No. 81-268
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GARY JOSEPH SWAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula
Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hsn. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Mark Murphy, Assistant Attorney General, argued,
Helena, Montana
Robert L. Deschamps 111, County Attorney, argued,
Missoula, Montana
Submitted: June 22, 1982
Decided: August 19, 1982
Filed: ,A$d613 1 8
92
T kj=
"Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
On a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s from t h e U n i t e d States
District Court, Missoula Division, defendant appeals his
1972 c o n v i c t i o n s of second d e g r e e a s s a u l t ( s e c t i o n 94-602,
R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , now r e p e a l e d ) and r a p e ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, R.C.M.
1947, now r e p e a l e d ) .
On May 11, 1972, d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o s i x y e a r s
f o r t h e a s s a u l t and n i n e t y - n i n e y e a r s f o r t h e rape convic-
t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t
of the S t a t e of Montana, Missoula County. According to
d e f e n d a n t , h i s c o u n s e l t o l d him t h a t a n o t i c e of a p p e a l had
been f i l e d . After t h e t i m e l i m i t f o r a p p e a l had e x p i r e d ,
d e f e n d a n t d i s c o v e r e d , however, t h a t a n o t i c e had n e v e r been
filed.
Defendant wrote Chief J u s t i c e Harrison i n November
1972 s e e k i n g a t r a n s c r i p t and a i d i n a p p e a l i n g h i s c o n v i c -
tion. Chief Justice Harrison wrote back to defendant
stating:
"You s t a t e d t h a t you r e q u e s t e d your a t t o r n e y
t o a p p e a l b u t he d i d n o t do s o ; I am informed
t h a t you d i d d i s c u s s an a p p e a l w i t h your
c o u n s e l b u t you were a d v i s e d t h e r e was no
i s s u e t o a p p e a l on.
" I am a l s o a d v i s e d by t h e d i s t r i c t judge t h a t
he d i d n o t f e e l t h e r e were any p r o b l e m s upon
t h e t r i a l , nor were any r u l i n g s made t h a t
c o u l d be an i s s u e on a p p e a l . Also t h a t t h e
e v i d e n c e was c l e a r and your c o u n s e l d i d a
good j o b on your t r i a l .
"You do n o t need a t r a n s c r i p t f o r an a p p l i c a -
t i o n f o r a w r i t of h a b e a s c o r p u s , j u s t make
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and s e t f o r t h i n i t w h e r e i n
you f e e l your r i g h t s were p r e j u d i c e d . If
t h i s c o u r t r e q u i r e s some of t h e t e s t i m o n y t o
a s c e r t a i n i f what you s a y is t r u e , we w i l l
s e c u r e it."
Over t h e n e x t few y e a r s , d e f e n d a n t made s e v e r a l pro
- a t t e m p t s t o g e t a t r a n s c r i p t which he b e l i e v e d was n e c e s -
se
s a r y i n o r d e r t o p e r f e c t an appeal. I n 1973, he f i l e d f o r a
w r i t o f mandamus i n F e d e r a l District Court, w h i c h was d e -
nied. I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 8 , h e f i l e d a n o t h e r w r i t o f mandamus
w i t h t h i s C o u r t , s e e k i n g c o u r t r e c o r d s and t r a n s c r i p t , w h i c h
was a l s o d e n i e d . Also, i n 1978, d e f e n d a n t began an a c t i o n
i n Powell County s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t Mon-
tana's former rape s t a t u t e ( s e c t i o n 94-4101, R.C.M. 1947)
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t males. Apparently
no a c t i o n was t a k e n on t h i s p e t i t i o n .
On December 20, 1978, defendant filed a p r o se
p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of habeas corpus i n t h e United S t a t e s
District Court, Missoula Division, claiming, among other
t h i n g s , t h a t h e was d e n i e d a r i g h t o f a p p e a l . The w r i t was
d e n i e d f o r want o f e x h a u s t i o n of s t a t e remedies. See, 36
St.Rep. 746,
I n J u l y 1979, t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e i n Missoula
County d e s t r o y e d t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e o f t h i s c a s e .
