No. 84-565
IN THE SUPREME3 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
ARTHUR E. STAUDT,
Petitioner and Respondent,
and
IWRILYN J. STAUDT,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Stillwater,
The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Joseph E. Mudd, Bridger, Montana
For Respondent :
Parker, Sweeney, Healow & Lee; Mark D. Parker,
Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 1985
Decided: 2 3 1 1985
Filed: MAY :
! LJ~;
Mr.- Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Arthur E. Staudt filed a petition for dissolution of
marriage which was tried on May 3 , 1984. The Stillwater
County District Court entered findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law and a judgment on August 6, 1984. Marilyn J.
Staudt appeals from this judgment. We affirm.
Arthur and Marilyn Staudt were married on June 8, 1957.
They have two sons, born in 1960 and 1962. Arthur graduated
with a degree in veterinary medicine in 1960. In 1964, the
Staudts built a veterinary clinic in Absarokee, Montana, for
$30,000; $10,000 of that sum was received as a gift from
Marilyn's grandmother.
In 1969 the Staudts bought a ranch for $56,000. It was
purchased on a contract for deed, with the down payment being
borrowed. In 1972, Arthur retired from the practice of
veterinary medicine and the Staudts devoted their time to
raising and selling registered. horses. The Staudts lived
together on the ranch until 1981 when they separated and
Marilyn moved from the ranch. They attempted an unsuccessful
two-month reconciliation in 1982 prior to commencement of
these proceedings.
The only asset the Staudts have of any significant value
is the ranch which has increased in value to approximately
$450,000. Before trial, the Staudts stipulated that the
ra.nch was to be sold and the District Court was asked only to
set the percentage division of the sale proceeds between the
parties.
The District Court apportioned the Staudts' property
approximately evenly. It is from this distribution that
Marilyn appeals. The specific issues appellant addresses on
appeal are as follows:
1. Whether the inheritance of the appellant should have
been the sole property of the wife or included in the marital
estate.
2. Whether the court erred in the valuation of the
stock in question.
3. Whether the court abused its discretion in dividing
the real property.
4. Whether the court erred in requiring that the wife
pay one-half of the ranch operating debt, existing at date of
separation.
5. Whether the District court erred when it failed to
include, as a marital debt, the indebtedness incurred by the
wife for the purpose of making the ranch payment.
6. Whether the court erred in failing to include in the
distribution of property, the tractor, manure spreader and
disk.
7. Whether a new trial should have been granted.
The Inheritance of Appellant
In 1975, Marilyn inherited various stocks from her
grandmother. These stocks were placed in trust in 1 9 7 5 and
disbursed in 1 9 7 9 . The stocks have been held at Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis since 1 9 7 9 as a stock portfolio.
They have not been cashed and remain in the same form.
Income from these stocks has been used in the marriage.
Since separation of the parties, the income has been used by
Marilyn alone.
The District Court treated this stock as a marital asset
and appellant asserts this is error. Appellant particularly
takes exception to the District Court finding "[iln that the
stock was preserved due in good part to Petitioner's contri-
butions of his income, said stock should be considered a
marital asset."
Section 40-4-202 (1), MCA, provides, in part, that in a
dissolution of marriage, the District Court shall:
"equitably apportion between the parties
the property and assets belonging to
either or both, however and whenever
acquired and whether the title thereto is
in the name of the husband or wife or
both. ... In dividing ... property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent ... the court shall consider
those contributions of the other spouse
to the marriage, including:
" (a) the nonmonetary contribution of a
homemaker;
" (b) the extent to which such contribu-
tions have facilitated the maintenance of
this property; "
This Court has recognized that inherited assets are
marital property, but the District Court must consider the
origin of the assets and the contributions of the divorcing
parties to its preservation when making an award of assets.
In re the Marriage of Keepers (Mont. 1984) , 691 P. 2d 810, 41
St.Rep. 2163. There was no question that Arthur worked hard
in the marriage. The preservation of the stock in its origi-
nal form was due, at least in part, to his hard work. It
never became necessary to sell the stock because the Staudts
had an income from the ranch.
The District Court awarded the stock to Marilyn in the
division of property. We affirm the inclusion of this stock
in the marital property.
Valuation of Stocks
The appellant also contends that the District Court
erred in its valuation of the stock. The District Court
valued the inherited stock at $60,500. Both parties submit-
ted affidavits to the court listing their assets and liabili-
ties. Both parties valued the stock in their affidavits at
$60,000. At trial, appellant testified the stock was worth
approximately $54,000 to $55,000. In his proposed findings
of fact, respondent valued the stock at $60,497.45. In a.n
affidavit submitted to the court after judgment was rendered-,
appellant stated the stock had declined in value to $48,000.
