No. 81-498
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
LEE SCHMID and ALPHIE SCHMID,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS.
JOSEPH RAYMOND McDOWELL et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead
Honorable James M. Salansky, Judge presidinq.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Hash, Jellison, OIBrien & Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana
Kenneth O'Brien, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondents:
Astle and Astle, Kalispell, Montana
David Astle, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on briefs: April 22, 1982
Decided: July 15, 1982
Filed :
JUL 1 5 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
The plaintiffs appeal a judgment issued by the
D i s t r i c t C o u rt of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l District, Flathead
County, denying their claim for an implied reservation of
right-of-way o r way o f n e c e s s i t y a c r o s s d e f e n d a n t s ' land.
The f a c t s were s t i p u l a t e d on a p p e a l a n d , w i t h r e f e r -
e n c e t o E x h i b i t 1 b e l o w , may be summarized a s f o l l o w s :
TRACT c
v
( ~ nh tr a ~ o npat+) D.iV A
TRACT
LAND (5chm,d 7mt)
-
3
(Mcnowelj
5 TI4 7-E
-
.- LAND B.PJ.
-
-
LAND
I
/
STATE L A N D /,TAT€ LAW^
-A
\\
COQN T)/ ROAD
A person named Junkins acquired title to Tract A
(Schmid Tract) in 1908 and acquired title to Tract B
(McDowell T r a c t ) i n 1940. I n 1914 h e b o u g h t and t h e n s o l d
T r a c t C (Mathiason T r a c t ) . I n 1945, he s o l d T r a c t B t o t h e
predecessors in interest of the respondents (McDowells) .
That same y e a r , the respondents' predecessors in interest
b u i l t t h e road t r a v e r s i n g T r a c t 0 .
I n 1957 t h e a p p e l l a n t s ( S c h m i d s ) and a p e r s o n named
H a r d i n g e r p u r c h a s e d T r a c t A. I n 1965, a p p e l l a n t s purchased
Hardinger's i n t e r e s t i n T r a c t A and became i t s s o l e o w n e r s ,
No e x p r e s s r i g h t - o f - w a y o r o t h e r e a s e m e n t was r e s e r v e d o v e r
t h e McDowell T r a c t .
When Junkins sold the McDowe11 and Schmid Tracts,
t h e y were b o t h landlocked in that t h e y were s u r r o u n d e d by
s t a t e l a n d o r B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n ( B N ) l a n d and t h e r e was no
l i n k t o t h e county road w i t h o u t c r o s s i n g s t a t e l a n d .
When J u n k i n s s o l d t h e McDowell T r a c t , a r o a d known a s
King C r e e k Road existed e a s t of t h e McDowell T r a c t . This
road, l~owever, n e i t h e r ad j o i n e d nor traversed t h e McDowell
o r Schmid T r a c t s .
The d i s p u t e h e r e c e n t e r s a r o u n d u s e o f t h e r o a d b u i l t
by respondents' predecessors in interest in 1945. The
D i s t r i c t Court, based on t h e above facts, concluded as a
matter of law that t h e r e was no implied r e s e r v a t i o n of a
right-of-way or way of n e c e s s i t y over t h e McDowe11 T r a c t ,
The sole issue on review, then, is simply whether the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by c o n c l u d i n g t h a t a p p e l l a n t s h a v e no
way of n e c e s s i t y a c r o s s r e s p o n d e n t s f p r o p e r t y .
B e c a u s e b o t h t r a c t s o r i g i n a l l y owned by J u n k i n s were
landlocked with no access to a public road except across
s t a t e o r BN l a n d s , and b e c a u s e a way o f n e c e s s i t y c a n n o t be
claimed o v e r l a n d s of a t h i r d p a r t y o r a s t r a n g e r i n t i t l e ,
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t must be a f f i r m e d .
Appellants contend that it is "well settled" in
Montana that if one conveys a part of his land so as to
deprive himself of access t o the remainder u n l e s s he g o e s
a c r o s s l a n d s o l d , h e h a s a way o f n e c e s s i t y o v e r t h e p o r t i o n
conveyed. H e r r i n v. Sieben (1912), 46 Mont. 226, 126 P.
223. A p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t under t h i s r u l e t h e y h a v e a way
of n e c e s s i t y t o t h e c o u n t y r o a d a c r o s s b o t h T r a c t B and t h e
s t a t e land.
Respondents contend that a way of necessity, a s an
i m p l i e d e a s e m e n t , m u s t be i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e tirne t h e l a n d
is i n i t i a l l y severed. Since the r o a d was n o t b u i l t until
a f t e r Junkins sold the property, r e s p o n d e n t s c l a i m a way o f
n e c e s s i t y does n o t e x i s t .
Neither party has c o r r e c t l y presented the d e f i n i t i o n
of a "way of necessity." Respondents a r e c o r r e c t in the
sense that a "way of necessity" is a type of "implied
easement ." T h a t d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean, however, that a
way of necessity must be in existence at the time of
conveyance. A way o f n e c e s s i t y is d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r
i m p l i e d e a s e m e n t s on t h e s i m p l e g r o u n d t h a t i t need - be
not
i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e of conveyance. S e e , 3 P o w e l l on
R e a l P r o p e r t y ( 1 9 8 1 ) , s e c t i o n s 410 and 411.
