CHRIS SCHULTZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STILLWATER MINING COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 96-004.
Submitted on Briefs June 13, 1996.
Decided July 23, 1996.
Appeal from the District Court of Stillwater County.
Thirteenth Judicial District.
Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge.
See C.J.S. Master and Servant Sec. 48.
Vacated and remanded.
For Appellant: Scot Schermerhorn, Freeman & Schermerhorn, Billings.
For Respondent: Jeanne M. Bender, Holland & Hart, Billings.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Chris Schultz appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Thirteenth Judicial
District Court, Stillwater County. The court granted judgment in favor of defendant
Stillwater Mining Company on Schultz's claim of wrongful discharge. We vacate and
remand.
We find dispositive the issue of whether Schultz's claim is exempt from Montana's
Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act under Sec. , MCA, because he also filed a
complaint with the United States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Adminis-
tration to recover damages for retaliatory discharge based on disparate treatment.
In March of 1995, Chris Schultz, then an employee of Still-water Mining Company, was
involved in a fist fight with another employee on company property. Schultz reported the
incident to his supervisor and asserted that he was merely attempting to defend himself.
Both Schultz and the other employee were fired as a result of the fist fight.
Schultz filed a complaint with the Mine Safety and Health Administration, alleging that
he was discharged in retaliation for reporting a safety concern. The agency made a
determination that the discharge did not constitute a violation of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Act (FMSHA) and therefore would not pursue a complaint against Stillwater.
Schultz appealed the agency's determination. In January of 1996, an administrative law
judge determined that the discharge did not violate FMSHA because "hitting another
miner, even when one was hit first, is not the type of activity that is protected under the
Act."
Schultz also filed this claim in District Court, alleging violation of Montana's Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act, Secs. through-915, MCA. Stillwater moved for
summary judgment, arguing that because both Schultz's FMSHA claim and his claim in
District Court arose out of a single discharge, the District Court did not have jurisdiction
to hear the wrongful discharge claim.
In granting Stillwater's motion for summary judgment, the court relied upon Sec. , MCA.
That statute provides:
Exemptions. This part does not apply to a discharge: (1)
that is subject to any other state or federal statute that provides a procedure
or remedy for contesting the dispute. Such statutes include those that
prohibit discharge for filing complaints, charges, or claims with
administrative bodies or that prohibit unlawful discrimi-nation based on
race, national origin ...
The court reasoned that Schultz has only one actionable dispute with Stillwater, and that
his choice to pursue his grievance under the federal statute precluded a Montana court
from entertaining his cause of action.
Is Schultz's claim exempt from Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act
under Sec. , MCA, because he also filed a complaint with the Mine Safety and Health
Administration to recover damages for retaliatory discharge based on disparate
treatment?
The District Court ruled that no material issues of fact exist and that Stillwater is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law because Schultz chose to pursue his grievance
under a federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for contesting his discharge.
Our standard of review is the same as the standard used by the District Court--whether,
pursuant to Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., material issues of fact exist and whether Stillwater is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Motarie v. N. Mont. Joint Refuse Disposal
(1995), 907 P.2d 154, 156.
In this case, the arguments on appeal are legal arguments not relating to issues of fact.
Schultz contends that his state law claims are independent from his federal cause of
action, and that, therefore, exemption under Sec. , MCA, does not apply.
It appears that the language of Sec. , MCA, is unique to Montana, so that case law from
other jurisdictions is not particularly helpful to us. Although the parties have cited a
number of Montana cases which bear tangentially on the question before us, we find the
language of the statute itself and its interpretation in Tonack v. Montana Bank of Billings
(1993), 854 P.2d 326, decisive.
In Tonack, the defendant bank argued that Sec. , MCA, prohibited Tonack from
recovering under both the Wrongful Discharge Act and the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). In evaluating that claim, Justice McDonough wrote for this
Court:
Whether a discharge will ultimately be "subject to any other state or
federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for contesting the
dispute" is not immediately known when a claim is filed. This must be
determined before it is known whether the Wrongful Discharge Act may
be applied.
It is established only when a finder of fact has made that determination or
when judgment on the claim has otherwise been entered. Therefore, we
conclude that claims may be filed concurrently under the Wrongful
Discharge Act and other state or federal statutes described in Sec. , MCA,
but if an affirmative determination of the claim is obtained under such
other statutes, the Wrongful Discharge Act may no longer be applied.
Tonack, 854 P.2d at 331. Because the district court had made a factual determination that
the ADEA applied to Tonack's discharge from employment, this Court held that she was
not entitled to recover damages under the Wrongful Discharge Act. Tonack, 854 P.2d at
331.
Relying upon Tonack, Stillwater argues that any judgment by the Mine Safety and Health
Administration provides Schultz with a procedure or remedy for contesting his dispute.
We disagree.
In this case, no affirmative determination of the claim has been obtained under the
FMSHA. Instead, a negative determination has been obtained, both at the agency level
and before the administrative law judge, that the activity which led to Schultz's discharge
was "not the type of activity that is protected under the [FMSHA]." Therefore, Schultz
has not been provided a procedure or remedy for contesting his dispute.
Section , MCA, provides an exemption for discharges "subject to any other state or
federal statute." The determination that the activity which led to Schultz's discharge was
"not the type of activity that is protected under the [FMSHA]" amounts to a
determination that his discharge was not subject to the FMSHA. We conclude that Sec. ,
MCA, does not preclude application of the Wrongful Discharge Act under these
circumstances.
We hold that the District Court erred as a matter of law in granting Stillwater's motion for
summary judgment. We therefore vacate that judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
JUSTICES GRAY, HUNT, LEAPHART and ERDMANN concur