On May 2 0 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t
o f h a b e a s c o r p u s w i t h t h i s C o u r t , w h i c h was d e n i e d . (Docket
No, 80-184.)
Finally, on September 29, 1980, defendant filed
another pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
Federal District Court, Missoula Division. The District
Court, after a telephone conference in which the State
conceded c e r t a i n f a c t s , issued an o r d e r on May 13, 1981,
h o l d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s d e p r i v e d of h i s r i g h t t o a p p e a l
because he did n o t have effective a s s i s t a n c e of counsel.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o f u r n i s h
defendant with a review of h i s c o n v i c t i o n w i t h t h e assis-
t a n c e of counsel. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h e
S t a t e t o proceed with d i l i g e n c e i n procuring a t r a n s c r i p t
and a p p o i n t m e n t of c o u n s e l , and t o r e p o r t back t o t h e c o u r t
as t o what h a s been done w i t h i n 120 d a y s . This appeal
followed.
I n M i s s o u l a , Montana, on t h e e v e n i n g of December 1 3 ,
1971, Sharon B r i g g s , a seventeen-year-old girl, went out
drinking with defendant, d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e and a f r i e n d of
defendant, Rodger Smalley. Defendant and h i s wife were
s t a y i n g a t t h e "93 Motel." All f o u r people drank beer at
t h e m o t e l room from a b o u t 6:30 t o 9:00 p.m. They t h e n l e f t
t h e m o t e l and went t o a l o c a l b a r , d r i n k i n g and d a n c i n g f o r
a b o u t two more h o u r s . About 11:30 p.m., a l l four returned
t o t h e m o t e l and B r i g g s a s k e d t o be t a k e n home.
The following account was told by Briggs at the
trial:
A f t e r B r i g g s a s k e d t o be t a k e n home, d e f e n d a n t s t a y e d
in the car, apparently willing t o d r i v e h e r home. Defen-
d a n t ' s w i f e and Rodger Smalley went back t o t h e m o t e l room.
B r i g g s s a t i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of t h e c a r w i t h d e f e n d a n t . When
they drove p a s t t h e s t r e e t t o her house, Briggs again t o l d
d e f e n d a n t s h e wanted t o go home. Defendant t o l d her t h a t he
wanted t o buy some b e e r f i r s t .
A f t e r buying t h e b e e r , defendant continued t o d r i v e
s o u t h , o u t of M i s s o u l a . When B r i g g s a s k e d where t h e y were
g o i n g , d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t h e was t a k i n g h e r t h e " l o n g way
home." B r i g g s r e p e a t e d l y a s k e d d e f e n d a n t t o t a k e h e r home.
Af t e r a few m i l e s defendant turned onto the Blue
Mountain Road, which was snow-packed and slippery.
Defendant's car became s t u c k a c o u p l e of times, but they
were a b l e t o f r e e i t e a c h t i m e u n t i l t h e c a r s l i d p a r t i a l l y
o f f t h e road. The d e f e n d a n t t o l d B r i g g s t h e y would have t o
walk home, and he o f f e r e d h e r some b e e r . When s h e r e f u s e d ,
t h e d e f e n d a n t h i t h e r on t h e s i d e of h e r f a c e w i t h h i s f i s t .
The d e f e n d a n t o r d e r e d t h e v i c t i m o u t o f t h e c a r and h i t h e r
again, breaking her glasses. When s h e threw h e r glasses
down, t h e d e f e n d a n t h i t h e r a g a i n and pushed h e r o v e r a snow
bank toward t h e r i v e r . After t h e y had reached the river
bank, he h i t h e r a g a i n and k i c k e d h e r .
At this point, according to Briggs, the defendant
t h r e a t e n e d t o make h e r s w i m t h e r i v e r and a l s o a t t e m p t e d t o
remove h e r p a n t s . He took h e r p a n t s and p a n t i e s down and
t o l d h e r he was g o i n g t o have s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h h e r .
