No. 90-381
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1991
DEBRA STEFFANI IRVING,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1-lA, VALLEY COUNTY,
MONTANA; and the BOARD OF TRUSTEES, said
Board consisting of Everett Breigenzer,
Sharon Archambeault, ~ o i s
Johnson, ~hirley
Kirkland, Terry Hueth, James Olk, and Fred
Compton, Individually and as a Body ~olitic,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court ofthe Seventeenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Valley,
The Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David L. Irving, Glasgow, Montana
For Respondent:
Chadwick H. Smith; Smith Law Firm, Helena, Montana
Donald R. Herndon; Herndon, Hartman, Sweeney h
Halverson, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 22, 1991
Decided: June 4, 1991
Filed:
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Debra Steffani Irving appeals from a decision of the
Seventeenth Judicial District, dismissing her lawsuit filed against
School District 1-1A in Valley County and the Board of Trustees.
The District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 12(b),
M.R.Civ.P. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
The only issue we find necessary for review is:
Whether the District Court properly granted the defendants1
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), M.R.Civ.P.
Debra Steffani Irving (Steffani) was first employed by School
District 1-lA, Valley County (School District) in October 1985.
She was rehired on a full time basis in 1986, and again in 1987.
During the 1986-1987 and 1987-1988 academic years, Steffani taught
part time in a social studies position and part time in a Spanish
position in Glasgow High School. Throughout this period of time,
she was evaluated as adequate and above average in her teaching
ability. She did not obtain tenure, however, because her contract
was not renewed for the requisite fourth year.
According to Steffani, she was a victim of continual
harassment which was perpetrated by officials at the School
District. According to her statement of facts, the principal of
Glasgow High School attempted to terminate her in 1987 by
recommending that her teaching contract not be renewed for the
1987-1988 school year. He justified his actions by maintaining
that the elimination of Steffani's job was part of a necessary
reduction in force. The School Board apparently disagreed with the
2
principal and renewed Steffani's contract for the 1987-1988
academic year.
According to Steffani's complaint, the high school principal
was undeterred by the School Board's action. She maintains that
after her renewal in 1987, the principal vowed that he would ''get
her next year.'' The following year the School District did not
renew her contract.
Under the authority of 5 20-4-206, MCA, Steffani asked the
School Board for a list of reasons for her non-renewal. In
compliance with her request, the School Board told her she was not
renewed due to financial considerations, declining enrollment and
that she was not rehired due to a reduction in force. Following
her non-renewal, the responsibility of teaching Spanish was given
to Karen Ortmann, a tenured teacher who taught part time since
1984.
Steffani filed a notice of appeal with the Valley County
Superintendent of Schools. This appeal was dismissed after the
Superintendent ruled that she did not have jurisdiction to hear the
claim. This ruling was affirmed by the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction on May 1, 1989.
Steffani also filed a complaint in District Court alleging
breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, violations of provisions of
the state and federal constitutions and an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. After the State Superintendent denied jurisdiction of her
administrative claims, Steffani amended her complaint to add an
appeal of that decision. Eventually, Steffani's lawsuit was
dismissed under Rule 12(b) for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted. Steffani appeals this dismissal. The
substance of her complaint will be discussed in greater detail
below.
Rule 12 (b), M.R. Civ.P., provides that a defendant may, through
a motion, raise the defense that the plaintiff has not stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering such a
motion, the District Court must consider only the sufficiency of
matters raised in the complaint. It must not go beyond the four
corners of the complaint, nor may it engage in any fact finding.
Nordlund v. School District No. 14 (1987), 227 Mont. 402, 738 P.2d
1299. A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
her claim which will entitle her to relief. Proto v. Missoula
County (1988), 230 Mont. 351, 749 P.2d 1094. With this standard
in mind, we will review Steffani's complaint to determine whether
it was properly dismissed.
In Count I of her second amended complaint, Steffani seeks
judicial relief from an administrative order of the State
Superintendent of Education. That order denied jurisdiction of her
appeal of the School Board's decision to not renew her contract.
Steffani also seeks damages which she alleges resulted from a
closed meeting held by the School Board.