Clearly, the value of stock is subject to fluctuation.
The trial judge is free to select the value he wishes, so
long as there is substantial credible evidence to support the
value he selects. In re the Marriage of Glass (Mont. 1985) ,
42 St.Rep. 328. Therefore, the trial judge did not err when
he adopted the value respondent placed on the stock.
We affirm the valuation of the inherited stock by the
trial judge.
50/50 Division of Property
Appellant argues that the division of the ranch proceeds
was an abuse of discretion by the District Court. The main
thrust of her argument is that she contributed $10,000 to
build their first veterinary clinic which, when sold, went
toward the purchase of their ranch.
Although it is true that one-third of the clinic wa.s
paid for by the appellant, the remaining two-thirds was paid
principally by the work and veterinary practice of the re-
spondent. A trial court has far-reaching discretion in
making property divisions in dissolution proceedings. In re
the Marriage of Madden (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 493, 41 St.Rep.
1332. F e see no abuse of that discretion in the equal
J
division of the ranch property. We affirm.
50/50 Split of Ranch Operating Debt
In 1981, when Marilyn and Arthur separated, the ranch
operating debt was $29,400. Since the separation the debt
has increased to $52,416. The District Court found this
increase was a result of the sole actions of Arthur and he
should be totally responsible for the debt incurred since the
separation. The District Court found the debt at the time of
separation, $29,400, to be a marital debt. Each party was to
pay one-half of the sum, or $14,700.
Appellant argues that the court erred by failing to
offset this debt with the assets it secures, the horses and
cattle. She contends that since Arthur was awarded the
horses, he should have to pay the full debt on them.
It may be true that the debt of $29,400 was mostly
incurred for the purchase of horses for the ranch. However,
prior to the sepa.ration, both Marilyn and Arthur worked on
the ranch and incurred this ranch indebtedness together. The
debt is a marital debt and the court may order it be borne by
both parties.
We affirm the equal allocation of ranch operating debt
prior to separation.
Failure to Include Ranch Payment as Debt
Since the Staudts' separation, two annual contract
payments on the ranch, for the years 1982 and 1983, have
become due. The 1982 payment was made by Arthur. In 1983,
Marilyn received a default notice that the ranch payment of
$5,188.79 had not been made. She borrowed the money from her
mother in order to make this payment.
Appellant argues that it was error for the court not to
include this debt incurred by her, among the martial debts
and require repayment thereof.
The District Court did not discuss this debt extensive-
ly, but did indicate awareness of it in its findings of fact
number 10, when it stated: "Since separation, both have
participated in making payments on the ranch and both have
received some income from the ranch."
It was a burden for Marilyn to have to make this ranch
payment when she was not even living on the ranch. However,
the payment was made to protect her equity in a very
important asset. She, as well as her husband, is responsible
for preserving the ranch because upon its sale she will
receive one-half of the proceeds. As with the division of
property, the District Court is given wide discretion in the
division of debts. In re the Marriage of Loegering (Mont.
1984), 689 P.2d 260, 41 St.Rep. 1892. We see no error in the
District Court's failure to include this ranch payment in
marital debts. We affirm.
Failure to Include Farm Equipment
Appellant argues that the District Court erred in fail-
ing to include a tractor, manure spreader and disk as marital
assets when making the distribution of property. There are
numerous items on the ranch that the District Court did not
list specifically. The words "ranch property" were meant to
include more than just the land and buildings. Since the
tractor, the manure spreader and the disk were not singled
out or listed as assets with any specific value, they were
meant to be included in "ranch property." The District Court
did not err in failing to name them separately in the distri-
bution of property.
New Trial
After judgment had been rendered, appellant made a
motion to amend judgment, or in the alternative for a new
trial, on the issue of the value of the horses. Appellant
testified at trial that the horses were worth at least
$52,000. Respondent testified the horses were worth about
$30,000. The District Court placed the value of the horses
at $40,000.
Appellant attached a Billings Gazette newspaper article
to her brief on the motion. The article indicates that the
horses owned by Arthur Staudt were racing well at Billings.
Appellant contends t h i s i s evidence t h a t t h e horses a r e worth
more t h a n $40,000.
It may well be that the horses a r e worth more than
$40,000 a t this time. Clearly, assets w i l l appreciate o r
depreciate. However, a new t r i a l ca.nnot b e g r a n t e d e v e r y
t i m e t h e v a l u e o f an a s s e t changes. The v a l u e p l a c e d on t h e
h o r s e s by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was w i t h i n t h e r a n g e o f v a l u e s
given to the court at trial. A newspaper a r t i c l e i s n o t
s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o mandate a new t r i a l . W e affirm.
W e concur: