NO. 95-425
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1996
FARMERS ALLIfiATCE MUTITAL INSUR&TCE:
COMP.LVY,a Kansas Insurance corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
KRISTI H O L E W , Personal Representative
of the Estate of Gary Lee Leonard, Deceased,
Defendant and Respondent
CERTIFZED QUESTION FROM:
The United States District Court for the District
of Montana, Billings Division, The Honorable Jack
D. Shanstrom presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Robert Savage; Habedank, Cumming, Best & Savage,
Sidney, Montana (argued for Farmers Alliance)
For Respondent:
Donald D. Sommerfeld; Towe, Ball, Enright,
Mackey & Sommerfeld, Billings, Montana (argued for
Kristi Holeman, Personal Representative)
For Amicus:
Peter F. Habein; Crowley, Haughey, Hanson,
Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana (argued for
Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company)
Susan P. Eoy, Garlington, Lohn &Robinson, Missouia,
Montana (argued for Alliance of American Insurers)
Gene R. Jarussi; Jarussi &Bishop, Billings, Montana
(argued for Montana Trial Lawyers Association)
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; Heard: May 2 0 , 1996
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, .LA Submitted: June 25, 1 9 2 6
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aeptamber
Justice W. VJilliam Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court
The United States District Court for the District of Montana,
.- -
Bliiings Division, bas zertified the folLowing question to this
Court pursuant to Rule 44, M.R.Appp.F. We answer the certified
question "no."
The certified question is:
Section 33-23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of
the uninsured motorist coverage available under a policy
of motor vehicle liability insurance. Does Section 3 3 -
23 -203, MCA, prohibit the stacking of the medical payment
coverage and the -insuredmotorist coverage available
under a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance where
a premium is charged for coverage of each motor vehicle
listed within that policy?
In the insurance policy at issue, a premium is
charged on each motor vehicle listed within the policy
for medical payment co*Jerage and a premium is charged on
each motor vehicle listed within the policy for
-insurance coverage. The premium for the
-insured motorist coverage is included as part of the
premium for the uninsured motorist coverage.
In its Order Certifying Question to the Supreme Court of
Montana, the District Court submitted a statement of agreed facts
The facts that this Court finds dispositive of the question are as
follows :
4. That, at approximately 0450 hours, on November
9 , 1991, a vehicle insured by the Plaintiff under the
policy issued to Wade and Diana Brown, namely a 1971 Ford
pickup with VIN FlOGKL66406, being driven by Lori Watson,
in which Scott Hankel and Gary Lee Leonard were
passengers, was involved in a one-vehicle accident in
Jefferson County, Montana, on Interstate 90 at milepost
233.4, 15.6 miles west of Whitehall, Montana.
5. Subsequent thereto, at approximately 0510 hours,
at [sic] 1983 Ford pickup truck, V1N 1FTHF26LSDPA15458,
owned by Darrel. M. Storey and driven by Darrel Maynard
Storey, Jr., was traveling east on Interstate 90 when the
driver lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to
slow for the accident scene and went into a sideskid.
The Storey vehicle struck the right roar corner of the
trailer attached ts the subject 1971 Ford pickup, VIN
F30GRL66406. Such contact pushed the trailer into the
ditch and onto its Left side. The Storey vehicle then
rapidly rotated. Mr. Leonard's coat became entangled on
the bitch of the Storey pickup which caw-sed Mr. Leonard
to be dragged under the Storey vehicle until after it
went backwards into the ditch on the south side of the
road. 1 . Leonard died as a result o f the injuries
sustained.
6. The Storey vehicle was insured by State Farm
A u t o Insurance Company under Pnli.cy PJo 1.3E 5 2 2 . 2 - 4 9 5 - 2 2 5
add State Farm subsequently paid out its policy limits
under the liability portion of its policy limits in the
amount of $25,000.
7. Prior to signing a Release, the Estate of Gary
Lee Leonard made demand upon Plaintiff for the uninsured
(underinsured)motorist coverage and auto medical payment
coverage provided for in the Business Auto Policy of Wade
and Diana Brown.
8. Plaintiff has refused to make any payments of
uninsured (underinsured! motorist coverage and auto
medical payment coverage to the heirs and/or Estate of
Gary Lee Leonard, deceased.
