State v. Arbgast

No. 82-228 I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A F F O T N 1983 THE STATE O MONTANA, F P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -VS- JULIE ARBGAST I Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: District Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l District, I n a n d f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n , The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: German & McClain, M i s s o u l a , Montana Keller & G i l m e r , K a l i s p e l l , Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana W i l l i a m A. D o u g l a s , County A t t o r n e y , L i b b y , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : December 1 6 , 1982 Decided: January 2 0 , 1983 Filed: J N 2 0 1983 A Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court. D e f e n d a n t was charged with t w o c o u n t s of criminal s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s i n t h e District C o u r t , L i n c o l n County. Defendant pled not guilty at her arraignment on October 5, 1981. On February 5, 1982, d e f e n d a n t changed h e r p l e a to g u i l t y to t h e charge in count two of the information and count one was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain with the Lincoln County Attorney's Office. On March 1 5 , 1 9 8 2 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t sen- tenced defendant to five years in prison with three years suspended. On A p r i l 7 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t moved to withdraw h e r p l e a of guilty. After a hearing t h e District Court denied the m o t i o n on May 11, 1 9 8 2 . Defendant appeals. Defendant was charged with two c o u n t s o f criminal sale of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s w h i c h p r e c i p i t a t e d from d e f e n d a n t ' s a d m i t t e d sale of marijuana to Richard Morrow, an undercover investigation o f f i c e r working i n L i n c o l n County. D e f e n d a n t claims s h e f i r s t met Morrow a t a b a r i n E u r e k a , M o n t a n a , when s h e was i n t r o d u c e d t o him b y a m u t u a l friend, Gary T o r r e s . She t e s t i f i e d Morrow asked h e r i f s h e or a n y o n e s h e knew of would s e l l him c o c a i n e . D e f e n d a n t s t a t e d s h e was n o t i n v o l v e d w i t h d r u g s n o r a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p e o p l e who were. Morrow s t a t e d by s w o r n a f f i d a v i t d e f e n d a n t s o l d him % o u n c e of m a r i j u a n a f o r $ 2 5 o n t h e i r f i r s t m e e t i n g a t t h e Eureka Tavern. Defendant tes t i £ i e d she sold marijuana to Morrow o n their t h i r d m e e t i n g a t t h e L i n c o l n County F a i r . She c l a i m s a f r i e n d o f h e r s f r o m K a l i s p e l l a p p r o a c h e d h e r and s t a t e d s h e had some m a r i - juana t o sell. D e f e n d a n t claims s h e w a s t h e n a p p r o a c h e d by G a r y Torres who told her Morrow was looking to buy some drugs. D e f e n d a n t t h e n o b t a i n e d some m a r i j u a n a from h e r K a l i s p e l l f r i e n d , e x c h a n g e d i t w i t h Morrow i n a car, and g a v e a l l of t h e exchange money t o t h e f r i e n d from K a l i s p e l l . Defendant testified she sold marijuana to Morrow a s e c o n d t i m e when G a r y T o r r e s approached her and told her Morrow was l e a v i n g f o r W a s h i n g t o n and w a n t e d t o buy more d r u g s f o r t h e r o a d . D e f e n d a n t a g a i n a p p r o a c h e d h e r K a l i s p e l l f r i e n d and o b t a i n e d some m a r i j u a n a w h i c h s h e e x c h a n g e d w i t h Morrow. D e f e n d a n t re t u r n e d the exchange money to her friend. Morrow stated defendant a p p r o a c h e d him a t t h e L i n c o l n County F a i r s e e k i n g to s e l l mari- juana f o r $25 p e r a ounce. H e claims he t h e n p u r c h a s e d o n e f u l l o u n c e o f m a r i j u a n a f o r $ 4 5 f r o m h e r t h e n e x t n i g h t a t t h e same location. D e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d o n S e p t e m b e r 1, 1 9 8 1 , and c h a r g e d b y i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h t w o c o u n t s o f c r i m i n a l s a l e of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s . On O c t o b e r 5, 1 9 8 1 , d e f e n d a n t a p p e a r e d and pled n o t g u i l t y to both counts. On February 8, 1982, defendant signed a plea bargain agreement with the