97-278
No. 97-278
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1998 MT 51
VICTOR A. JOHANSEN,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA, DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONSERVATION,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,
The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William G. Sternhagen, Sternhagen Law Firm, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Tommy H. Butler, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana
Department of Natural Resources & Conservation, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 18, 1997
Decided: March 10, 1998
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Victor A. Johansen (Johansen) and the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation (Department) have filed cross-appeals from an order of the First
Judicial
District Court, Lewis and Clark County. Johansen had filed a petition for judicial
review in
the District Court of the Department's decision to cancel his lease of agricultural
land for
failing to make timely lease payments. The District Court granted summary judgment
in
favor of the Department and dismissed Johansen's petition for lack of jurisdiction.
We
reverse and remand.
¶2 The sole issue we address on appeal is whether the District Court erred in
holding that
it did not have jurisdiction to review Johansen's petition for judicial review of the
Department's decision to cancel his agricultural lease pursuant to § 77-6-506, MCA,
for
failing to make timely lease payments.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 For decades, Johansen's family leased agricultural land from the State of
Montana.
Johansen continued leasing the same land that had originally been leased by his
grandfather.
The date when Johansen's rental payments were due are set by statute. Section 77-6-
506(2),
MCA. Pursuant to that statute, his latest lease payment was initially due on
November 15,
1995. If he failed to make a payment by that date, then the full rental and a
$25.00 penalty
were due on December 31, 1995. The statute also provides the Department with the
discretion to extend the deadline past that date. Specifically, that statute
provides:
For agricultural leases and the agricultural portion of leases containing
both grazing and agricultural land, when the rental is paid on a crop share
basis or on a crop share/cash basis, the rental is due in cash on or before
November 15 of the year in which the crop is harvested. If the rental is not
paid on or before November 15 of the year of crop harvest, a $25 penalty shall
be imposed on the lessee. If the full rental and the $25 penalty are not paid
on
or before December 31 of the year in which the crop is harvested, the entire
lease is canceled. The department may extend the deadline in writing. If the
lessee does not make the rental payment by the date of extension, the entire
lease is canceled. Any rental payment made after November 15 of the year in
which the crop is harvested, including payment made after an extension of the
deadline, must include the $25 penalty.
Section 77-6-506, MCA.
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¶4 Because Johansen had not paid the rent by November 15, the full rental plus a
$25
penalty was due on December 31. Johansen attempted to make this payment from his
rural
postal box. Postal service for his route is provided by a contract carrier.
Contractors,
including the contractor on Johansen's route, routinely accept letters for mailing
that are
placed in the postal box without the stamps affixed when the customer has provided
the
correct amount of money for postage. In such a case, the contractor accepts the
mail, takes
it to the post office, and affixes the postage.
¶5 Johansen testified that he and his father before him have mailed the lease
payments
in this fashion from his rural postal box for the past 38 years. On Friday,
December 29,
1995, Johansen again attempted to mail his lease payment in this fashion. He placed
the
envelope containing his payment in his rural postal box with 32 cents. The postal
carrier
did not take the letter, however, because snow had blown into the mailbox. The
postal
carrier left Johansen a note stating that because the box was filled with snow, she
was unable
to find all the money to pay the required postage. She requested that Johansen
remove the
snow.
¶6 On Saturday, December 30, 1995, when Johansen went to the mailbox, he discovered
the postal carrier's message. He removed the snow and again left the rental payment
in the
mail box with money to pay the required postage. That day the postal carrier found
the mail
and the money in the mailbox, which had been cleaned. Once again, she declined to
accept
the letter. She left a note, stating that she did not have any stamps and would be
unable to
get any more because it was a Saturday.
¶7 The next two days, Sunday, December 31, 1995, and Monday, January 1, 1996 were
both legal holidays, so the post office was closed and mail was not delivered.
See 1-1-216(a) and (b), MCA. On Tuesday, January 2, 1996, Johansen went to his
mailbox and
discovered the note left by the postal carrier the previous Saturday and saw that
the envelope
containing the rental payment was still in his postal box. That same afternoon, he
drove to
East Helena and personally mailed the payment from the East Helena post office.
However,
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the envelope did not receive a postmark until the next day, January 3, 1996.
¶8 By letter dated January 24, 1996, and delivered February 9, 1996, the Department
notified Johansen that it was canceling his agricultural lease, for failure to
timely pay his
rent. It notified him that he no longer had the right to use the leased land, and
that any use
would be considered a trespass. The Department also informed him that it would be
advertising the land for lease.
