No. 85-195
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
RICHARD MELVIN WILLIAMSON,
D e f e n d a n t and Appel l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: District Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis & C l a r k ,
The H o n o r a b l e Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Cannon & Sheehy; Edmund F. Sheehy, J r . , Helena,
Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Mike McGrath, County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana
C a r o l y n Clemens, Deputy County A t t y . , Helena
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : July 25, 1985
Decided: October 9 , 1985
Filed:
a%- Clerk
&
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e
Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F i r s t
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f
Lewis and C l a r k , t h e H o n o r a b l e Gordon R. Bennett p r e s i d i n g .
The a p p e a l i s from an o r d e r d e n y i n g w i t h d r a w a l o f a g u i l t y
p l e a on c h a r g e s o f t h e f t and a r s o n . W e affirm.
The a p p e l l a n t , W i l l i a m s o n , was c h a r g e d i n 1983 w i t h t h e
offense of a r s o n a l l e g e d t o have b e e n committed on ,January
11, 1983; and with the charge of theft, alleged to have
o c c u r r e d between J a n u a r y 10 and F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1983. The t h e f t
charge was filed prior to the filing of the arson
information. A f t e r numerous p r e - t r i a l proceedings, t h e arson
c h a r g e was s e t f o r t r i a l May 3 1 , 1 9 8 3 , and t h e t h e f t c h a r g e
was s e t f o r J u n e 3 0 , 1983.
Williamson was represented on b o t h o f t h e s e c a s e s by
R i c h a r d J. Pyfer, Esq. Mr. P y f e r f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s
and a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s some e v i d e n c e d e v e l o p e d i n t h e a r s o n
case. These motions w e r e h e a r d May 11, 1983. The t r i a l
court denied t h e motions but gave Williamson's counsel an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o s u b m i t a d d i t i o n a l memorandum on t h e a r g u m e n t s
being r a i s e d i n b o t h motions. Thereafter t h e D i s t r i c t Court
n o t e d no s u c h a d d i t i o n a l memorandum w e r e e v e r f i l e d w i t h t h e
court. On o r a b o u t May 23, 1983, t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r
d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s and t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s i n
the arson case. Prior to that time, there had been no
d i s c u s s i o n between t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e and d e f e n s e
counsel with regard t o a plea bargain.
On or about May 23, 1983, defense counsel was
a p p r o a c h e d by t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e t r i a l ,
which was s e t w i t h i n t h e week. A f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , the
c o u n t y a t t o r n e y a d v i s e d c o u n s e l t h a t i f t h e appe'l l a n t would
e n t e r a g u i l t y p l e a t o b o t h f e l o n y c h a r g e s , t h e S t a t e would
forego seeking increased punishment against him as a
p e r s i s t e n t felony offender. I n exchanqe f o r t h e g u i l t y p l e a ,
t h e S t a t e a l s o s a i d i t would a s k f o r a t e n y e a r s e n t e n c e on
each charge to run concurrently. Williamson's counsel
approached him with the State's offer. Williamson was
advised of t h e plea b a r g a i n on o r a b o u t May 2 5 , 1 9 8 3 , and
requested that the county attorney come to him p e r s o n a l l y
with h i s counsel t o discuss t h e plea bargain. H e alleged a t
t h a t t i m e t h e county a t t o r n e y , i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p l e a
b a r g a i n , s a i d i f h e d i d n o t change h i s p l e a by 10:OO a.m. the
n e x t m o r n i n g , which was t h e t i m e s e t t o s e l e c t a j u r y f o r t h e
a r s o n c a s e , t h e p l e a b a r g a i n would n o t b e o f f e r e d a t a l a t e r
date. Williamson, after f u l l discussion with h i s counsel,
P y f e r , and t h e County A t t o r n e y , McGrath, d i d a g r e e on May 2 6 ,
1983, t o t h e p l e a b a r g a i n and W i l l i a m s o n changed h i s p l e a t o
g u i 1t y .
The District Court, on July 27, 1983, sentenced the
a p p e l l a n t on b o t h c h a r g e s on t h e b a s i s o f h i s g u i l t y p l e a .
W i l l i a m s o n r e c e i v e d t e n y e a r s on t h e t h e f t c h a r g e ; and on t h e
arson charge he received twenty years with ten years
suspended, on the condition that he would pay $36,000 in
r e s t i t u t i o n f o r t h e arson.
W i l l i a m s o n t h e n s o u g h t s e n t e n c e r e v i e w from t h e Montana
S e n t e n c e Review Board. His a p p l i c a t i o n was d e n i e d and h e
f i l e d w i t h t h i s C o u r t a p r o se p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
relief. A t t h e same t i m e , i n J u l y 1 9 8 4 , Williamson f i l e d a
pro se m o t i o n in t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o withdraw h i s p l e a .
T h i s C o u r t on August 3 1 , 1984, e n t e r e d an o r d e r h o l d i n g t h e
petition for post-conviction relief in abeyance until the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d on W i l l i a m s o n ' s motion t o w i t h d r a w h i s
g u i l t y plea.