Answering the question certified by the United States District
Court requires this Court to construe § 33-23-203, MCA. In
construing a statute, "the office of the judge is simply to
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has
been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The rules of statutory
construction require the language to be construed according to its
plain meaning. Stratemeyer v. L~ncolnCounty (Flont. 1996), 915
P.2d 175, 178, 53 St.Rep. 245, 250 (citing Clarke v. Massey (19951,
271 Mont. 412, 416, 897 P.2d 1085, 1088). If the language is clear
and unambiguous, then no further interpretation is required; we
will resort to legislative history only if the intent cannot be
determined f r o m t h e plain wording of the statute. Clarke, 847 F.id
at 1088. Where the intention of the legislature can be determined
from che piain meaning of the words used in a statute, the courts
may not go further and apply other rneans of interpretation.
Clarke, 897 P.2d at 1088 (citing Tongue River Glec. Coop. v.
Montana Power Co. (1981), 191 Mont. 511, 515, 636 P.2d 862, 864).
The question certified is a narrow one. We are asked only trj
determine whether § 33-.23-203, MCA, prohibits the stacking of
woptional" coverages--here,the medical payments and underinsurance
coverages. We do not consider whether the terms of the insurance
contract prohibit stacking. Rather, our analysis is confined to an
interpretation of § 33-23-203, MCA. Accordingly, this Court's
recent decision in Chilberg v. Rose (1995), 273 Mont . 414, 903 P.2d
1377, is not controlling in this case as Chilberq is a multiple
policy case and does not interpret § 33-23-203,MCA. In addition,
we note that Sayers 'J. Safeco Ins. Co. of America i1981), 192 Mont.
336, 628 P.2d 659, cited with approval in Chilberq, is contrary to
§ 33-23-203, MCA, as Savers approved the stacking of uninsured
motorist coverage under a single policy. Thus, under § 33-23-203,
MCA, Savers is no longer good law because under the terms of S 33-
23-203, MCA, stacking of uninsured motorist coverage for multiple
vehicles lnsured under a single policy is expressly prohibited
unless the policy specifically provides otherwise. Section 33-23-
203, MCA, provides:
(1) Unless a motor vehicle liab~lity policy
specifically provides otherwise, the limits of insurance
coverage available under any such policy, including the
limits of liability under uninsured motorist coverage,
4
n m s t be determined as follows, regardless of the number
of motor vehicles ' insured under the policy:
.
(a) the l~rnltof insurance coverage available for
any one accident is the Limit specified for the motor
vehicle involved in the accident;
(bj if no motor vehicle insured under the policy is
involved in the scciclent, the limitof insurance coverage
available for any one accidest is the highest limit of
coverage specified for any one motor vehicle insured
under the policy; and
(c) the limits of coverage specified for each motor
vehicle insured under the policy may not be added
together to determine the limit of insurance coverage
available under the policy for any one accident.
(2) A motor vehicle liability policy may also
provide for other reasonable limitations, exclusions, or
reductions of coverage which are designed to prevent
duplicate payments for the same element of loss.
From the language of the statute, it is clear that "stacking" is
not allowed "unless a motor vehicle liability policy specifically
provides otherwise." It is equally clear that the "anti-stacking"
provisions of the statute apply to a "motor vehicle liability
policy" (MVLP). The term MVLP is defined in § 33-23-204(2), MCA,
as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance against
liability now or hereafter required under Title 61, chapter 6,
parts 1 and 3." (Emphasis added.)
The dissenters argue that 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, refers to
required "policiesti
rather than required "co~erages.'~ makes no
It
sense, however, to discuss "policies" in a vacuum. A policy of
insurance is nothing more than the coverages which are provided
within the policy. In 9: 33-23-204(2), MCA, the legislature was
obviously correlating the anti-stacking stiitutes with the fact that
policies with specific types of coverage are required by Title 61,
chapter 6, parts 1 and 3. In particular, the per person, per
vehicle and property damage coverages mandated by § 61-6-103(2),
5
FICA.
