May v. Figgins

No. 14958
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1980

ROBERT MAY,' Deputy Administrator,
Western Conference of Teamsters Pension
Trust Fund,
Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant,

WILLIE FIGGINS, individually
and d/b/a FIGGINS & SONS,

Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents.

1 from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
County of Gallatin,
Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant :
Berg, Morgan, Coil & Stokes, Bozeman, Montana
Michael C. Morgan argued, Bozeman, Montana

For -Respondents:
Bolinger, Higgins and Andes, Bozeman, Montana
Gerry M. Higgins argued, Bozeman, Montana

Submitted: February 25, 1980
Decided : HA!? 1': @@
H ~ IR- I?;;,
Filed: -1-
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff sued a state District Court in Montana to
enforce a Colorado default judgment against defendant.
Defendant moved for summary judgment based on Colorado's
lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
Colorado action. Summary judgment was denied. After trial,
the Court, sitting without a jury, found for plaintiff.
Defendant appeals from that judgment.
The material facts are undisputed. Defendant Willie
Figgins is a Montana road contractor who does most of his
work in the Gallatin Valley. Including family members,
Figgins has only seven employees at any one time. He does
no road contracting in Colorado, does not advertise or
solicit business in Colorado, and does not have a Colorado
bank account.
On December 17, 1971, Willie Figgins signed a "Collec-
tive Bargaining Compliance Agreement" which was also signed
by representatives of the Montana Joint Council of Teamsters
No. 2 3 , which has no connection with the State of Colorado.
The compliance agreement was accepted by the Montana A.G.C.
Teamsters Trust Fund and by the trustees of the Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund at Seattle,
Washington.
Under this agreement, Figgins agreed to be bound by the
articles of trust contained in the pension trust fund. He
agreed "to be bound by, become a party thereto, comply with
and execute all forms necessary to be bound to the various
Articles of Trust contained in the health and welfare plan
and pension plan or any other trust established under the
terms and conditions of said extent agreement." The Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is one of the
trusts so established. The administrative office of the
Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund is in
Seattle, Washington, the situs of the trust is the State of
Washington, and the articles of the trust state that ". . .
all questions pertaining to its validity, construction, and
administration shall be determined in accordance with the
laws of that State." The trust provides that "Employer Con-
tributions shall be paid to the depository bank designated
by the Administrator of the Trust Fund for the particular
Pension Agreement," and that "The County in which the parti-
cular Employer Contribution is payable shall be a proper
county in which to institute legal proceedings to collect
delinquent Employer Contributions."
Neither the collective bargaining compliance agreement
nor the trust agreement specify where the contributions are
to be made. In the compliance agreement, however, defendant
also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is
the employer's monthly report which designates the United
Bank of Denver in Denver, Colorado as the depository bank.
Willie Figgins' bookkeeper sent thirty-five (35) checks, ap-
proximately one per month, to Colorado following the Trust
Administrator's instructions, beginning on March 10, 1972.
The checks were defendant's only contact with the State of

Colorado.
Figgins was later audited by a Seattle, Washington firm
for the trust. Plaintiff-respondent, Robert May, Deputy
Administrator of the trust, brought an action in Colorado to
collect delinquent employer contributions from Figgins. A

summons was served on Figgins in Montana, but he did not
defend the Colorado lawsuit, and plaintiff took a default
judgment i n Colorado. P l a i n t i f f b r o u g h t s u i t i n t h e Montana

D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o e n f o r c e t h e Colorado judgment. Figgins

moved f o r summary judgment on t h e b a s i s of C o l o r a d o ' s l a c k

o f p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r him i n t h e Colorado s u i t , b u t

t h e Montana D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d summary judgment and found

for plaintiff. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h a t judgment.

The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s have been p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t

f o r review:

1. Did t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t of s e n d i n g t h i r t y - f i v e

c h e c k s t o t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s t r u s t a c c o u n t i n a Colorado bank

e s t a b l i s h s u f f i c i e n t "minimum c o n t a c t s " t o g i v e t h e Colorado

c o u r t - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e n o n r e s i d e n t Montana
in

defendant?

2. Did t h e Montana d e f e n d a n t knowingly c o n s e n t t o

Colorado j u r i s d i c t i o n ?

