No. 89-434
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
In Re the Marriage of
EDGAR C. SCOTT,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
CHARLOTTE L. SCOTT,
Respondent and Appellant.
.PPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow,
The Honorable Mark P. Sullivan, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Paul N. Cooley, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Daniel R. Sweeney, Butte, Montana
Submitted on briefs: August 23, 1990
~ecided: December 12, 1990
Filed: b
a
Clerk
Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Charlotte Loy Scott appeals the dissolution proceeding in the
District Court of the Second Judicial District, Silver Bow County.
We reverse and remand.
The parties raise the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the District Court erred in not ordering the sale
of the family residence?
2. Whether the District Court erred in receiving the
inventory and appraisement of the Elmer L. Mayhew Estate?
3. Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlotte's
equity in her 1976 Cadillac?
4. Whether the District Court erred in equitably distributing
the marital estate?
5. Whether the District Court failed to take into account
Edgar's vested benefits under the company pension plan?
6. Whether Edgar failed to disclose all of his Westinghouse
savings plan?
7. Whether the District Court failed to account for funds
which Edgar applied to marital obligations?
8. Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlotte's
equity in the family home at $39,500?
9. Whether the District Court erred in denying Charlotte
maintenance?
Charlotte and Edgar were married in Malta, Montana, on June
14, 1964. Twenty-four years later, on August 22, 1988, Edgar filed
a petition for dissolution with the District Court. The couple
2
have four children. At the time of the hearing, however, only
Rhonda, was under the age of 18, and thus the issues of child
support and custody only concern Rhonda.
Charlotte has a high school education, and has been a
housewife during all of the parties' 25-year marriage. Charlotte
possesses no real job skills, and would require extensive job
training to compete in the current job market. To compound
Charlotte's economic woes, she suffers from chronic alcoholism.
The District Court found that Charlotte has admitted "to
receiving a devise from her father, Elmer Mayhem's Estate in the
amount of $42,000, of which she has spent approximately $34,000 for
her living expenses since their separation, which were not
reimbursed by petitioner and has assigned to her sister an addition
sum of approximately $66,420. from her father Is estate.
Furthermore, the District Court explained that Charlotte I1may be
entitled to approximately $400 per month from promissory notes due
and owing in her father's estate."
Edgar has a college education, and earns approximately $50,974
a year plus bonuses as an engineer for Westinghouse. He supports
Rhonda without financial assistance from his wife. His job with
Westinghouse provides him with full benefits, life insurance and
a pension. The parties dispute the value of the pension.
Charlotte contends the pension plan has a present value of $51,000
that will pay Edgar about $1,400 per month at retirement if he quit
working today. Edgar values his pension plan at $18,214. The
District Court agreed with Edgar.
The District Court found the parties acquired the following
real property:
Family residence, Butte, MT (FMV) $140,000.00
Mortgage Balance due 61,000.00
Equity $ 79,000.00
Condominium, Phoenix, Az (FMV) $ 47,000.00
Mortgage Balance Due 21,858.00
Equity $ 25,142.00
The District Court awarded the possession and use of the
family residence in Butte to Edgar, until Rhonda reached the age
of majority, or is otherwise emancipated. At that time the court
ordered the residence sold and half of the equity in the family
home, as of the date of the decree, turned over to Charlotte. The
District Court awarded the Phoenix condominium solely to Charlotte.
The District Court suggested that Charlotte sell the condominium
to aid in her maintenance.
Next, the District Court found the parties acquired the
following personal property during their marriage:
Cash in American Federal Savings $12,800
Petitioner's Westinghouse Retirement 18,214
Petitioner's Westinghouse Savings Plan 14,828
Kemper Funds IRA'S 14,230
Stocks 11,084
Household furnishings 8,240
1976 Cadillac 1,500
1956 Austin Healey 500
TOTAL $81,396
The District Court also found the parties incurred the
following debts during their marriage:
VISA $ 2,415
J. C. Penney 368
Dr. Silva - Dentist 341
Dr. Milanovich - Orthodontist 1,795
Dr. Charles - Eye Specialist 345
University Physicians - Eye Specialist 3,016
University Hospital
First Citizens Bank - Loan
State of Montana Hospital
Highland View
A-1 Ambulance
Rocky Mtn Plastic Surgery
Butte Pathology
OB GYN
TOTAL
The District Court applied the parties1 cash on deposit in the
American Federal Savings and Loan Association in the amount of
$12,800, and $4,000 of the parties1 Westinghouse stock to the above
debts, leaving a balance due of $5,776. The court ordered Edgar
responsible for the remaining $5,776.