She did not resist because she was afraid. Apparently
b e c a u s e of t h e c o l d , he c h o s e n o t t o have s e x w i t h h e r . He
o r d e r e d h e r t o g e t d r e s s e d and f o l l o w him o r he would b e a t
and/or k i l l her.
A f t e r w a l k i n g some d i s t a n c e , t h e y s t o p p e d a t a house
and a s k e d f o r a r i d e back t o M i s s o u l a . The o c c u p a n t of t h e
house agreed t o give them a ride and later testified he
noticed how badly Briggs was beaten but accepted the
defendant's s t o r y about a bar brawl. He offered t o take
B r i g g s t o t h e h o s p i t a l , b u t d e f e n d a n t s a i d s h e was h i s w i f e
and he would t a k e c a r e o f h e r .
When B r i g g s a r r i v e d back a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s motel,
s h e a g a i n r e q u e s t e d t o be t a k e n home. The d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e
was awake when t h e y r e t u r n e d and t o l d B r i g g s t h a t s h e c o u l d
n o t go home b e c a u s e s h e was t o o c o l d . The d e f e n d a n t and h i s
w i f e removed t h e v i c t i m ' s c l o t h i n g and o r d e r e d h e r i n t o bed
between them. When t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s w i f e l e f t t o go t o t h e
bathroom, B r i g g s t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t f o r c e d h e r t o have
sexual intercourse with him. Defendant's wife later
r e t u r n e d from t h e bathroom.
When B r i g g s was s u r e t h e y were b o t h a s l e e p , she g o t
o u t of bed and began l o o k i n g f o r h e r c l o t h e s . She t h e n , f o r
t h e f i r s t t i m e , r e a l i z e d t h a t Rodger S m a l l e y was s l e e p i n g on
t h e couch i n t h e room. When S m a l l e y awoke, a t a b o u t 5:00
a.m., B r i g g s was l o o k i n g f o r h e r c l o t h e s and a s k e d S m a l l e y
t o t a k e h e r home. H e r e f u s e d b e c a u s e h e d i d n ' t have a c a r .
B r i g g s t h e n w a i t e d f o r l i g h t enough t o f i n d h e r s h o e s . Once
s h e found h e r s h o e s , s h e went t o a n e a r b y s h o p p i n g m a l l and
c a l l e d h e r mother. Her b r o t h e r p i c k e d h e r up. Upon s e e i n g
her condition, he s t o p p e d on t h e way home and c a l l e d t h e
police. The p o l i c e m e t B r i g g s a t home and e s c o r t e d h e r t o
t h e h o s p i t a l where s h e was examined by h e r p h y s i c i a n .
A t t r i a l h e r p h y s i c i a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t B r i g g s was " i n
a p r e t t y s o r r y s t a t e ' ' when he saw h e r . She was b a t t e r e d and
bruised w i t h hemorrhages on t h e s u r f a c e and w h i t e of the
eye. She had dried blood in her nose, a cut lip and
s c r a t c h e s on h e r neck. T h e r e were b r u i s e s l o c a t e d on h e r
lower r i g h t r i b c a g e and on t h e i n s i d e of h e r r i g h t t h i g h .
The X-rays showed t h a t t h e r e was a f r a c t u r e of t h e jaw on
the r i g h t s i d e and the s i n u s i n her l e f t cheek had been
o b l i t e r a t e d by blood and s w e l l i n g .
A pelvic e x a m i n a t i o n was conducted. No sperm was
found in the vaginal cavity, but there were signs of a
narrow g e n i t a l i n j u r y .
Before t h e t r i a l , t h e S t a t e moved f o r a protective
o r d e r p r o h i b i t i n g r e f e r e n c e t o Br i g g s ' morals o r c h a s t i t y .
