No. 81-217
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981
ROBER W. DVORAK and PATRICIA J. DVORAK,
Plaintiffs and Respondents and
Cross-Appellants,
HUNTLEY PROJECT IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
JOHN PROPP and NORMAN MAYNARD,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone
Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Harwood, Galles & Gunderson, Billings, Montana
Anderson, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull & Jones, Billings,
Montana
Rockwood Brown argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondents:
Keefer, Roybal, Hanson, Stacey and Jarussi, Billings,
Montana
Calvin J. Stacey argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: October 26, 1981
Decided : bft '2 3
i
~4
Filed: DEc 2s " 8
i2
M r . Chief J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
I n an a c t i o n for damages a g a i n s t a n irrigation district
a n d two o f i t s e m p l o y e e s f o r r e f u s a l to p r o v i d e i r r i g a t i o n water
t o plaintif fs' farm, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a w a r d e d p l a i n t i f f s com-
p e n s a t o r y and p u n i t i v e damages i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h a j u r y v e r d i c t .
In a post-trial order, t h e District Court vacated t h e award o f
p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a g a i n s t t h e i r r i g a t i o n d i s t r i c t and d e n i e d a new
trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
On A p r i l 2 3 , 1 9 7 6 , p l a i n t i f f s Roger and Ann Dvorak f i l e d
a damage action in the District Court of Yellowstone County
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s H u n t l e y P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t and two of
i t s employees, Norman Maynard, its manager, and John Propp, a
ditch rider. Plaintiffs sought actual damages for their crop
losses i n 1 9 7 4 and 1 9 7 5 a n d p u n i t i v e damages o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 a g a i n s t
each of t h e s e defendants. The d e f e n d a n t s c r o s s - c l a i m e d f o r puni-
t i v e damages a g a i n s t p l a i n t i f f Roger D v o r a k .
On November 7, 1980, the jury returned a verdict for
plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 compensatory damages and
$40,000 punitive damages against each of the three defendants.
The j u r y d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t s ' cross-claim against plaintiff Roger
Dvorak f o r p u n i t i v e damages.
Thereafter, defendants moved for a new trial. The
District Court struck the award of punitive damages against
defendant Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n District and denied a new
trial.
Defendants appeal from d e n i a l of t h e i r motion f o r a new
t r i a l and p l a i n t i f f s c r o s s - a p p e a l from t h a t p a r t o f the District
C o u r t ' s o r d e r s t r i k i n g t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 p u n i t i v e damages award a g a i n s t
defendant Huntley P r o j e c t I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t .
W e r e s t a t e t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l o r c r o s s - a p p e a l in
t h i s manner:
1. Did t h e manner of drawing the preselected jury list
for this trial violate sections 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA,
thereby denying appellants' right to a trial before a jury
s e l e c t e d i n t h e manner p r o v i d e d by l a w ?
2. Were e m p l o y e e s Maynard and P r o p p exempt o r immune from
a p u n i t i v e damage j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t them?
3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e
damage award against Huntley Project Irrigation District?
The p a r t i e s ' sub-issues w i l l be d i s c u s s e d u n d e r t h e p r i n -
c i p a l i s s u e s set f o r t h above t o t h e e x t e n t n e c e s s a r y f o r d e t e r -
mination of t h i s appeal.
The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e manner i n which
t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d t h e a p p l i c a b l e Montana s t a t u t e s .
The s t a t u t e s i n q u e s t i o n are as f o l l o w s :
" 25-7-202. t o draw
Judge -- c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g
ballots. When a n i s s u e o f f a c t t o be t r i e d b y a
j u r y is b r o u g h t t o t r i a l , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e i n
t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t must
o p e n l y d r a w o u t o f t h e t r i a l j u r o r box as many
o f t h e c a p s u l e s c o n t a i n i n g b a l l o t s w i t h t h e names
o f j u r o r s t h e r e o n , o n e a f t e r a n o t h e r , as a r e s u f -
f i c i e n t to form a jury."
"25-7-204. - -o f d r a w i n g c a p s u l e s .