The District Court upheld the State Superintendent's order on
the grounds that Steffani did not timely file her appeal. A review
of the record, however, reveals that Steffani did file her appeal
within the sixty day period provided by 3 20-3-107(2), MCA.
However, the Superintendent denied jurisdiction of Steffanils
appeal because she found that as a non-tenured teacher, Steffani
was not entitled to a hearing. We agree with this reasoning.
Because Steffani was non-tenured she was not entitled to a
hearing after her contract was not renewed. Rather, she was only
entitled to a list of reasons for her non-renewal. See 3 20-4-
206, MCA. She requested and received written reasons for the
School Board's decision.
Nowhere in either the statutes or the collective bargaining
agreement is Steffani given a right to appeal her non-renewal.
Moreover, as a non-tenured teacher she has no legally recognized
property right in a new contract. See Board of Regents v. Roth
(1972), 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. Therefore,
she was not entitled to constitutional due process and did not have
a legally cognizable claim under Montana law. Steffani did not
present a claim upon which relief could be granted and the appeal
of her administrative claim was properly dismissed.
As stated above, Steffani also seeks damages which she alleges
were incurred when the School Board held a closed meeting in
violation of Article 11, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.
This provision requires all meetings of public bodies to be open
to public scrutiny. The only exception to this rule is when the
demands of individual privacy exceed the merits of public
disclosure.
The Legislature has provided one remedy that can be utilized
when Article 11, Section 9 is violated. Section 2-3-213, MCA,
provides that any decision made during an illegally closed meeting
can be declared void by a District Court. A suit to void any such
decision must be commenced within 30 days of the decision.
Steffani has not, however, sought to void the decision of the
School Board. Instead, she has sought monetary damages. The
damages she seeks to collect do not arise directly from the act of
closing the meeting. Instead they arise from alleged acts of
discrimination that may have occurred at that meeting. These
damages have been sought in other portions of her complaint. In
particular, they are recoverable under her 5 1983 claims and
therefore all damages sought here are merely duplicative. This
cause of action was therefore properly dismissed.
In Count I1 of her complaint, Steffani alleges that the
defendants committed fraud by supplying her with a false reason
for her discharge and by leading her to believe that she would be
interviewed for the Spanish position she held during the 1987-1988
school year. The first allegation fails the basis her
pleadings.
In order to establish fraud, Steffani must prove nine
elements:
1) the defendants made a representation;
2) the representation was false;
3) the representation was material;
4) the defendants knew the representation was false
or were ignorant of its truth;
5) the defendants intended that the representation
should be acted upon in the manner contemplated;
6) Steffani was ignorant of the representation s
falsity;
7) Steffani relied upon its truth;
8 Steffani had a right to rely upon the
representation; and
9) as a proximate cause of this reliance suffered
damages.
Kinjerski v. Lamey (1979), 185 Mont. 111, 604 P.2d 782.
As stated above, Steffani maintains that the defendants
fraudulently misled her to believe that her contract was not
renewed due to an overall reduction in force. However, even if the
defendants did attempt to mislead Steffani, she cannot establish
an action for fraud. The sixth and seventh elements of this cause
of action require that Steffani did not know the defendants1
representations were false and that she relied upon the assertions.
According to her pleadings, the school principal told her that
he would "get her next year." Steffani believed that this
statement constituted a threat that her contract would not be
renewed the following year. The threat was made after the
principal unsuccessfully attempted to terminate her. If we assume
that this threat in fact occurred, it is impossible to believe that
Steffani thought she was non-renewed as part of a reduction in
force. By her own pleadings she cannot establish a cause of action
and this allegation was properly dismissed.
In her second allegation of fraud, Steffani maintains that the
defendants misled her to believe that she would be interviewed for
a teaching position in the Spanish department. She states that
under the circumstances this assurance, which the defendants knew
or should have known was false, prevented her from obtaining other
work.
7
Rule 9(b), M.R.Civ.P., requires that the circumstances
constituting fraud must be stated with particularity. In
Fraunhoffer v. Price (1979), 182 Mont. 7, 594 P.2d 324, we stated:
"Of primary importance in understanding the particularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) is the recognition that it does
not render the general principles set forth in Rule 8
entirely inapplicable to pleadings alleging fraud;
rather, the two rules must be read in conjunction with
each other. It should be kept in mind that Rule 8 (a)
requests 'a short and plain statement of the claim1 for
relief .. .
