No. 80-390
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS J. STANDING BEAR,
Deceased, by and through CORRINE BILLY,
Personal Representative,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
GERALD BELCOURT, JEAN BELCOURT, and
LEOTA M. STANDING BEAR,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Hill.
Honorable B.W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Altman & Lilletvedt, Havre, Montana
Frank Altman argued, Havre, Montana
For Respondents:
Wm. George Harris, Missoula, Montana
Submitted: June 16, 1981
Decided :
Jd $ .. ICJg!
lg
Filed: \I \\ :\ - 1981
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
Plaintiff is the personal representative of the
e s t a t e of Douglas J. Standing Bear. She a p p e a l s from an
order of the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial
D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f H i l l , d i s m i s s i n g f o r l a c k
of subject matter jurisdiction her action in claim and
d e l i v e r y t o r e c o v e r a r o a d g r a d e r a l l e g e d t o be p r o p e r t y o f
the estate.
D o u g l a s S t a n d i n g Bear was k i l l e d i n a c a r a c c i d e n t on
J u l y 22, 1978. He was, and h i s t h r e e n a t u r a l c h i l d r e n a r e ,
e n r o l l e d members o f t h e Wind R i v e r Arapaho I n d i a n T r i b e i n
Wyoming. H i s wife, d e f e n d a n t Leota M. Standing Bear, and
his adopted daughter, Teresa Standing Bear, are enrolled
members o f t h e Chippewa-Cree T r i b e i n Montana. A t the t i m e
o f h i s d e a t h , d e c e d e n t , h i s w i f e , and t h r e e o f t h e c h i l d r e n
w e r e d o m i c i l e d on t h e Rocky B o y ' s Indian Reservation. The
f o u r t h c h i l d was l i v i n g i n H a v r e , Montana.
On October 1, 1976, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
a p p r o v e d an I n d i a n B u s i n e s s Development G r a n t t o d e c e d e n t i n
t h e amount o f $30,000 f o r t h e p u r c h a s e o f a motor g r a d e r s o
that he could s t a r t a private contracting business. The
g r a n t r e q u i r e d t h a t d e c e d e n t o b t a i n 60 p e r c e n t o f the cost
of the grader from other sources. He applied for and
received a $54,000 loan from the F i r s t National Bank of
H a v r e and a g u a r a n t y f o r t h a t l o a n f r o m t h e S m a l l B u s i n e s s
Administration. The Havre bank obtained a perfected
security interest in the grader. Upon d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h , a
c r e d i t l i f e insurance policy paid the loan balance t o the
bank.
On A u g u s t 9 , 1 9 7 8 , upon a p p l i c a t i o n o f L e o t a S t a n d i n g
Bear (decedent's widow), she was appointed as personal
representative of her husband's estate and jurisdiction
placed in the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial
District, County of Hill. Leota M. Standing Bear was
subsequently restrained by orders of the state District
Court dated April 11, 1 9 7 9 , May 7, 1979, and October 4,
1 9 7 9 , from d i s p o s i n g o f a n y p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e e s t a t e
of Douglas J. Standing Bear. On O c t o b e r 4 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e c o u r t
removed her as personal representative for cause. One o f
the decedent's natural children, Corr ine Billy, was
t h e r e a f t e r appointed p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e s t a t e .
On A u g u s t 2 3 , 1 9 7 8 , L e o t a M . S t a n d i n g Bear p e t i t i o n e d
the Tribal Court of the Chippewa-Cree Tribe and was
appointed administrator of decedent's estate. Subsequent
p r o c e e d i n g s were had in that court by Leota M. Standing
Bear, i n t h e e s t a t e o f D o u g l a s J . S t a n d i n g B e a r , and on J u n e
1 8 , 1979, t h e T r i b a l Court g r a n t e d her ownership of c e r t a i n
a s s e t s o f d e c e d e n t l o c a t e d a t t h a t t i m e on t h a t r e s e r v a t i o n ,
including the Caterpillar motor grader. All of these
p r o c e e d i n g s and o r d e r s w e r e made e x p a r t e w i t h o u t any n o t i c e
t o any i n t e r e s t e d p e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g any of d e c e d e n t ' s o t h e r
heirs or potential heirs.
