No. 81-420
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982
JACK HENRY et al.,
Relator,
VS.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE
SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, et al.,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel of Record:
For Relators:
Hoyt and Trieweiler, Great Falls, Montana
John Hoyt argued, Great Falls, Montana
Goetz, Madden & Dunn, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondents:
Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings,
Montana
Submitted: January 11, 1982
Decided: 36. fin
Filed.
EB 2 5 1982
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is a case involving a petition for a writ of
supervisory control and a motion for stay of proceedings.
'The case initially arose in the District Court of the
Seventeenth Judicial District of the State of Montana, in
and for the County of Phillips.
A claim was filed in District Court against
Burlington Northern, Inc., et al. (hereinafter BN) on June
4, 1979. The claim alleged that B N 1 s negligence at the west
Dodson railroad crossing resulted in the injuries sustained
by the relator, Jack Henry, and caused the death of his
wife, Lorene Henry. There were several alleged "acts" com-
mitted by BN that were the bases of the negligence claim.
These acts included: permitting hay to be stacked near a
crossing; failing to sound a proper warning whistle; and
failing to equip its locomotive with an oscillating head-
light and a strobe light.
On April 30, 1981, BN filed a motion in Limine in the
District Court. The motion requested the court to enjoin
the relator, his witnesses, and his counsel. from mentioning
anything about locomotive mounted warning devices, either
visual or audible, other than those used on the locomotive
in question. The District Court granted the motion,
stating:
"Burlington Northern's only duty in this case
with respect to audible and visual warning
devices on this locomotive at the time of the
accident was to comply with the applicable
regulations on the subject. The jury will
not be permitted to deliberate on whether
Burlington Northern had a duty to equip its
engine in accordance with the standard
exceeding those set by the regulations.
"The Court finds that the federal government,
pursuant to its plenary powers in the field
of interstate commerce, has seen fit to pre-
empt state action in determining the standard
of care or duty required of the BN railroad
insofar as equipping its railway engines with
audible and visual warning devices is con-
cerned. "
At the same time the District Court stayed the pro-
ceedings to allow the relator to file a writ of supervisory
control so that this Court could review the propriety of the
District Court's order. This Court issued an order on
October 2, 1981, directing BN to respond to the relator's
application for the writ of supervisory control.
Shortly thereafter, on October 7, 1981, B 1 filed a
1
motion for stay of proceedings in this Court pending a
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in the case of Mary Marshall, etc. v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., Case No. CA, Docket No. 81-3161. This Court
then ordered in pertinent part:
"1. That respondents file their response and
brief to relator's application for writ of
supervisory control in this Court on or
before October 30, 1981.
"2. That relator file his response and brief
to respondents' motion to stay proceedings on
or before October 30, 1981.
"3. That each party thereafter have to and
including November 13, 1981, in which to file
reply memoranda to the adverse party's
responsive briefs. Relator's reply memorandum
shall relate solely to issues raised on his
application for supervisory control. Respon-
dents' reply memorandum shall relate solely
to issues raised on its motion for stay of
proceedings.
"4. The parties shall serve copies of all
documents filed upon counsel of record.
"5. All matters now pending in this cause
are held in abeyance pending further order of
this Court . . ."
As a result of these orders, it is now necessary that
this Court address both the motion to stay the proceedings
and the application for the writ of supervisory control.
The r e l a t o r h a s r a i s e d a f u r t h e r i s s u e r e g a r d i n g t h e admis-
s i o n of e v i d e n c e of other accidents. However, this issue
was n o t p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n
a n d , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l n o t be a d d r e s s e d i n t h i s i n s t a n c e .
Therefore, t h e i s s u e s presented f o r review a r e :
1. Whether federal leg i s l a t i o n has preempted the
s t a t e fro11 i m p o s i n g a common-law d u t y on r a i l r o a d c a r r i e r s
to have additional warning devices mounted on their
locomotives?
2. Whether the proceedings i n t h i s case should be
stayed until the United States Court of Appeals for the
N i n t h C i r c u i t r e n d e r s a d e c i s i o n on t n e i s s u e o f p r e e m p t i o n ?
