Matter of Wood

IN THE SIJPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN THE MATTER OF KEITH WAYNE WOOD,
a Youth under the age of Eighteen.

I
- .-
C .
I TI
U
APPEAL FROM: The Youth Court of the Eleventh Judicial I f $ ~ t r i ~ ,
--
In and for the Countv of Flathead, I. I :.
17.1 . '
The Honorable Michael H. Keedy, Judge pres&d??ng?3
0 _yr:
C 4
COUNSEL OF RECORD: m
4

For Appellant:
Stephen J. Nardi; Sherlock & Mardi, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:

Honorable Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
George Schunk, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ted 0 . Lympus, Flathead County Attorney, Kalispell, Montana

Submitted: November 15, 1988

Decided: February 14, 1989
0

Filed:

-- X
Clerk s -
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., del-j-veredthe Opinj-on of
the Court.

Pursuant to 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA, the youth court of the
Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, ordered the case
of Keith Wavne Wood, a youth, transferred to District Court.
The youth appeals the transfer, arguing that S 41-5-206(3),
MCA, is unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court.
The following issues were raised on appeal.
1. Is § 41-5-206(3), MCA, unconstitutional because it:
(a) denies a youth's right to due process?
(b) denies a youth's right to equal protection?
(c) violates the separation of powers doctrine of the
Montana Constitution?
Keith Wayne Wood, a youth, was arrested on March 30,
1988 for two counts of deliberate homicide. He was brought
before the youth court on March 31, 1988 for the purpose of
appointing him a counsel and determining whether he should be
detained. On April 4, 1988, the county attorney for Flathead
County filed a motion pursuant to 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, in the
youth court to transfer the case to the District Court. Wood
appeared before the youth court on May 6, 1988, at which time
he conceded he was 16 years old at the time of the wrongful.
acts alleged in the petition and, if true, the acts alleged
would constitute two counts of deliberate homicide under
45-5-102, MCA.
On May 10, 1988, the youth court, by written order,
granted the county attorney's motion and transferred
jurisdiction over the matter of Keith Wayne Wood to the
District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead
County. In its findings of fact, the youth court found that
at the time of the alleged wronqful acts Wood was 16 vears of
age, the acts, if true, would constitute deliberate homicide
as defined in 45-5-102, MCA, and probable cause existed to
conclude that Wood committed the alleged acts.
In granting the order, the youth court relied. on 5
41-5-206(3), MCA, which states that
The court shall grant the motion to t-ransfer if the
youth was 16 years old or older at the time of the
conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act
would constitute deliberate homicide as defined in
45-5-102, mitigated deliherate homicide as defined
in 45-5-103, or the attempt, as defined in
45-4-103, of either deliberate or mitigated
deliberate homicide if the act had been committed
by an adult.
The youth court found this statute rationally based upon the
age of the offenders and the seriousness of the offenses.
The youth court thus found that the statute does not create
an unreasonable age classification and therefore does not
violate a youth's right to due process nor to equal
prot.ection. The youth court also found that the statute does
not violate the constitutional guarantee of the separation of
legislative and judicial powers, but rather found that
redefining the Youth Court Act is a valid exercise of
legislative authority. Wood appeals the transfer to District
Court, presenting three constitutional issues for review.
The first issue raised on appeal is whether 5
41-5-206(3), MCA, denies a youth's constitutional right tc?
due process.
One of the purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act, S S
41-5-101 through 41-5-809, MCA (1987), is to substitute
rehabilitation in lieu of punishment for youths who have
violated the law. Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. To further this
purpose, the youth court is granted exclusive original.
jurisdiction of youths who have violated any law other than a
traffic or fish and game law prior to having reached 18 years
of age. Section 41-5-203(l), MCA. The Act, however, also
pro~rides for a youth's transfer to district court upon a
motion of the county attorney in certain instances. Section
41-5-206, MCA.
Wood argues that § 41-5-206(3), MCA, is unconstitutional
because the provision denies a youth, aged 16 years or older
and who has allegedly committed or attempted to commit
deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide, the right to a
hearing whereby a youth court considers mitigating factors in
its determination of whether to transfer the youth to
district court. In particular, Wood argues that §
41-5-206 (1), MCA, grants these youths a hearing to determine
whether to transfer them to district court, hut that S
41-5-206 (3), MCA, dictates the outcome of the hearing by
mandating the youth court to grant the county attorney's
motion to transfer these youths.
In asserting this argument, Wood relies upon a United
States Supreme Court decision, Kent v . United States (19661,
383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In Kent, a 16
year old youth from the District of Columbia was charged with
housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Before transferring a
youth aged 16 years or older from youth court to district
court, the District of Columbia statute required a "full
investigation." The youth court transferred jurisdiction of
the youth to district court without a hearing or any
investigation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-48, 86 S.Ct. at
1048-51, 16 L.Ed.2d at 87-90. The Supreme Court stated that
the statute "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the
particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the
statutory requirement of a ' full investigation. ' " Kent, 383
U.S. at 553, 86 S.Ct. at 1053, 16 L.Ed.2d at 93. The Court
therefore held that procedural due process is required by the
F0urteent.h Amendment when transferring a youth from youth
court to district court. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557-63, 86 S.Ct.

