D & F Sanitation Service v. City of Red Lodge

No. 81-25 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F OTN 1981 D & F SANITATION SERVICE, a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n , P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , CITY OF RED LODGE, D e f e n d a n t and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Carbon Honorable W i l l i a m J. S p e a r e , Judge p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For A p p e l l a n t : A l e x a n d e r & Baucus, Great F a l l s , Montana N e i l U g r i n a r g u e d , Great F a l l s , Montana F o r Respondent: Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana A r t h u r W. A y e r s , J r . , a r g u e d , C i t y A t t o r n e y , Red Lodge, Montana Submitted: September 14, 1 9 8 1 Decided : flb d l FEB 111982 Filed: Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court. Plaintiff, D & F Sanitation Service, appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Carbon County District Court, which held unconstitutional section 7-13-4107, MCA, which retroactively prohibits a municipality from providing its own garbage collection service unless it gives any existing private garbage contractor five years notice of its intention to do so, or unless the municipality purchases the private contractor's equipment at fair market value. The District Court declared that this statute violated the prohibition against impairment of contracts of the Montana Constitution (Art. 11, 5 31) and also that the statute violated the prohibition against retroactive application of laws of the Montana Constitution (Art. XIII, § l(3)) . We affirm the District Court, but on a different ground. We hold that the contract involved had expired before the effective date of the statute and therefore that the statute could not be applied to the expired contract. Plaintiff, D & F Sanitation Service (D & F) is a private motor carrier duly licensed by the Public Service Commission to transport solid waste in Carbon County, Montana. The defendant, City of Red Lodge (City), is a municipal corporation in Carbon County. On November 25, 1978, D & F and the City entered into a contract for solid waste collection. This contract provided that D & F was to perform garbage collection services for the City from November 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979. During the entire period of the contract, D & F provided exclusive garbage collection services for the City. In 1979, the legislature enacted section 7-13-4107, MCA (Ch. 448, Laws of Montana (1979) which states: ) "7-13-4107. Protection of private waste disposal service in municipality. A municipality, as of January 1, 1979, that receives garbage and solid waste disposal services from a private motor carrier authorized by the public service commission to provide such service may not, by ordinance or otherwise, elect to provide exclusive garbage and solid waste service unless the municipality pays the private motor carrier fair market value for his equipment or unless the municipality delays commencing the public service for a period of 5 years from the date of the decision by the municipality to provide the garbage and solid waste services. The private motor carrier shall be given notice of the decision by the municipality to provide exclusive garbage and solid waste services no later than 10 days after the decision has been made by the municipality." This statute, of course, was not in existence when the City and D & F signed their contract in November 1978, and obviously was not in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was signed. On June 30, 1979, the day the contract was to expire, the city council met at a special session. The council voted to provide its own garbage collection service, and authorized the mayor to hire city employees for this purpose. The City has provided garbage collection service since July 1, 1979. After learning of the city council action, D & F invoked section 7-13-4107, and demanded that the City either pay to D & F the fair market value of its equipment or delay providing its own garbage collection service for five years. The City refused this demand and D & F then filed suit to recover the full market value of its equipment. In defending, the City relied on the impairment of contract and on the constitutional prohibition against retroactive application of the law. The City also, however, contended that the contract had expired before the effective date of the statute. The trial court ruled in favor of the City on both constitutional arguments, but did not address the argument that the contract had expired. W do n o t d e c i d e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y o f s e c t i o n 7-i3- e 410'7. The u n d e n i a b l e f a c t i s t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t e x p i r e d b e f o r e t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e . The s t a t u t e went i n t o e f f e c t on J u l y 1, 1979, and a l t h o u g h i t i s i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y t o c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s " a s of J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 7 9 , " t h e r e w a s no c o n t r a c t i n e x i s t e n c e on J u l y 1 t o which t h e s t a t u t e could apply. The c o n t r a c t e x p i r e d on J u n e 30, 1979 a t m i d n i g h t , and t h e C i t y on J u n e 30, 1979, had d e c i d e d t h a t s t a r t i n g on J u l y 1, 1979, it would assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f c o l l e c t i n g garbage. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s t a t u t e was i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y t o c o n t a c t s i n e x i s t e n c e b e f o r e J a n u a r y 1, 1979. The l a n g u a g e o f s e c t i o n 7-13-4107-- " a s o f J a n u a r y 1, 1979"--appears t o be i n t e n d e d t o a p p l y t o c o n t r a c t s s i g n e d on o r a f t e r J a n u a r y 1, 1979. A p p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 7-13-4107 t o the contract here would c l e a r l y s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r t h e c o n t r a c t u a l o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e City. Whether i t c o n s t i t u t e s a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l impairment o f c o n t r a c t , o r would c o n s t i t u t e a n u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of a law, w e need n o t d e c i d e , a s t h e c o n t r a c t expired b e f o r e t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e s t a t u t e . On a ground o t h e r t h a n t h a t d e c i d e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , w e a f f i r m t h e g r a n t o f summary judgment. W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e Justices