NO. 83-41
I N T E SUPREME C U T O T E STATE O M N A A
H O R F H F OTN
1983
KATHLEEN RACHEL WILKINSON,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t ,
vs .
STATE O M N A A
F O T N ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent.
Appeal from- D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County of Missoula
Honorable J a c k L . Green, Judge p r e s i d i n * .
Counsel of Record:
For A p p e l l a n t :
Nick A. R o t e r i n q a r g u e d , S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Xontana
R o b e r t L. Deschamps 111, County A t t o r n e y , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Karen S. Townsend, Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a r q u e d . M i s s o u l a ,
Montana
Submitted- June 2 , 198 3
Decided- A u g u s t 1, 1983
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
The Department of Institutions of the State of Montana
appeals from an order by the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District, Missoula County, declaring the Department
financially responsible for costs incurred as a result of the
b i r t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s baby.
On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a g u i l t y p l e a t o t h e
charge of negligent homicide. The District Court sentenced
d e f e n d a n t t o t e n y e a r s w i t h two y e a r s s u s p e n d e d , t o be s e r v e d a t
a women's correctional facility chosen by the Department of
Institutions.
B e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t was s o o n t o g i v e b i r t h and b e c a u s e t e s t i -
mony a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g indicated t h a t s h e had a s t r o n g
medical relationship with her physician, the District Court
a l l o w e d h e r t o r e m a i n a t t h e M i s s o u l a County j a i l u n t i l a f t e r t h e
birth of her child. S h e was remanded to the c u s t o d y of the
M i s s o u l a County s h e r i f f and s u b s e q u e n t l y g a v e b i r t h t o h e r c h i l d
a t t h e M i s s o u l a Community H o s p i t a l . On O c t o b e r 2 8 , 1 9 8 2 , s h e was
taken to the Women's Correctional Center at Warm Springs,
Montana.
The D e p a r t m e n t of Institutions refused to pay the medical
e x p e n s e s of the birth. M i s s o u l a County moved f o r a n o r d e r from
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c l a r i n g t h a t t h e D e p a r t m e n t pay t h e m e d i c a l
expenses. After a show-cause hearing, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made
t h e f o l l o w i n g f i n d i n g s , c o n c l u s i o n s , and d e c r e e :
"FINDINGS OF FACT
"1. The D e f e n d a n t , K a t h l e e n R a c h e l W i l k i n s o n ,
was found g u i l t y by a p l e a of g u i l t y t o t h e
o f f e n s e of N e g l i g e n t H o m i c i d e , a f e l o n y , and
s e n t e n c e d on t h e 1 0 t h day of S e p t e m b e r , 1982
t o a t e r m of t e n ( 1 0 ) y e a r s a t Montana S t a t e
P r i s o n w i t h two of t h o s e y e a r s s u s p e n d e d .
" 2 . The D e f e n d a n t , o n S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 , was
o r d e r e d t o s e r v e h e r time a t t h e women's p r i -
s o n f a c i l i t y a t Warm S p r i n g s S t a t e H o s p i t a l .
" 3 . The D e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d r e t a i n e d i n t h e
M i s s o u l a County J a i l u n t i l a f t e r t h e b i r t h of
h e r c h i l d s o t h a t h e r o b s t e t r i c i a n c o u l d con-
tinue to care for her.
" 4 . The D e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o r e m a i n i n
M i s s o u l a C o u n t y and n o t be t r a n s f e r r e d t o Warm
S p r i n g s S t a t e Hospital u n t i l her doctor deter-
mined t h a t it would n o t be d e t r i m e n t a l t o h e r
i n t e r e s t s o r t h e i n t e r e s t s of h e r c h i l d t o be
transferred.
" 5 . The D e f e n d a n t was t a k e n t o M i s s o u l a
Community H o s p i t a l f o r t h e b i r t h of h e r c h i l d
on O c t o b e r 23, 1982.
"6. E x p e n s e s f o r m e d i c a l and s e c u r i t y c o s t s
i n t h e amount of T h r e e Thousand F o u r Hundred
E i g h t y - t w o and 4 7 / 1 0 0 t h D o l l a r s ( $ 3 , 4 8 2 . 4 7 )
w e r e i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e
Defendant's son.
"7. The D e f e n d a n t was t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e
women's p r i s o n f a c i l i t y on t h e 2 8 t h d a y of
O c t o b e r , 1982 a f t e r her p h y s i c i a n s t a t e d s h e
c o u l d be t r a n s f e r r e d .
"CONCLUSIONS OF L W
A
"1. The D e f e n d a n t became a s t a t e p r i s o n e r on
t h e 1 0 t h d a y of S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 8 2 upon p a s s i n g
of sentence.
" 2 . The D e f e n d a n t ' s s t a y i n t h e M i s s o u l a
C o u n t y J a i l and o r t h e M i s s o u l a Community
H o s p i t a l from S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 8 2 u n t i l O c t o b e r
2 8 , 1 9 8 2 , was a t e m p o r a r y s t a y f o r a s t a t e
p r i s o n inmate.
"3. The Montana D e p a r t m e n t of I n s t i t u t i o n s i s
f i n a n c i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e m e d i c a l and
s e c u r i t y c o s t s i n c u r r e d as a r e s u l t of t h e
b i r t h of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d .
"ORDER
"The Montana D e p a r t m e n t of I n s t i t u t i o n s i s
h e r e b y o r d e r e d t o assume t h e f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n -
s i b i l i t y f o r a l l m e d i c a l and s e c u r i t y c o s t s
i n c u r r e d a s a r e s u l t of t h e b i r t h of t h e s o n
of Kathleen Rachel W i l kinson.
"The D e p a r t m e n t is f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t o r e m i t t o
M i s s o u l a Community H o s p i t a l t h e sum of Two
Thousand E i g h t y - f i v e and 8 7 / 1 0 0 t h s D o l l a r s
( $ 2 , 0 8 5 . 8 7 ) ; t o D r . Thomas A. B a u m g a r t n e r t h e
sum of Four Hundred and Sixty Dollars
( $ 4 6 0 . 0 0 ) ; and t o M i s s o u l a County ( G u a r d s ) t h e
sum of Nine Hundred Fifty-four dollars
($954.00).
The sole issue on appeal is whether the Department of
Institutions is r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e m e d i c a l and s e c u r i t y c o s t s
incurred as a result of the birth of the defendant's baby,
despite the fact that she was not delivered to the Women's
C o r r e c t i o n a l C e n t e r a t Warm S p r i n g s p r i o r t o t h e b i r t h .
The l a w of Montana is c l e a r t h a t " [ o l n c e a v a l i d s e n t e n c e is
imposed, the court lacks jurisdiction to vacate o r modify it
unless specifically authorized by statute. State v. Porter
(1964), 1 4 3 Mont. 528, 540, 3 9 1 P.2d 704." S t a t e v. Downing
( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 2 4 2 , 593 P.2d 4 3 , 44. Here t h e c o u r t , i n i t s
judgment, committed the defendant t o t h e Montana D e p a r t m e n t of
Institutions. From t h i s it is c l e a r t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e S t a t e as t h e r e is no way f o r t h e j u d g e to
c h a n g e h i s d e c i s i o n , a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e j u d g m e n t .