Thus, it is inappropriate to focus
exclusively on the fact that Rule 9(b) requires
particularity in pleading fraud. This is too narrow an
approach and fails to take account of the general
simplicity and flexibility contemplated by the rules .
. .
The sufficiency of a particular pleading under Rule
9 (b) depends upon a number of variables. For example,
the degree of detail required often turns on the context
in which the fraud is alleged to have occurred . . .
Perhaps the most basic consideration in making a judgment
as to the sufficiency of a pleading is the determination
of how much detail is necessary to give adequate notice
to an adverse party and enable him to prepare a
responsive pleading.I1 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Civil 1298, p. 406-07, 410, 415;
Fraunhoffer, 182 Mont. 715, 594 P.2d 324, 328-329.
She has identified the person who made the statement, the time
the statement was made, that the defendants knew the statement was
false, that she was misled and that she suffered damages. This
information meets the rule set down in Fraunhoffer. Under this
rule and under the guidelines established by Rule 12(b), she has
stated a claim.
In Count 111, ~teffanialleges that the defendants breached
several provisions of the Collective ~argainingAgreement, which
was appended to and made part of her complaint. She maintains that
the defendants breached Articles 5.3 and 5.4 which state:
5.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment
No teacher shall be disciplined, dismissed,
reduced in rank or compensations, or deprived
of any professional advantage without due
process.
5.4 Reduction in Force:
a. In the event it becomes necessary to
lay off certified tenure staff for
any reason, staff shall be laid off
in the reverse order of their
seniority.
b. For the purposes of a reduction in
teaching staff, seniority and
certification will be the criteria
for lay-off within the system.
c. Seniority will be defined as the
length of total service in the
district. Time off for approved
leaves of absence will count for
seniority purposes, and such leaves
will not be considered as an
interruption of service.
d. When a teacher receives notification
of termination under Article 5.4,
Reduction in Force, he/she upon
request, will be granted 1 day of
his/her personal leave, with pay,
for the purpose of a job interview.
According to Steffani's argument, she was entitled to the
Spanish position because she had the most seniority. As stated
earlier, Steffani worked for the School District for three years.
When she was non-renewed, the Spanish position was given to a
tenured teacher, who worked for the School District for four years
under part time contracts. Steffani maintains that her full time
experience exceeded the total experience of the part time teacher
and that she therefore had more seniority. Her non-renewal, she
argues, violatedthe seniority provisions contained in Article 5.4.
This argument, in light of the clear language of Article 5.4,
is untenable. Section (a) of this provision clearly states that
lay offs of certified tenure staff will occur in reverse order of
seniority. Steffani was not tenured, and therefore this provision
has no application to her.
Next Steffani alleges that the School District violated
Article 5.3 because they did not afford her any due process before
they decided to not renew her contract. Article 5.3 provides that
''no teacher shall be disciplined, dismissed, reduced in rank or
compensations, or deprived of any professional advantage without
due process." As a nontenure teacher who had no legitimate
expectation of contract renewal, Steffani was not dismissed or
deprived of any professional advantage. She received all benefits,
privileges and rights she was entitled to. When her contract
expired in the spring of 1988, her employment with the School
District was terminated. She had no right to a new contract and
consequently she was not entitled to any due process. This
allegation does not state a cause of action.
Finally, Steffani alleges that the School District
discriminated against her in violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement because they did not pay the full amount of
her health insurance. We need not explain this allegation in any
detail. The face of the complaint reveals that this issue was
resolved in the teacher's favor in Glasgow Education Association
v. Board of Trustees, Valley County, School District 1-1A (1990),
242 Mont. 478, 791 P.2d 1367. This allegation was, therefore,
properly dismissed.
In Count IV, ~teffanialleges that the defendants violated the
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, 5 5 39-2-901, et. seq., MCA.
Section 39-2-912(2), MCA, states:
This part does not apply to a discharge of an employee
covered by a written collective bargaining agreement or
a written contract of employment for a specified term.