The United States Supreme Court in Rreed v. Jones
(1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, however,
recognized that it has

never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the
nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a
decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult
court. We require only that, whatever the relevant
criteria, and whatever the evidence demanded, a
State determine whether it wants to treat a
juvenile within the juvenile-court system before
entering upon a proceeding that may result in an
adjudicatj-on that he has violated a criminal law
and in a substantial deprivation of liberty, rather
than subject him to the expense, delay, strain, and
embarrassment of two such proceedings. Breed, 421
1 . . at 537-38, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, 44 L.Ed.?d at
JS
360.
Subsequent United States' Court of Appeals decisions have
held that a state's treatment of youths outside of the
criminal system is not an inherent right and may be redefined
or restricted by state legislation, so long as no arhitrarv
or discriminatory classification is in~~olved. Woodard v.
Wainwright (5th Cir. 1977), 556 F.2d 781, 785, cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1285, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978); --
see also
IJnited States v. Quinones (1st Cir. 1975), 516 ~ . 2 d1309,
1311, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852, 96 S.Ct. 97, 46 L.Ed.2d 76;
Cox v. United States (4th Cir. 1973), 473 F.2d 334, 336,
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116.
Wood recognizes that a youth's treatment outside of the
criminal system may be redefined or restricted by the state
legislature, hut asserts that under S 41-5-206 (1), MCA, the
legislature qranted all youths a hearing before being
transferred to djstrict court and. that 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA,
dictates the outcome of that hearing for youths aged 16 vears
or older and who have committed or attempted to commit
deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide. We disagree
with Wood's basic assertion. Section 41-5-206 (1)(a)(i), MCA,
provides that youths, aged 12 years or older and who have
committed sexual intercourse without consent or who have
committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated
deliberate homicide, may be transferred, after a hearina, to
district court by motion of the county attorney. Section
41-5-206(3), MCA, however, provides that youths aged 16 years
or older who have allegedly committed or attempted to commit
one of these offenses--deliberate or mitigated deliberate
homicide--must he transferred to district court upon a motion
--
by the county attorney.
This Court first recognizes that S 41-5-206, MCA, is
presumed constitutional and that the party attacking the
statute, Wood, has a significant burden in proving its
invalidity. T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial (19821, 196 Mont.
287, 292, 641 P.2d 1368, 1370. We hold that Wood failed to
meet this burden. When interpreting statutes, this Court
must adhere to the legislators' intent. State v. Hubbard
(1982), 200 Mont. 1.06, 110-11, 649 P.2d 1331, 1333. Prior to
1987, S 41-5-206, MCA, required a hearing for all youths
before transferring them to district court. The legislature
amended the statute in 1987 by enacting S 41-5-206(3), MCA.
This provision provides for automatic transfer of youths aged
16 years or older and who have allegedly committed or
attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate
homicide. The presumption exists that, by adopting an
amendment to a statute, the legislature intended to make some
change in existing law. Foster v. Kovich (1983), 207 Mont.
139, 144-45, 673 P.2d 1239, 1243. This Court must also, if
possible, give effect to all of the provisions. D a r b ~Spar,
Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue (Mont. 19851, 705 P.2d 111, 113, 42
St.Rep. 1262, 1264-65. We therefore hold that S 41-5-206(3),
MCA, which applies to youths aged 16 years or older, has the
effect of limiting S 41-5-206(1), MCA, to youths aged 12
years or older hut under the age of 16 years when the alleged
offense is deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide or the
attempt of either. Section 41-5-206 (3), MCA, therefore does
not dictate the outcome of a hearing, since the youths who
fall under this provision are not granted an initial hearing.
Any other interpretation of the entire statute would render
the legislature's enactment of subsection 3 of the statute
meaningless.
