.Civ.P. requires that an appeal from a
D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g m e n t m u s t be t a k e n w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s f r o m t h e
date of s e r v i c e of notice of entry of judgment. Although a
motion f o r a new t r i a l made p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 9 ( d ) , I'4.R.Civ.P.
s t o p s t h e running of the thirty-day period, it d o e s n o t do s o
indefinitely. The thirty-day period generally s t a r t s running
again a f t e r the trial court has entered its order denying the
motion a f t e r a h e a r i n g . If t h e r e is a h e a r i n g , the t r i a l court
must enter an order within fifteen days after the matter is
submitted. R u l e 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. I f h e f a i l s t o r u l e by t h e
f i f t e e n t h day, t h e motion is c o n s i d e r e d d e n i e d , and t h e a p p e a l
time s t a r t s running. R u l e 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. Here t h e d e f e n d a n t s
s e r v e d p l a i n t i f f s w i t h t h e m o t i o n on A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 7 9 .
A h e a r i n g on t h i s m o t i o n w a s r e q u i r e d w i t h i n t e n d a y s o f this
d a t e of s e r v i c e u n l e s s c o n t i n u e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r a p e r i o d
of n o t t o e x c e e d t h i r t y d a y s . R u l e 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P. B e c a u s e no
h e a r i n g was held ( b y agreement of the parties), the time for
a p p e a l s t a r t e d r u n n i n g on May 3 ( t e n d a y s a f t e r d e f e n d a n t s s e r v e d
i t s m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l ) . The time f o r a p p e a l e x p i r e d on J u n e
2 , and t h u s , d e f e n d a n t s ' n o t i c e o f a p p e a l f i l e d on J u n e 1 2 came
too late.
Even t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r on May 1 5 ,
1979 denying t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l , the order
was a n u l l i t y b e c a u s e it was i s s u e d a f t e r t h e t i m e had e x p i r e d
u n d e r R u l e 5 9 , w i t h i n w h i c h t o r u l e on a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l .
See L e i t h e i s e e r v. Montana S t a t e P r i s o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 343,
348, 505 P.2d 1203, 1206. W h a v e r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t t h e time
e
and p r o c e d u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s f o r p o s t - j u d g m e n t motions under Rule
59 a r e m a n d a t o r y . K e l l y v. S e l l & S e l l Paint Contractors (1978),
Mont. , 574 P.2d 1002, 1003; Armstrong v. High C r e s t
Oils, Inc. ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 1 6 4 Mont. 1 8 7 , 1 9 6 , 520 P.2d 1081, 1086. See
a l s o , S e i b e l v . B y e r s ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 3 9 , 4 6 , 344 P.2d 1 2 9 , 1 3 3
( d e c i d e d b e f o r e our a d o p t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e ) ;
McVay v. McVay (1954), 1 2 8 Mont. 31, 34, 270 P.2d 393, 394
( l i k e w i s e decided before our adoption of the present r u l e s of
procedure) .
We initially entered an order summarily denying
plaintiffs' motion to dismiss, but because the question is
jurisdictional, we, of course, are not precluded from
reconsidering t h i s issue. It is axiomatic t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
d e f e c t s can be c o n s i d e r e d a t any s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s . Nor
d o e s s e c t i o n 3-1-502, MCA, a s argued by t h e d e f e n d a n t s , p r e c l u d e
t h e p l a i n t i f f s from r e n e w i n g i t s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s . This s t a t u t e
f o r b i d s o n l y a s u b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e same o r d e r t o a n y
"other" judge, and n o t t h e r e n e w a l o f a m o t i o n b e f o r e t h e same
court.
Accepting t h e d e f e n d a n t s 1 argument t h a t t h e motion f o r a
new t r i a l was t o be c o n s i d e r e d s u b m i t t e d t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t , o n l y
upon c o m p l e t i o n of b r i e f i n g by b o t h s i d e s , would mean t h a t a t i m e
period f o r an a p p e a l t o r u n c o u l d n e v e r be f i x e d . The p a r t i e s
could c o n t r o l t h e time period s i m p l y by n o t g e t t i n g the briefs
expeditiously filed. For this reason, we distinguish the
s i t u a t i o n h e r e from t h a t which e x i s t e d i n B r i t t o n v. Burlington
Northern, Inc. (1979), Mont . , 6 0 1 P.2d 1 1 9 2 , 36 S t . R e p .
1956. Furthermore, the defendants1 interpretation would result
i n an u n t e n a b l e s i t u a t i o n extending the time for appeal thirty
d a y s a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d , whenever t h a t m i g h t b e . The
r u l i n g p r i n c i p l e of t h e r u l e s i s t o " s e c u r e t h e j u s t , s p e e d y , and
i n e x p e n s i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of every action." R u l e 1, M.R.Civ.P.
and R u l e 6 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., expressly prohibit discretionary
e x t e n s i o n s of any t i m e l i m i t s s e t u n d e r R u l e 5 9 ( d ) .
The trial courts may not disregard the procedural
r e q u i r e m e n t s g o v e r n i n g a m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l a s s e t f o r t h i n
Rule 5 9 ( d ) , by i n d e f i n i t e l y extending the time limits for the
c o n v e n i e n c e of one of the parties. C a i n v. Harrington (1973),
161 Mont. 401, 506 P.2d 1375, 1377. Nor can the parties
accomplish by stipulation what the District Court cannot
a c c o m p l i s h by o r d e r .
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal and the
cross-appeal are dismissed.
Justice
We concur:
Justices