Mode Before the
f i r s t c a p s u l e c o n t a i n i n g a b a l l o t s h a l l have
b e e n d r a w n , t h e box m u s t be c l o s e d and w e l l s h a -
ken so a s t o t h o r o u g h l y mix t h e c a p s u l e s
therein. The d i s t r i c t j u d g e m u s t d r a w a c a p s u l e
containing a ballot with the juror's name
t h e r e o n t h r o u g h a n a p e r t u r e made i n t h e l i d
l a r g e e n o u g h o n l y to a d m i t h i s hand c o n v e n i e n t l y
a n d w i t h o u t s a i d j u d g e g a z i n g i n t o s a i d box
b e f o r e or w h i l e d r a w i n g s a i d c a p s u l e ."
The s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s s e t o u t a b o v e were n o t f o l l o w e d
i n t h i s case. Instead, a deputy c l e r k of c o u r t removed p a p e r
s l i p s , n o t i n c a p s u l e s , from a metal box. The d e p u t y c l e r k d i d
not shake the box before the names were drawn. The names
d r a w n by t h e d e p u t y c l e r k were p l a c e d on a list t h a t w a s not
d r a w n by l o t p r i o r t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g o f t h e t r i a l j u r y . Finally,
t h e most important departure from t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e took
p l a c e when t h e d e p u t y c l e r k d r e w t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s ' names
f r o m t h e metal box o u t s i d e t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e d i s t r i c t judge.
This procedure violated t h e fundamental purpose of these
statutes, viz. t o i n s u r e random s e l e c t i o n o f t r i a l j u r o r s b y l o t
from t h e e n t i r e p a n e l o r array. The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t of
encapsulating the ballots containing the jurorst names and
t h o r o u g h l y s h a k i n g t h e box b e f o r e d r a w i n g is t h e s t a t u t o r y method
f o r a c h i e v i n g random s e l e c t i o n . The s t a t u t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t
t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e d r a w t h e names o f the jurors i n the presence
o f t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t is to i n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s
are followed. The s t a t u t o r y v i o l a t i o n s h e r e d e f e a t e d t h e o b j ec-
t i v e o f i n s u r i n g random s e l e c t i o n .
I n S t a t e v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t County o f S i l v e r BOW ( 1 9 ~ 9 1 3~
) 6
Mont. 3 5 4 , 348 p.2d 1 4 3 , t h i s C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of
following the jU ~ Y select i o n statutes and held,
"It is not the r i g h t of the individual
n e c e s s a r i l y involved, but r a t h e r the e n t i r e jury
s y s t e m and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h m u s t
b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a s h o w i n g i s t i m e l y
b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s c o u r t w e would be remiss i n
o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n or
d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e
legislature." 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 .
This Court reaffirmed the requirement that the District
C o u r t f o l l o w t h e s t a t u t o r y m a n d a t e o f j u r y s e l e c t i o n i n S t a t e v.
F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 1 7 4 , 5 6 9 P.2d 3 8 3 , when w e s t a t e d :
" . .. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a l l d u t i e s d e l e g a t e d to
t h e j u r y c o m m i s s i o n and d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e
were p e r f o r m e d b y t h e c l e r k o f c o u r t w i t h o u t a n y
apparent overseeing. W h i l e w e h a v e no c a u s e t o
q u e s t i o n t h e good f a i t h of t h e p u b l i c o f f i c e r s
i n v o l v e d , it is o b v i o u s t h e s t a t u t o r y scheme f o r
s e l e c t i n g and d r a w i n g a j u r y w a s c o m p l e t e l y
circumvented. The r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t
j u r i e s m u s t be s e l e c t e d and drawn i n s u b s t a n t i a l
compliance with the l a w . Where t h e d i s r e g a r d
f o r l e g i s l a t i v e m a n d a t e s a m o u n t s t o more t h a n
t e c h n i c a l i r r e g u l a r i t y s u b s t a n t i a l compliance
h a s n o t been achieved." 569 P.2d a t 389.
Respondents contend t h a t t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n process used
by the D i s t r i c t Court i n t h i s case w a s t y p i c a l of that court.
Therefore, respondents contend that counsel for the District
s h o u l d h a v e known t h e p r o c e d u r e and o b j e c t e d to t h e j u r y selec-
t i o n p r o c e s s i m m e d i a t e l y and h e s h o u l d n o t h a v e w a i t e d until a
week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t had been e n t e r e d t o make h i s o b j e c t i o n
known.
