No. 14749
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1980
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
WILLIAM STUMPF,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
Honorable Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Joseph P. Hennessey, Billings, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Harold Hanser, County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on briefs: October 25, 1979
Decided :
; .
Filed:
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Defendant William Sturnpf appeals from a judgment of
the Yellowstone County District Court whereby he was
sentenced to three years imprisonment for the crime of
tampering with witnesses (section 45-7-206, MCA).
Defendant has two basic attacks on the statute itself.
He claims that the substantive provisions of the statute
are too broad, and furthermore, that the penalty provision
does not contain proper guidelines for sentencing. Defendant
cites no authority and virtually makes no argument to
support his contention that the substantive provision of the
statute is too broad, and we are not inclined to do that for
him. Accordingly, we reject this portion of his argument.
Section 45-7-206(2), provides that "[a] person convicted
of tampering with witnesses or informants shall be imprisoned
in the state prison for any term not to exceed 10 years."
He claims that the statute itself contains inappropriate
guidelines for sentencing, and furthermore, that the trial
court abused its discretion by sentencing him to three years
in prison. The statute itself does not have to contain the
sentencing guidelines, and therefore we find no merit to
this contention. We do find, however, that the failure of
the trial court to specify the reasons why defendant was
sentenced to three years in prison, is an abuse of discretion.
We do not deny the discretion of a trial court to
sentence a defendant within the limits set by the statute.
Indeed, it has always been the position of this Court that
the extent of punishment is vested in the sound discretion
of the trial court. But here, although the sentence imposed
was well within the statutory limit of ten years, we are
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presented with no underlying reasons of why the trial court
exercised its discretion in sentencing defendant to three
years in prison. That a trial court has a right to exercise
its discretion does not mean that a trial court should not
disclose the reasons underlying a discretionary act. Absent
these reasons, we as an appellate court, are left to guess
as to why the trial court made a particular decision.
In Ballantyne v. Anaconda Co. (1978), 175 Mont. 406,
574 P.2d 582, set forth the underlying reasons why trial
courts should set forth in the record the reasons for their
decisions. Although that case involved the granting of a
new trial without a specification of reasons, the same
rationale applies to most of the decisions made by trial
courts in both civil and criminal cases.
Although admittedly in a different context, this Court
recently in the Matter of McFadden (1980), - Mont . I
605 P.2d 599, 37 St.Rep. 55, determined that a sentencing
court must articulate its reasons underlying a determination
that an offender was to be designated as a dangerous offender.
Although McFadden turned on a statutory requirement, that
reasoning also applies here.
In the context of this case, several jurisdictions
require sentencing courts to state on the record the reasons
for selecting a particular sentence. Some of these are
controlled by statutes requiring the sentencing courts to
disclose its reasons for sentencing (e.g., ~ennsylvania,
Louisiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon). Others require
it under the criminal procedure rules of the respective
states (e.g., Pennsylvania, Iowa, and New Jersey). See,
for example, State v. Ingenito (1979), 169 N.J. Super. 524,
405 A.2d 418; Com. v. Wareham (Pa. Super. 1978), 393 ~ . 2 d
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951. W e a l s o n o t e t h a t t h e American Bar A s s o c i a t i o n
S t a n d a r d s R e l a t i n g t o A p p e l l a t e Review o f S e n t e n c e s ,
r e q u i r e t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge t o s t a t e h i s r e a s o n s f o r
s e l e c t i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n c e imposed. Standard 2 , 3 ( c ) .
Although a d e f e n d a n t i s o f c o u r s e e n t i t l e d t o have a
s e n t e n c e reviewed by t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board, t h e r e can
be no q u e s t i o n t h a t a s t a t e m e n t i n t h e r e c o r d a t t h e t i m e
s e n t e n c e i s imposed a s t o t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r
s e n t e n c e , can g i v e v a l u a b l e a i d t o t h e Board when i t i s
c a l l e d upon t o r e v i e w t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n c e i n v o l v e d .