On c r o s s - a p p e a l p l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e :

Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n by l i m i t i n g

p l a i n t i f f ' s a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o $1200?

"As a r e s u l t o f t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e Supreme
C o u r t expanding t h e l i m i t s o f due p r o c e s s t o
p e r m i t t h e a s s e r t i o n o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r non-
r e s i d e n t s where t h e r e h a s been o n l y minimal
c o n t a c t s w i t h t h e forum s t a t e , s t a t e s have re-
sponded by e n a c t i n g long-arm s t a t u t e s and c o u r t
r u l e s e n l a r g i n g t h e scope of p e r m i s s i b l e j u r i s -
diction i n the s t a t e courts." 2 Moore's F e d e r a l
P r a c t i c e 714.41-1 [ 3 ] a t 4-437.

"Under t h e s e s t a t e long-arm s t a t u t e s , t h e d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n of whether t h e c o u r t h a s i n personam
j u r i s d i c t i o n i s a two-step p r o c e s s . The c o u r t
f i r s t must l o o k t o t h e s t a t e s t a t u t e t o d e t e r -
mine whether t h e s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r the e x e r -
c i s e of j u r i s d i c t i o n under t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s
of t h e c a s e , and second, t h e c o u r t must d e t e r -
mine whether i t would o f f e n d due p r o c e s s t o
assert j u r i s d i c t i o n . " 2 Moore's F e d e r a l Prac-
t i c e 114.41-1111 a t 4-421.

The Montana Supreme C o u r t has f o l l o w e d t h e two-step

a p p r o a c h i n Haker v. S o u t h w e s t e r n Ry. Co. (1978), - Mont.
 , 578 P.2d 724, 729, 35 St.Rep. 523, and i t i s t h e

p r o p e r frame of a n a l y s i s i n which t o c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e .

A Colorado s t a t u t e g r a n t s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r n o n r e s i -

d e n t s i f t h e c a u s e o f a c t i o n a r i s e s from ". . .the trans-

a c t i o n of any b u s i n e s s w i t h i n t h i s s t a t e . " Colo. Rev. S t a t .

§ 13-1-124. The Colorado Supreme C o u r t h a s i n t e r p r e t e d t h e

s t a t u t e t o mean t h a t Colorado h a s - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n
in

o v e r any n o n r e s i d e n t who meets t h e "minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t

o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 326

U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 1 5 4 , 9 0 L.Ed. 95.

"By e n a c t i n g t h e l a t t e r s t a t u t e s , o u r l e g i s -
l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o e x t e n d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of
o u r c o u r t s t o t h e f u l l e s t e x t e n t p e r m i t t e d by
t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h amend-
ment o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . "
S a f a r i O u t f i t t e r s , I n c . v. S u p e r i o r C o u r t
( 1 9 6 8 ) , 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783, 784.

A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n t o be d e c i d e d i s whether o r

n o t t h e Montana d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t t o due p r o c e s s was v i o -

l a t e d by C o l o r a d o ' s a s s e r t i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e .

The l e a d i n g case a d d r e s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of when a

s t a t e may e x e r c i s e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e p e r s o n o f a non-

r e s i d e n t d e f e n d a n t i s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of

Washington, s u p r a . The S t a t e of Washington b r o u g h t s u i t t o

r e c o v e r u n p a i d c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e s t a t e unemployment

compensation fund from a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n which had no

o f f i c e i n Washington and made no c o n t r a c t s t h e r e , b u t which

employed salesmen w i t h i n t h e s t a t e t o s o l i c i t o r d e r s . The

d e f e n d a n t c o r p o r a t i o n m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e a c t i v i t i e s of i t s

salesmen d i d n o t r e n d e r i t " p r e s e n t " w i t h i n t h e s t a t e f o r

p u r p o s e s of p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o -

c e s s . I n r e j e c t i n g t h e s e c o n t e n t i o n s , t h e Supreme C o u r t

announced:
 ". . .due p r o c e s s r e q u i r e s o n l y t h a t i n o r d e r
t o s u b j e c t a d e f e n d a n t t o a judgment i n p e r -
sonam, i f he be n o t p r e s e n t w i t h i n t h e t e r r i t o r y
of t h e forum, h e have c e r t a i n minimum c o n t a c t s
w i t h i t s u c h t h a t t h e maintenance o f t h e s u i t
d o e s n o t o f f e n d ' t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r
p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e . ' " I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Shoe, 326 U.S. a t 316.