New c o u n s e l was a p p o i n t e d by the District Court for
W i l l i a m s o n t o r e p r e s e n t him o n t h i s motion t o withdraw h i s
guilty plea. O November 3 0 , 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d a
n
f u l l h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a , and
on F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d i t s o r d e r and o p i n i o n
d e n y i n g t h e motion t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a . I t i s from
this order of the District Court that Williamson is
appealing.
The s o l e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s c a s e i s whether t h e
District Court erred in denying the motion to withdraw
FJilliamson's guilty plea. The appellant, in his pro se
motion t o w i t h d r a w t h e g u i l t y p l e a a r g u e s h e was c o e r c e d i n t o
e n t e r i n g it and was n o t g i v e n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l
a t t h e t i m e t h i s m a t t e r was a r g u e d .
The coercion argument stemmed from Williamson's
testimony t h a t he e n t e r e d i n t o t h e g u i l t y p l e a t o avoid t h e
i n c r e a s e d punishment f o r b e i n g a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r .
Five y e a r s p r i o r t o t h e charges t h a t he faced i n t h i s cause,
h e had b e e n s e n t e n c e d t o a t e n y e a r p r i s o n t e r m . Appellant
alleges h i s counsel, M r . Pyfer, a d v i s e d him t h e S t a t e c o u l d
n o t i c e him a s a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r , which a d v i c e was
erroneous. The t e s t i m o n y a t t h e h e a r i n g on t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f
t h e plea indicated M r . P y f e r t o l d Williamson a t t h e t i m e t h e
p l e a b a r g a i n was made he was n o t c e r t a i n and would c o n s u l t
more experienced counsel. However, after researching the
statute, counsel agreed at a later hearing held with the
c o u n t y a t t o r n e y and t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e , t h e a p p e l l a n t could
not have been charged as a persistent felon due to the
s t a t u t e ' s five-year limitation.
Williamson contends t h e p l a i n language o f t h e s t a t u t e ,
S 46-18-501, MCA, was m i s c o n s t r u e d by h i s o r i g i n a l c o u n s e l ,
Mr, Pyfer, the county attorney's office, and the District
Court. S e c t i o n 46-18-501, MCA, reads a s follows:
A "persistent felony offender" i s an
offender who has previously been
convicted of a felony and who is
presently being sentenced for a second
felony committed on a different,occgsion
than the first. An offender is
considered to have been previous1 y
convicted of a felony if:
(1) The previous felony conviction was
for an offense committed in this state or
any other jurisdiction for which a
sentence to a term of imprisonment in
excess of 1 year could have been imposed;
(2) Less than 5 years have elapsed
between he commission of the present
offense and either:
(a) the previous felony conviction; or
(b) the offender's release on parole or
otherwise from prison or other commitment
imposed as a result of the previous
felony conviction; and
(3) the offender has not been pardoned on
the ground of innocence and the
conviction has not been set aside in a
postconviction proceeding.
It is Williamson's position that having entered a
guilty plea to the theft charges, and then pleading guilty to
the arson charges, he could not be found a persistent felony
offender because the two felonies were committed at
approximately the same time and his pleas were entered at the
same time.
The State's position is the statute's definition of a
"persistent felony offender" is not wholly consistent with
the statute ' s definition of "previously convicted" and thus
the rules of statutory construction require that the statute
be read and construed in its entirety. State ex re1 Cashmore
v. Anderson (1972), 160 Mont. 175, 500 P.2d 921, cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L.Ed.2d 593. The
State submits that this is precisely what Judge Bennett did,
and hence no abuse of discretion could be shown.
The substantive argument revolves around the terms
"commission" and "conviction" of prior and subsequent
felonies, which was clearly summarized and decided in Judge
Bennett's order:
The p r i s o n e r u r g e s t h a t 46-15-501 be
c o n s t r u e d t o ban t h e u s e o f t h e s t a t u t e
where t h e s e c o n d o f f e n s e was committed
p r i o r t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n on t h e f i r s t one.
If construction of the statute is
r e q u i r e d , it must b e , i f a t a l l p o s s i b l e ,
construed i n favor of t h e defendant. The
statutory definition of the t e r m is
crystal clear and needs no
construction: "A 'persistent felony
offender' is an offender who has
p r e v i o u s l y been c o n v i c t e d o f a f e l o n y and
who i s p r e s e n t l y b e i n g s e n t e n c e d f o r a
second f e l o n y committed on 2 d i f f e r e n t
o c c a s i o n t h a n t h e f i r s t . I' (46-18-501)
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , would
n o t p e r m i t t h e q u e s t i o n now r a i s e d by t h e
prisoner. I t simply r e q u i r e s a p a s t
c o n v i c t i o n and s e n t e n c i n g on a s u b s e q u e n t
one. ..