O t h e r w i s e i t , t o o , i s f o r c e d t o g u e s s a s t o why t h e p a r t i c u l a r
s e n t e n c e was i n v o l v e d . Undoubtedly, t h e Board c o u l d always
c o n t a c t t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge, b u t t h e c h a n c e s t h a t a f a u l t y
memory w i l l become a f a c t o r i n t h i s p r o c e s s a r e a v o i d e d
when t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e s e n t e n c e a r e s t a t e d f o r t h e r e c o r d
a t t h e t i m e of t h e s e n t e n c i n g .
W e note, furthermore, t h a t t h i s requirement t h a t t h e
s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t s t a t e t h e s p e c i f i c r e a s o n s f o r imposing
t h e p a r t i c u l a r sentence involved, i s c o n s i s t e n t with t h e
f i r s t p a r a g r a p h o f Canon 1 9 , Montana Canons o f J u d i c i a l
E t h i c s , 1 4 4 Mont. a t X X V I - X X V I I :
" I n d i s p o s i n g of c o n t r o v e r t e d c a s e s , a judge
should i n d i c a t e t h e reasons f o r h i s a c t i o n
i n a n o p i n i o n showing t h a t h e h a s n o t d i s -
r e g a r d e d o r o v e r l o o k e d s e r i o u s arguments of
counsel. H e t h u s shows h i s f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f t h e c a s e , a v o i d s t h e s u s p i c i o n of a r b i t r a r y
c o n c l u s i o n , promotes c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l
i n t e g r i t y and may c o n t r i b u t e u s e f u l p r e c e d e n t t o
t h e growth of t h e law."
W e s e e no r e a s o n why a d e f e n d a n t s e n t e n c e d t o p r i s o n
i s n o t a l s o e n t i t l e d t o know p r e c i s e l y why t h e s e n t e n c i n g
judge c h o s e t h e p a r t i c u l a r s e n t e n c e i n v o l v e d . I t is not
enough t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e be w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y maximum.
I f t h a t were t h e c a s e , t h e s e n t e n c e would simply n o t be an
a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n , it would be p l a i n l y i l l e g a l . While
illegal action must inevitably be an abuse of discretion,
an abuse of discretion can occur and still not be tainted
by illegality.
For the foregoing reasons the sentence imposed is
vacated and this cause is remanded to the District Court
for resentencing consistent with what we have said in this
&-her than as it ap lies to the defendant
!i
opinion/ This decision sha 1 have prospective ap8lication
only. =
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Justice
We Concur: .
p.*.* Justices -------------
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The punishment for the crime of which the defendant was
convicted is a prison term not to exceed 10 years. Section 45-7-
206, MCA. A sentence of three years imprisonment in the State
Prison was imposed in this case. The extent of punishment is
vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge. Petition
of Amor (1963), 143 Mont. 305, 389 P.2d 54.
The majority hold that the district judge abused his
discretion because he did not articulate his reasons for imposing
a three year sentence in the record. This holding flies directly
in the face of the presumption that the trial court is correct
and it is the appellant's burden to overcome that presumption.
State v. Lane (1977), 175 Mont. 225, 573 P.2d 198, 34 St.Rep.
1588; Petition of Meidinger (1975), 168 Mont. 7, 539 P.2d 1185.
Whatever the law in other states may be, I find no support
in the laws of Montana for a requirement that the sentencing judge
specify in the record his reasons for imposing a particular sen-
tence within the limits provided by law. If the majority now seek
to impose such additional requirement, they should at least give
advance notice of the fact to the district judges of this state
and not impose this additional requirement retroactively. See
Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (1980), Mont. , 606
P.2d 520, 37 St.Rep. 240, and authorities cited therein.
The majority state that their decision shall have pros-
pective application only. Yet they set aside a sentence imposed
over a year ago because the district judge failed to follow a
sentencing requirement imposed upon him for the first time today.
Prospective application?
The majority find solace in the case of In the Matter of
McFadden (1980), Mont. , 605 P.2d 599, 37 St.Rep. 55, de-
cided after the sentencing in this case. Despite certain language
in that decision that might support a contrary view, I believe
that McFadden is based on a lack of substantial evidence to
support a determination that petitioner was a dangerous offender.
This is a far cry from requiring the sentencing judge to specify
his reasons for imposing a particular sentence in a given case.
Chief Justice )