The Supreme C o u r t e l a b o r a t e d on t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f t h e

"minimum c o n t a c t s " t e s t :

"Whether due p r o c e s s i s s a t i s f i e d must depend
r a t h e r upon t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e ac-
t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a i r and o r d e r l y
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e laws which i t w a s t h e
p u r p o s e of t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e t o i n s u r e .
That c l a u s e does n o t contemplate t h a t a s t a t e
may make b i n d i n g a judgment i n personam a g a i n s t
a n i n d i v i d u a l o r c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t w i t h which
t h e s t a t e h a s no c o n t a c t s , t i e s , o r r e l a t i o n s

"But t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n e x e r c i s e s
t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n
a s t a t e , it e n j o y s t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n
o f t h e laws o f t h a t s t a t e . The e x e r c i s e of
t h a t p r i v i l e g e may g i v e r i s e t o o b l i g a t i o n s ;
and, s o f a r a s t h o s e o b l i g a t i o n s a r i s e o u t of
o r a r e connected with t h e a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n
t h e s t a t e , a p r o c e d u r e which r e q u i r e s t h e c o r -
p o r a t i o n t o respond t o a s u i t brought t o enforce
them c a n , i n most i n s t a n c e s , h a r d l y be s a i d t o
be undue." I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, 326 U.S. a t
319. (Citations omitted.)

Applying t h e s e s t a n d a r d s t o t h e f a c t s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe,

t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d :

" I t i s evident t h a t these operations establish
s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s o r t i e s w i t h t h e s t a t e of
t h e forum t o make i t r e a s o n a b l e and j u s t ac-
c o r d i n g t o o u r t r a d i t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of f a i r
p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e t o p e r m i t t h e
s t a t e t o e n f o r c e t h e o b l i g a t i o n s which a p p e l -
l a n t has incurred there." 326 U.S. a t 320.

McGee v. I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co. ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 355 U.S.

220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223, r e p r e s e n t s t h e f a r t h e s t

e x t e n s i o n t h u s f a r of j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a n o n r e s i d e n t under

t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe d o c t r i n e . 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e

114.25[4] a t 4-253 and g 4 . 4 1 - l [ l ] a t 4-413. In McGee the

b e n e f i c i a r y under a l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y b r o u g h t s u i t i n
California against a nonresident insurance corporation. The
foreign corporation was served by registered mail pursuant
to California statutes. The policy upon which the suit was
based had been purchased by the decedent from an Arizona
company which was subsequently, absored by defendant, a
Texas corporation. Defendant's only connection with Cali-
fornia was that it had mailed a reinsurance certificate to
the decedent in California offering to insure him under the
terms of the original policy and later delivered the insur-
ance contract there. Also, the insured had sent his pre-
miums by mail to defendant in Texas. The plaintiff obtained
a default judgment in a California state court against the
nonresident insurance company and brought an action to
enforce the judgment in Texas, where the Texas courts re-
fused to give full faith and credit to the California decree
on the grounds that the California court had not secured
jurisdiction over defendant consistent with due process.
The Supreme Court reversed holding that the California
judgment did not violate due process under the rationale of
International Shoe. The Court said:
"It is sufficient for purposes of due process
that the suit was based on a contract which had
substantial connection with that State .
. .
The contract was delivered in California, the
premiums were mailed from there and the insured
was a resident of that state when he died. It
cannot be denied that California has a manifest
interest in providing effective means of redress
for its residents when their insurers refuse to
pay claims. These residents would be at a severe
disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to
hold it legally accountable. When claims were
small or moderate individual claimants frequently
could not afford the cost of bringing an action
in a foreign forum--thus in effect making the
company judgment proof. Often the crucial wit-
nesses--as here on the company's defense of sui-
cide--will be found in the insured's locality."
McGee. 355 U.S. at 223.
Thus, - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n w a s u p h e l d i n McGee where t h e
in

o n l y c o n t a c t t h e n o n r e s i d e n t had w i t h t h e forum s t a t e w a s

t h e i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t sued upon, and where no e v i d e n c e w a s

p r e s e n t e d t h a t any a g e n t o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e d e f e n d a n t

was e v e r i n t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a . "However, where d e f e n -

d a n t ' s contacts with the state a r e not s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y

t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of f a i r p l a y and s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e , -
in

personam j u r i s d i c t i o n may n o t be s e c u r e d o v e r him t h r o u g h

long-arm s e r v i c e . " 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1] at