The r e c o r d shows o n l y t h a t a d i s c u s s i o n was h e l d i n chambers
and t h a t t h e motion was t a k e n under a d v i s e m e n t . The r e c o r d
does not reflect the District Court's decision on the
motion.
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l gave n o t i c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t would u s e
the defense of insanity and made a motion for an order
a l l o w i n g d e f e n d a n t t o be examined by a p s y c h i a t r i s t of h i s
own c h o i c e , p a i d by t h e S t a t e . D e f e n d a n t had a l r e a d y been
examined by one p s y c h i a t r i s t a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l .
The motion was d e n i e d .
A t t r i a l t h e main e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e S t a t e was
t h e t e s t i m o n y of B r i g g s , t h e p o l i c e m a n who accompanied h e r
t o t h e h o s p i t a l and h e r p h y s i c i a n .
The d e f e n s e c a l l e d o n l y two w i t n e s s e s : defendant's
previous a t t o r n e y t o rebut hearsay testimony concerning a
conversation between defendant and the attorney, and the
p s y c h i a t r i s t who examined d e f e n d a n t a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e
Hospital. The p s y c h i a t r i s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had a
below normal I .Q. of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 78 and t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s
a b i l i t y t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s c o n d u c t c o u l d
be i m p a i r e d b e c a u s e of h i s low m e n t a l i t y . Neither defendant
nor h i s w i f e t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l .
Defendant's counsel did not present any proposed
instructions. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 8 , a Sandstrom-type instruc-
t i o n , was g i v e n t o t h e j u r y :
" I n e v e r y c r i m e o r p u b l i c o f f e n s e t h e r e must
e x i s t a u n i o n o r j o i n t o p e r a t i o n of a c t and
i n t e n t , or criminal negligence. The i n t e n t
o r i n t e n t i o n i s m a n i f e s t e d by t h e circum-
s t a n c e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e and t h e
sound mind and d i s c r e t i o n of t h e a c c u s e d .
" I n order t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e o f f e n s e charged
i n t h i s case the i n t e n t alleged i n the Infor-
m a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y t o be p r o v e d , b u t d i r e c t
and p o s i t i v e t e s t i m o n y is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o
prove t h e i n t e n t . I t may be i n f e r r e d from
t h e e v i d e n c e i f t h e r e a r e any f a c t s proved
which s a t i s f y t h e j u r y , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
doubt, of its existence.
"The l a w a l s o presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s
the ordinary consequences of any voluntary
a c t c o m m i t t e d by him. The l a t t e r p r e s u m p t i o n ,
however, is termed a d i s p u t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n
a n d may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r e v i d e n c e . "
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant was charged with second degree assault,
r a p e and kidnapping. The j u r y r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s o n
o n l y t h e a s s a u l t and r a p e c h a r g e s . D e f e n s e c o u n s e l made a
m o t i o n f o r a new t r i a l w h i c h was d e n i e d .
The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e :
1. Whether defendant's rights to counsel, due
p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n w e r e v i o l a t e d by t h e f a i l u r e t o
a p p o i n t c o u n s e l and p r o p e r l y h e a r h i s a p p e a l ?
2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l ?
Because both i s s u e s must be answered a f f i r m a t i v e l y ,
w e r e v e r s e t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and remand f o r
a new t r i a l , i f e n o u g h e v i d e n c e s t i l l e x i s t s .
The i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is w h e t h e r o r
n o t t o a p p l y c u r r e n t law. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t i f w e a p p l y
c u r r e n t l a w we m u s t d o s o r e t r o a c t i v e l y . W e do n o t a g r e e .
The question of whether or not a rule of law is to be
applied retroactively arises only when cases have been
"finalized." Cases are generally considered "finalized"
o n l y when t h e r e h a s b e e n " a j u d g m e n t o f c o n v i c t i o n , s e n t e n c e
and exhaustion of rights of appeal." State v. Rogers
( 1 9 7 9 ) , 93 N.M. 5 1 9 , 602 P.2d 6 1 6 , 618.
The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t i s w h e t h e r the
State violated his rights to effective assistance of
counsel, equal protection, and due process by summarily
preventing h i s i n i t i a l attempt t o appeal. Defendant a r g u e s
that the f a i l u r e of the Montana c o u r t system t o a p p o i n t
c o u n s e l f o r him, when i t was a p p a r e n t he was i n d i g e n t and
h i s t r i a l c o u r t c o u n s e l was n o t p u r s u i n g h i s c a s e , was a
f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n of h i s r i g h t s . The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t
d e f e n d a n t ' s " t r i a l s and t r i b u l a t i o n s " i n o b t a i n i n g a n a p p e a l
a r e i r r e l e v a n t and t h a t t h e o n l y i s s u e s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t
a r e i s s u e s t h a t would have been p r e s e n t e d i n a n immediate
a p p e a l of t h i s c a s e .
If t h i s C o u r t were t o f o l l o w t h e S t a t e ' s r e a s o n i n g ,
we would be b l i n d i n g o u r s e l v e s t o t h e f a c t t h a t d u r i n g t h e
ten years defendant s a t in prison his rights were being
violated. To s a y t h a t t h o s e t e n y e a r s a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e
c a s e b e f o r e us is t o i g n o r e a l o n g l i n e of United States
Supreme Court cases and Federal District Court cases
acknowledging that neither an appellate court nor trial
c o u n s e l may " s a b o t a g e " an a p p e a l by i n a c t i o n , even i f the
appeal is thought to be without merit. See, Miller v.
McCarthy ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 607 F.2d 854, 857, and c a s e s c i t e d
therein.
I n t h e landmark c a s e of Gideon v. Wainwright ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, t h e Supreme C o u r t
concluded that appointment of counsel for an indigent
c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t was a " f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t , e s s e n t i a l t o a
fair trial," and that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
a p p o i n t m e n t of counsel i n a s t a t e c o u r t , j u s t a s t h e S i x t h
Amendment r e q u i r e s i t i n a f e d e r a l c o u r t . 372 U.S. a t 340.
In a sister case, Douglas v. California ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 372 U.S.
353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, the Court applied the
Gideon holding to the appellate process, stating that
"federal c o u r t s must honor h i s [the indigent defendant's]
r e q u e s t f o r c o u n s e l r e g a r d l e s s of what t h e y t h i n k t h e m e r i t s
of the case may be; and 'representation in the role of an
advocate is required.' Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674,
675." 372 U . S . at 357. The Court went on to apply this
rule to the California Supreme Court, which had denied
appellants' petitions for appeal without a hearing, stating:
". . . The present case, where counsel was
denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the
discrimination is not between ' possibly good
and obviously bad cases,' but between cases
where the rich man can require the court to
listen to argument of counsel before deciding
on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There
is lacking that equality demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who
appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of
counsel's examination into the record, re-
search of the law, and marshalling of argu-
ments on his behalf, while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determina-
tion that his case is without merit, is
forced to shift for himself. The indigent,
where the record is unclear or the errors are
hidden, has only the right to a meaningless
ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful
appeal." 372 U.S. at 357.
Under such case law, defendant, as an indigent, clearly had
the right to have counsel on appeal.
Nevertheless, an even more important question before
this Court is whether the court system undermined his right
to counsel by informally and summarily denying his appeal.
Clearly, it has.
In Anders v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 738, 87
S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, the United States Supreme Court
was confronted with a case very similar to the one now
before us. In Anders the court-appointed counsel for an
indigent defendant thought there was no merit to the
indigent's appeal. The appointed counsel wrote a letter to
California's District Court of Appeals, expressing his
opinion that the indigent's appeal was without merit. The
California court affirmed the conviction after examining the
record. The Supreme C o u r t of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s t a t e d t h a t
such a procedure
'I. . .smacks of t h e t r e a t m e n t t h a t E s k r i d g e
r e c e i v e d , which t h i s C o u r t condemned, t h a t
p e r m i t t e d a t r i a l judge t o w i t h h o l d a t r a n -
s c r i p t i f he found t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ' h a s been
a c c o r d e d a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l , and i n
t h e C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n no g r a v e o r p r e j u d i c i a l
e r r o r s occurred ,therein. ' E s k r i d g e v. Wash-
i n g t o n S t a t e Board, 357 U.S. 214, 215 ( 1 9 5 8 ) .
Such a p r o c e d u r e , t h i s C o u r t s a i d , ' c a n n o t be
an a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e r i g h t t o f u l l ,
a p p e l l a t e review a v a i l a b l e t o a l l d e f e n d a n t s
who may n o t be a b l e t o a f f o r d s u c h a n e x p e n s e
. . ." 386 U.S. a t 742-743.
The C o u r t t h e n went on t o o u t l i n e what p r o c e d u r e s
would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s u c h a c a s e :
"The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t of s u b s t a n -
t i a l e q u a l i t y and f a i r p r o c e s s can o n l y be
a t t a i n e d where c o u n s e l a c t s i n t h e r o l e of a n
a c t i v e a d v o c a t e i n b e h a l f of h i s c l i e n t , a s
opposed t o t h a t of amicus c u r i a e . The no-
m e r i t l e t t e r and t h e p r o c e d u r e i t t r i g g e r s d o
not reach t h a t d i g n i t y . Counsel s h o u l d , and
c a n w i t h honor and w i t h o u t c o n f l i c t , be of
more a s s i s t a n c e t o h i s c l i e n t and t o t h e
c o u r t . H i s r o l e a s a d v o c a t e r e q u i r e s t h a t he
s u p p o r t h i s c l i e n t ' s a p p e a l t o t h e b e s t of
h i s ability. Of c o u r s e , i f c o u n s e l f i n d s h i s
c a s e t o be w h o l l y f r i v o l o u s , a f t e r a con-
s c i e n t i o u s e x a m i n a t i o n of i t , he s h o u l d s o
a d v i s e t h e c o u r t and r e q u e s t p e r m i s s i o n t o
withdraw. T h a t r e q u e s t must, however, be
accompanied by a b r i e f r e f e r r i n g t o a n y t h i n g
i n t h e r e c o r d t h a t might a r g u a b l y s u p p o r t t h e
appeal. A copy of c o u n s e l ' s b r i e f s h o u l d be
f u r n i s h e d t h e i n d i g e n t and t i m e a l l o w e d him
t o r a i s e any p o i n t s t h a t he c h o o s e s ; t h e
court--not counsel--then proceeds, a f t e r a
f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n of a l l t h e p r o c e e d i n g s , t o
d e c i d e whether t h e c a s e is wholly f r i v o l o u s .
I f it s o f i n d s i t may g r a n t c o u n s e l ' s r e q u e s t
t o withdraw and d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l i n s o f a r a s
f e d e r a l requirements a r e concerned, or pro-
c e e d t o a d e c i s i o n on t h e m e r i t s , i f s t a t e
law s o r e q u i r e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f i t
f i n d s any of t h e l e g a l p o i n t s a r g u a b l e on
t h e i r m e r i t s (and t h e r e f o r e not f r i v o l o u s ) it
must, p r i o r t o d e c i s i o n , a f f o r d t h e i n d i g e n t
t h e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l t o a r g u e t h e
appeal." 386 U.S. a t 744.
Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l n o t o n l y b e l i e v e d d e f e n d a n t
had no g r o u n d s f o r a p p e a l , b u t a l s o t o l d d e f e n d a n t he had
filed a notice of appeal when, in fact, he had not. More-
over , defendantls appeal was prevented by this Court by an
informal process condemned by the Anders Court.
The State claims that all these errors have been
cured because we now grant defendant his right to appeal. We
cannot agree in light of the other errors arising out of
defendant's trial; errors that include, most blatantly, the
issuance of an improper Sandstrom-type instruction, and that
cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial of the defendant.