As this makes clear, this Act does not apply to Steffani and Count
IV is dismissed.
In Count V Steffani alleges that the defendants breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the code of
governmental fair practices found at 5 49-3-201, et seq., MCA. In
Brinkman v. State of Montana (1987), 224 Mont. 238, 729 P.2d 1301,
we held that a cause of action for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is barred when the litigant is subject to
a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, Steffani cannot
receive damages for this allegation. See also Riley v. State of
Montana (1988), 748 P.2d 455, 229 Mont. 518.
As stated above, Steffani alleges the defendants breached
certain provisions of Governmental Code of Fair Practices. Section
49-3-201, et. seq., MCA. This statute directs governmental
agencies to llrecruit,
appoint, assign, train, evaluate and promote
personnel on the basis of merit." 5 49-3-201(1), MCA. It forbids
discrimination when the government seeks to carry out any of these
duties. Steffani was not recruited, appointed, assigned, trained,
evaluated or promoted. Rather, she was not rehired after her
contract expired. Her allegation, therefore, does not fall under
the purview of this statute and this cause of action similarly
fails.
In Count VI, Steffani set forth several claims based upon
alleged violations of her constitutional rights and 42 U.S.C. 5
1983. In particular, she argues that the defendants, while acting
under the color of state law, violated her rights to equal
protection, free speech, association and due process. The District
Court, in a very brief opinion, dismissed this count on the basis
of immunity and because Steffani's allegations were ''insufficient
to state a claim under Section 1983."
On the basis of the District Court's memorandum, it is
impossible to discern the exact reasons for the dismissal of
Steffani's 5 1983 claims. Her complaint, however, appears to
adequately set forth a claim for relief. We therefore reverse the
District Court's order of dismissal and order further
consideration of these allegations to determine which, if any, can
proceed to ultimate resolution in trial.
Conclusion
The order of the District Court dismissing claims under the
second allegation of Count I1 and Count VI is reversed and the
claims reinstated. All other allegations, claims and counts of
her complaint were properly dismissed and the District Court, on
these issues, is affirmed. Pursuant to above, the case is remanded
for further proceeding.
We Concur:
Chief Justice
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion of the majority.
This Court has as recently as April 30, 1991, refused to
affirm summary dispositions of claims where the record is
incomplete. Johnston v. American Reliable Ins. Co., et al.,
48 St.Rep. 405 (Mont. 1991).
Pursuant to Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.:
[Alny order of the court granting a motion under Rules
12 or 56 which is appealable to an appellate court shall
specify the grounds therefor with sufficient particu-
larity as to apprise the parties in the appellate court
of the rationale underlying the ruling and this may be
done in the body of the order or in an attached opinion.
Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed by the District Court
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failing to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 52, plaintiff
and this Court were entitled to an explanation from the District
Court of the grounds for the dismissal of each of plaintiff's
claims.
In this case, plaintiff Is complaint alleges at least ten bases
for relief. The District Court's order dismissed all of them, but
gave reasons only for the dismissal of plaintiff's petition to set
aside an administrative order and plaintiff's claim for relief
under 42 U.S.C. The majority has now found both those
grounds to be either incorrect or inadequate, although they have,
sllrr spotzte, found another basis for denying review of the State
Superintendent's order.
The record in this case is almost nonexistent. The factual
bases for the plaintiff's claims and the legal bases for the denial
of those claims have not been developed in the District Court.
It is particularly troubling that on the basis of this
inadequate record this Court would enter such an expansive decision
concluding that plaintiff has no right to any appeal under the
Administrative Procedure Act; she has absolutely no rights under
the collective bargaining agreement; and yet, she is precluded from
recovery under either the Wrongful Discharge Act or pursuant to her
employer's duty of good faith and fair dealing, because at all
times relevant she was covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. This decision would seem to leave untenured teachers
uniquely unprotected under Montana law from retaliatory action by
their employers. On the basis of this record, I am unwilling to
arrive at such a sweeping conclusion.
For these reasons, I would remand this case to the District
Court for proper compliance with Rule 52 (a), M.R. Civ.P. , before
further consideration by this Court.
I concur with the foregoing dissent of Justice Trieweiler.