I N THE SUPREME COIJRT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA
STATE ex r e l . , STEVEN WADE E L L I O T ,
Relator,
VS.
D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE S I X T H J U D I C I A L
D I S T R I C T , I N AND FOR THE COUNTY O F
SWEET GRASS, THE HONORABLF BYRON
L. ROBB, D I S T R I C T JUDGE,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For R e l a t o r :
J a m e s T u l l e y argued, B i q T i m b e r , Montana
F o r Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l v , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Jim Schier, Assistant Attorney General, arqued, Helena,
Montana
G. T h o m a s B i q l e n , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , ~ i ~ i m b e r ,M o n t a n a
q
Submitted: March 1 9 , 1 9 8 4
Decided-: J u n e 2 0 , 1 98 4
Filed: >u\\ d u '984
Clerk
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Relator Steven Wade Elliot petitions this Court for a
writ of supervisory control or other appropriate writ
ordering the Sixth Judicial District Court, Sweet Grass
County, to dismiss deliberate homicide and robbery charges
for lack of jurisdiction. We deny the application for writ
of supervisory control.
The issues are:
1. Whether a youth 15 years of age is legally capable
of committing a crime?
2. Does the District Court have jurisdiction to try an
individual charged at 22 years of age for felonies allegedly
committed at the age of 15?
On July 1, 1.976, when relator was about 15 1/2 years of
age, his neighbor, William Feldt, was found dead in his home.
At about the same time, relator left home and was picked up
several days later as a runaway. He was adjudicated a youth
in need of supervision and confined at various youth
institutions until he was 19. Soon after his release from
Swan River Youth Camp, he was arrested and convicted of a
felony in Missoula. He was sentenced to the State Prison and
was later paroled.
In May 1983, while being questioned in Helena concerning
an incident there, relator confessed to having murdered and
robbed his former neighbor, William Feldt. Upon 1ea.rning of
the confession, Sweet Grass County authorities petitioned the
District Court for authority to exhume Feldt's body for
examination. Authority was granted and the results of the
post-mortem examination corresponded with relator's
confession. Relator, then 22 years of age, was charged in
District Court with deliberate homicide and robbery.
On June 30, 1983, relator moved the District Court for
dismissal of the charges for lack of jurisdiction, arguing
that the Youth Court had exclusive jurisdiction of the
offenses. After a hearing on the motion, the District Court
denied relator's motion and later filed a written order. The
court reasoned that because the alleged crimes were not
discovered until relator was 22, the Youth Court had never
obtained jurisdiction and that the Youth Court's jurisdiction
is exclusive only in cases where the offender is a youth when
charged. Relator then filed this application for a writ of
supervisory control.
1
Relator argues that the Legislature has by implication
set the minimum age of criminal responsibility at 16 and that
a 15 year old is incapable of committing a crime. A 15 year
old, he argues, can commit only "delinquent acts." We reject
this argument.
Section 41-5-103 (12)(a), MCA defines "delinquent youth"
as a youth who has committed an offense which if committed by
an adult would constitute a criminal offense. Section
41-5-206, MCA allows transfer from Youth Court to district
court only if the youth charged was 16 or older at the time
of the offense. Further, subsection (4) provides that "no
youth may be prosecuted in the district court for a criminal
offense originally subject to the jurisdiction of the youth
court unless the case has been transferred as provided" in
section 41-5-206, MCA. From these provisions, relator argues
that the Legislature intended to establish a rule that one
under the age of 16 is incapable of committing a crime.
Relator argues that such a rule is consistent with a national
legislative trend recognizing that youths under a certain age
should not be subject to criminal responsibility. Further,
he argues, a noncriminal act does not ripen into a crime by
the mere passage of time.
We conclude that the statutory provisions cited by
relator are more consistent with a different legislative
purpose and do not establish a rule that a youth under 16 is
incapable of committing a crime.
The primary purposes of these statutory provisions are
to make it clear that delinquency proceedings in Youth Court
are noncriminal, section 41-5-106, MCA, and to prohibit
prosecution of youths in district courts while they are
youths, section 41-5-206(4), MCA. These provisions are
consistent with the fundamental objective of the Youth Court
Act, which is to attempt to rehabilitate the offender while
he is a youth and presumably amenable to rehabilitation.
Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. A delinquent youth is defined as a
vouth who has committed an offense which would be criminal if
committed by an adult to emphasize that an adjudication of
delinquency is noncriminal. However, this provision does not
address the capacity of a youth to commit a crime. Cf.
McBeth v. Rose (Ariz. 1975), 531 P.2d 156, 159.
The incapacity argument raised by relator was rejected
in State v. Little (Or. 1965), 407 P.2d 627. There,
defendant was arrested and indicted for murder at the age of
15. After defendant turned 16, his case was remanded to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court for adult disposition.
Oregon law provided that juvenile court had exclusive
original jurisdiction over youths under 18 years of age, but
that a child could be remanded to the appropriate trial court
for adult disposition if at the time of the remand he was 16
years of age or older. 407 P.2d at 628-29. The defendant
contended that this statutory scheme was enacted with the
intent to prohibit prosecution of any person for crimes
committed before reaching the age of 16. The Oregon court
rejected this argument, stating:
"No Oregon statute permits the discretionary remand
of a person under sixteen at the time of the
remand. Therefore, the defendant argues, the
legislature intended to make persons under sixteen
immune from criminal liability. Exclusive
jurisdiction of persons under sixteen, the
defendant says, remains exclusive, and cannot be
converted into concurrent jurisdiction by the
passage of time. The defendant's argument rests
upon a premise that the statutes forever fix the
court's power over a child according to his age on
the date an offense was committed. . ..
"If there is to be some arbitrary age before which
a person cannot, as a matter of law, be accorded
adult treatment for his criminal conduct, the age
may, of course, be clearly fixed by statute. If,
however, the legislature has not fixed such an age,
it is not the function of the courts to do so.
"It is extremely unlikely that if the Assembly had
considered the precise problem now before us, it
would have intended to create a hiatus in the law
that could wholly frustrate the administration of
justice when a serious offense had been committed
by a person below the age for discretionary
remand." 407 P.2d at 629-30.
Although Little involved a statutory transfer rule, slightly
different from Montana's, we believe the Oregon court's
reasoning applies here. Specifically, the Montana
Legislature has not expressly stated a minimum age of
criminal capacity, even though it could. have done so if such
a rule had been intended.
Relator contends that his position is supported by
People ex rel. Terrell v. District Court (Colo. 19671, 4 3 5
P.2d 763. There, a 15 year old was charged in district court
with a.ssault with a deadly weapon. The court held that the
Colorado Legislature, by enacting its statutory juvenile
court provisions, in effect raised the minimum age of
criminal responsibility from 10 to 16 years of age. The
statutory language relied upon by the Colorado court appeared
in section 22-1-4(4) of the Colorado Children's Code:
"A child [under 181 shall be charged with the
commission of a felony only as provided in
subsection (4) (a) of this section, except for
crimes of violence punishable by death or life
imprisonment where the accused is 16 years of age
or older." (court's emphasis)
The court found that this language precluded prosecution of a
15 year old for a felony. 435 P.2d at 765-66.
However, at least two significant distinctions separate
Terrell from this case. First, Terrell addressed a different
factual situation. There the offender could have been
charged in juvenile court instead of criminal court because
he was only 15 when charged. Here the crime was not
discovered nor was relator charged until the age of 22, when
Youth Court jurisdiction was no longer available. Second,
the Colorado statute included an express statement by the
legislature that a child could be charged with commission of
a felony only if 16 years of age or older and under specified
circumsta.nces. Montana1s statute provides only that a youth
may not be prosecuted in district court for a criminal
offense originally subject to Youth Court jurisdiction.
Section 41-5-206(4), MCA. This statute is inapplicable to
relator because he is not a youth and the alleged offense was
never subject to Youth Court jurisdiction because it was not
discovered until relator was 22. Terrell does not support
relator's argument, nor does any of the numerous additional
cases cited in furtherance of his argument. We have examined
the cases cited by relator and find them distinguishable.
