No. 90-417
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT D. GRIFFIN, Deceased.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Jefferson,
The Honorable Larry W. Moran, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
J. Richard Orizotti; Poore, Roth & Robinson; Butte,
Montana
For Respondent:
David A. Grauman; Jardine & Grauman; Whitehall,
Montana
W. William Leaphart; Leaphart Law Firm, Helena,
Montana
John K. Hencz; Clancy; M n w k a m , y - n s p
Submitted on Briefs: April 25, 1991
Decided: June 4, 1991
Filed:
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case involves the resolution of an entitlement to part
of an estate (auto parts business) on a motion for summary
judgment. The decedent's son, Barry Griffin, appeals the order of
the Montana Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson County,
granting summary judgment to the decedent's surviving spouse, Jeri
Griffin. The District Court held that the surviving spouse's
renunciation of her interest in the estate and an agreement between
the surviving spouse and son, purporting to transfer her daughter's
interest to the son, were null and void. We affirm.
The issues on appeal are:
(1) Did the District Court err in determining the
wDisclaimerll
signed by the surviving spouse and renouncing any and
all right and interest in the decedent's auto parts business was
void as a matter of law?
(2) Did the District Court err in determining that an
agreement between the surviving spouse and the son, whereby the
surviving spouse purportedly sold her minor daughter's interest in
the decedent's auto parts business, was void as a matter of law?
The undisputed facts in this case are as follows. In April
of 1985, the decedent and Jeri Griffin (the surviving spouse) were
married. At the time of the marriage the decedent had two adult
children, Lori Hencz and appellant Barry Griffin (the son) . The
surviving spouse had a minor child, Angela, whom the decedent
adopted. In the spring of 1986, the surviving spouse and minor
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daughter left the decedent and moved to Oregon. On November 28,
1987, the decedent died intestate.
On January 11, 1989, the surviving spouse entered into a
purported agreement with the son on behalf of her minor daughter.
Under this agreement, the son would acquire the minor daughter's
interest in decedent's auto parts business in exchange for payments
totalling $16,000.00 to be made by the son to a trust set up for
the minor daughter. On the same date, the surviving spouse signed
an instrument entitled "Disclaimerfl purporting to 'I. . .
relinquish, renounce and disclaim any and all rights ... in and
to Magicland Sales and Service. . . .'I "Magicland" is the auto
parts business. In the "Disclaimer", the surviving spouse
requested that her share in the business be distributed to
decedent's son, who currently operated the business. She retained
possession of the '8Disclaimer.
'
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On May 11, 1988, the surviving spouse signed an instrument
entitled "Renunciation of Disclaimerw purporting to ". . .
irrevocably cancel, revoke, rescind and withdraw the Disclaimer
executed by her on January 11, 1988. .. .It On December 28, 1988,
the surviving spouse simultaneously filed both the purported
'lDisclaimerwand the "Renunciation of DisclaimerN in the estate
proceeding.
The surviving spouse alleges that over the several months
after being appointed as personal representative of the estate she
learned that the decedent's business was worth significantly more
than the amount she had considered when she signed the purported
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agreement regarding her daughter's interest in the estate and the
purported disclaimer. The son argues that she had knowledge of
Magicland's worth due to her involvement in the business and that
it was her agent, a real estate broker, who valued the business at
the time the instruments were executed, pursuant to her direction.
He further alleges on appeal that genuine issues of material fact
exist regarding her knowledge of the business's worth at the time
the instruments were executed and whether she ratified the
agreement regarding her daughter's interest.
I. Renunciation of Succession
The effect of the wDisclaimer9'executed by Jeri Griffin is
governed by 5 72-2-101, MCA, entitled "Renunciation of succession.'I
The statute allows an individual to renounce his or her right to
succession by filing a written renunciation (a) describing the
property or interest renounced; (b) signed by the person
renouncing; and (c) declaring the renunciation and the extent
thereof. Section 72-2-101(1), MCA. Unless the transferor
(decedent here) of the interest has otherwise provided, the
property or interest renounced devolves as though the person
renouncing had predeceased the decedent. Section 72-2-101(4), MCA.