In interpreting 33-23-204(2), I K A , three points are
apparent; it is directed at insurance against iiabiiity. Secondly,
it is directed at insurance coverage which is "required" by law:
and finally, it is concerned with liability icsuraace which is not
only required, but is required by both part 1 and part 3. There
are only three v a r i a t i r j l ? ~of insurance coverage whiilh meet the
above criteria; that is, liability coverage which is required by
both the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Liability Act. Those three
coverages are the per person, per vehicle and property damage
coverages which are required by S 61-6-103(2),MCA, and which are
incorporated into the Motor Vehicle Liability Act by § 61-6-301,
MCA. Unlilce the third-party coverage mandated by MVSRA and the
Motor Vehicle Liability Act, underinsurance and medical payment do
not qualify as insurance against liability. Rather, underinsurance
and medical pay coverage are designed to protect the first party
insured. Furthermore, there is nothing in MIJSRA, the Motor Vehicle
Liability Act or Title 33, chapter 23, MCA, which would "require"
underinsurance and medical pay coverage. To the contrary, the
MVSRh specifically excludes coverages which are in excess of the
required per person, per vehicle and property damage coverage.
The MVSRA, § 61-6-103(8),provides as follows:
Any policy which grants the coverage required for a
motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful
coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage
specified for a motor vehicle liability policy, and the
excess or additional coverage is not subject to the
provisions of thls part, With respect to a policy which
grants the excess or addlti~nalcoverage, the term "motor
vehicle liability policy" applies only to that part of
the coverage which is required by this section.
As Justice Erdrnann's dissent points cut, the above pro-,?ision
specifically refers to coverage which is required "by this
secticlr." Although '*thissection" refers to the MVSRA, the Motor
Vehicle Liability Act has a l s o incorporated those same "c~verage'~
requirements; $25,000 because of bodily injury to any one person,
$50,000 for bodily injury in any one accident* and $10,000 fcr
property damage. There is nothing in the Motor Vehicle Liability
Act which would suggest that the liability coverage requirements
incorporated from MVSRA are any broader than those required under
MVSRA. Since MVSRA specifically does not require any excess or
additional coverage such as underinsurance, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Motor Vehicle Liability Act likewise treats
medical pay coverage and underinsurance as in 'IexcessN or in
addition to the coverages which are specifically required by both
Acts in question. Title 61, chapter 6 , parts 1 and 3.
As medical payment coverage and underinsured motorist coverage
are "excess or additional coverage" which are not required under
either the MVSRA or the Motor Vehicle Liability Act, we determine
that these coverages are not part of the MVLP under § 33-23-204 2 ) ,
!
MCA . Accordingly, the prohibition against stacking required
coverages in § 33-23-203,MCA, does not apply to underinsurance and
medical payment coverage.
This Court has recognized that "Montana has no statutory
insurance requirement concerning underinsured motorists." Grier v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. !1931), 248 Mont. 457, 4 5 5 - 5 9 , 812 P.2d
347, 3 4 9 . While coverage in excess of the minimum amounts mandated
by 51-6-103(2), MC~rder
33-23-203(I;, MCA. -i
, the majority was only construing
5 61-6-103, MCP., they wosld be ccrrect in their i.r.ter;recazion.
However, in the present case the Fecieral Giscrict Court has
requested our interpretaticc of § 33-23-203, MCA. When several
statutes apply to a given sitnarion, this Cocrt's '-i t? adopt
J ~ ; is
-
a construction that will qive effect to all. Section ;-2-L01, NCA;
- - Schuman v. Besrrom (1Y85), 214 Mcnt. 410, 693 P.26 536.
See also
The aefinition of NVLP in S 61-6-103!13, MCA, applied by tne
majority to g 33-23-203, MCA, is restricted by its own terms to
Part 1 of Chapter 6 and to only those pclicies certified under
SS. 61-6-133 or -i34, MCA, for individuals who are required zo
provide proof of financial responsibi.lity.' § 01-6-131, YCA.
The Language of S 61-5-:03 (8:, A , reas~nakly constraed, means
T h e cajority relies on S 1-2-107,M3A, as authcriry to apply
the definition of IWLP in the MVSRA in Title 61 to rhe
+ slcii: lng statute in, Title 33. Secti2;r i - 2 - 1 Q 7 , MCA, prcviees,
+--I<
.
however, that the defirrclon of a phrase in cne part of the co5e
may be applied to the same phrase - -q ansther
i uerceu7 wkLert.i
A -
ccntrary intention plaizly appears," Here, the plair language of
5 6;-5-133 ( i ) , restzict-s the defi~ittonof W J L P "as tl?e tern
MCA,
is used in :his part" ard then cnLy for policies certifie" under
S § 61-5-133, -- - , XCA.