BN c o n t e n d s t h a t C o n g r e s s , through t h e Federal Kail-
way S a f e t y A c t , 45 U.S.C. §§421-444, and t h e B o i l e r I n s p e c -
t i o n Act, 45 U.S.C. g22-23, S28-43, h a s preempted a l l s t a t e
s t a n d a r d s , s t a t u t e s and common-law d o c t r i n e s a f f e c t i n g r a i l -
road safety. I t contends t h a t the s t a t e s cannot, without
narrow e x c e p t i o n s , i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e f e d e r a l government i n
t h e a r e a o f i n t e r s t a t e commerce. T h e r e f o r e , BN c o n t e n d s , a s
t h e D i s t r i c t Court h e l d , that ". . . B u r l i n g t o n IIJorthern's
only duty i n t h i s case with r e s p e c t t o a u d i b l e and v i s u a l
w a r n i n g d e v i c e s on t h i s l o c o m o t i v e a t t h e t i m e of the acci-
d e n t was t o comply w i t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e f e d e r a l r e g u l a t i o n s
on t h e s u b j e c t , " and t h a t " [ t l h e j u r y w i l l n o t be p e r m i t t e d
t o d e l i b e r a t e on w h e t h e r B u r l i n g t o n N o r t h e r n had a d u t y t o
equip its engine in accordance with a standard exceeding
t h o s e s e t by t h e r e g u l a t i o n s . "
Respondent's c o n t e n t i o n and the District Court's
r u l i n g a r e c o n t r a r y t o t h e c a s e law o f Montana. I n Kunkle
v. Burlington Northern (1980), I4ont. -, 613 P.2d 982,
37 St.Rep. 995, this Court held:
"Thus it may not be enough for the railroad
to protect its crossing with a standard
crossbuck, to operate a train within a speed
limit or to blow the whistle and ring the
bell. The jury is still permitted to
--------------------- a u t i o n u n d e r t h e
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e railroad exercised
.....................................
reasonable c a r e and c
circumstances and conditions existing at the
time of t; accident. Whether a railroad is
h
neqligent in a particular manner, such as in
-
failing to provide automatic crossing gates, --
oscillating headlights, flasher lights, or in
failing to reduce its speed is a z e s t i o n of
fact for the jury." 613 P.2d at 991. (Empha-
sis supplied. )
It is clear from the language in Runkle that a jury should
be permitted to deliberate on whether BJ had a common-law
I
duty to equip its locomotive with various warning devices.
Montana is not the only jurisdiction that has ruled
in this manner. The Supreme Court of Arizona held in
DeElena v. Southern Pac. Co. (1979), 121 Ariz. 563, 592 P.2d
". . . whether a railroad is negligent j.n a
particular manner, such as failing to provide
automatic crossing gates, is a question of
fact for the jury.
". . . Ordinarily the issue of the negligence
in crossing cases, whether the railroad was
negligent in the design and maintenance of
the crossing or in the operation of the
train, is one of fact as in other negligence
cases. (Id. [Peri v. L.A. Junction Ry., 22
Cal.2dI at 120, 137 P.2d 441; Wilkinson v.
Southern Pacific Co., 224 Cal.App.2d 478,
487-488, 36 Cal.Rptr. 689). . .
"A railroad company-- not necessarily free
is
fyom negligence, e v-------g------- -----
e n t h o u h i t may h a v e
-
literally complied with safety statutes or
rules; the circumstances may require it to do
more. (Hogue v. Southern Pacific Co., supra,
1 Cal.3d at 258, 81 Cal.Rptr. 765, 460 P.2d
965) .. ." 592 P.2d at 762. (Emphasis sup-
plied.)
Also see, Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. Buchman (F1a.App.
1 9 7 8 ) , 358 S o . 2 d 8 3 6 .
Respondent's contention that this case involves
preemption is misplaced. The d o c t r i n e o f preemption d e a l s
w i t h f e d e r a l and s t a t e r e l a t i o n s u n d e r t h e Supremacy C l a u s e
o f A r t i c l e X I of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . There i s
no c o n f l i c t in this case between a federal s t a t u t e and a
state statute. F u r t h e r , by a l l o w i n g a j u r y t o d e t e r m i n e i f
the BN violated its common-law duty, this Court is not
implementing i t s own s t a n d a r d . The F e d e r a l R a i l w a y S a f e t y
Act, 45 U.S.C. SS421-444, provides that engines must be
e q u i p p e d w i t h a h e a d l i g h t which w i l l i l l u m i n a t e a p e r s o n on
t h e t r a c k s a t a d i s t a n c e o f 800 f e e t . No f e d e r a l e n a c t m e n t
governs warning s y s t e m s on t h e e n g i n e s . The p r o o f sought
h e r e t o be o f f e r e d by p l a i n t i f f r e l a t e s t o w a r n i n g and n o t
t o illumination. W hold Congress h a s preempted t h e a r e a of
e
i l l u m i n a t i o n d e v i c e s but n o t warning d e v i c e s .