Based on the above figures the District Court found the net
value of the marital estate was $168,738. The District Court then
distributed the marital estate as follows:
Petitioner (Edgar)
Kemper IRA $ 7,115
Petitioner's Westinghouse Retirement 18,214
Home Equity - family residence 39,500
Petitioner's Westinghouse Savings 14,828
Household Furnishings 4,212
1956 Austin Healey 500
TOTAL $84,369
Respondent (Charlotte)
Kemper IRA $ 7,115
Condominium in Phoenix 25,142
1976 Cadillac 1,500
Stocks 7,084
Household Furnishings 4,028
Home Equity - family 39,500
TOTAL $84,369
Charlotte testified that she needed maintenance in the amount
of $500 per month. The District Court determined that Charlotte
was not in need of maintenance in addition to her share of the
marital estate.
The District Court awarded custody of Rhonda to Edgar, and
granted Charlotte liberal visitation rights. The court did not
hold Charlotte responsible for any child support obligations while
Rhonda is in the care and custody of her father.
Charlotte now, with different counsel, challenges the District
Courtls valuation and distribution of the marital estate. Our
standard of review is that the District Courtls judgment, when
based upon substantial credible evidence, will not be altered
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. In Re the Marriage
of Watson (1987), 227 Mont. 383, 387, 739 P.2d 951, 954; In Re the
Marriage of Stewart (1988), 232 Mont. 40, 42, 757 P.2d 765, 767.
With this standard in mind, we now review the issues presented to
this Court.
I
Whether the District Court erred in not ordering the sale of
the family residence?
Charlotte contends that given her immediate need for housing,
at the time of the decree she was living with her sister, it was
an abuse of discretion not to order the family home sold. We
disagree with Charlotte. The District Court awarded the possession
and use of the family home to Edgar until Rhonda "reaches the age
of majority, or is otherwise emancipated.I1 The family home is
necessary to provide a stable environment for the parties1 minor
child Rhonda as determined by the District Court.
Next, Charlotte relying on In Re the Marriage of Hereford
(1986), 223 Mont. 31, 34-35, 723 P.2d 960, 962, argues that the
District Court failed to place a burden on an identifiable party
with regards to the eventual sale of the family home. In Hereford,
we discussed the problems the parties face when a decree fails to
make one party responsible for the sale of the family home:
The problem in this case is in the drafting of the
original dissolution decree. The language ''the parties
shall cause the said property to be appraised by a
qualified appraiser, and placed for sale ...I1 is not
a model of clarity in drafting. The decree places no
specific burden on an identifiable party within any time
period. It requires only that someone appraise and list
the house. It technically does not even require the
house to be sold. The property could be, and has been,
listed for years without selling. Yet sales remain
within the language, if not the spirit, of the decree.
Clearly the decree must be modified to place specific
burdens on identifiable parties to get the house sold
within a reasonable time.
Hereford, 723 P.2d at 962.
The District Court's order does provide a specific time for
the sale of the family home, Rhondalsmajority or her emancipation,
the order, however, fails to list a specific person responsible for
the sale. Rather than remand this issue back to the District
Court, we order Edgar responsible for the sale of the property at
the time Rhonda reaches her majority or is otherwise emancipated.
This revision of the District Court's order complies with our
holding in Hereford.
Whether the ~ i s t r i c tCourt erred in receiving the inventory
and appraisement of the Elmer L. Mayhew Estate?
Charlotte claims the District Court abused its discretion when
it received the inventory and appraisement of her father's estate
without taking testimony to determine its weight and credibility.
During the dissolution hearing, the parties disputed the amount of
the devise Charlotte renounced from her father's estate. In order
to determine the value of the assets renounced by Charlotte, the
District Court order Charlotte's trial counsel to file the
inventory and appraisement. He filed the inventory and
appraisement in compliance with the court order and made no request
of a hearing to determine the document's weight and credibility.
The District Court could clearly ascertain from the inventory
and appraisement the size of the devise that Charlotte renounced.