The basic flaw in this contention is that counsel for
t h e I r r i g a t i o n District did not discover the discrepancies i n the
jury selection process u n t i l a week a f t e r t h e t r i a l . Further,
c o u n s e l had no r e a s o n , p r i o r to h i s i n q u i r i e s , to s u s p e c t t h a t
the s t a t u t o r y procedures were not being followed. In other
w o r d s , t h e "means o f k n o w l e d g e " were n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r c o u n s e l to
o b j e c t b e f o r e or d u r i n g t h e t r i a l .
I n L e d g e r v . ~ c ~ e n z i( 1 9 3 8 ) r 1 0 7 Mont. 3 3 5 , 8 5 P.2d
e 352,
t h i s Court d i s c u s s e d t h e n e c e s s i t y of o b j e c t i n g t o t h e impaneling
of a jury in a timely manner. This Court held:
" . . . t h a t i f c o u n s e l does n o t have t h e
knowledge, o r means o f knowledge, of the
i r r e g u l a r i t y i n t h e drawing of t h e j u r y , o r t h e
p a n e l from w h i c h it is s e l e c t e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e
v e r d i c t , t h e q u e s t i o n may be r a i s e d f o r t h e
f i r s t t i m e on m o t i o n f o r new t r i a l . " 8 5 P.2d
353.
I n t h i s c a s e , c o u n s e l had a r i g h t to r e l y on t h e j u d g e and
c l e r k t o follow their statutory duties. The f a c t t h a t no a c t u a l
p r e j u d i c e h a s b e e n shown i s i r r e l e v a n t . Whether a d i f f e r e n t ver-
dict would have resulted had the statutory procedures been
followed is purely speculative, conjectural and impossible to
determine. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t went w e l l beyond a mere t e c h n i c a l
departure from the jury selection statutes and this type of
d e p a r t u r e n e c e s s i t a t e s t h e r e v e r s a l o f t h e v e r d i c t and a r e t r i a l
w i t h a j u r y s e l e c t e d i n t h e p r o p e r manner.
To a s s i s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o n r e t r i a l , we w i l l d e t e r m i n e
two o t h e r i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h i s a p p e a l .
The second issue presented by the District is w h e t h e r
defendants Propp and Maynard are exempt and immune from the
e x e m p l a r y and p u n i t i v e damages awarded a g a i n s t them. The Irri-
gation District contends that because of s e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and
2-9-105, MCA, Maynard and P r o p p are n o t l i a b l e f o r t h e $ 4 0 , 0 0 0
e x e m p l a r y award.
S e c t i o n s 2-9-104 and - 1 0 5 , MCA, d o n o t a p p l y to i n d i v i d u a l
d e f e n d a n t s b u t t o t h e s t a t e and g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s . The sec-
t i o n o f C h a p t e r 9 t h a t a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s is s e c t i o n
2-9-305 , MCA, which p r o v i d e s :
"Governmental e n t i t y to be j o i n e d a s defendant--
immunization and i n d e m n z i c a t i o n o f employees.
(1) I t is t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s e c t i o n t o p r o v i d e
- -
f o r t h e i m m u n i z a t i o n and i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n o f
p u b l i c o f f i c e r s and e m p l o y e e s s u e d f o r t h e i r
a c t i o n s o t h e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s
a c t s , t a k e n w i t h i n t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f t h e i r
employment.
" ( 2 ) I n a n a c t i o n b r o u g h t a g a i n s t any employee
o f a s t a t e , c o u n t y , c i t y , town, or o t h e r govern-
m e n t a l e n t i t y f o r a n e g l i g e n t a c t , e r r o r , or
omission or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e conduct of t h e
employee committed w h i l e a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e
c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s o f f i c e or e m p l o y m e n t ,
t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r s h a l l be made a
p a r t y defendant t o the action.
" ( 3 ) Recovery a g a i n s t a governmental e n t i t y
under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of p a r t s 1 through 3 o f
t h i s c h a p t e r s h a l l c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p l e t e b a r to
a n y a c t i o n o r r e c o v e r y o f damages b y t h e
c l a i m a n t , b y r e a s o n o f t h e same s u b j e c t m a t t e r ,
a g a i n s t t h e e m p l o y e e whose n e g l i g e n c e o r wrong-
f u l a c t , e r r o r , o r o m i s s i o n or o t h e r a c t i o n a b l e
c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e claim. I n any such
action against a governmental entity, the
e m p l o y e e whose c o n d u c t g a v e r i s e t o t h e s u i t
s h a l l be immune from s u i t by r e a s o n s o f t h e same
s u b j e c t matter if the governmental entity
a c k n o w l e d g e s or i s bound b y a j u d i c i a l d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n t h a t t h e c o n d u c t upon which t h e claim
i s b r o u g h t a r i s e s o u t o f t h e c o u r s e and s c o p e o f
s u c h e m p l o y e e s 1 e m p l o y m e n t , u n l e s s t h e c l a i m is
b a s e d upon a n i n t e n t i o n a l t o r t or f e l o n i o u s a c t
o f t h e employee.
"(4) I n a n y a c t i o n i n which a governmental
e n t i t y e m p l o y e e is a p a r t y d e f e n d a n t , the
e m p l o y e e s h a l l be i n d e m n i f i e d b y t h e governmen-
t a l e n t i t y e m p l o y e r f o r a n y money j u d g m e n t s or
l e g a l e x p e n s e s t o w h i c h he may be s u b j e c t as a
r e s u l t o f t h e s u i t u n l e s s t h e c o n d u c t upon which
t h e claim is b r o u g h t d i d n o t a r i s e o u t o f t h e
c o u r s e and s c o p e o f h i s employment or i s a n
intentional tort o r f e l o n i o u s act of tG
employee ." ( ~ p ha m i s a d d e d . )
s
Under t h i s s e c t i o n , i n d i v i d u a l d e f e n d a n t s a r e immune from
b e i n g s u e d f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s u n l e s s t h e i r a c t is i n t e n t i o n a l o r
felonious. S e c t i o n 2-9-305(1), MCA. The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t
c o n t e n d s t h a t t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t s p e c u l a t e as t o w h e t h e r t h e j u r y ,
in their verdict, had f o u n d P r o p p and Maynard t o h a v e c o m m i t t e d
an intentional tort.
The o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was b a s e d upon t h e v i o l a t i o n of sec-
tion 85-7-1911(1), MCA, which states in pertinent part:
"The b o a r d o f c o m m i s s i o n e r s s h a l l a p p o r t i o n t h e
water f o r i r r i g a t i o n among t h e l a n d s i n t h e
d i s t r i c t i n a j u s t and e q u i t a b l e manner . . ."
The j u r y found that t h e D i s t r i c t had v i o l a t e d t h i s s e c t i o n and
t h a t P r o p p and Maynard b y t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l a c t s had a l s o v i o l a t e d
t h i s section. T h e r e was a c l e a r v i o l a t i o n o f a s t a t u t o r y duty
when t h e D i s t r i c t , t h r o u g h t h e a c t s o f P r o p p and Maynard, failed
t o p r o v i d e water t o t h e D v o r a k s . to
The " a c t " o f f a i l i n g - p r o v i d e
-
water - - i- case w a s a r g u a b l y - i n t e n t i o n a l a c t a n d a s s u c h
in th s - an
it
- would j u s t i f y - award - p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s . S e c t i o n 27-8-221,
an of
I
MCA.
The I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t c o n t e n d s t h a t no showing o f a c t u a l
malice was made and t h e r e f o r e t h e p u n i t i v e damage award a g a i n s t
P r o p p and Maynard c a n n o t s t a n d . I n F i r s t S e c . Bank o f Bozeman v .
Goddard (1979) ---- Mont ---- . I 5 9 3 P.2d 1040, 1048-10491 36
St.Rep. 8 5 4 , 864-865, t h i s Court held:
" I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o show a c t u a l m a l i c e t o
r e c o v e r p u n i t i v e damages. Kwmk+w+ v. H o l i d a y ' N a r r ; n q i ? - 0 ~
P.2d 5 7 8 , 3 5 S t . R e p . 46.
.
R a m b l e r C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , ----Mon t ---- I 5 7 5
F r a u d or malice may be
Y
a c t u a l or presumed. S e c t i o n 17-208, R.C.M.
1 9 4 7 , now s e c t i o n 27-1-221, MCA. I m p l i e d malice
may be shown b y p r o o f t h a t d e f e n d a n t e n g a g e d i n
a c o u r s e o f c o n d u c t knowing i t to be h a r m f u l and
unlawful. Ferguson v. Town Pump, I n c . v.
Wallace D i t e m a n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , .
Mon t I 580 P.2d
9 1 5 , 9 2 1 , 35 S t . R e p . 8 2 4 , 8 3 1 ; Miller v . Fox
(1977)1 Mon t . , 5 7 1 P.2d 8 0 4 , 34 S t . R e p .
1 3 6 7 ; C a s h i n v. N o r t h e r n p a c i f i c R a i l w a y Company
( 1 9 3 4 ) 96 Mont. 9 2 , 28 P.2d 8 6 2 .
"'Malice-in-law' is imp1 i e d where the
."
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t is u n j u s t i f i a b l e
Here , P r o p p and Maynard s cond u c t was a r g u a b l y un j u s t i-
f i a b l e i n t h a t t h e y i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e water to t h e
Dvoraks' farm. T h e i r a c t i o n s , i f b e l i e v e d by t h e j u r y , a r e suf-
f i c i e n t t o c o n s t i t u t e a v i o l a t i o n s u b j e c t i n g them to l i a b i l i t y
f o r p u n i t i v e damages.
The Dvoraks have cross-appealed, alleging that the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o m m i t t e d error by s t r i k i n g t h e p u n i t i v e damage
award a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t . They p r e s e n t s e v e r a l c o n t e n t i o n s b u t
w e need o n l y t o d i s c u s s w h e t h e r Montana l a w p r o v i d e d f o r g o v e r n -
mental immunity at the time this a c tion arose.
T h i s a c t i o n arose i n and is l i m i t e d to t h e summer o f 1 9 7 4 ,
a f a c t t h a t was s t i p u l a t e d to by b o t h p a r t i e s . The 1 9 7 2 Montana
C o n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d e s i n S e c t i o n 1 8 , A r t i c l e 11:
" S e c t i o n 1 8 . S t a t e s u b j e c t t o s u i t . The s t a t e ,
c o u n t i e s , c i t i e s , t o w n s , and a l l o t h e r l o c a l
g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t i e s s h a l l h a v e no immunity
f r o m s u i t f o r i n j u r y t o a p e r s o n or p r o p e r t y ,
e x c e p t as may be s p e c i f i c a l l y p r o v i d e d b y l a w b y
a 2/3 v o t e o f e a c h h o u s e of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ."
The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t p r o v i d e immunity f o r c e r t a i n s t a t e and
governmental entities until it enacted sections 2-9-104 and
2-9-105, MCA, in 1977. These s t a t u t e s do not a p p l y to this
a c t i o n and c a n n o t be a p p l i e d r e t r o a c t i v e l y . S e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA
provides :
"When laws r e t r o a c t i v e . No l a w c o n t a i n e d i n a n y
--
o f t h e s t a t u t e s o f Montana is r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s
e x p r e s s l y so d e c l a r e d . "
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by s t r i k i n g t h e award o f p u n i t i v e
damages against the Huntley Project Irrigation District.
R e v e r s e d and remanded f o r a new t r i a l .
Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent.
The m a j o r i t y h o l d s t h a t t h e manner i n which t h e j u r y
was s e l e c t e d v i o l a t e d s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204, MCA,
and t h e r e b y a b r i d g e d t h e D i s t r i c t ' s f u n d a m e n t a l . r i g h t s t o a
f a i r and i m p a r t i a l j u r y . The m a j o r i t y r e l i e s upon S t a t e v .
D i s t r i c t C o u r t , C o u n t y o f S i l v e r Bow ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 6 Mont. 354,
348 P.2d 1 4 3 ; Ledger v . MacKenzie ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 0 7 Mont. 3 3 5 , 85
P.2d 352; and S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 4 Mont. 174,
569 P.2d 383. While each of these cases does in fact
discuss the necessity for a D i s t r i c t Court to follow the
s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e s when s e l e c t i n g a j u r y , t h e r e a r e some
i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s between t h e f a c t s i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e
and t h o s e i n t h e c a s e s r e l i e d upon by t h e m a j o r i t y .