Lincoln County Attorney's Office a g r e e i n g t o e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y to c o u n t two o f the infor- mation i n exchange for dismissal of count one. On March 15, 1 9 8 2 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o be incarcerated a t Montana S t a t e P r i s o n f o r a term o f f i v e y e a r s w i t h a l l b u t t w o y e a r s suspended. On A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t moved t o w i t h d r a w h e r p l e a o f g u i l t y and t o s e t a s i d e t h e p l e a b a r g a i n a g r e e m e n t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e a r d t h e m o t i o n on A p r i l 1 9 , 1 9 8 2 . On May 1 , 1 1982 the District Court denied defendant's motion. Defendant appeals. The i s s u e s r a i s e d o n a p p e a l a r e : 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and refusing to set aside the plea bargain agreement. 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e error i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 45-9-101, MCA. Defendant f i r s t contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n denying h e r motion t o withdraw h e r g u i l t y p l e a . The g r a n t i n g or r e f u s a l o f p e r m i s s i o n t o w i t h d r a w a p l e a o f g u i l t y and s u b s t i t u t e a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y rests i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and i s s u b j e c t t o r e v i e w o n l y upon a s h o w i n g o f a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n . S t a t e v. H u t t i n g e r ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -- -- Mont . - -- 1 5 9 5 P.2d 363, 376, 36 In Huttinqer, s u p r a , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d t h r e e f a c t o r s m u s t be b a l a n c e d when e x a m i n i n g a d e f e n d a n t ' s a t t e m p t t o w i t h d r a w a p l e a of guilty: " (1) t h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e e n t r y of the guilty plea as to defendant's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e consequences of h i s p l e a , ( 2 ) t h e promptness w i t h which t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t s t o w i t h d r a w t h e p r i o r p l e a , and ( 3 ) the fact that the defendant's p l e a was a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a b a r g a i n i n w h i c h t h e g u i l t y p l e a was g i v e n i n e x c h a n g e f o r d i s m i s s a l of a n o t h e r c h a r g e . . ." Here, defendant admits the interrogation by the District C o u r t was a d e q u a t e b u t claims s h e d i d n o t a c t u a l l y u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h e r r e s p o n s e and t h a t s h e was o n l y a n s w e r i n g a s instructed by h e r attorney. Her argument is u n f o u n d e d . The record indicates defendant and defendant's s i s t e r had several meetings with defendant's counsel. The consequences of the charges were t h o r o u g h l y d i s c u s s e d . That defendant voluntarily entered a guilty plea is w i t h o u t question. Her attempt to withdraw h e r g u i l t y p l e a was prompted by t h e District C o u r t ' s sentence. We do not find this to be sufficient grounds to reverse the District Court's ruling as a defendant has o t h e r r e m e d i e s to p u r s u e i n such an i n s t a n c e . The S t a t e a g r e e s t h e s e c o n d f a c t o r i n H u t t i n g e r , t h e prompt- . - n e s s o f t h e motion to withdraw, is n o t a n i s s u e h e r e . The t h i r d factor, t h a t t h e g u i l t y p l e a was a p p a r e n t l y t h e r e s u l t of a p l e a bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for d i s m i s s a l o f a n o t h e r c h a r g e , is t h e e x a c t s i t u a t i o n t h a t f a c e s u s here. On February 8, 1982, defendant signed a plea bargain a g r e e m e n t w h e r e b y s h e a g r e e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y to c o u n t two o f t h e information and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss the c h a r g e c o n t a i n e d i n c o u n t one of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s Court has s t a t e d many times that it w i l l not lend its a s s i s t a n c e to a n accused criminal in escaping the o b l i g a t i o n s of his agreement a f ter accepting the b e n e f i t s t h e r e o f . S t a t e v. H u t t i n g e r , s u p r a ; State v. Sattler (1976), 170 Mont. 35, 549 P.2d 1080. In . uttinger H - we stated : " T h i s is u n d o u b t e d l y t h e most troubling a s p e c t of t h i s a p p e a l and is t h e f a c t o r w e i g h i n g most s t r o n g l y against allowing Huttinger to withdraw his guilty plea." Although i n H u t t i n g e r we found t h i s f a c t o r d i d n o t outweigh t h o s e f a c t o r s which favored allowing the withdrawal, in the present case the State rests upon the heavy arm of the scale. In H u t t i n g e r t h e r e were s e r i o u s d e f e c t s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e g i v i n g and a c c e p t a n c e of the g u i l t y p l e a , not p r e s e n t h e r e . On appeal defendant has questioned the competency of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l p r i o r t o , and a t t h e t i m e of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . However, this Court finds the claim is u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d i n the record. A s s t a t e d a b o v e , d e f e n d a n t was d i s t r a u g h t w i t h t h e s e n - tence pronounced by the District Court and her ill-feelings toward c o u n s e l sprang therefrom. S u c h is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n t o f i n d i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . S e e S t a t e v. Bigsmoke (198211 - - - - Mont . , 6 4 2 P.2d 1068, 39 St.Rep. 481. The s e c o n d i s s u e i n v o l v e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s e c t i o n 45-9-101 MCA. S e v e r a l times d u r i n g t h e p r o c e e d i n g s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t a c a n d i d a t e f o r a suspended or d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of sentence relying upon a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t s e c t i o n 45-9-101( 4 ) , MCA, r e q u i r e s a mini- mum i m p r i s o n m e n t o f o n e y e a r . An e x a m p l e is from t h e A p r i l 1 9 hearing : ". . . i f you c a n t e l l m e , w i t h a s t r a i g h t f a c e , t h a t t h e p e o p l e of t h e S t a t e of Montana h a v e n ' t s a i d t o t h e j u d g e s , 'You b e t t e r s e n d p e o p l e who d e a l i n d r u g s t o p r i s o n , ' I g u e s s I b e t t e r go b a c k t o l a w s c h o o l , too. I ' v e -- i f you wish to go t h r o u g h t h e r e c o r d s , M r . K e l l e r , i n s t e a d o f making some w i l d comment of somebody who s i t s on t h e s i d e l i n e , t h a t ' s o n e t h i n g , b u t you g o t e v e r y r i g h t to d o i t . B u t t h e r e are a l l k i n d s of c a s e s , M r . K e l l e r : T h e r e a r e p o s s e s s i o n cases, there's sale c a s e s , w e e v e n had a m a n u f a c t u r i n g c a s e t h a t d i d n ' t g e t to t r i a l . And s o , anyway, i f t h a t ' s a c h a l l e n g e , I see it and a c k n o w l e d g e it, B u t t h e good p e o p l e o f t h e S t a t e of Montana h a v e s a i d t o t h e j u d g e s t h a t , 'You b e t t e r put the drug-sales people i n prison,' a n d p l a i n and s i m p l y , t h a t ' s t h i s c a s e . " However, s e c t i o n 45-9-101 ( 4 ) , MCA, d o e s n o t r e q u i r e i m p r i s o n - ment. A prison sentence may be deferred under section 46-18-201(3), MCA: " E x c e p t as p r o v i d e d i n 46-18-222, t h e imposi- t i o n o r e x e c u t i o n o f t h e f i r s t 2 y e a r s o f a s e n t e n c e of i m p r i s o n - m e n t imposed u n d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n s may n o t be d e f e r r e d o r suspended : . .. 45-9-101(2) and (3) . . ." A s defendant was sentenced under s e c t i o n 45-9-101(4), MCA, s h e was n o t b a r r e d from a suspended or deferred imposition of sentence by section 46-18-201(3), MCA. The S t a t e c o n c e d e s s e c t i o n 4 5 - 9 - 1 0 1 ( 4 ) , MCA, does not require mandatory imprisonment as the D i s t r i c t Court b e l i e v e d , b u t claims t h e s e n t e n c e o f f i v e y e a r s i n Montana S t a t e P r i s o n w i t h a l l b u t two y e a r s s u s p e n d e d was w i t h i n t h e con£ i n e s of t h e s t a t u t e and t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s m i s r e l i a n c e was n o t p r e j u d i c i a l to d e f e n d a n t . W disagree. e I n l i g h t of t h e f a c t s it appears the District Court's belief that the charge required i m p r i s o n m e n t was p r e j u d i c i a l to d e f e n d a n t . We order t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e be v a c a t e d and remand f o r r e s e n - tencing . w Chief Justxce