B u t t h e n t h e same s t a t u t e g o e s on t o
define a previous felony conviction. It
f i r s t d e f i n e s a f e l o n y , which i s t o t a l l y
u n n e c e s s a r y (see 45-2-101 ( 2 1 ) ) , and t h e n
it d e f i n e s " p r e v i o u s " by l i m i t a t i o n : it
i s n ' t p r e v i o u s i f more t h a n f i v e y e a r s
e l a p s e d between t h e commission o f t h e
c r i m e f o r which a s e n t e n c e i s b e i n g
imposed and the previous felony
conviction. The p r i s o n e r a r g u e s t h a t h e
has, under t h i s s t a t u t e , a s o r t of
"window o f o p p o r t u n i t y . " H e c a n commit
a l l manner o f f e l o n i e s b e t w e e n t h e t i m e
b e commits h i s f i r s t f e l o n y and h i s
c o n v i c t i o n t h e r e f o r and b e immune from
p e r s i s t e n t felony designation because t h e
f i v e y e a r clock d o e s n ' t s t a r t running
u n t i l a f t e r the f i r s t conviction. There
i s no evidence in the statute, or
anyplace else, that the legislature
i n t e n d e d t o p r o v i d e s u c h an open s e a s o n .
be
7 have o f t e n h e l d , t h e r u l e s o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n
d i c t a t e t h a t l e g i s l a t i o n must be r e a d a s a who3.e i n o r d e r t o
ascertain legislative intent. The most recent h o l d i n g on
t h i s i s s u e i s S t a t e v. Magnuson (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 682 P.2d 1365
F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t b u t t r e s s e s h i s argument w i t h a vague
and u n s u p p o r t e d a t t e m p t t o d i s t i n g u i s h " d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s "
from " t h e same t i m e f r a m e . " The s t a t u t e s p e a k s c l e a r l y o f
two f e l o n i e s b e i n g committed on d i f f e r e n t o c c a s i o n s , w h i c h
are t h e f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e . Appellant d e f i n e s "occasions" a s
"time frames" without t h e burden o f any a u t h o r i t y . The t r i a l
judge characterized this terminology as "deriving from the
Watergate hearings" and refused "to open another window of
opportunity under the statute."
In his argument appellant cites three recent cases of
this Court covering our latest holdings on the problem of a
prosecutor's notice of intention to increase punishment to a
defendant pursuant to Montana's persistent felony offender
statute. State v. Seitzinger (1979), 180 Mont. 136, 589 P.2d
655; State v. Johnson (1978), 179 Mont. 61, 585 P.2d 1328;
and State v. Sather (1977), 172 Mont. 428, 564 P.2d 1306.
In this case, we find there is no dispute that the
appellant was told from the outset the persistent felony
offender designation would be sought if no bargain could be
struck. In addition, there is no dispute he was free at all
times to accept or reject this offer. Although appellant
attempts to generate some confusion and to attribute to the
State an improper motive, it is clear the State did nothing
improper in refusing to give the persistent felony offender
notice until after the appellant had been convicted of the
first felony, the felony in which he entered a plea.
Throughout appellant's retaliation argument he confuses
bargaining with coercion. Both this Court and the United
States Supreme Court have explicitly rejected this type of
"Indeed, acceptance of the basic
legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily
implies rejection of any notion that a
guilty plea is involuntary in a
constitutional sense simply because it is
the end result of bargaining process. By
hypothesis, the plea may have been
induced by promises of a recommendation
of a lenient sentence or reduction of
charges, and thus by fear of the
possibility of a greater penalty upon
conviction after a trial. "
Johnson, 179 Mont. at 69, 585 P.2d at 1333.
Finally as to appellant Williamson's allegation
performance of his original defense counsel, Mr. P y f e r was
n o t w i t h i n " t h e r a n g e o f competence demanded o f a t t o r n y s i n
c r i m i n a l cases'' w e c i t e S t a t e v. Rose ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 187 M o n t 74,
86, 608 P.2d 1074, 1081. The s t a n d a r d s c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e M r .
Pyfer's actions w e r e within the range set forth in Rose,
supra. Mr. Pyfer consulted with other criminal counsel
r e g a r d i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y d e s i g n a t i o n and
d i d a l l t h i n g s p r o p e r l y t o d e f e n d t h i s man who f a c e d s e r i o u s
criminal charges. We note this was not the first time
appellant graced the county courthouse doors in his
a c t i v i t i e s a s an o f f e n d e r . The r e c o r d indicates Mr. Pfyer
did everything possible to investigate and advise the
appellant before he entered his pleas of guilty. It is
i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t i n h i s c u r r e n t b r i e f a p p e l l a n t makes
no e f f o r t t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f M r . P y f e r ' s performance a s
measured by t h e S t a t e v. Rose s t a n d a r d . H e has failed t o
show M r . P y f e r ' s c o u n s e l i n g was i n a d e q u a t e o r i n c o m p e t e n t o r
that the t r i a l judge abused h i s d i s c r e t i o n i n n o t g r a n t i n g
t h e withdrawal o f h i s p l e a s .
The d e c i s i o n o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W e concur: