No. 84-59
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
IN RE THE lJlARRLAGE OF
ALICE BURKART SUMMERFELT,
Petitioner and Appellant,
and
DONALD A. SUMMERFELT,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial ilistrict,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Skedd, Ashley, McCabe, Weingartner & Graveley;
Charles Graveley, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Harlen, Thompson & Parish; Shaun R. Thompson,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 17, 1984
Decided: September 18, 1984
Filed: $EP 16 1904
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Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This case comes on appeal from a decree of the
District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and
Clark County, distributing the parties' marital assets. We
reverse.
The parties to this action were married on May 11,
1963, at Townsend, Montana. At the time of the marriage,
the wife owned a ranch near Townsend (hereinafter referred
to as the Townsend ranch) consisting of 3,880 acres which
the parties have stipulated was worth $185,000. In
addition, the wife had purchased 120 acres of additional
ranchland, known as the Cooney property, for $8,000. Also,
at the time of the marriage, the wife owned approximately
170 head of various livestock, a 1/3 interest in three
rental houses in Billings valued at $7,000, household
furniture and crops in storage.
Prior to the marriage, the husband had worked as a
heavy equipment operator and at the time of the marriage he
was employed as a business manager for the International
Union of Operating Engineers at Butte. At the time of the
marriage, the husband owned a house in Helena valued at
$13,500, subject to a debt of $7,791.07, other vehicles and
a trailer collectively valued at $4,900. The District Court
found that the husband and wife mutually decided that the
husband quit his employment as a business manager for the
union and that they would operate the wife's Townsend ranch,
although the wife testified that the husband quit his job
after the lessee of the ranch surrendered his lease a year
early due to a dispute with the husband.
The w i f e a s s e r t s t h a t h e r n e t w o r t h a t t h e t i m e o f t h e
marriage was $425,618 and the husband's was $12,355.07.
Although the husband disagrees with the amount the wife
a s s e r t s was h e r n e t w o r t h , the record c l e a r l y indicates t h e
w i f e b r o u g h t s u b s t a n t i a l l y more p r o p e r t y i n t o t h e marriage
t h a n d i d t h e husband.
On J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 7 5 , t h e Townsend r a n c h was s o l d u n d e r
a c o n t r a c t f o r d e e d t o t h e w i f e ' s d a u g h t e r and s o n - i n - l a w ,
t h e Henleys, for $100,000 with a l i f e e s t a t e reserved for
t h e husband and w i f e . The w i f e a l s o r e s e r v e d t h e r i g h t t o
run f i f t y head of c a t t l e on t h e r a n c h . The p a r t i e s also
accumulated funds in various bank accounts during the
m a r r i a g e which a r e n o t a t i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l .
I n 1 9 7 7 , t h e p a r t i e s s e p a r a t e d when the wife f i l e d a
petition f o r d i s s o l u t i o n which was s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s m i s s e d .
Thgreafter, the wife, i n an e f f o r t t o w a r d s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ,
added the husband as a joint tenant owner of the Cooney
property.
On May 16, 1980, the wife petitioned the District
Court f o r a d e c r e e of dissolution. At t h a t time t h e w i f e
was 68 and the husband 60. On November 18, 1982, the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e Townsend r a n c h was n o t a
m a r i t a l a s s e t b u t t h a t t h e value of t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed
and t h e l i f e e s t a t e r e s e r v e d u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t w e r e m a r i t a l
a s s e t s t o be d i s t r i b u t e d . On J u l y 1 2 , 1983, the District
C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e d e c r e e of d i s s o l u t i o n and on November 2 3 ,
1983, it e n t e r e d its f i n d i n g s of fact, c o n c l u s i o n s of law
and d e c r e e r e g a r d i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . In
i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t a t e d , i n p e r t i n e n t
part: t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s worked h a r d d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and
made numerous improvements to the ranch; that the value of
the contract for deed was the principal balance owing in the
sum of $100,000 and the current value of the partiesg life
estate was $90,000 for a total of $190,000; the Henleygs
contract was a sham and void if they could not be required
to pay $100,000 immediately or at a very early date; the
current market value of the Cooney property was $38,000;
that the total marital assets amounted to $358,490.74; that
the wife was currently 72 years of age and receiving $229
per month in Social Security; and that the husband was 6 4
years of age and had little likelihood of securing
significant assets for retirement.
In its conclusions of law the District Court
distributed the marital assets as follows: the husband
received a total of $163,094.24 in assets which included 1/3
of the principal balance remaining on the contract for deed
($33,330), the Summerfelt house in Helena ($43,000), the
Cooney property ($38,300), twenty-five cows with calves
($13,750) and several other assets that were added to the
husband's total award. The wife received a total of
$196,406.50 in assets which included the life estate
reserved under the contract for deed ($90,000), 2/3 of the
principal balance remaining o n the contract for deed
($66,670), 1/2 of all bank accounts ($16,309.50), and the
wife's personal property excluding cattle ($22,017).
From the decree of the District Court distributing the
marital assets the wife appeals, raising four issues:
(1) Whether the District Court erred in its
determination of "total marital assets" because it failed to
accept present day net values on the contract for sale of
t h e r a n c h and on t h e r e s e r v e d l i f e e s t a t e .
( 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its wholesale
a d o p t i o n o f t h e h u s b a n d ' s p r o p o s e d f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s .