Wood was transferred from youth court to district court
under 41-5-206(3), MCA. No procedural irregularities were
alleged, nor were any evident in the record. Section
41-5-206 (3), MCA, therefore meets the minimum federal
requirements and does not violate Wood's right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The next issue raised on appeal is whether $5
41-5-206(3), MCA, denies a youth's right to equal protection.
In asserting his equal protection argument, Wood only
refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14, 1. As previously
stated, youths aged 16 years or older and who have committed
or attempted to commit deliberate or mitiqated deliberate
homicide are not granted a hearing prior to transfer to
district court as a result of S 41-5-206(3), MCA. Since a
state's treatment of youths outside of the criminal svstem is
not an inherent right and. may be redefined or restricted by
state legislation, see Woodard, 556 F.2d at 785, this Court
needs to determine next whether such a classification is
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
 The United States Supreme Court recognizes three levels
of scrutiny when determining whether a system o"
classification found within a state statute is
constitutional. The strict scrutinv analvsis, requiring the
most exacting scrutiny, is applied when the classification is
based on an inherently suspect class--race, national origin
or al.i.enage--or when the classification infringes on a
fundamental right. See, e.g., Loving v. ~irginia (1967), 388
U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (race); Graham v.
Richardson (1971), 403 1J.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d
534 (alienage); Oyama v . California (1948), 332 U.S. 633, 68
S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 249 (national origin); Shapiro v.
Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600
(fundamental right to travel interstate); Dunn v. ~lumstein
(1972), 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274
(fundamental right to vote) . When applying the strict
scrutiny test, the government has the burden of proving that
the statute is justified by a compelling state interest,
narrowly tailored, and no other avenues less burdensome are
avail-able in which to accomplish the objective. Dunn, 405
U.S. at 342-43, 92 S.Ct. at 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d at 284-85.
The intermediate level of scrutiny employed by the
United States Supreme Court generally applies when
classifications are based on gender or illegitimacy. -- See,
e.g., Clark v. Jeter (1988), - U. S. , 108 S.Ct. 1910,
100 L.Ed.2d 465 (illegitimacy); Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan (1982), 458 U.S. 718, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73
L. Ed. 2d 1090 (gender). To withstand intermediate scrutiny,
the party seeking to uphold the statutory classification must
show that the classification is substantially related to an
important governmental objective. Hogan, 458 U . S . at 724, 73
S.Ct. at 3336, 73 L.Ed.26 at 1098.
 All other classifications scrutinized under the United
States Constitution are subject to the minimal rational basis
standard of review. Under this standard, classifications are
presumed constitutional and the party challenging the statute
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate
state objective. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
(1981), 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, ?24, 66 L.Ed.2d
659, 668-69, reh. denied, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68
L.Ed.2d 222. The United States Supreme Court applies this
standard of review when classifications are based on
economics or social welfare. Dandridge v. b7illiams (1970),
397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491,
501-02.
Wood argues that 5 41-5-206 (3), MCA, deprives him, and
all such youths si-milarly situated, to equal. protection by
infringing on his "'fundamental right' of due process of
law." In asserting this argument, Wood argues that the
strict scrutiny analysis is applicabl-e and that the stat-e
therefore has the burden of showing that classifying youths
who have violated the law on the basis of age and seriousness
of the offense is justified by a compelling state interest.
Wood recognizes the protection of the community as the
state's interest in this matter, and then argues that
classifying youths on the bases of their age and seriousness
of the offense is neither rationally related to a legitimate
state interest nor justified by a compelling state interest.