Contrary to Charlotte's assertion, we see no need for a hearing on
the credibility of this document, especially in light of the fact
that her own counsel submitted it to the District Court. The
District Court, after reviewing the inventory and appraisement, and
considering this information with the evidence relating to this
matter at the hearing properly concluded that Charlotte had
renounced over $66,000 in assets from her father's estate and found
she may be entitled to an additional $400 per month still available
from her father's estate.
I11
Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlotte's equity
in her 1976 Cadillac?
Charlotte purchased the 1976 Cadillac from her father's estate
for $450. The car had been driven over 100,000 miles when
Charlotte purchased it. As the record reveals, she purchased the
Cadillac when the parties, though separated, were still married.
At the hearing, Charlotte valued the car at $500. In contrast,
Edgar testified that through his conversation with various
automobile dealers, the fair market value of the Cadillac ranged
between $800 and $1,800. Edgar valued the Cadillac at $1,500, and
the District Court adopted Edgar's value for the car. The record
reveals that no written estimates were submitted to the court by
either party.
Now, Charlotte claims the District Court's finding is not
supported by substantial credible evidence. While it is true the
District Court was not given the best evidence on which to base its
valuation of the Cadillac, the District Court's determination of
the Cadillaclsvalue will stand unless it is not supported by the
record. In Re the Marriage of Hurley (1986), 222 Mont. 287, 296,
721 P.2d 1279, 1285; In Re the Marriage of Luisi (1988), 232 Mont.
243, 247, 756 P.2d 456, 459. Upon the review of the record, the
District Court's finding is supported by the record. Charlotte
cannot now find fault with the District Court's valuation of the
Cadillac, when she herself offered no professional estimates of the
Cadillaclsvalue at the hearing.
In the alternative, Charlotte claims the car is not part of
the marital estate, since she purchased it from her father's estate
when the parties were separated. Generally, property acquired
during the course of a marriage, belonging to either or both
parties however acquired, is part of the marital estate. Luisi,
756 P.2d at 458; See 40-4-202, MCA. The Cadillac, though
purchased by only Charlotte, was bought during the marriage of the
parties, thus making the Cadillac a marital asset distributable by
the ~istrictCourt.
Whether the District Court erred in equitably distributing the
marital estate?
The issue before this Court is whether the District Court
complied with the provisions under 1 40-4-202, MCA, in making the
distribution of the marital property in an equitable manner. In
In Re the Marriage of Dirnberger (1989), 237 Mont. 398, 401, 773
P.2d 330, 332, we reiterated the longstanding rule that district
courts must determine the net worth of the parties in order to
properly comply with 5 40-4-202, MCA. In Dirnberser, we explained:
The basic goal is that the court must I1finallyequitably
apportion between the parties the property and assets .
. . " In construing this statute, this Court has
consistently held that this apportionment must be
predicated upon a finding of the net worth of the estate.
Only after a finding of net worth can the trial court
make an equitable apportionment. The District Court must
make complete findings of fact, including assets and
liabilities, from which can be established a net worth
of the parties. Schultz v. Schultz (1980), 188 Mont.
363, 613 P.2d 1022, and cases cited therein; Cook v. Cook
(1980), 188 Mont. 472, 614 P.2d 511. Additionally, I1[i]f
the District Court's findings and conclusions do not
reflect the net worth of the parties1 marital assets at
the time of the divorce, this Court on appeal cannot
determine if the property was equitably divided."
Robertson v. Robertson (1979), 180 Mont. 226, 231, 590
P.2d 113, 116.
The District Court findings reveal the parties had assets
totaling $185,538 and debts of $22,576. In order to reduce the
debts of the couple the District Court ordered that "the parties
cash on deposit in the American Federal Savings and Loan
~ssociation in the amount of $12,800 and $4,000 worth of the
parties' Westinghouse stock should be applied to the payments of
these obligations leaving a balance of $5,776. The petitioner
shall be responsible for the payment of these obligations . .. II
The District Court then found the net worth of the marital estate
to be $168,738. Next, the District Court split the value of the
marital estate evenly between the parties, the court awarded
$84,369 for Charlotte and $84,369 for Edgar.
Charlotte finds fault with the amount of debt the District
Court listed in its findings. She maintains the District Court
abused its discretion when it blindly accepted Edgar's list of the
parties' marital debts. The record does show that the District
Court accepted most of Edgar's valuation of the couple's debts.
According to Charlotte, Edgar over-estimated the amount of the
couple's debt in his proposed findings, making it impossible for
the District Court to properly calculate the parties' net worth.
