Matter of Hardy

No. 14892 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O M N A A F OTN 1980 I N THE MATTER O STEVEN D A E HARDY, F U N Petitioner, ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; C o u n s e l o f Record: For P e t i t i o n e r : M i c h a e l J. Whalen, B i l l i n g s , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana H a r o l d H a n s e r , County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : J u n e 25, 1980 Decided: AUG 6 - 1380 Filed: -- - 1 '2 - ' ih:' Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. I n August 1974 p e t i t i o n e r w a s c o n v i c t e d of r o b b e r y on a p l e a of g u i l t y . I n J u l y 1979 p e t i t i o n e r i n s t i t u t e d a n o r i g i n a l proceeding i n t h i s Court f o r post-conviction r e - l i e f , s e e k i n g l e a v e t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . This C o u r t remanded t h e matter t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h d i r e c - t i o n s t o c o n d u c t a h e a r i n g and t o d e t e r m i n e t h e m e r i t s of the petition. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , a f ter h e a r i n g , d e n i e d t h e r e q u e s t f o r l e a v e t o withdraw t h e p l e a , and p e t i t i o n e r appeals. On J u l y 2, 1974, a Kwik Way s t o r e i n B i l l i n g s , Montana, w a s robbed. P e t i t i o n e r w a s a r r e s t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g morning. On J u l y 1 5 , 1974, p e t i t i o n e r a p p e a r e d w i t h a p p o i n t e d c o u n s e l and e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . On J u l y 31, 1974, p e t i t i o n e r a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and moved t o change h i s p l e a t o g u i l t y . A t t h a t time p e t i t i o n e r w a s n o t a d v i s e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e n a t u r e of t h e c h a r g e , t h e r i g h t s waived by a p l e a of g u i l t y , o r p o t e n t i a l punishment. Defense c o u n s e l d i d , however, t e l l t h e c o u r t t h a t he had a d v i s e d p e t i t i o n e r of t h e p o s s i b l e maximum p e n a l t y of f o r t y y e a r s i n p r i s o n . The c o u r t a c - c e p t e d t h e p l e a and s e t s e n t e n c i n g b e f o r e a n o t h e r d i s t r i c t judge f o r August 1 4 , 1974, which w a s l a t e r c o n t i n u e d t o August 26. I n t h e t i m e between a r r a i g n m e n t and s e n t e n c i n g , t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge, t h e Honorable C h a r l e s Luedke, became aware o f a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by p e t i t i o n e r t o t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y i n which p e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t e d h i s innocence. Judge Luedke, t h e r e f o r e , engaged p e t i t i o n e r i n a n e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n of t h e n a t u r e of t h e c h a r g e , t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , and h i s reasons f o r pleading g u i l t y . P e t i t i o n e r admitted being i n t h e car w i t h t h e r o b b e r s and s h a r i n g t h e p r o c e e d s w i t h them. H e a l s o a d m i t t e d t h a t h e had p r i o r knowledge t h a t t h e r o b b e r y would t a k e p l a c e . The judge a d v i s e d p e t i t i o n e r t h a t h i s p l e a c o n s t i t u t e d a w a i v e r of s e v e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , s u c h a s t h e r i g h t t o t r i a l by j u r y , r i g h t t o con- f r o n t and cross-examine w i t n e s s e s , and t h e r i g h t t o remain silent. The judge informed p e t i t i o n e r t h a t t h e p l e a would p r o b a b l y r e s u l t i n a s e n t e n c e of c o n f i n e m e n t i n t h e s t a t e prison. Judge Luedke on two o c c a s i o n s o f f e r e d p e t i t i o n e r f u r t h e r t i m e t o c o n s i d e r h i s p l e a , which p e t i t i o n e r r e f u s e d . F i n a l l y , t h e judge a d v i s e d p e t i t i o n e r t h a t h e had t h e r i g h t t o a j u r y t r i a l and t h a t a j u r y m i g h t f i n d him n o t g u i l t y on t h e f a c t s before t h e court. P e t i t i o n e r nonetheless refused t o withdraw h i s g u i l t y p l e a . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed e r r o r i n denying p e t i t i o n e r ' s p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e q u e s t t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . I n S t a t e v. Haynie ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 607 P.2d 1128, 1131, 37 St.Rep. 415, 4 1 9 , t h i s C o u r t h e l d : "A change of p l e a w i l l b e p e r m i t t e d o n l y i f i t f a i r l y a p p e a r s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s i g n o r a n t of h i s r i g h t s and t h e consequences of h i s a c t , o r h e w a s unduly and i m p r o p e r l y i n f l u e n c e d e i t h e r by hope o r by f e a r i n making t h e p l e a , o r i f i t a p p e a r s t h e p l e a