On March 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e T r i b a l C o u r t made and e n t e r e d
a n o r d e r v a c a t i n g a l l p r i o r o r d e r s made i n t h e m a t t e r o f t h e
estate of Douglas Standing Bear for the reason that the
T r i b a l C o u r t d i d n o t have j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e e s t a t e s i n c e
decedent was not an enrolled member of the Chippewa-Cree
Tribe.
A t t h e time of d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h , t h e r o a d g r a d e r was
l o c a t e d on t h e F o r t Peck I n d i a n R e s e r v a t i o n . I t was moved
t o t h e Rocky B o y ' s Reservation. Defendant Leota Standing
Bear then s o l d t h e grader t o her b r o t h e r , defendant Gerald
Belcourt, f o r $ 1 2 5 , who i n t u r n s o l d i t f o r $70,000 t o an
unknown p a r t y .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t found t h a t o u t o f the proceeds,
B e l c o u r t g a v e L e o t a S t a n d i n g Bear t h e sum o f $ 2 2 , 0 0 0 ; k e p t
$ 6 , 0 0 0 f o r h i m s e l f ; and d e p o s i t e d t h e sum o f $ 4 2 , 0 0 0 i n t h e
Montana Bank o f B r o w n i n g , Montana, i n h i s name and t h a t o f
h i s wife, Jean Belcourt. A l l defendants in this action are
e n r o l l e d members o f t h e Chippewa-Cree T r i b e .
Corrine Billy, as personal representative of the
estate, b r o u g h t a c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n t o r e c o v e r t h e
grader or t h e proceeds of its s a l e . On March 26, 1 9 8 0 , t h e
District Court granted plaintiff a preliminary injunction
which restrained transfer of the grader or its proceeds.
D e f e n d a n t s f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n and a l s o a
motion to quash the preliminary injunction. The court
continued the hearing on those motions to May 28, 1980,
combining t h e h e a r i n g w i t h t h e " p a r e n t " c a s e , P r o b a t e Cause
No. 5 1 5 8 , E s t a t e of D o u g l a s J . S t a n d i n g B e a r , D e c e a s e d .
On J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d t h a t i t had
j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e p r o b a t e proceeding b u t t h a t it lacked
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n . I n denying
jurisdiction, t h e c o u r t noted t h a t t h e s a l e of the grader
t o o k p l a c e on t h e reservation, t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of
t h e p r o c e e d s a r e d e p o s i t e d i n a bank on an I n d i a n r e s e r v a -
tion, and that the Chippewa-Cree Tribal Code claims
j u r i s d i c t i o n of a l l c i v i l s u i t s whenever t h e d e f e n d a n t i s a
tribal member. The District Court concluded that state
j u r i s d i c t i o n would i n t e r f e r e w i t h t r i b a l g o v e r n m e n t and t h a t
p l a i n t i f f ' s remedy was t o s u e i n t h e T r i b a l C o u r t .
P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s t h e f i n a l judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t
Court.
The sole issue presented to this Court on appeal
concerns the subject matter jurisdiction of t h e c l a i m and
d e l i v e r y a c t i o n by t h e s t a t e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d when
i t h e l d it d i d n o t have s u b j e c t m a t t e r jurisdiction of the
c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s . I n Crawford
e t a1. v. Roy ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 227, 577 P.2d 392, this
Court, using the transactional analysis test, held that
t h e r e were sufficient a c t i v i t i e s occurring outside the
r e s e r v a t i o n t o i n v e s t t h e s t a t e c o u r t with j u r i s d i c t i o n and,
a s s u c h , s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n c o u l d n o t be h e l d t o i n f r i n g e on
t h e r i g h t s o f t h e r e s e r v a t i o n I n d i a n s t o make t h e i r own l a w s
and t o be r u l e d by t h e i r own l a w s .