4 -C w3.cld be difficult to enyw~isicn
A %
. z
clearer expression of legislative ictenz. T h e 1,egislzture inten6ed
that the defifiitlon of MVLP in S 51-6-103(1), MCA, be restricted to
the MVSEA.
that the strict require~orrsof the MVSRA apply to the 1iabil;ty
c s ~ ~ c r zrea;ired
g~ L
by scbser--icn ( 2 ) (b:, but not t- the adjitic-al
- ,
~r excess cs:-eraqes avziLaE;li; in a x;n_:c;r ertified f , z r z~ :'>,-
,a?
+.".: ". , e y ,18,'
GL "
,
i n ~ cons~ruction: further supported by reviewing Fart 3 sf
-?
s s
Chapter 5 which contains the mandatory liability limizs far a l l
Montana d r i ~ ~ e r s .As noted, S 33-23-204 (2:, MCA, defines KVLF as
any policy required uncer Title 61, Chapcer 5, Parts 1 & 3 .
Policies can be lssued under either Par- 1 or Part 3 and the two
parts are independent. Transamerica Ins. Co. v . Xoyle i 1 3 5 3 1 ,
202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 920.
Part 3 of Chapter 6 references and incorporates only the
liability limits ccctaiced in S 61-6-103, FICA, and the remaining
provisio~s of the MVSRA are not incorporated into Part 3 . If,
-herefore, a policy is issaed under Part 3 , it ' - r-'
,at subjecr + u-
L~
L
. .
_he prcnlslons of Part I. - -
See Boldr, 443 P.23 at 35-36;
Tra~sanerica, 6 5 5 P.2d at e22-23. ?he facts incll~ied with the
certified question do not reflect that the policy was issued under
Zart 1 , and it is apparerit frcn the policy Lrself that it w a s
issued under Par: 3. I therefore believe the majority's conciusion
that the definitioc of MVLP in the MVSBA apclies in its entirety tc
' Fclicies issuec under the ?4VSnnA (Part 1: contain a cumber of
restricti.orrs not fcun5 in joiizies issued ucder the mandatcry
liakility provisions (Part 3). For instance, ~ n d e r the NVSRA the
liability of tne insurer is absolute afser an accident occurs and
there are restrictions as cc cancellation and increasing premiums.
& § 61-5-103(6)- 7 1 , MCA.
(
g 33-23-203?PICA, is in error and ignores the refsrecce r c Part 3
only to policies issued under the MVSRA:
Other policies not affected. (1; This pr:, :&art 1;
shall not be held to apply -tc or affecr. poiicies f
.
a,~torr.obileinsarance a~ga~irst ~1abilit-ywhich rtay now or
hereafter be r e p i r e 5 by a2y ccher L a w c ' LI1:is srate
r
. . . .
'iere .the policy was issaed u:ider Parc 3 ar,d the rescricti-,-e
definitiofi of MVLF in Part I clearly was cot ictecded ro apply to
policies issued under the part repiri-g mandatory liability limits
for a11 drivers.
- if an
Even TMVLP ander 5 33-23-263,KCA, was as limited as chc
majcrity holds, the clear language of S 32-23-2833,K ? , still leads
C.
. .
to the conciusion char the szacite ~rohibics SSaCKIrig of
underinsured mccorist and medicai pay coverages. ectisn
33-23-203(13, MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited f ~ r
insurance coverage "available under any such [KJL?] policy."
:Znphasis aicied.: The Legislarcre dic! r?ot grohibis stacking for
caverage "required" by the policy, whicil according to cke
in~urar~ce
r
- .
r2aJ o : 'ty is ocly the iiaciii~,ylizitc f o ~ r din 5 5I-0--lC3:2, )
I, ~3 "
P2A, t-at r a t , ~r3hibited sca~king for -_.oi;erages "availablev
under the colicy.
Under tne plain ianjliage of D 33-22-263,MCA, s t a c k k g cf b.oci-
.. -
mea;ca~ payaent and undericsured mctorist ccvsraqes is prohibited
. -
.
since both were "available' under the policy. wnere the languaue
--
G . , el..-7, and .---'---
i.-il.l-U~,
a stat-;te is ;;lair,, l~r.avpm7 , ~ r ~ e
L. furcti-,r: cf
-
Eke c0c-Z is s l n ~ i yto ascertain and S e c i s r ? :what is i n ?.errns c r
~
L I-
s I,U~t3n~e
~, c~ntained .
-i -,
-.--3'- 3.2 , 5s i~serc h;is I- --vs
~dez..
omitted or orrit what has been inserted. Secitisn 1 - 2 - X i , NCA.
Xeese v. Iieese ii381), 136 Mont. 1a1, E 3 7 P.2d ii63.
Further, : e
h =ajority1s conclusion thac an XVLF policy, as it
is used in § 33-23-203, MCA, is limiied to the $25,000/$50,090,'
$10,000 requirements of § 61-6-163( 2 : (b), MCA, is simply not
consisterc with the other language of § 33-23-203, XCA. Becrion
33-23-203(1), MCA, provides that stacking is prohibited for
insurance coverage "available under any su-oh LMVLP; policy
includinq limirs c E liabiii" under uninsured mctorist coverage."
Ly
(Emphasis added.) Znzer ~ h e
ma?orityls interpretation, an MVL?
ii~cluder;
only the found in S 6 1 - 6 - 1 C 3 ( 2 ~
(b),
MCA. Clea--I uninsured r c o i r
,ly, n:rs coverage is not repired by that
provision, b~: is specifically recognized by the Legislature 2s
being available ur.der an MVLF.
Lr, an effort to a v ~ i d this clear statctory language, tne
xajority coccLudes chat ucinsured coverage is required ccverage.
dearee it is required, is not recuirei
cnics-cred c-xjeraqe, La c h ~ d
kv Fart I of Chapter 6 , Title 61, MCA, but rather by 5 33-23-20? - I
MCA.' The language ir S 6 1 - 5 - ? . 0 3 i 8 i C MCA, relied upon by the
Ir? Yemp 7.r. Allstate 1 ~ s .
CC. (1975), 193 Mcnt. 5 2 6 , 531, 6CI
P.2d 20, 2 5 , this Cc~Jrt,i n a stacking case predating 5 33-23-203,
MCA, neld that: 'vru;oncana's
urinsured motorist statute is coc
3ajorit-y, cirarly states thar when a p i c ;
c:)
., in
9r;;ncs cc7~eracre
e iiir~r c=uerz.ge i-q?aired by
----c the
mF 22 :,?VLP, term ~ ~ V L vapplies
P
c ~ L ycs thzic cf , h e co~j-ra~f-
, I
.
Is rt.q,jire+ .,
sectl37. L' , zdjej,: sirice ..i.-'7s-.-1: 1s
u .A,_c_c. c.ul,_
. qe not
required by 5 6i-6-103, MCA, che najority's Logic breaks dcwn.
Finally, the phrase "inciuding the ].inits of liability under
uni~suredmotor-isr co-reraqe"in S 33-23-233, C also de~onstrates
that the ieoislature inter.ded that the stacking prohibition a p p l y
to coverages other than those required by 5 6i-6-i03!,2 1 (b'j , MCA,
an6 uninsured motorist coverase. ?he rerm "including" is rct a
limii;izg ce-m, but instead is used as an illiistratii~edevice. A
cumber of courts have neld that the term "includir,g" used ir,
similar contexts is not all-inclusive. i?h;llps Dodge Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Bd. (lY41), 313 U . S . 177, 51 S. Ct. 845,
85 1. Ed. 1271; Federai ' n
ad Bank of Sc, Pa~iv. Bismarck iumber
Cic. i13411, 314 Z . S . 95, 62 S. Ct. 1 86, 1,. Ed. 65; S c h a b v.
Ariyoshi [Eaw. I977), 564 P.26 1 3 5 ; Ccfinerty v. Mecrcpclitan Disc.
Comm'n ;Mass. 1986), 495 N.E.2d 84C; Cumberland Reclamatior, v.
Secretarq. Dep't of interior (6cn Cfr. I991), 925 "2d 161. SEf:
also 2A C. Sands, Sutkerland Statutorv Ccnstruition S 47.23 at 114
(4th e e . 19ec: .
- - , - - :r
zandatory, 1~ the sense that the , insured has the right tc -~-je,-+
-
w r i c i n ~ si;c?: ccverage i n pollcies issiled in Nontana." he
~ a j o r i c holding in chis r a s e tha.t uni~suredmstorist coverage is
~'~
ri.quire6 col-erage is in dil-ect conflict with c u r holding in m.
. .
Tnis Court's prior cleclsion; irr this area are ad-itredly
, . ,
ccnf;~i~crar.3
a ad&
~23j~rity zr, c-zfasigr, by ~istir.j216;~-~13c2
.
,
sev-rai s;ses t h a t clear>; apply tr tkis slt~~ation. ! , ~7.4-. - .~ r, n ~ tfar . ~..
i Lie; s poi;cies iss~j~ei
under --- MT,7SX.EA f
iLr- 0-
;
"ha3 drivers" an6 unirisured motorist coverage. Since sta-ckinghas
n ; x - : been appiieci to - ,
--,e- ;:ability cc-jera~es,"
the only type cf
coverage in Monrana for which sracking is prchibired is ncw
cninsurea motorist coverage. The plain language of the statute is
simply not that narrow.
The practical result of tne majority's decisisn is absurd.
Since the majority opinion recognizes che prohibition against che
stacking crf ~ninsuredcoverage limits, if Leonard had been struck
and killed by a driver with no liability insurance a all, stacking
,
wozld not be allowed and ~ h ex a x i n ~ m his esrate could have
recovered under rhe poiicy would be $ S C , O O C . .
under ;he aajority's
interpretation, however, since the driver who strack Leonard had
iimics, the vehicles ucder the policy can be stacked
the r~ini~urn
and Leonard's estate is entitled to $350,0CO. Statutes should be
read and eonstr~ied so as tc avoid absurd resul-rs if a reascnable
constructign can avoid it. Christenot v . State (I995j, 2 7 2
' See Ailstate - (1533), 1 3 Norit.
Lnsurapce ConpaiLy v . Skor;pa .,
-
Fed. Rep. 355, which addressed the issue of stackicg -iability-
. ,
pc;licies and concluded t h a t tnls _oar: 5 ~ s s a r i y reccgrizc;d a
- , . , - ,
l
distirrc:isn betweerr i;abL~.lty cc7.rerage and r e rnotcri.sc
csverage cizing Jacobson -J. Implement Dealers W2t. Ins. Co. ; 1982;,
. .
196 M o n t . 542, 644 P.2d 908, and Cnaffee v . Lynited States Fid. &
-.
-dar. Co. '19'793, 191 Nonc. 1 , i9i F.8d i102.
Mcnc . 3 9 5 , 9 C 1 T 2.5 541 - Darby S ~ a r ,
8 Lzd. v . Cepartment of Reven*~e
(1195), 3 , 376, --
,G5 p ~ z d .11:~
T would t h e r e f o r ? ans:~Jer certified q u e s h ~ c r e s e g r e d ic
o
this T c a r t in ~1.- affirrxarL\-o a
d
i ksid L
^
,
" ..
3,;.~2;2C3i 'J-"
Il - n i
prohibits t h e stacki~g medical payment coverage and uncierir.sured
cf
mctcrist coverage
Justice Kar1.a P . Gray, dissenting.
I
I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion. While I
think the Court does a relatively creditable job of attsmpting to
mesh statxtes which simply do not track well, I am uzabie to join
:
in its analysis.
Plainly stated, the question before us is whether the anti-
stacking provision contai~~eci 5 33-23-2C3(i!, XCA, is limited to
in
liability coverages required by law or applies to all coverages
contained in a vehicle insurance policy. The Court concludes that
the statute prohibits only the stacking of required liability
coverages, as the Court creatively defines such coverages. It is
my view that, while the statute is not a model of clarity, the
legislature's intent to more broadly prohibit stacking is apparent
therein, On that basis, I would answer the certified question in
the affirmative.
The Court begins with the "motor vehicle liability policy"
(MVLP) language contained in § 33-23-203,MCA, and looks first to
5 33-23-204,MCA, for a definition of that term; that detinition is
stated as "any policy of automobile or motor vehicle insurance
against liability now or hereafter required under Title 51, chapter
6 ; parts i and 3 . ' ! 1 agree that chis appears co be a rational
starting point.
Moreover, I generally agree with the Court's interpretation
that the definition of MVLP contained in § 33-23-204, MCA,
addresses the third-party per person, per vehicle and property
damage liability coverages required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts
1 and 3. Finally, I agree that the first-party med pay and
underinsuraace coverages at issue in this case are not liability
coverages within the definitional parameters of W7LE contained in
S 33-23-204, MCA.
Tnat saic?, it is important to recall that our resolutiori of
the certified question before us turns on the proper interpretation
of 5 33-23-203, MCA, rather than § 33-23-204,MCA. In my view, it
is the Court's attempt to force feed the S 33-23-204, MCA,
definition of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1), MCA, that results in a
legally flawed and logically inconsistent analysis which disregards
the actual language used by the legislature in 5 33-23-203(I), MCA.
Inserting the 5 33-23-204,MCA, definition of MVLP into § 33-
23-203(1), MCA, produces the following rough reading of the first
pertinent portion of that statute: "the limits of liability
coverage required by Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 . . .
cannot be stacked." The problem I have with such a reading is that
the legislature did not use language even approximating such a
reading; it clearly used different words, and words clearly at odds
with the Court's interpretation, in 5 33-23-203(1),MCA. What the
legislature said is that the iimits of "insurance coverage
available" cannot be stacked. It is my view that, if the
legislature had intended to limit the anti-staclcing provision to
"liability coverage required by law," it could and would have done
so. It did not.
A more reasonable interpretation of 5 33-23-203(1), MCA, is
that the legislature intended precisely what it said: to prohibit
stacking of any and all "insurance coverage available" in an
automobiie insurance poiicy, inciuding the med pay and
underfnsiirznce coverages a issue here. i n tl: regard, 1 ccjnclude
:
: ia:
that neither the definition contained in § 33-23-204,MCA; nor that
contained in 61-6-103, MCA, is logically transferable to the
t, 1in; s of insurance coverage availablei' language contaiaed in
,
,
B 33-23-203;l),MCA. Therefore, while the geaeral ruie contained
in § 1-2-107,MCA, is that definitions contained in one part of the
Code Annotated are applicable to the s a w ? wor4 or phrase
?~?ontana
wherever it occurs, I would apply the exception to that rule also
contained in 5 1-2-107, MCA, and conclude in this case that "a
contrary intention plainly appears" with regard to inserting
definitions of MVLP into § 33-23-203(1),MCA.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the remaining--and,
in my view, largest--barrierto the Court's interpretation of § 33-
23-203(I), MCA. The critical portion of the statute reads "the
limits of insurance coverage available under any such policy,
including the limits of liability under uninsured motorist
coverage. . . . " With the Court's definition of "such policy"
inserted, the statute reads "the limits of coverage required under
Title 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3 [the $25,000/$50,000/$10,000
amounts of third-party liability coverage! including the limits of
liability under uninsured motorist coverage."
Whether or not one agrees with the Court's creative
interpretation that uninsured motorLst coverage is actually
reauired by § 33-23-201, MCA, and 1 do not, an inconsistency
results on the face of § 33-23-203(1),MCA, when both the Court's
definitron of MVLP and the "includingn clause are considered. It
is ciear that notblng ~n 'i'ltie 61, chapter 6, parts 1 and 3,
requires uninsured motorist coverage; the Court's own anaiy-'-
bi
P %
makes that clear in pointing out that the ii 33-23-204, E4CA/Title 61
required coverages are third-party per person, per vehicle and
Froperty damage liability ccverage. it 5s equally clear that t h e
"including" clause refers back to what preceded it in the statute--
"such policy"--defined by the Court as t l
ie § 33-23-204, MCA,
definitior sf MVL9. The "inciudingN clause simply cannot broaden,
by any rule of logic, grammar or law of which I am aware, the
statutory definition of MVLP which the Court has inserted into the
statute.
For these reasons, it is my view that the Court's analysis is
flawed. A more reasonable reading of § 33 -23-203(1), MCA, requires
a conclusion that the legislature intended to prohibit the stacking
of all coverages contained in an automobile insurance policy
insuring more than one vehicle. I invite the legislature to
revisit the statutes addressed in this case by both the Court and
the dissenting opinions with an eye toward clarifying statutes
which simply do not mesh well under any analysis.
I dissent.