We disagree with Wood's basic assertion that procedural
due process, as mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is also
a fundamental right. No support exists for this assertion.
On the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has limited
its recognition of fundamental rights, requiring a strict
scrutiny analvsis, to interstate travel, voting, privacy, and
the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, which includes
the freedom of speech, press, religion, association and
belief, and the right to assemble peaceably and to petition
the government for redress of grievances. - e-g.,
See,
Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600
(interstate travel); Dunn, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31
L.Ed.2d 274 (voting); Stanley v. Georgia (1969), 394 U.S.
557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (privacy); widmar 17.
Vincent (1981), 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 ~ . ~ d . 2440
d
(speech); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (1984), 464
11.s. 501, 1.04 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (press); Wisconsin v.
Yoder (1972), 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 ~ . ~ d . 2 15
d
(religion); Shelton v. Tucker (1960), 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct.
247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (association and belief); and Hague v.
C.I.O. (1939), 307 1J.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L . E ~ . 1423
(assemble peaceably and petition government for redress of
grievances) .
The classification found in 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, is based
on both age and gravity of the offense. The United States
Supreme Court has held that age is not a suspect class
requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia (1976), 427 U.S. 307, 313-15, 96 S.Ct.
2562, 2566-67, 49 L.Ed.2d 520, 524-26. The classification is
also not based on gender or illegtimacy, and therefore not
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny.
In light of the above, we hold that the proper standard
of review in this case is whether the classification found in
5 41-5-206, MCA, is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Wood therefore has the burden of showing that the
age and seriousness of the offense are not rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. Metropolitan Casualty Ins.
Co. v . Brownell (1935), 294 1J.S. 580, 584, 55 S.Ct. 538, 540,
79 L.Ed. 1070, 1072-73. Me hold that. Wood has failed to meet
this burden. The legislative history of House Bill 470, the
legislative vehicle of 5 41-5-206(3), MCA, reveals that the
legislature recognized the increase in the number of
homicides committed by today's teenagers and expressed that
the passage of House Bill 470 would aid in dealins
effectively with these youths. Minutes of Montana House
Judiciary Committee, at 8-9 (February 17, 1987).
Wood bases his argument on the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. 14, S
1, and in light of the federal cases noted above, we hold
that $ 41-5-206, MCA, does not violate this clause. Wood,
however, does not refer to the Montana Constitution.
Nonetheless, this Court reserves "the power to examine
constitutional issues that involve broad public concerns to
avoid future litigation on a point of law." In the Matter
of N.B. (Mont. 1980), 620 P.2d 1228, 1231, 37 St.Rep. 2033.,
2033. We choose to exercise this power to determine whether
§ 41-5-206, MCA, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Montana Constitution.
In examining whether a statute is constitutional under
our state Equal Protection Clause, Mont. Const. art. 11, S 4,
this Court also recognizes a three tier analysis. This
Court, however, has chosen not to follow the exact standards
as set forth in the United States Supreme Court's decisions.
Pfost v. State (Mont. 1985), 713 P.2d 495, 500-01, 42 St.Rep.
1957, 1963-64; Butte Community Union v. Lewis (Mont. 19861,
712 P.2d 1309, 1313, 43 St.Rep. 65, 70. When a fundamental
right, as enumerated by the Montana Constitution, is being
deprived, or when a suspect classification exists, this Court
will apply the strict scrutiny analysis. - -
Pfost, 713 P.2d at
501, 42 St.Rep. at 1964.
The middle tier analysis, first developed in - -
Butte
Community -
. -
Union, is applicable when a benefit, not. found
within the Declaration of Rights, is nonetheless lodged
within the Montana Constitution. In Butte Community Union,
we held that no fundamental right to welfare exists, but.