In the past, t h i s Court has discussed an "implied
r e s e r v e d easement of necessity." Godfrey v. Pilon (1974),
1 6 5 Mont. 439, 529 P.2d 1372. I n Godfrey, we s t a t e d t h a t
s u c h a n e a s e m e n t must be "open and v i s i b l e " a t t h e t i m e o f
conveyance. 529 P.2d a t 1376. I n G o d f r e y , however, we were
discussing implied easements i n general and n o t a "way of
necessity" in particular, as recognized in Thisted v,
Country C l u b Tower Corporation (1965), 146 Mont. 87, 405
P.2d 432.
Generally, a way o f n e c e s s i t y i s d e f i n e d a s f o l l o w s :
" [ w l h e r e an owner o f l a n d c o n v e y s a p a r c e l t h e r e o f which h a s
no o u t l e t t o a highway e x c e p t o v e r the remaining l a n d s of
the grantor or over the land of strangers, a way of
n e c e s s i t y e x i s t s o v e r t h e r e m a i n i n g l a n d s of the grantor."
Finn v. Williams ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 376 I l l . 95, 33 N,E.2d 226, 228;
see also, 25 Arn.Jur .2d Easements, section 34 et seq.; 3
P o w e l l on R e a l P r o p e r t y ( 1 9 8 1 ) , s e c t i o n 410. Similarly, a
way o f necessity i s found when t h e owner of lands r e t a i n s
the inner p o r t i o n conveying to another the balance, across
which he must go for exit and access. Powell, supra,
section 410. The easement itself arises at the time of
conveyance, i.e., when t h e n e c e s s i t y t o have a c c e s s t o t h e
o u t s i d e world a r i s e s . Unlike o t h e r implied easements, i t is
t h e r e f o r e w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t a way o f n e c e s s i t y need n o t be
i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e time of conveyance s i n c e t h e n e c e s s i t y
does n o t a r i s e p r i o r t o t h a t time.
Appellants' argument, nevertheless, cannot succeed
b e c a u s e t h e y a r e c l a i m i n g a way o f n e c e s s i t y n o t o n l y a c r o s s
t h e p o r t i o n conveyed b u t a l s o a c r o s s s t a t e l a n d .
An i m p o r t a n t p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f a way o f
necessity is that the tracts over which the easement is
claimed must have been held by one person at one time.
Montana Wilderness Association v. United States Forest
Service (D. Mont. 1980), 496 F.Supp. 880. This "common
o w n e r s h i p " o r " u n i t y of t i t l e " m u s t h a v e e x i s t e d i m m e d i a t e l y
p r i o r t o t h e severance g i v i n g r i s e t o t h e n e c e s s i t y . Powell,
supra, s e c t i o n 410; 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements, s e c t i o n 35; and
f o r l i s t o f c a s e s s e e 94 A.L.R.3d 5 0 2 , s e c t i o n s 9-12,
As a corollary to the requirements of common
o w n e r s h i p , most c o u r t s h a v e h e l d t h a t a way o f n e c e s s i t y c a n
only arise out of the land granted or reserved by the
grantor and never o u t of the land of a third party or a
stranger to the title. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Summers
( 1 9 7 5 ) , 24 Md.App. 1 0 0 , 330 A.2d 722; R o b e r t s o n v. R o b e r t s o n
(1973), 214 Va. 76, 197 S,E.2d 183. Here, the land now
owned by t h e S t a t e o f Montana was n o t p a r t of the original
land owned by Junkins and, therefore, not under "common
ownership" or "unity of title," On this ground alone,
appellants' c l a i m f o r t h e way of n e c e s s i t y m u s t f a i l .
Moreover, it has also been held that a way of
n e c e s s i t y c a n n o t e x i s t a c r o s s l a n d which had no a c c e s s t o a
public road when the property was divided by the common
grantor. G r i f f i n v. North (Fla.App. 1 9 7 9 ) , 373 So.2d 96.
The r a t i o n a l e o f t h i s r u l e was e x p r e s s e d w e l l i n Daywalt v ,
Walker ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 217 Cal.App.2d 669, 3 1 C a l . R p t r . 8 9 9 , 903:
". . . I f two p a r c e l s j o i n e d and t e m p o r a r i l y
c o n s t i t u t i n g one a r e both l a n d l o c k e d , an
e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a way
of n e c e s s i t y is n o n e x i s t e n t , b e c a u s e i f b o t h
p a r c e l s a r e c u t o f f from a p u b l i c r o a d , t h e
b a s i c r e a s o n f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o f a way o f
n e c e s s i t y , namely, t o p e r m i t c o m m u n i c a t i o n
with t h e o u t s i d e world, is n o t p r e s e n t . "
H e r e , b o t h t h e Schmid and McDowell T r a c t s were l a n d -
l o c k e d when J u n k i n s owned them. Both p a r c e l s w e r e c u t o f f
from t h e p u b l i c r o a d . After t h e s e l l i n g of t h e Mathiason
Tract in 1914, Junkins himself had no access to a public
r o a d and p r e s u m a b l y had t o c r o s s s t a t e o r BN l a n d t o r e a c h
h i s landlocked land. A s i n Daywalt, the basic reason f o r a
way of necessity was not present at the time Junkins
conveyed T r a c t B t o t h e McDowellsl p r e d e c e s s o r s i n i n t e r e s t .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e way o f n e c e s s i t y
is t h e r e f o r e a f f i r m e d .
Justice
W e concur:
8 C h4i e f 4J u s t &(&.Q"Qq
lce