¶9 By letter dated April 1, 1996, Johansen requested that the Department reinstate
his
lease. He argued that the Department had the authority to do so pursuant to § 77-6-
211(3),
MCA, which provides that a lease may be reinstated where "the violation is not
serious
enough to warrant cancellation. . . ." Alternatively, Johansen requested that the
Department
give him a contested case hearing pursuant to the Montana Administrative Procedure
Act
(MAPA), § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA.
¶10 The Department informally discussed the cancellation of the lease with
Johansen.
With regard to Johansen's claim that he mailed the letter from the East Helena post
office
on January 2, 1996, the Department admitted that if had been postmarked that day
rather than
January 3, it would not have canceled the lease. Subsequently, by letter dated May
30, 1996,
the Department denied his request for a contested case hearing, stating that
because no
person could verify (1) that he indeed placed the rental payment in the mail in a
timely
fashion; and (2) that the post office routinely accepts letters for mailing without
postage
stamps affixed to them, there were no issues of fact or law to be resolved by a
contested case
hearing. It also denied his request for reinstatement of the lease, and stated that
the letter
constituted a final agency decision pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-623, MCA, which pertains
to
final agency decisions adverse to a party in a contested case.
¶11 On June 11, 1996, Johansen requested a redetermination of the Department's
decision
or alternatively an appeal to the State Board of Land Commissioners pursuant to 77-
6-211,
MCA. In direct response to the Department's statement that no person could verify
whether
the postal carrier accepts letters for mailing without postage stamps affixed to
them,
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Johansen submitted a letter from the postmaster in East Helena verifying that the
postal
carrier accepts such mail so long as money is provided for the stamps. He
additionally
submitted relevant excerpts from the USPS Handbook. Johansen also challenged the
Department's failure to address or make factual findings or legal conclusions that
addressed
the issues raised by Johansen in his original request for reinstatement.
¶12 At some point, the postal carrier servicing Johansen's route testified by
affidavit that
she routinely accepts letters from the Johansen residence without the stamps affixed
when
the correct amount of money is provided for postage. She also confirmed Johansen's
statements that she found mail in his mailbox on Friday, December 29, and again on
Saturday, December 30, but did not take the mail because snow had blown into the
mailbox
on Friday, and she was unable to get stamps on Saturday. Although this affidavit
was filed
with the District Court in connection with various motions below, the record is
unclear as
to when she signed the affidavit or when Johansen provided it to the Department, if
at all.
¶13 By letter dated June 25, 1996, the Department again refused to reinstate his
lease and
rejected his request for a hearing before the State Board of Land Commissioners. The
Department stated that the cancellation of the lease was "automatic." Although the
Department insisted that cancellation was "automatic," it did not address its
statutory
authority to extend the rental due date past the December 31, 1995 deadline, nor did
it
explain under what circumstances it has done so in the past. See § 76-6-506, MCA.
It also
rejected Johansen's evidence that his rural postal carrier accepted letters without
postage
affixed to it, even if there was money for the postage in the mailbox along with the
letter.
Additionally, although it had earlier stated in its April 1, 1996 letter that its
decision was a
final decision under contested case proceedings pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-623, MCA, it
now
stated for the first time that Johansen had no statutory right to a contested case
hearing,
because termination for nonpayment of rent was automatic pursuant to § 77-6-506,
MCA.
The Department also stated that its purpose in meeting informally with Johansen was
to
verify that his payment was not received by the statutory deadline. In its view,
whether it
set out a formal division of facts and law was thus "irrelevant." Finally, it
stated its view that
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§ 77-6-211, MCA, which allows for reinstatement when the lease violation is not
serious,
only applies to cases where the lease is canceled "for cause," such as for
overgrazing, and
not where the lease is canceled for failure to timely pay rent.
¶14 Consequently, Johansen filed a petition for judicial review with the District
Court.
The court ruled in favor of the Department on the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment. It held that the Department's action in this case was not a contested case
proceeding, and that it therefore had no jurisdiction under MAPA to review the
agency's
decision. Accordingly, it dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It is
from this
decision that the parties have filed cross-appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 This Court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment rulings de novo.