In the instant case, Leota Standing Bear invoked
s t a t e c o u r t j u r i s d i c t i o n when s h e p e t i t i o n e d f o r t h e p r o b a t e
of her deceased husband's e s t a t e . A t t h e t i m e of d e c e d e n t ' s
d e a t h , t h e g r a d e r was n o t l o c a t e d on t h e Rocky B o y ' s R e s e r -
v a t i o n ; and f u r t h e r , d e f e n d a n t s G e r a l d and J e a n B e l c o u r t a r e
r e s i d e n t s o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana. These f a c t s , according
to appellant, are sufficient to meet the transactional
analysis test and, therefore, confer jurisdiction on the
s t a t e court.
There is no federal treaty or statute that has
preempted j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . Furthermore,
t h e T r i b a l Court has n o t , and i s n o t , exercising jurisdic-
tion in this case. Therefore, the Tribal Court has not
preempted Distr i c t Court jur isd i c t i o n but, in fact, has
conceded that jurisdiction lies with the state District
C o u r t and w i l l s u p p o r t and e n f o r c e t h e s t a t e c o u r t ' s f i n a l
order.
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t , by e n t e r i n g i n t o a s a l e o f t h e
grader, respondents committed the torts of fraud and
conversion against appellant. S i n c e s u c h t o r t i o u s a c t s were
directed against an estate being administered in state
c o u r t , and s i n c e s u c h d e l i b e r a t e a c t i o n was t a k e n t o d e p r i v e
the state court of its lawful jurisdiction, i t would be
plain error t o hold that remedial a c t i o n does not lie in
s t a t e court.
Respondents d i d n o t appear i n t h i s Court a t t h e time
set for oral arguments. The brief filed by respondents
indicates the following general position. The state is
p r e c l u d e d by f e d e r a l p r e e m p t i o n and t h e e x e r c i s e o f p l e n a r y
power of the United States over Indian tribes from
exercising jurisdiction in Indian estate and probate
matters. Exclusive jurisdiction over estate and probate
p r o c e e d i n g s r e s p e c t i n g d e s c e n t and d i s t r i b u t i o n o f a s s e t s o f
an Indian is v e s t e d in the S e c r e t a r y of the Interior by
f e d e r a l law. S e e , 25 U.S . C . S372 e t s e q . ; 25 C.F.R. -2
e t seq.; and 43 C.F.R. SS4.200 e t s e q . ; s e e a l s o Pub. L . No.
83-280, 67 STAT 588; 28 U.S.C. S 1 3 6 0 ( b ) ; and S t a t e e x r e l .
Three I r o n s v. Three I r o n s ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mon t . , 6 2 1 P.2d
476, 37 S t . R e p . 2016. Respondents argue t h a t t h e following
reservation "contacts" are s u f f i c i e n t t o defeat s t a t e court
jurisdiction:
1. The p r i n c i p a l h e i r s of Douglas J . S t a n d i n g Bear
r e s i d e d a t t h e t i m e o f h i s d e a t h on t h e Rocky R o y ' s R e s e r v a -
tion;
2. The p r i n c i p a l p l a c e o f business for the grading
s e r v i c e was on t h e Rocky B o y ' s R e s e r v a t i o n ;
3. The c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h e d e c e d e n t u n d e r -
t o o k w e r e w i t h t h e B u r e a u o f I n d i a n A f f a i r s , t o be p e r f o r m e d
on I n d i a n r e s e r v a t i o n s ;
4. The e q u i p m e n t and records of t h e b u s i n e s s were
l o c a t e d on t h e F o r t Peck I n d i a n R e s e r v a t i o n ;
5. The income d e r i v e d from s e r v i c e s performed on
Indian reservations;
6. An administrative law probate proceeding was
ongoing under D a n i e l S. BOOS, A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Law J u d g e , and
b o t h a p p e l l a n t and r e s p o n d e n t s h a v e n o t i c e t h e r e o f ;
7. Under 2 5 C.F.R. SS11.1 e t s e q . , through a Court
of Indian Offenses, any claimed heir may bring suit to
determine heirs and divide decedent' s property and that
decedent's spouse, on A u g u s t 23, 1978, s o u g h t and invoked
j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t ; and
8. More importantly, by o r d e r of March 10, 1980,
jurisdiction over the f i l e d p r o b a t e and e s t a t e p r o c e e d i n g s
was, by the Court of 1ndia.n Offenses, attempted to be
conceded t o t h e s t a t e D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
The b r i e f s and D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e h e r e i n a r e v a g u e
and d i f f i c u l t t o f o l l o w . I t a p p e a r s t h a t on A u g u s t 9 , 1 9 7 8 ,
Leota M. Standing Bear filed an application for informal
appointment of personal representative in intestacy of
decedent's estate with the District Court of the Twelfth
Judicial District. S h e was a p p o i n t e d p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e t h a t same d a y . Two weeks l a t e r , L e o t a a p p l i e d t o t h e
Rocky B o y ' s R e s e r v a t i o n t o have d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e adminis-
tered in the Tribal Court. On A u g u s t 23, 1978, s h e was
a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e e s t a t e i n t h e T r i b a l C o u r t .
On O c t o b e r 4 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t removed L e o t a
a s personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and restrained her from trans-
f e r r i n g o r d i s p o s i n g of t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e e s t a t e . Subse-
q u e n t l y , on May 1 0 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e T r i b a l C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r
v a c a t i n g a l l p r i o r o r d e r s made i n t h e m a t t e r o f the Estate
o f D o u g l a s J . S t a n d i n g Bear f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t i t d i d n o t
h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e e s t a t e b e c a u s e d e c e d e n t was n o t a
member of t h e Chippewa-Cree Tribe. The T r i b a l C o u r t a l s o
conceded j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e s t a t e .
L e o t a was r e s t r a i n e d by o r d e r s o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
d a t e d A p r i l 11, 1 9 7 9 , May 7 , 1 9 7 9 , and O c t o b e r 4 , 1979, from
d i s p o s i n g of any p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e e s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g
t h e g r a d e r which i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s l i t i g a t i o n . However,
a s stated previously, Leota, sometime a f t e r t h e October 4,
1979, o r d e r , s o l d t h e g r a d e r t o h e r b r o t h e r G e r a l d , who i n
turn sold it to a nonresident. On March 14, 1980, the
personal representative, appellant herein, f i l e d an a c t i o n
f o r c l a i m and d e l i v e r y o f t h e g r a d e r .
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A s i m i l a r m o t i o n was a l s o made
i n the probate proceeding. Both m o t i o n s w e r e t r i e d on May
2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , i n s o f a r a s t h e y i n v o l v e d some o f t h e same p a r t i e s
and t h e same f a c t u a l m a t t e r s . On J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e n t e r e d anomalous results . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the probate
proceeding but that it d i d n o t have s u b j e c t m a t t e r juris-
d i c t i o n o v e r t h e c l a i m and d e l i v e r y a c t i o n b e c a u s e s u c h a n
e x e r c i s e would i n t e r f e r e w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t .
In the longstanding case of United S t a t e s ex rel.
Riggs v. J o h n s o n County ( 1 8 6 8 ) , 6 W a l l . 1 6 6 , 1 8 L.Ed. 768,
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : ". .. Jurisdiction
i s d e f i n e d t o be t h e power t o h e a r and d e t e r m i n e t h e s u b j e c t
matter i n c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e s u i t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t , and t h e
r u l e i s u n i v e r s a l , t h a t i f t h e power is conferred t o render
t h e judgment o r e n t e r t h e d e c r e e , i t a l s o i n c l u d e s t h e power
t o i s s u e p r o p e r p r o c e s s t o e n f o r c e s u c h judgment o r d e c r e e
. . ." F u r t h e r m o r e , i n S t a t e ex r e l . E i s e n h a u e r v . D i s t r i c t
C o u r t ( 1 9 1 7 ) , 54 Mont. 1 7 2 , 1 6 8 P. 522, t h i s C o u r t h e l d t h a t
i f a c o u r t h a s t h e power t o make a n o r d e r , it has j u r i s d i c -
tion t o enforce t h a t order.