The purposes of the Youth Court Act are set forth in the
Act's "declaration of purpose," section 41-5-102, MCA. That
section provides:
"The Montana Youth Court Act shall be interpreted
and construed to effectuate the following express
legislative purposes:
"(1) to preserve the unity and welfare of the
family whenever possj-ble and to provide for the
ca.re, protection, and wholesome mental and physical
development of a youth coming within the provisions
of the Montana Youth Court Act;
"(2) to remove from youth committing violations of
the law the element of retribution and to
substitute therefore a program of supervision,
care, rehabilitation, and, in appropriate cases,
restitution as ordered by the youth court;
" (3) to achieve the purposes of (1) and (2) of
this section in a family environment whenever
possible, separating the youth from his parents
only when necessary for the welfare of the youth or
for the safety a.nd protection of the community;"
Reading the Youth Court Act as a whole in light of this
declaration of purpose, we find the Act is designed to
provide a separate method of treatment for youths while they
are youths, with the ultimate goal of rehabilitation. Nowhere
in the Youth Court Act has the Legislature declared that a
youth is incapable of committing a crime. We believe that
had the Legislature intended to establish such a rule, it
would have expressly stated so.
We hold that a youth 15 years of age is legally capable
of committing a crime.
Relator argues that the Youth Court Act vests in the
Youth Court exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by persons
under 18 years of age and that this jurisdiction cannot be
transferred to district court if the youth was under 16 at
the time of the offense. He argues that because the Youth
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over these offenses or
transfer the cause district court , court has
jurisdiction over the offenses and the charges must be
dismissed.. We disagree.
Section 41-5-203(1), MCA provides:
"Jurisdiction of the court. (1) Except as
provided in subsection (21, the [vouthl court has
exclusive original jurisdidtion o f all -proceedings
under the Montana Youth Court Act in which a youth
is alleged to be a delinquent youth, a in
need of supervision, or a youth in need of care or
concerning any person under - years of age charged
21
with having violated any - - t h e state or
law of -
ordinance of any city or town other than a traffic
or fish and game law prior to having become - 18
years of age." (emphasis addedT
In State ex rel. Bresnahan v. District Court f1953), 127
Mont. 310, 263 P.2d 968, this Court held that the
substantially similar predecessor of this section granted the
Youth Court jurisdiction where the offender is under 21 when
charged and the offense was committed before the offender
reached the age of 18. Thus, the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" of the Youth Court depends upon two factors:
(1) the offense wa.s committed while the youth was under the
age of 18 and (2) the youth is charged before the age of 21.
Because the crimes were not discovered nor charges brought
until relator was 22, the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Youth Court was never invoked. Because relator's alleged
offenses were not "originally subject" to Youth Court
jurisdiction, the limitations on district court prosecution
contained in section 41-5-206(4), MCA are inapplicable.
Relator's argument that this statute precludes district court
jurisdiction is without merit.
It is true that some jurisdictions determine juvenile
court jurisdiction based upon the offender's a.qe at the time
of the offense. See Annotation, 89 A.L.R.2d 506 (1963).
However, the determination depends upon the state
jurisdictional statute in question, and cases from other
jurisdictions decided under different statutes do not control
our determination. Section 41-5-203, MCA expressly requires
consideration of the offender's age when charged in addition
to his age at commission of the offense.
In State v. Fowler (Del. 1963), 194 A.2d 558, the
Delaware court faced a similar dilemma. The offender had
committed a homicide at the age of 17 and confessed 10 years
later. The juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction of
crimes committed by a person under 18 and charged before the
age of 21. Youth court jurisdiction ended at 21. The court
concluded that the general criminal court had jurisdiction
because the offender was no longer a youth when charged. 194
While the Youth Court is granted jurisdiction by
statute, district courts are granted jurisdiction by the
Constitution. Article VII, section 4 of the Montana
Constitution provides:
"The district court has original jurisdiction in
all criminal cases amounting to felony . . .
and
such additional jurisdiction a s m a y be delegated by
the laws of ...
the state of Montana." (emphasis
added)
Lack of Youth Court jurisdiction does not affect the
scope of district court jurisdiction. In State v. Bradley
(Wash.App. 1978), 580 P.2d 640, the court stated:
"Bradley could - be treated as a juvenile
not
following his 18th birthday but this fact does not
deprive the superior court of jurisdiction over his
person . . ..