As Charlotte correctly notes, without a proper calculation of net
worth, this Court cannot determine if the District Court equitably
divided the marital estate. Dirnberser, supra. Edgar argues the
District Court's findings are based on substantial evidence and
thus Charlotte's bare allegations are not grounds for reversal by
this Court. To determine if the District Court's findings are
based on substantial evidence we must review the disputed list of
debts in the District Court's findings.
The first debt in dispute is the VISA bill. At the hearing,
and in his proposed findings, Edgar claimed the parties sustained
a debt to VISA amounting to $2,415. As seen in the court's
findings, the court accepted Edgar's claim. Charlotte alleges the
record supports a different amount and we agree. In his December
21, 1988, answer to interrogatory No. 18, Edgar claimed that the
VISA bill was originally $2,476.42 and he paid $2,174.27 leaving
a balance still due of $302.15 in September, 1988. However, the
VISA bill ballooned up to $2,415 by April, 1989. Edgar claims this
VISA debt was incurred between the time interrogatories were
answered and the hearing, a period of 7 months. Edgar explained
the purchases on the VISA card consisted of marital liabilities
such as clothing for the parties1 child. Edgar failed to offer,
and the court did not request him to produce, any VISA receipts to
substantiate his claim that the VISA bill paid exclusively for
marital liabilities. We remand the valuation of the VISA debt to
the District Court to determine if the VISA charges covered marital
liabilities. Presently, the record does not support such a large
VISA bill. Edgar must substantiate the $2,415 VISA bill with
something more than a mere statement that it was used for clothing
for the parties1 minor child.
The second debt that Charlotte alleges is not supported by the
record is $7,026 to Dr. Stronger of Rocky Mountain Plastic Surgery.
In his proposed findings Edgar listed the bill as $7,026. Edgar
admitted in his answer to interrogatories, and during the hearing
that his insurance medical plan reimburses the doctor or Edgar for
at least 85% of the provided medical services. After Edgar
submitted his bill of $7,026 to Rocky Mountain Plastic Surgery, the
District Court discovered during the hearing that Edgar received
an insurance check of $1,900 to cover a portion of the Rocky
Mountain Plastic Surgery bill. The court ordered Edgar to apply
the $1,900 to the debt, and Edgar agreed to turn the check over to
Rocky Mountain Plastic Surgery. Despite this testimony in the
record, the District Court's findings do not show a bill of $5,176
($7,026 minus $1,900), but the whole $7,026 bill, with the $1,900
check conspicuously not deducted from the $7,026 original bill.
Edgar argues that since the District Court absolved Charlotte
from paying any of the marital debt, she now has no reason to
challenge the trial court's findings on this point. We disagree
with Edgar's reasoning. First, in order for the District Court to
equitably divide up the marital estate the court needs to know the
net worth of the parties. Again, the District Court must make
complete findings of fact, including assets and liabilities, from
which can be established a net worth of the parties. Dirnberser,
773 P.2d at 332. Here, when the District Court failed to subtract
the $1,900 insurance check from the original debt, the court failed
to make a proper finding regarding one of the parties liabilities,
and thus the court could not correctly establish the couple's net
worth. If the District Court's findings and conclusions do not
represent the net worth of the couple's marital assets at the time
of their dissolution, this Court on appeal cannot determine if the
property was equitably distributed. Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178
Mont. 341, 344, 583 P.2d 1072, 1074; Robertson v. Robertson (1979),
180 Mont. 226, 231, 590 P.2d 113, 116.
Furthermore, the District Court took $16,800 in the parties'
assets to reduce the original $22,576 debt. The District Court may
not have chosen to apply these assets to the parties1 debt if the
debt was less than $22,576. A court cannot equitably distribute
property if its calculations are based upon faulty asset and debt
figures . Accordingly, we remand to the District Court the
valuation of the Rocky Mountain Plastic Surgery debt.
In addition to the Rocky Mountain Plastic Surgery, Charlotte
claims that a number of other debts listed in the District Court's
findings as unpaid debts were paid by the insurance company before
the April, 1989 hearing. Charlotte claims Edgar deceived the court
by not applying the insurance reimbursement checks to the parties'
marital medical debts. Charlottels allegations are supported by
insurance records that her appellate counsel discovered after the
District Court hearing, and now seeks to introduce them for the
first time on appeal. Unfortunately, however, this Court cannot
accept the insurance company records as evidence of Edgar's true
debt since they were not introduced first in the District Court.