This point is illustrated most vividly by a line of
W a s h i n g t o n cases w h e r e i t h a s b e e n s t a t e d t h a t :
" T h i s c o u r t s a i d i n J a n u a r y v. P o r t e r , 7 5
Wash.2d 7 6 8 , 4 5 3 P.2d 8 7 6 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , t h a t upon
--
t h e e n t r y o f a f i n a l judgment and s e n t e n c e o f
---
imprisonment, l e g a l a u t h o r i t y over t h e accused
passes b x o p e r a t i o n o f law t o t h e D e p a r t m e n t
- I n s t i t u - (now the-tmxt
of t i o n s -- o f Social
a n d H e a l t h S e r v i c e s ) ----B o a r d o T P r i s o n
and t h e -
-
Terms a n d P a r o l e s , and t h a t t h o s e a g e n c i e s of
t h e e x e c u t i v e branch bear f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r e x e c u t i n g t h e j u d g m e n t and s e n t e n c e o r
granting parole. " ( E m p h a s i s added ) Kanekoa
v . W a s h i n g t o n S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t of S o c i a l and
H e a l t h S e r v i c e s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 95 Wash.2d 445, 626
P.2d 6 , 7 ( s e e a l s o I n Re Bush ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 26
Wash.App. 4 8 6 , 616 P.2d 6 6 6 , I n R e t h e W e l f a r e
o f Lowe ( 1 9 7 8 ) , .2d 8 2 4 , 5 7 6 P.2d 6 5 . )
S i m i l a r l y , b e c a u s e of circumstances i n t h i s particu-
lar case, t h e D e p a r t m e n t of I n s t i t u t i o n s must bear t h e medical
c o s t s f o r t h e b i r t h of d e f e n d a n t ' s c h i l d .
I t m u s t be n o t e d t h a t o u r h o l d i n g h e r e a p p l i e s s o l e l y t o t h e
particular expenses in question. W are neither
e setting nor
suggesting a general method for determining financial respon-
s i b i l i t y of s t a t e p r i s o n e r s . T h a t is a l e g i s l a t i v e
da t t e r .
For t h e reasons s t a t e d above, the ourt's judgment
is affirmed.
W e concur: /
Y
%-RJ
Chief J u s t i c e
t . w
Q (&
&J
Justices
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:
I dissent. I would hold that Missoula County is
responsible for the expenditures. The unfortunate result
here is that the Department of Instituti,ons, without even
having been notified of the District Court decision in time
to object, has been saddled with paying the costs of
hospitalization and cost of providing guards at the hospital.
The result not only is unfair it is papered over with
citations and quotations of authority that have no
application to the questions presented to the District Court
and to this Court.
At the sentencing hearing it was the defense attorney
and the deputy county attorney who requested the District
Court to take the action it did. The District Court did so
without ever conferring with anyone from the Department of
Institutions. Had the Department of Institutions been
notified of the contemplated action rather than the completed
action, it is possible that it could have made other and
satisfactory arrangements for care of the mother and the baby
through the time of delivery.
The authority cited by the ma:jority has no application
to the facts presented here. Here the District Court
committed the defendant to the Department of Institutions.
This should have meant that the defendant was in the custody
and control of the Department and that the Department could
have made appropriate arrangements itself for the proper care
of the mother and expected child. The question here is not
whether custody passed by operation of law to the Department
of Institutions upon the passing of sentence of imprisonment.
The question is whether the District Court had the authority
to grant custody and control of defendant to the Department
on the one hand, but on the other to take it away by never
notifing the Department that it had made arrangments for the
custody of the defendant up to the time that the baby was
delivered. By the action it took, the District Court
deprived the Department of any meaningful opportunity to
object to the Court's decision.
In later ruling that the Department must bear the
hospitalization and guard expenses the District Court simply
sanctified the time-honored rule that if possible make the
State pay rather than the local unit of government, a
governmental application of the deep pocket theory. This
Court has of course, ratified that action by approving the
ruling that the State rather than the county must pay.
Here the District Court made a mistake and I have no
doubt it had the authority to correct its own mistake by a
ruling that truly passed the custody and control of defendant
to the Department of Institutions. Had the Department been
timely notified of the decision it could have objected and
the District Court could have amended its decision to truly
turn custody and control of defendant over to the Department
of Institutions. I doubt that the Department would have been
so callous as not to take care of the real needs of the
expectant mother, but it was never given the opportunity to
act. The county, not the State, should pay.