R e s p o n d e n t h a s made a m o t i o n t o s t a y t h e p r o c e e d i n g s
i n t h i s Court u n t i l t h e United S t a t e s C o u r t of Appeals f o r
the Ninth C i r c u i t has rendered a decision in t h e c a s e of
Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., C a s e No. CA, Docket
No. 81-3161. Respondent contends that a stay in these
p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d be g r a n t e d b e c a u s e : t h e r e is a s u b s t a n -
t i a l r i s k of c o n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i o n s between t h e Ninth C i r c u i t
in the Marshall case and our decision in this case; the
issue is a federal question which i s more appropriately
d e c i d e d by t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s ; t h e r i s k o f c o n f l i c t i n g d e c i -
s i o n s w i l l c r e a t e a dilemma f o r BN i n o p e r a t i n g i t s t r a i n s
i n Montana and o t h e r states; and t h e i n t e r e s t s o f justice,
~ u d i c i a l economy, and good court administration requires
t h i s C o u r t t o do s o .
The l e a d i n g c a s e on when a s t a y o f p r o c e e d i n g s m o t i o n
s h o u l d be g r a n t e d is L a n d i s v . N o r t h American Co. (1936),
299 U.S. 248, 57 S . C t . 1 6 3 , 8 1 L.Ed. 153. The v a r i o u s p r o -
nouncements of L a n d i s h a v e been f o l l o w e d and r e e s t a b l i s h e d
over the years. The c o u r t in Dellinger v. Mitchell (D.C.
Cir. 1 9 7 1 ) , 442 F.2d 782, s e t s o u t t h e i m p o r t a n t l e g a l con-
s i d e r a t i o n s , i n i t i a l l y b r o u g h t o u t i n L a n d i s , t o f o l l o w when
determining whether a stay in the proceedings should be
utilized. The c o u r t s t a t e d :
.
I l l A c o u r t h a s i n h e r e n t power t o stay
proceedings i n c o n t r o l of i t s docket--after
b a l a n c i n g t h e competing i n t e r e s t s . [Footnote
omitted.]
'I2 . ' T h e s u p p l i a n t f o r a s t a y m u s t make o u t
a c l e a r c a s e of hardship o r i n e q u i t y i n being
---
required t o go forward, i f t h e r e i s even a
f a i r p o s s i b i l i -y -t h a t t h e s t a y f o r w h i c h h e
t -
E r a y s w i l l w o r k d a m- g-------------------
a e t o some o n e e l s e .
Only i n r a r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w i l l a l i t i q a n t i n
one c a u s e be compelled t o s t a n d a s i d e while a
--
l i t i g a n t i n a n o t h e r s e t t l e s t h e r u l e of law
t h a t w i l l d e f i n e t h e r i g h t s of b o t h . ' 299
U.S. a t 255, 57 S . C t . a t 1 6 6 . [Emphasis
added. ]
113 . ' E s p e c i a l l y i n c a s e s of e x t r a o r d i n a r y
p u b l i c moment, t h e i n d i v i d u a l may be r e q u i r e d
t o s u b m i t t o d e l a y and n o t immoderate i n
e x t e n t and n o t o p p r e s s i v e i n i t s c o n s e q u e n c e s
i f t h e p u b l i c welfare or conveninece w i l l
t h e r e b y be p r o m o t e d . ' 299 U.S. a t 256, 57
S . C t . a t 166." 442 F.2d a t 786.
When t h e a n a l y s i s from L a n d i s i s a p p l i e d t o t h e f a c t s
of t h e c a s e a t bar i t becomes e v i d e n t that t h e motion to
s t a y t h e p r o c e e d i n g s s h o u l d n o t be g r a n t e d .
First, t h i s Court does n o t b e l i e v e that there is a
federal preemption question involved in this case; there-
f o r e , t h e r e is not a s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k of conflicting deci-
sions. Second, respondent h a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y demonstrated
t h a t , by a l l o w i n g a j u r y t o d e l i b e r a t e on t h e q u e s t i o n o f a
common-law duty, a great hardship w i l l befall it. Third,
respondent h a s f a i l e d t o s a t i s f y t h i s Court t h a t t h e nard-
s h i p on r e l a t o r is l e s s burdensome t h a n t h a t on r e s p o n d e n t
or that "some d e l a y i s i n h i s [relator's] own interest."
Fourth, and as respondent argues, t h e g r a n t i n g of a stay
rests within the discretion of the court. It is very
doubtful t h a t the " j u d i c i a l economy" o f t h e c o u r t w i l l be
a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by r e f u s i n g t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n .
The p e t i t i o n for a writ of supervisory control is
granted pursuant t o the rationale s e t out i n t h i s opinion.
The m o t i o n f o r s t a y o f p r o c e e d i n g s i s d e n i e d f o r t h e r e a s o n s
d i s c u s s e d above.
W concur:
e
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