noted that Article XII, S 3(3), directed the legislature to
provide necessary assistance to the misfortunate. e
therefore held that in determining whether a classification
found within a welfare statute is constitutional, the state
must demonstrate that 1) the classification is reasonable and
2) the state's interest in the classification is more
important than the people's interest in obtaining welfare
benefits. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1312-14, 43
St.Rep. at 68-71. In other circumstances, this Court applies
the rational basis analysis. - Cottrill v. Cottrill
See
Sodding Service (Mont. 1987), 744 P.2d 895, 897, 44 St.Rep.
1762, 1764; Godfrey v. Montana State Fish and Game Comm'n.
(Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 1265, 1267-68, 38 St.Rep. 661, 663-65.
The Montana Constitution provides that "the rights of
persons under 18 years of age shall include, hut not be
limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article unless
specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection
of such persons." Mont. Const. art. 11, 5 15. The Equal
Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution provides that
"Inlo person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws. . . ." Mont. Const. art. 11, 5 4. No provision exists
in the Montana Constitution that provides a youth with a
fundamental right to be treated specially, nor are anv
benefits lodged within the Montana Constitution that would
provide a youth with an interest whose statutory abridgement
requires something more than a rational relationship to a
legitimate government objective. We therefore hold that the
rational basis analysis is applicable in this case to
determine whether the statute is constitutional under the
Montana Constitution. As we noted above, we hold that the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Other jurisdictions faced with the same issue, utilized
a rational relationship test and upheld classifications based
on age and seriousness of the offense. See People v. J. S.
(Ill. 1984), 469 N.E.2d 1090, 1094-95; State v. Anderson
(Idaho 1985), 700 P.2d 76, 80; People v. Drayton (N.Y. 19761,
350 N.E.2d 377, 379-80; People v. Thorpe (Colo. 19821, 641
P.2d 935, 937-40. As already noted, treatment as a juvenile
is not an inherent right and the legislature may restrict or
qualify that right. We therefore conclude that the
classification found in S 41-5-206, MCA, based on age and
seriousness of the offense, is rationally related to the
legitimate state objective of curbing homicides committed by
teenagers and protecting society from these violent offenders
under both the United States and Montana Constitutions.
The last issue raised on appeal is whether § 41-5-306,
MCA, violates the separation of powers doctrine of the
Montana Constitution.
Wood argues that the legislature is attempting to
control a judicial function by enacting § 41-5-206 (3), MCA.
Specifically, Wood argues that the legislature has usurped
the judiciary's power to hear and decide motions brought
before it and that this violates the doctrine of separation
of powers under the Montana Constitution and must be declared
invalid. We disagree.
The legislature's power to create the youth courts is
unquestionable. The Montana Constitution provides that
"[tlhe judicial power of the state is vested in one supreme
court, district courts, justice courts, - -
and such other ---
- courts
- may - provided & - " (emphasis added). Mont. Const.
as be law
art. VII, 1. Under this section, the legislature
established the vouth courts to provjde iudicial protection
 for youths who have violated the law. As previously noted,
the legislature also has the inherent power to redefine that
protection to achieve a legitimate state objective. The
legislature pursued this option in 1987 by revising the
legislatively-created transfer of jurisdiction mechanism.
We held above that by the enactment of S 41-5-206(3),
MCA, the legislature does not grant youths age 16 years or
older who have committed or attempted to commit deliberate or
mitigated deliberate homicide, a hearing to consider
mitigating factors before transferring the youth to district
court. No violation of the separation of power doctrine
occurs under the Montana Constitution when the legislature
acts to revise the protections afforded youths which were
created. under its own legislative power. In light of the
above we hold that 41-5-206, MCA, does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine of the Montana Constit.ution.
Affirmed.

We Concur

CL; ,
, r
Chief Justice