Want of jurisdiction of the juvenile
court merely precludes acts of that court. It does
not invalidate an otherwise valid act of the
superior court which properly had jurisdiction of
the subject matter and the person." 580 P.2d at
642 (citations omitted) (court's emphasis) .
As in Bradley, the Montana district courts have been given
jurisdiction by constitutional provision, and lack of
jurisdiction in Youth Court does not limit a district court's
jurisdiction.
In In the Matter of the Welfare of S.V. (Minn. 1980),
296 N.W.2d 404, the 17 year old defendant was charged with
homicide in juvenile court. However, the case dragged on in
juvenile court over four years and the court lost
jurisdiction because the offender turned 21. At 22, the
county sought to prosecute him in district court. Defendant
made the same argument as relator here:
". . . the respondent is attempting to take
advantage of an alleged loophole in the juvenile
court statutes. Minn. Stat. S260.111 .
provides that juvenile courts have original and.
. .
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by
persons under age 18 unless the case is referred by
the juvenile court for adult prosecution. . ..
However . .. juvenile court jurisdiction ends for
all purposes at age 21. The respondent urges that
the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction because he is
over 21, and the district court lacks jurisdiction
because there has been no juvenile court referral
of the juvenile act. The respondent thus argues
that he cannot now be prosecuted anywhere." 296
N.W.2d at 407.
The court responded that it had been confronted before
with identical situations and had rejected the "home free"
argument. The court relied on State v. Dehler (Minn. 1960),
102 N.W.2d 696, where the court allowed prosecution of a 34
year old for an act committed at age 16. The court quoted
from Dehler:
"'We believe it would be ridiculous to say that if
a person of 16 or 17 years of age commits a murder
and escapes detection or apprehension either on a
warrant or indictment until after he reached 18
years of age, or 21 years under the recent changes,
he could no longer be proceeded against in the
juvenile court or tried by the district court.
[court's emphasis deleted]
"'Dehler's interpretation would be in violation of
[the Minnesota Constitution] which gives the
district court original jurisdiction in all
criminal cases, and it would be unreasonable and
absurd. The legislature does not intend a result
that is absurd or in violation of the constitution
. . .." 296 N.W.2d at 407.
S.V. held the defendant could be prosecuted and distinguished
State v. Fleming (Minn. 1974), 223 N.W.2d 397, cited here by
relator, based upon statutory differences and because the
offender in that case coull: still be tried in juvenile
court. 296 N.W.2d at 408.
In our review of the Youth Court Act, we do not find any
direct statement or implication that the Legislature intended
to place a person such as relator beyond the reach of the
judicial process. Our review of the Act suggests that the
possibility of the present fact situation was neither
considered nor addressed by the Legislature. Relatorfs
interpretation of the Act would lead to the type of result
classified as absurd in State v. Little (Or. 1965), 407 P.2d
627, 630.
Because we have concluded that relator1s age at
commission of the alleged. offenses did not render him
incapable of committing crimes, we hold that the District
Court has jurisdiction to try an individual charged at 22 for
felonies allegedly committed at the age of 15, as provided in
the court's constitutional grant of jurisdiction over all
felonies.
We conclude that the District Court was correct in
denying relator's motion to dismiss and we therefore deny the
application for writ of supervisory control or other
appropriate writ.
We concur:
X& 9,
Chief Justice
&**
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, specially concurring:
I concur in the result here only because of the
provisions of 1972 Montana Constitution, Art. VII, 5 4, and
of section 46-2-201, MCA.
Art. VII, § 4 provides in part: "The district court has
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to a
felony.. . ."
Section 46-2-201, MCA, states: "The district courts
have jurisdiction of all public offenses not otherwise
provided for."
Our statutes do not provide for a crime allegedly
committed by a 15-year old person who was never prosecuted
until he reached the age of 22. His case would fall between
the cracks except for the enactment of section 46-2-201. It
specifically covers Elliot's case, and we need look no
further for jurisdiction in the District Court to handle the
prosecution.