This Court will not consider evidence extraneous to the record.
Section 3-2-204, MCA; Downs v. Smyk (1979), 185 Mont. 16, 24, 604
P.2d 307, 312; In Re the Marriage of Stout (1985), 216 Mont. 342,
351, 701 P.2d 729, 735. Section 3-2-204(5), MCA, states in
pertinent part:
In equity cases and in matters and proceedings of an
equitable matter, the Supreme Court shall review all
questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented in
the record ...
Accordingly, we may not consider the insurance company records
since they were not introduced first in the District Court. They
may be considered on remand.
v
Whether the District Court failed to take into account Edgar's
vested benefits under the company pension plan?
Charlotte maintains the District Court failed to take into
account Edgar's vested benefits under the Westinghouse pension
plan, primarily because Edgar never disclosed then. In
interrogatory No. 60, Charlotte asked Edgar, ' D you participate
'o
in any pension program in connection with your employment?" Edgar
answered affirmatively, and allegedly attached the pension plan
booklet to his interrogatories. Charlotte claims she never
received the pension booklet, and only obtained the pension booklet
by subpoena after the entry of decree in preparation for her motion
for a new trial. In his answer to interrogatory No. 67, Edgar
claimed the pension plan amounted to $18,214. This figure was
later adopted in the District Court Is findings as "Petitioner's
Westinghouse Retirement."
Charlotte now claims Edgar failed to specify the Itvested
matching contributionsw portion of the pension plan in his answer
to her interrogatory requests. Edgar maintains that he complied
fully with Charlotte's discovery requests, and supplied all the
requested information, including the pension booklet. According
to Edgar, the interrogatories were placed into evidence by
Charlotte without the booklet attached. Edgar argues if the
pension booklet was not received prior to the final hearing, her
trial attorney would have noted this oversight. There is no such
objection by Charlotte's counsel in the record.
Furthermore, Edgar claims the amount of the pension plan or
the number of pension plans were never contested by Charlotte in
the District Court and she never presented any argument which
conflicted with Edgar's pension valuation. Edgar relying on Rule
52, M.R.Civ.P., argues that the trial court made a finding based
on substantial credible evidence presented at the hearing and it
must be upheld by this Court. We agree the time for Charlotte to
raise contentions regarding the pension plan was at the District
Court. The District Court's finding is supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record and will not be overturned on
appeal. Stewart, 757 P.2d at 76; Watson, 739 P.2d at 951.
However, in view of the remand here, the issue may be reviewed in
the District Court.
VI
Whether Edgar failed to disclose all of his Westinghouse
savings plan?
Edgar claimed in his proposed findings that his employee
savings plan totaled $14,828, and this figure was later adopted by
the District Court. After the hearing, via subpoena, Charlotte
discovered that Edgar's Westinghouse savings plan allegedly
amounted to over $24,000, not the $14,828 claimed by Edgar.
Charlotte contends Edgar purposely excluded an "after tax account1'
and a "401(k) accountw from the District Court. Edgar claims he
properly complied with Charlotte's discovery requests, and
presented the savings plan information supplied to him by
westinghouse. Furthermore, he claims that Charlotte's exhibit
showing the alleged extra savings plans is dated August 2, 1989,
several months after the final hearing, and therefore it has no
bearing on the June 9, 1989 District Court order.
The District Court's finding of $14,828 in the Westinghouse
Savings plan was supported by the evidence presented to the court.
We will not reverse the finding with evidence that lists the
alleged status of the savings plan several months after the
District Court hearing.
Accordingly, we find the District Court's findings regarding
the savings plan are based upon the substantial credible evidence
in the record. Stewart, 757 P.2d at 767; Watson, 739 P.2d at 954.
VII
Whether the District Court failed to account for funds which
Edgar applied to marital obligations?
In June 1988, Charlotte was involved in a car accident, from
which she was later sued. Edgar worried about the couple's
liability in the lawsuit, forged his wife's name, and withdrew
$25,884 from the couple's cash account at D.A. Davidson. Edgar
then placed one-half of the couple's funds in a joint savings
account and placed the rest in a trust account with himself as the
trustee. The money in the joint savings account, according to
Edgar, was used to pay off marital obligations. When this matter
came before the ~istrictCourt the only money left of the $25,884
D.A. Davidson account was the $12,942 in the trust account.