The purpose of probate is the just and equitable
t r a n s f e r of e s t a t e property t o the proper h e i r s . The D i s -
trict Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
parent probate proceeding. In an a t t e m p t t o p r o t e c t the
estate property, the District Court issued restraining
orders against the decedent's wife, Leota. L e o t a , however,
allegedly violated t h o s e o r d e r s and s o l d t h e g r a d e r , which
was p a r t o f t h e e s t a t e , t o h e r b r o t h e r . Contempt p r o c e e d i n g s
were i n i t i a t e d , b u t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e is v o i d of any
determination of the contempt m a t t e r . In an attempt to
recover the estate property, appellant instituted the
present claim and delivery action. The subject matter
jurisdiction of this action has its roots in the probate
proceedings and, even though f i l e d s e p a r a t e l y , i t i s , none-
t h e l e s s , t h e e n f o r c e m e n t arm t o r e c o v e r p r o p e r t y w i t h i n t h e
j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e p r o b a t e c o u r t , whose j u r i s d i c t i o n is n o t
i n q u e s t i o n b u t c o n c e d e d by t h e T r i b a l C o u r t .
Additionally, when Leota applied to the District
Court to be the personal representative of decedent's
estate, s h e e l e c t e d t o be g o v e r n e d by t h e l a w s o f Montana.
She c a n n o t r e t r e a t t o t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , d i s p o s e o f p r o p e r t y
contrary to s t a t e laws and be afforded protection of the
T r i b a l C o u r t t o deny t h e s t a t e c o u r t o f its j u r i s d i c t i o n t o
enforce its rulings. Such a n a c t i o n would make a sham o f
probate proceedings.
The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g i m p o s i t i o n of juris-
d i c t i o n enunciated in I r o n Bear v . D i s t r i c t Court (1973),
1 6 2 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292 a r e : (1) whether t h e e x e r c i s e
of state jurisdiction would i n t erfere with reservation
self-government; and ( 2 ) whether the tribal court is cur-
r e n t l y exercising j u r i s d i c t i o n or has exercised j u r i s d i c t i o n
i n s u c h a manner a s t o p r e e m p t s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n . This has
b e e n a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s e d by C h i e f T r i b a l J u d g e M i t c h e l l i n
h i s order dismissing t h i s matter and relinquishing subject
matter jurisdiction t o t h e s t a t e D i s t r i c t Court a s follows:
"This Court concedes t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n over
t h e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y owned by D o u g l a s J .
S t a n d i n g B e a r o r i n which h e had a n i n t e r e s t ,
which may h a v e b e e n o r i s l o c a t e d on t h e
Rocky B o y ' s R e s e r v a t i o n , i s i n t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t of t h e T w e l f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e
S t a t e o f M o n t a n -, - i- -a n d f o r t h e Counfiy-
- - a- - n -
-- - of
Hill. A l l of t h e m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o t h e
p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y o f D o u g l a s J . S t a n d i n g Bear
m u s t be r e s o l v e d by t h e s a i d C o u r t f o r t h e
S t a t e o f M o n t a n a , ---------- o u r t o f I n d i a n
and t h e C
O f f e n s e s w i l l s u p p o r t t h e f i n a l o r d e r s of t h e
S t a t e C o u r t and w i l l a s s i s t i n e n f o r c e m e n t o f
o r d e r s of s a i d C o u r t i f r e q u i r e d . " (Emphasis
supplied. )
The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d , and
t h e c a u s e remanded t o t h e s t a t e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r
proceedings.
W e concur:
~ d*
P-
M (7
$
Chief J u s t i c e