In Parker v. Crist (1980), - Mont. -, 621 P.2d
484, 37 St.Rep. 2048, this Court upheld a Sandstrom-type
instruction identical to the one in this case. Our reason-
ing was based on three grounds: (1) the instruction itself
was a permissive inference and not a conclusive presumption;
(2) the instructions as a whole made it clear that the State
would bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
every essential element of the crimes charged; and (3) the
error, if any, was harmless because the evidence of the
requisite intent was overwhelming. 621 P.2d at 486-487.
In State v. Lundblade (1981), Mont . , 625
P.2d 545, 38 St.Rep. 441, we limited our reasoning in
Parker, stating ". . . we cannot say that the circumstances
making the instruction permissible in Parker occurred in the
instant case, nor do we know for certain that the United
States Supreme Court would find this instruction to be
constitutional in this case in light of Sandstrom v. Montana
(1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 239." 625
P.2d at 549.
Here, two of the alleviating factors listed in Parker
do not exist. The instructions, as a whole, fail to place
t h e f u l l b u r d e n o f p r o o f o n t h e S t a t e , and t h e e v i d e n c e of
i n t e n t is h a r d l y " o ~ e r w h e l m i n g . ~ e e a l s o , S t a t e v . H a m i l t o n
S~
( 1 9 8 0 ) f - Mont. , 605 P.2d 1121, 37 S t . R e p . 70, and
S t a t e v. Dolan (1980), Mont . , 620 P.2d 355, 37
St.Hep. 1860.
Here, as i n S t a t e v. Kyle (1981), Mont. I
628 P.2d 263, 38 S t . R e p . 578Q, the i n s t r u c t i o n cannot be
considered harmless because the jury could have easily
viewed the instruction as mandatory, and because mental
s t a t e was a c r u c i a l f a c t u a l q u e s t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t o f
t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c l a i m i n g t h e i n s a n i t y d e f e n s e .
Such an e r r o r , in itself, is c a u s e f o r r e v e r s a l a n d
remand. We a l s o note, however, that the trial itself did
n o t meet t h e f a i r n e s s a n d d u e p r o c e s s s t a n d a r d s p r o v i d e d f o r
i n Art. 11, S e c t i o n s 1 7 a n d 24, 1 9 7 2 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
T h i s case i s s i m i l a r t o S t a t e v . M i c k e l s o n ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 2 Mont.
489, 565 P.2d 308, w h e r e w e s t a t e d :
". . . The s e a r c h f o r t r u t h was l e s s t h a n
v i g o r o u s b y c o u n s e l i n t h i s m a t t e r and t h i s
w r i t e r f e e l s t h a t , p a r t i c u l a r l y on a b e n c h
t r i a l , t h e judge h a s t h e i n h e r e n t power,
r i g h t a n d y e s , d u t y , t o s u a s p o n t e demand
t h a t a s e a r c h f o r t h e t r u t h be exhausted
b e f o r e t h e matter b e a c c e p t e d f o r d e c i s i o n .
Otherwise, t h e d e f e n d a n t , as h e r e , h a s been
d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l and d u e p r o c e s s u n d e r
Art. 11, Section 24, 1972 Montana
Constitution." 565 P.2d a t 311.
We therefore reverse the judgment of t h e District
Court.
D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t a new t r i a l would b e i m p o s s i b l e
b e c a u s e t h e p h y s i c a l e v i d e n c e was d e s t r o y e d i n 1 9 7 9 . Never-
theless, n o t knowing w h a t e v i d e n c e s t i l l e x i s t s , w e remand
t o g i v e t h e S t a t e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t r y t h e r a p e case if
s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e . T h i s is n o t t r u e o f the
a s s a u l t case, a s t h e six-year sentence i n that cause has
long s i n c e been s a t i s f i e d .
W concur:
e
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Chief J u s t i c e
*a ..