4-414, c i t i n g Hanson v. Denckla ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 235, 78

S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283. Hanson, d e c i d e d a y e a r a f t e r

McGee, r e p r e s e n t s a l i m i t a t i o n t o t h e Supreme C o u r t ' s e a r l i e r

h o l d i n g s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe and M c G e e .

I n Hanson, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e n i e d a

F l o r i d a c o u r t ' s a s s e r t i o n o f j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r a Delaware

t r u s t and s t a t e d : ". . .it i s e s s e n t i a l i n each case t h a t

t h e r e be some a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t p u r p o s e f u l l y a v a i l s

i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of c o n d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e

forum S t a t e , t h u s i n v o k i n g t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n of

i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253. I n Hanson a r e s i d e n t o f Penn-

s y l v a n i a c r e a t e d a t r u s t , naming a Delaware t r u s t company a s

trustee. The s e t t l o r r e t a i n e d a l i f e e s t a t e and r e s e r v e d a

power of a p p o i n t m e n t o v e r t h e remainder. She s u b s e q u e n t l y

became a r e s i d e n t o f F l o r i d a , where s h e e x e c u t e d an i n t e r

v i v o s power of a p p o i n t m e n t o v e r a p o r t i o n of t h e r e m a i n d e r

and made o u t a w i l l a p p o i n t i n g t h e b a l a n c e of t h e t r u s t

corpus t o her executrix. When t h e s e t t l o r d i e d i n F l o r i d a ,

t h e q u e s t i o n a r o s e a s t o whether t h e a s s e t s a p p o i n t e d i n t e r
v i v o s s h o u l d have p a s s e d under d e c e d e n t ' s w i l l , s i n c e t h e

i n t e r v i v o s a p p o i n t m e n t would have been i n v a l i d under F l o r i d a
law a s an a t t e m p t e d t e s t a m e n t a r y d i s p o s i t i o n . A declaratory

judgment a c t i o n was b r o u g h t i n F l o r i d a t o r e s o l v e t h i s

issue.

The Delaware t r u s t company w a s g i v e n n o t i c e a s r e q u i r e d

by t h e F l o r i d a s t a t u t e s d e a l i n g w i t h c o n s t r u c t i v e s e r v i c e .

The Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d t h e F l o r i d a c o u r t ' s a d j u d i c a t i o n

o f t h e m a t t e r , h o l d i n g t h a t under F l o r i d a l a w t h e Delaware

t r u s t company was a n i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a r t y o v e r which t h e

F l o r i d a c o u r t s had n o t o b t a i n e d - personam j u r i s d i c t i o n .
in

The Supreme C o u r t concluded t h e r e were i n s u f f i c i e n t c o n t a c t s

l i n k i n g t h e t r u s t company t o t h e forum s t a t e . The m a j o r i t y
o p i n i o n i n Hanson s t a t e d :