The parties do not argue, nor will we determine, the effect of
subsection (4) of the statute on the purported llDisclaimerll
in
favor of the son in this case. Rather, our decision here is based
on the filing requirements of the statute.
In particular, the statute provides that It[i]f the
circumstances that establish the right of a person to renounce an
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interest arise as a result of the death of an individual, the
instrument must also be filed in the court of the county where
proceedings concerning the decedent's estate are pending or where
they would be pending if commenced. Section 72-2-101(3), MCA.
The plain language of the statute requires that the disclaimer be
filed, thus filing of the disclaimer is a condition precedent to
an effective renunciation. See e.g. Matter of Estate of Griffin
(Okla. 1979), 599 P.2d 402, 406; Matter of Estate of Brewington
(1981), 110 Mich.App. 672, 313 N.W.2d 182, 186. Furthermore, there
can be no waiver of a right to succession where there is no intent
to waive. Faught v. Estate of Faught (Tenn. 1987), 730 S.W. 2d 323,
326. Here the llDisclaimerll the surviving spouse's interest was
of
filed simultaneously with the second instrument llcancel[ing],
revok[ing], rescind[ing], and withdraw[ing]I1 the renunciation.
Thus, at the time the alleged ''DisclaimerW was to be given legal
effect the surviving spouse did not intend to renounce her
interest. We hold that the District Court correctly concluded that
the tlDisclaimerll void as a matter of law.
was Thus, any factual
issue concerning the surviving spouse's knowledge of the value of
the decedent's business is rendered immaterial for purposes of
summary judgment. See Rule 56 (c), M.R. Civ.P. ; Frigon v. Morrison-
Maierle, Inc. (1988), 233 Mont. 113, 117, 760 P.2d 57, 60; Cerek
v. Albertsonls,Inc. (1981), 195 Mont. 409, 411, 637 P.2d 509, 511.
11. Agreement Conveying Minor's Interest
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The second issue is whether the District Court erred in
determining that an agreement between the surviving spouse and the
son, whereby the surviving spouse purportedly sold her daughter's
interest in the decedent's business, was void as a matter of law.
The appellant concedes on appeal that at the time the agreement was
entered into on January 11, 1988, the surviving spouse had not yet
been appointed as conservator for the minor child and thus was
without legal authority to act for her minor daughter. The
appellant argues that after the surviving spouse was appointed
conservator on January 28, 1988, she took no action to notify the
appellant of her change in position that she would not perform the
agreement and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether her passive conduct amounts to a ratification of the
earlier agreement.
We disagree. The parties never entered a valid contract in
this case. The agreement was not a voidable contract enforceable
at the will of the innocent party. See e.g. Greater Iowa Corp. v.
McLendon (8th Cir. 1967), 378 F.2d 783, 792. Rather, because the
surviving spouse had no authority to enter the contract on behalf
of her minor child, the agreement was void at it's inception. See
e.g. Belgrade State Bank v. Swanson (1977), 172 Mont. 350, 359, 564
P.2d 174, 179. Furthermore, [a] void contract is no contract at
all; it binds no one and is a mere nullity. * * * It requires no
disaffirmance to avoid it ... Hames v. City of Polson (1950),
123 Mont. 469, 484, 215 P.2d 950, 958; overruled on other grounds
in Prezeau v. City of Whitefish (1982), 198 Mont. 416, 420, 646
P.2d 1186, 1189. "A void contract is one which never had any legal
existence or effect, and it cannot in any manner have life breathed
into it. 'I National Union Indemnity Co. v. Bruce Bros., Inc. (Ariz.
1934), 38 P.2d 648, 652. See also, generally Restatement (Second)
of Contracts 5 7, comment a; 5 163, comment c; 3 174, comment b.
The contract here is void, hence there can be no material fact
issue concerning its ratification.
We hold that the District Court correctly concluded that both
the llDisclaimerlf the agreement purporting to convey the minor's
and
interest are void. These determinations being purely questions of
law, summary judgment was appropriate. See Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P;
Friaon, 760 P.2d at 60; Cerek, 637 P.2d at 511. The order of the
District Court is
AFFIRMED.
- Justice
We Concur: /
Chief Justice - - q,
.