w a s e n t e r e d under some mistake o r misapprehension. S t a t e v. McAllister ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 96 Mont. 348, 353, 30 P.2d 821, 823." T h i s h a s been t h e l o n g - s t a n d i n g r u l e i n Montana. In a p p l y i n g i t t o t h e case b e f o r e u s , w e f i n d t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must b e s u s t a i n e d . J u d g e Luedke p r o v i d e d p e t i t i o n e r e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o n s i d e r h i s a c t i o n , t h e consequences of t h e p l e a and t h e r i g h t s he could e x e r c i s e . Looking t o t h e r e c o r d , w e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w a s v e r y c a r e f u l and e x p l i c i t i n i t s discussions with p e t i t i o n e r : " J U D G E LUEDKE: W e l l , M r . Cunningham, a r e you s a t i s f i e d i n your own mind t h a t your p a r t i c i - p a t i o n i n t h i s whole t r a n s a c t i o n was s u f f i c i e n t t h a t you a r e a c t u a l l y g u i l t y , t h a t you d i d t a k e p a r t i n t h e r o b b e r y by a i d i n g and by a b e t t i n g o r by a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g , any of them?" F u r t h e r , t h e judge gave an e x t e n s i v e e x p l a n a t i o n t o p e t i t i o n e r regarding h i s r i g h t t o a jury t r i a l , h i s r i g h t t o remain s i l e n t , t h e r i g h t t o cross-examine and t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t t h e w i t n e s s e s and e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t him. W e a r e a l s o p e r s u a d e d by t h e f a c t t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was a s s i s t e d by l e g a l c o u n s e l a t e v e r y p o i n t i n t h e c r i m i n a l procedure. Although p e t i t i o n e r b a s e s h i s a p p e a l i n p a r t on t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t h i s p l e a was t h e p r o d u c t of a fundamental m i s t a k e i n h i s l e g a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , J u d g e Luedke made a s p e c i a l e f f o r t t o g u a r a n t e e t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was aware of t h e consequences of h i s p l e a and t h e fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of law i n v o l v e d . I n i t s memorandum accompanying t h e o r d e r denying t h e motion t o withdraw t h e p l e a , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t stated: "Assuming t h a t t h e c h a r g e a g a i n s t t h e a t t o r n e y i s more t h a n adumbration, i t i s a p p a r e n t from t h e r e c o r d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c l a i m was t h e v e r y c o n c e r n t h e c o u r t had a t t h e t i m e of sen- t e n c i n g ; and i s t h e r e a s o n why d e f e n d a n t was q u e r i e d i n t h e c o n t e x t of ' a i d i n g and a b e t - t i n g ' ; and why i t was s u g g e s t e d t h a t a j u r y c o u l d p o s s i b l y f i n d him n o t g u i l t y ; and why h e was o f f e r e d on more t h a n one o c c a s i o n f u r t h e r t i m e t o d i s c u s s and c o n s i d e r t h e m a t t e r . It w a s t h e conclusion of t h e c o u r t a t t h a t t i m e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t knew what h e was d o i n g and wanted t o do it. The new h e a r i n g h a s produced t h e same f a c t u a l p i c t u r e a s was b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on August 2 6 , 1974." The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t p e t i t i o n e r was a c c o r d e d e v e r y consideration b u t declined t o reconsider h i s action. S i t t i n g w i t h o u t a j u r y , t h e t r i a l judge, as f i n d e r of f a c t , i s as f u l l y e n t i t l e d t o b e l i e v e o r d i s b e l i e v e a d e f e n - d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n s a s a j u r y would be. S t a t e v. Hilton (1979) - Mont. , 597 P.2d 1171, 1174, 36 St.Rep. 1314, 1319. In light of petitioner's continual insistence on a guilty plea and the evidence against him, we find a completely adequate basis for the District Court's factual conclusions. From petitioner's own testimony there is sufficient admis- sion to warrant the court's decision: "The only reason I have for participating in this crime is I needed money to get to Texas." Our view of the applicable law in this case is supported by several of our recent decisions. In re Brown (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 185, 37 St.Rep. 65; State v. Haynie, supra; State v. Doty (1977), 173 Mont. 233, 566 P.2d 1388; and State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 535 P.2d 498. The importance of these decisions, as they apply to the case at bar, is that it is the sole province of the trial court to determine whether a motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be granted. The abuse of discretion required to reverse the lower court is not present in this case. Af firmed . We concur: ( \ f '\\LA- / /' F& Justices - "Ly I