In State v. District Court, County o f Silver BOW,
supra, the trial judge failed to follow the statutory
p r o c e d u r e s f o r s e l e c t i n g a j u r y v e n i r e when h e drew s l i p s o f
paper, which were numbered and represented prospective
jurors, from t h e jury box. The slips of paper were not
enclosed i n separate black capsules. The f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w
t h i s s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r e was c h a l l e n g e d by c o u n s e l on t h e
v e r y n e x t d a y , b e f o r e a n y j u r y was a c t u a l l y i m p a n e l e d . This
Court held:
" I t is not t h e r i g h t of t h e individual
necessarily involved, but r a t h e r t h e e n t i r e
j u r y system and t h e s e l e c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s
which m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d , and when a showinq
i s t i m e l y b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t we would
be r e m i s s i n o u r d u t i e s i f we p e r m i t t e d
m a t e r i a l d e v i a t i o n o r d e p a r t u r e from t h e
p r o c e d u r e s s p e l l e d o u t by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . "
(Emphasis added.) 348 P.2d a t 1 4 6 .
The g e n e r a l r u l e a s s e t o u t i n 50 C . J . S . J u r i e s , S175
at 903, emphasizes the timeliness of an objection by
stating, "Objections because of irregularities in drawing or
--------q-----j -- y........................... t h e B u r y-
summonin the u r s h o u l d be m a d e b e f o r e is
impaneled and sworn, and if not so made ordinarily are not
available after verdict on a motion in arrest or for a new
trial." See, State v. Steen, (1916), 29 Id. 337, 158 P.
499. In this case no objection was made by counsel until
one week after the verdict had been entered. This delayed
objection cannot be considered timely, and it begs the
question as to whether counsel would have objected had the
verdict gone the other way.
The District contends, and the majority agrees, that
counsel did not discover the improper method of impaneling
the jury until a week after the trial. They cite Ledger v.
MacKenzie, supra, to support their argument that
irregularities in selection of a jury panel can be objected
to after a verdict has been entered. This is a misinterpre-
tation of the holding Ledger.
Ledger states the general rule that a party who fails
to challenge or object waives an irregularity in the
impaneling of a jury. 85 P.2d at 352. This Court, when
discussing the "knowledge" necessary for a timely objection
held:
"Counsel had the means of knowledge, and
while it may be true that the fact and manner
of the drawing were not brought home to them
personally, nevertheless such means of
knowledge were at their command, and
therefore, these cases do not come within the
rule of the Missouri court." 85 P.2d at 353.
Here, counsel also had the "means of knowledge," for he
merely had to ask, at anytime, how the jury was impaneled.
It is hard to imagine that, if counsel felt that the jury
was not impartial at the time of trial, he would wait until
a week a f t e r t h e v e r d i c t b e f o r e o b j e c t i n g t o t h e i m p a n e l i n g .
S t a t e v. Fitzpatrick, s u p r a , was n o t a r e v e r s a l t h a t
was b a s e d upon t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e n a t u r e o f t h e j u r y s e l e c t i o n
procedure. It was a reminder to the Thirteenth Judicial
District that it shall use and comply with the jury
selection statutes. This Court s a i d , "[wle s t a t e d i n i t i a l l y
t h a t t h i s m a t t e r was n o t p r o p e r l y r a i s e d o n a p p e a l , but it
is of sufficient import to warrant a full discusion for
f u t u r e guidance." 569 P.2d a t 3 8 9 .
H e r e , a s i n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e s e l e c t i o n o f j u r o r s was
n o t i n t o t a l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s e c t i o n s 25-7-202 and 25-7-204,
MCA. However, t h e o b j e c t i o n t o t h e p r o c e d u r e was n o t t i m e l y
and, therefore, should not be the basis of a reversal.
Further, t h e r e h a s b e e n no i n d i c a t i o n t h e j u r y h e a r i n g t h e
c a s e was a n y t h i n g b u t f a i r and i m p a r t i a l .
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