Charlotte claims Edgar lied to the court, and spent the joint
savings account money for his own personal use rather than for
marital obligations. At the hearing, Edgar could not present a
complete list of marital expenses paid for by the joint savings
account, so the District Court requested Edgar to submit an
itemized list of expenses paid for with the $12,942 from the joint
savings account to substantiate his claims. The record reveals
Edgar did submit a list of expenses as ordered by the District
Court. Contrary to Charlotte's assertion, the itemized list of
expenses supports Edgar's claims that the $12,942 was used to pay
marital obligations.
VIII
Whether the District Court erred in valuing Charlottels equity
in the family home at $39,500?
The District Court in its findings valued Charlotte's one-
half equity in the home at $39,500, but then ordered that Edgar did
not need to pay that amount until Rhonda "reaches the age of
majority, or is otherwise emancipated.'' Charlotte relying on In
Re the Marriage of Kis (1982), 196 Mont. 296, 639 P.2d 1151; and
In Re the Marriage of Summerfelt (1984), 212 Mont. 332, 688 P.2d
8, argues that the District Court must apply a present value to
Charlotte's equity in the house, not one in the future. Charlotte
argues the court had an obligation to award interest until 1995 or
reduce the wife's awarded equity amount to a present value.
Charlotte's counsel mistakes the meaning of present value,
however. A present value determination is necessary where the
recipient will be credited for the value of a payment or an object
now, but which money or value of an object will be delivered to the
recipient in the future. Here, Charlotte was awarded a present
equity in the house of $39,500, but will not receive that amount
until the house is sold in the future. Since the husband will
continue to occupy the house, and in effect enjoy her contribution
of $39,500 in equity until the house is sold, it would be more
appropriate to provide that Charlotte will receive, when the house
is sold, the principal sum of $39,500, plus an appropriate rate of
interest per annum until she receives her money.
We remand the issue to the District Court to determine
Charlotte's right to interest based on her present equity of
$39,500 in the home.
IX
Whether the District Court erred in denying Charlotte
maintenance?
Charlotte testified that she needed maintenance of $500 per
month, in order to maintain the standard of living achieved during,
the marriage, and to prevent her from becoming a ward of the State.
The District Court determined that Charlotte Itis not in need of
maintenance in addition to the property division."
In the past, this Court has held that "[glenerally, the award
of maintenance is not favored in states, such as Montana, which
have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The intent of
the drafters, as demonstrated by the Commission Comments to 5 40-
4-203, MCA, indicates a desire to 'encourage the court to provide
for the financial needs of the spouse by property disposition
rather than an award of maintenance.'" Commission Comments MCA
~nnotations,Vol. 5, p. 145; ~uisi,756 P.2d at 459; see also In
Re the Marriage of Johnsrud (1977), 181 Mont. 544, 572 P.2d 902.
Before a district court can order a maintenance award, the
Court must equitably distribute the marital estate. Johnsrud, 572
P.2d at 905. As we stated in Johnsrud, "After the court makes a
decision on property division, then any additional needs of spouse
petitioning for maintenance should be readily apparent.'! Johnsrud,
572 P.2d at 905; See also 5 40-4-203(1), MCA. As we have
previously explained, the District Court must determine the net
worth of the parties in order to equitably distribute the marital
property in accordance with 5 40-4-202, MCA. Here, the District
Court must properly apportion the marital estate.
We cannot effectively decide the issues of equitable division
of the marital estate and maintenance until the court properly
determines the net worth of the parties1 estate. Charlotte's need
for maintenance can only be determined after the court equitably
divides the marital estate. Accordingly, the District Court shall
address the issue of maintenance only after it determines the net
worth of the parties1 estate and makes an equitable distribution
of the marital estate.
Reversed.
We Concur:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
No. 89-434
In Re the Marriage of
EDGAR C. SCOTT,
1
petitioner and Respondent 1 ORDER
1 MODIFYING
and 1 OPINION
1
CHARLOTTE L. SCOTT, 1
1
Respondent and Appellant. 1
The opinion in this cause handed down on December 12, 1990,
is hereby clarified and modified by removing the word llReversedn
on page 20 of the slip opinion, and inserting in lieu thereof the
words:
"Remanded for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.I1
DATED this 20th day of Decembe