( 3 ) Whether t h e award t o t h e w i f e was ins-dequate in
l i g h t of t h e f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n of each of the parties a t
t h e o u t s e t of t h e m a r r i a g e .
( 4 ) Whether the District Court erred in failing to
r e c o g n i z e t h e p r o p e r t y i n h e r i t e d by t h e w i f e a s h e r s e p e r a t e
property.
Initially, we note t h a t the well-established rule in
Montana is:
"The a p p o r t i o n m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t w i l l . n o t b e d i s t u r b e d on r e v i e w
u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r abuse o f
d i s c r e t i o n a s m a n i f e s t e d by a s u b s t a n t i a l
i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e m a r i t a l
assets resulting in substantial
i n j u s t i c e s . " I n r e t h e M a r r i a g e o f Brown
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361.
In the present case, t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the marital
assets by the District Court resulted in substantial
i n j u s t i c e s t o t h e wife. I n G l a s s e r v . G l a s s e r (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) ,
669 P.2d 685, 40 S t . R e p . 1518, t h i s Court s t a t e d : "In -
Kis,
supra, we s t a t e d that, ' [ p l r e s e n t value is t h e "proper t e s t "
f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of m a r i t a l i n t e r e s t . ' " S i m i l a r l y , i n Popp
v. Popp (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 6 7 1 P.2d 24, 40 S t . Rep. 1747, this
Court s a i d :
" I t i s a l s o c l e a r from a t h o r o u g h r e v i e w
of t h e f i l e on t h i s m a t t e r t h a t t h e c o u r t
v a l u e d some a s s e t s a t t h e i r d e p r e c i a t e d
v a l u e a s l i s t e d on t h e p a r t i e s income t a x
r e t u r n s i n s t e a d of t h e i r f a i r market
value. Y e t t h e r e i s no f i n d i n g s t a t i n g
t h a t t h e d e p r e c i a t e d v a l u e is e q u a l t o
f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e o f c e r t a i n items o f
equipment. W i t h o u t s u c h a f i n d i n g we
hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
was ' c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . ' "
Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n i t s d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f
marital assets to be distributed because it accepted the
b a l a n c e r e m a i n i n g d u e on t h e r e a l e s t a t e c o n t r a c t f o r s a l e
of t h e ranch, r a t h e r than d i s c o u n t i n g it t o i t s p r e s e n t f a i r
market value, and i t e r r e d i n s e t t i n g t h e v a l u e on t h e l i f e
e s t a t e reserved t o the wife. The c o n t r a c t f o r s a l e of the
ranch required the buyers t o pay the i n t e r e s t on a y e a r l y
basis and allowed them to retire the principal amount as
t h e y were a b l e t o do s o . The r a n c h c o n t r a c t c o n t a i n e d no
l a n g u a g e a l l o w i n g t h e s e l l e r t o demand f u l l payment o f the
principal balance owing at anytime she desired. It is
elementary that the present day fair market value of a
contract for deed, rarely, if ever, equals the principal
balance due thereon. Although the husband asserts the
p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t o t h e p r e s e n t d a y v a l u e of t h e c o n t r a c t
for deed in a pretrial order, that contention is without
merit. The p r e t r i a l o r d e r indicates t h e husband and w i f e
only agreed that $100,000 was the principal balance
r e m a i n i n g on t h e c o n t r a c t f o r d e e d . In short, the D i s t r i c t
C o u r t d i d n o t p r o p e r l y d e t e r m i n e t h e p r e s e n t market v a l u e of
t h e c o n t r a c t f o r deed.
Similarly, t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n its valuation
of the life estate reserved by the wife. At trial, an
expert testified t h e p r e s e n t day market value of the l i f e
e s t a t e t o be t h i r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e s t a t e d amount o f t h e l i f e
estate. T h i r t y p e r c e n t amounted t o a $ 5 7 , 4 9 3 . 8 0 valuation
of the l i f e estate. However, the D i s t r i c t Court, without
e x p l a n a t i o n , a s s i g n e d a v a l u e of $90,000 t o t h e l i f e e s t a t e .
In, I n r e M a r r i a g e of Wolfe (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 659 P.2d 259, 40
St.Rep. 211, this Court stated: "Where there are widely
conflicting valuations between different appraisers, the
District Court shall give reasons why one value is selected
over others. "
Moreover, the award to the wife was inadequate in
light of the financial condition of each of the parties at
the outset of the marriage. Although the District Court did
not determine the financial condition of the parties at the
outset of the marriage, the record clearly indicates the
wife brought substantially more net worth into the marriage
than did the husband. The wife asserts her net worth at the
time of the marriage was $425,615 and the husband's was, at
the most, $12,355.07. We held in In re Marriage of Herron
-
396
(1980), 185 Mont. %, 608 P.2d 97, that the source of the
property was a major factor to be considered by the District
Court dividing property under section 40-4-202, MCA. See
'Ml4el-5
also, In re Marriage of #& (Mont. 1984), P.2d
, 41 St.Rep. 990. In this case, the amount the District
Court awarded the husband was an abuse of discretion when
considered in light of the parties' financial condition at
the outset of the marriage.
Since the issues discussed above are dispositive of
this appeal, we need not consider the other issues raised by
the wife.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of
4
division of marital assets.
- .
Justice
We concur:
Justices
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissents and will file a
written dissent later.