" I n McGee t h e C o u r t n o t e d t h e t r e n d of expanding
-
personal -u r i s d i c t i o n over nonresidents
j .
. .
But i t i s a m i s t a k e t o assume t h a t t h i s t r e n d
h e r a l d s t h e e v e n t u a l demise of a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s
on t h e p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of s t a t e c o u r t s . . .
Those r e s t r i c t i o n s are more t h a n a g u a r a n t e e of
immunity from i n c o n v e n i e n t o r d i s t a n t l i t i g a t i o n .
They a r e a consequence of t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t a t i o n s
on t h e power o f t h e r e s p e c t i v e S t a t e s . However
minimal t h e burden o f d e f e n d i n g i n a f o r e i g n
t r i b u n a l , a d e f e n d a n t may n o t be c a l l e d upon t o
do s o u n l e s s he h a s had t h e 'minimal c o n t a c t s '
with t h a t S t a t e t h a t a r e a prerequisite t o i t s
e x e r c i s e of power o v e r him. . .
"We f a i l t o f i n d s u c h c o n t a c t s i n t h e circum-
s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e . The d e f e n d a n t t r u s t company
h a s no o f f i c e i n F l o r i d a , and t r a n s a c t s no bus-
i n e s s there. None o f t h e t r u s t a s s e t s h a s e v e r
been h e l d o r a d m i n i s t e r e d i n F l o r i d a , and t h e re-
c o r d d i s c l o s e s no s o l i c i t a t i o n o f b u s i n e s s i n t h a t
S t a t e e i t h e r i n p e r s o n o r by m a i l . . .
"The c a u s e of a c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e i s n o t one t h a t
a r i s e s o u t o f a n a c t done o r t r a n s a c t i o n consum-
mated i n t h e forum S t a t e . I n t h a t r e s p e c t , i t
d i f f e r s from McGee v . I n t e r n a t i o n a l L i f e I n s . Co.,
355 U . S . 2 2 0 , 7 8 S . C t . 1 9 9 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223, and
the cases there c i t e d . . .
"In contrast, t h i s action involves the v a l i d i t y
of a n agreement t h a t was e n t e r e d w i t h o u t any
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e forum S t a t e . The agreement
w a s e x e c u t e d i n Delaware by a t r u s t company i n c o r -
p o r a t e d i n t h a t S t a t e and a s e t t l o r d o m i c i l e d i n
P e n n s y l v a n i a . The f i r s t r e l a t i o n s h i p F l o r i d a
had t o t h e agreement w a s y e a r s l a t e r when t h e
 s e t t l o r became d o m i c i l e d t h e r e , and t h e t r u s t e e
r e m i t t e d t h e t r u s t income t o h e r i n t h a t S t a t e .
From F l o r i d a M r s . Donner c a r r i e d on s e v e r a l b i t s
of t r u s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t may be compared t o
t h e m a i l i n g of premiums i n NcGee. But t h e r e c o r d
d i s c l o s e s no i n s t a n c e i n which t h e t r u s t e e p e r -
formed any a c t s i n F l o r i d a t h a t b e a r t h e same re-
l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e agreement a s t h e s o l i c i t a t i o n i n
McGee. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h i s s u i t c a n n o t be s a i d t o
b e one t o e n f o r c e a n o b l i g a t i o n t h a t a r o s e from a
p r i v i l e g e t h e defendant exercised i n Florida. ..
"The e x e c u t i o n i n F l o r i d a of t h e powers of a p p o i n t -
ment under which t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s and a p p o i n t e e s
claim does n o t give Florida a s u b s t a n t i a l connection
w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t on which t h i s s u i t i s based . ..
The u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of t h o s e who c l a i m some
r e l a t i o n s h i p with a nonresident defendant cannot
s a t i s f y t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of c o n t a c t w i t h t h e forum
S t a t e . The a p p l i c a t i o n of t h a t r u l e w i l l v a r y
w i t h t h e q u a l i t y and n a t u r e of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
a c t i v i t y , b u t i t i s e s s e n t i a l i n e a c h case t h a t
t h e r e be some a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t pur-
p o s e f u l l y a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e o f con-
d u c t i n g a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e forum S t a t e , t h u s
i n v o k i n g t h e b e n e f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of i t s laws.
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe Co. v . S t a t e of Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 1 5 4 , 159, 90 L.Ed.
95." 357 U.S. a t 250-253.

Defendant a d v o c a t e s t h a t Hanson i s d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s

a p p e a l , a p p a r e n t l y on t h e grounds t h a t a l l of h i s i n i t i a l

c o n t a c t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e Western Conference of Teamsters

P e n s i o n T r u s t Fund w e r e n o t w i t h Colorado, b u t were e i t h e r

w i t h Montana o r w i t h t h e S t a t e of Washington, t h e s i t u s of

the trust. I t i s t r u e t h a t a l l of t h e i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s con-

c e r n i n g t h e t r u s t e s t a b l i s h e d i n Hanson were e i t h e r i n Penn-

s y l v a n i a , where t h e s e t t l o r r e s i d e d a t t h e t i m e t h e t r u s t

w a s c r e a t e d , o r i n Delaware, t h e s i t u s of t h e t r u s t , r a t h e r

t h a n i n F l o r i d a , where t h e s e t t l o r r e s i d e d a t t h e t i m e s h e

e x e r c i s e d h e r power of a p p o i n t m e n t and a t t h e t i m e of h e r

death. T h a t f a c t , however, w a s n o t d i s p o s i t i v e i n Hanson,

where t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e F l o r i d a

c o u r t had no p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e t r u s t e e and no

j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e t r u s t based on a f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e

w e r e no "minimum c o n t a c t s " between t h e Delaware t r u s t e e and
t h e forum s t a t e o f F l o r i d a , e i t h e r i n i t i a l l y o r a t any

subsequent time.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , Hanson h a s a b e a r i n g on t h e outcome of

t h i s appeal. I n both cases, the nonresident defendant

( W i l l i e F i g g i n s i n t h i s c a s e , t h e Delaware t r u s t e e i n

Hanson) h a s no o f f i c e i n t h e forum s t a t e (Colorado i n t h i s

c a s e , F l o r i d a i n Hanson), h a s no a s s e t s t h e r e , t r a n s a c t s no

b u s i n e s s t h e r e , and h a s n o t s o l i c i t e d b u s i n e s s i n t h e forum

state. I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e cause of a c t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t

a p p e a l a r i s e s o u t o f W i l l i e F i g g i n s ' f a i l u r e t o make e m -

p l o y e r c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e Colorado bank, w h i l e i n Hanson

t h e C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t t h e c a u s e . o f a c t i o n was n o t one t h a t

a r o s e o u t o f an a c t done o r a t r a n s a c t i o n consummated i n t h e

forum s t a t e , s i n c e t h e Delaware t r u s t w a s n o t e s t a b l i s h e d i n

F l o r i d a and had no c o n n e c t i o n w i t h F l o r i d a , d e s p i t e t h e

u n i l a t e r a l a c t i v i t y of t h e s e t t l o r i n F l o r i d a and t h e

t r u s t e e ' s r e m i t t a n c e o f t r u s t income t o h e r i n t h a t s t a t e .

"The c o n t a c t s r e q u i r e d upon which t o b a s e j u r i s d i c t i o n ,

c o n s i s t e n t w i t h due p r o c e s s , would be g r e a t e r where t h e

a c t i o n i s b r o u g h t upon a c l a i m n o t a r i s i n g from t h e s e con-

t a c t s w i t h t h e s t a t e , t h a n where t h e a c t i o n d o e s a r i s e from

t h e s t a t e contacts." 2 Moore's F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e 114.41-1[1]

a t 4-414. S e e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Shoe, s u p r a , and P e r k i n s v .

Benguet C o n s o l i d a t e d Mining Co. ( 1 9 5 2 ) , 342 U.S. 437, 72

S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485. S t i l l , d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t of s e n d i n g

c h e c k s t o Colorado c a n be compared w i t h t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e

Hanson t r u s t e e i n r e m i t t i n g t r u s t income t o t h e s e t t l o r i n

F l o r i d a , and i t must be remembered t h a t i n Hanson t h e C o u r t

h e l d t h a t t h e r e was no a c t by which t h e d e f e n d a n t t r u s t e e

"purposely a v a i l s i t s e l f of t h e p r i v i l e g e of conducting

a c t i v i t i e s w i t h i n t h e forum s t a t e , t h u s i n v o k i n g t h e bene-

f i t s and p r o t e c t i o n s of i t s laws." 357 U.S. a t 253.
 Applying the rules enunciated in International Shoe,
McGee and Hanson to the present case, it does not appear
that defendant Willie Figgins had sufficient "minimum
contacts" to subject him to the jurisdiction of the Colorado
court. It would be unfair to this defendant and unreason-
able to require him to defend in Colorado where his only
contact with that forum was to mail thirty-five checks to a
Denver Bank. Willie Figgins has no offices in Colorado,
does no contracting work in Colorado, solicits no business
there, and does not have a Colorado bank account. By his
act of merely sending checks to plaintiff's bank in Colorado,
he has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting business within that forum, and he has not there-
by invoked the benefits and protections of its laws. Conse-
quently, there is no rationale to justify subjecting him to
Colorado ' s jurisdiction.
In support of this conclusion are holdings from the
courts of other states which state that merely making pay-
ments in a state does not establish the requisite minimum
contacts to satisfy due process. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc.
v. Burt (Tex. 1977), 553 S.W.2d 760, 763, cert. denied 434
U.S. 1063; Freedom Finance Co. v. Berry (N.J.Super. 1972),
62 N.J. 256,
290 A.2d 298, affVd/300 A.2d 341; "Automatic" Sprinkler
Corp. v. Seneca Foods Corp. (1972), 361 Mass. 441, 280
N.E.2d 423. Compare Tucker v. Vista Financial Corp. (1977),
Colo. , 560 P.2d 453, holding that California
could properly exercise jurisdiction over a resident of
Colorado whose sole contact with California was that in
Colorado she co-signed a promissory note payable in Cali-
fornia to a California bank and authorized funds to be
disbursed in California.
 The Montana contractor did not knowingly consent to
Colorado - personam jurisdiction.
in In the collective bar-
gaining compliance agreement which he signed with the
Western Conference of Teamsters, located in Seattle, Washing-
ton, defendant agreed to be bound by the articles of trust
contained in the pension trust fund. One provision of the
articles of trust stated that the county in which the employer
contribution is payable as designated by the Administrator
of the trust fund "shall be a proper county in which to
institute legal proceedings to collect delinquent Employer
Contributions." Neither the collective bargaining compliance
agreement nor the articles of trust specified where the
employer contributions were to be paid. They were paid to
the Colorado bank by defendant upon receipt of subsequent
instructions from the Trust Administrator. In the collec-
tive bargaining compliance agreement, however, defendant
also agreed to execute all necessary forms, one of which is
the employer's monthly report which designates the deposi-
tory bank.
The general rule is that "parties to a contract may
agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given
court . . ." National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent (1964),
375 U.S. 311, 316, 84 S.Ct. 411, 11 L.Ed.2d 354. In this
case, however, the courts of Colorado could not exercise -
in
personam jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with due
process, so that any purported consent to Colorado's juris-
diction would amount to a waiver of the constitutional right
to due process and would have to be evaluated in that light
and by the tests applicable to a waiver of constitutional
rights. The defendant contractor in this case could not
have known that the agreement which he signed would subject
him to the jurisdiction of Colorado courts because there was
nothing in the collective bargaining compliance agreement or
in the articles of trust that specified the jurisdiction as
to which he waived his constitutional due process rights.
Hence, there was no clear waiver of his due process rights
as required by Fuentes v. Shevin (1972), 407 U.S. 67, 95, 92
S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556. Compare Clinic Masters v.
District Court (1976), Colo. I 556 P.2d 473. As
stated in Telephonic, Inc. v. Rosenblum (1975), 88 N.M. 532,
543 P.2d 825, 830: "An agreement to waive this constitu-
tional right must be deliberately and understandingly made,
and language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must
clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of
this right."
To accept the respondent's argument that the defendant
here contractually consented to be sued in Colorado would be
to give the respondent carte blanche to use contracts of
adhesion to establish a right to sue defendants wherever
would be most convenient to respondents, and least con-
venient to defendants. The contractual provisions purport-
ing to waive - personam jurisdiction are unreasonable and
in
unenforceable.
Furthermore, defendant did not waive his rights as to
Colorado jurisdiction. The Compliance Agreement, which
Willie Figgins signed, and Trust Agreement, to which he was
bound, do not state specifically the county and state where
legal proceedings are to be instituted. By subsequently re-

ceiving a notice to send payments to Colorado and by accom-
modating the Trust Administrator by mailing payments to
Colorado, defendant did not deliberately, understandingly,
clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously consent to the
jurisdiction of the State of Colorado.
 The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the
cause is dismissed. The matter is remanded to the District
Court so that proceedings may be had to determine costs and
reasonable attorney fees for the services of defendant's
attorneys and assessment of the same against plaintiff.
I

I
I
Justice

We concur:

a&-8
Chief Justice
wa4.

%A: Justices