Seeley
v. Davis (Mont. 1997), 946 P.2d 119, 121, 54 St. Rep. 1006, 1007. It applies the
same Rule
56, M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by the district court. Seeley, 946 P.2d at 121. In
response to
a motion for summary judgment in this case, the court dismissed the case based upon
lack
of jurisdiction. This Court reviews that legal determination to determine whether
the court
erred. Seeley, 946 P.2d at 121.
DISCUSSION
¶16 The District Court held that the Department's action in this case was not a
contested
case proceeding under MAPA, § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA. It held that judicial review
pursuant
to MAPA was therefore not appropriate, and concluded that it had no jurisdiction to
review
Johansen's claim.
¶17 On appeal, Johansen argues that the Department unlawfully denied him his right
to
a contested case proceeding pursuant to MAPA, § 2-4-601, et seq., MCA. He contends
that
the District Court did have jurisdiction under MAPA, § 2-4-701, et seq., MCA, to
review his
petition and that it should have ordered the Department to grant him a full
contested case
hearing prior to canceling his lease.
¶18 The Department agrees with Johansen that the District Court had jurisdiction to
review his petition. However, it disputes Johansen's contention that he was
entitled to a
contested case hearing or that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the
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petition
pursuant to MAPA. Instead, it argues that the District Court had authority to
review the
petition pursuant to the standard of review for informal agency decisions set forth
in Langen
v. Badlands Co-op State Grazing District (1951), 125 Mont. 302, 234 P.2d 467; and
North
Fork Pres. v. DSL (1989), 238 Mont. 451, 778 P.2d 862.
¶19 For the reasons elaborated below, this Court agrees with the District Court's
determination that Johansen was not entitled to a contested case hearing and that
MAPA was
therefore inapplicable. But we do not agree with the court's conclusion that it
therefore
lacked jurisdiction to review Johansen's petition. We hold that the District Court
did have
jurisdiction to review the Department's decision to determine whether the lease
cancellation
was arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or unsupported by substantial evidence.
I.
¶20 Johansen is correct in asserting that pursuant to MAPA, an administrative
agency must
afford all parties a trial-type hearing in a "contested case." Sections 2-4-601, 2-4-
612, MCA.
He is equally correct in asserting that the District Court has jurisdiction to
conduct a judicial
review of such contested cases. Section 2-4-701, et seq., MCA. But the statutory
requirement of a trial-type hearing does not apply to every situation where a
person's interest
is adversely affected by agency action. Rather, such a hearing is required only in
"contested
cases."
¶21 A "contested case" within the meaning of MAPA is:
a proceeding before an agency in which a determination of legal rights, duties,
or privileges of a party is required by law to be made after an opportunity for
hearing. The term includes but is not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing,
and licensing.
Section 2-4-102(4), MCA. The lease of agriculture land does not constitute
ratemaking or
price fixing, and Johansen does not contend that the lease constitutes a "license."
We
therefore turn to the statutory provisions governing the lease of agricultural land
to determine
whether the Department was "required by law" to afford Johansen a trial-type hearing
prior
to canceling his lease.
¶22 The termination of a lease for failing to make a rental payment is provided for
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in § 77-6-506(2), MCA. That section contains no provision requiring the Department
to hold a
hearing prior to canceling the lease. In contrast, § 77-6-211, MCA, provides for an
administrative hearing when a lease is canceled pursuant to § 77-6-113, MCA (for
failing to
properly manage agricultural lands), § 77-6-208, MCA (for violating rules regarding
subleasing of land), § 77-6-209, MCA (for failing to seek approval before changing a
grazing
lease to an agricultural lease), and § 77-6-210, MCA (for various causes, such as
fraud,
misrepresentation, or using the land for purposes other than those authorized by the
lease).
No provision requires the Department to hold a hearing when the lease is canceled for
nonpayment.
§23 Although a contested case hearing is not required by statute, Johansen argues
that
such a hearing is required by Montana's constitution. Specifically, he contends
that such a
hearing is "required by law" pursuant to Article II, Section 17 of the Montana State
Constitution, which provides:
Due process of law. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
However, Johansen cites no legal authority and sets forth no analysis to support his
argument. Johansen fails to provide analysis as to whether he had a property
interest in the
continuation of the agricultural lease that was canceled for failure to timely pay
rent. Even
were we to assume that it does constitute "property" within the meaning of Montana's
constitution, he provides no analysis as to what process was due in this case. For
example,
he cites no case law that requires the Department to hold a formal, pre-termination
hearing
as opposed to an informal post-termination hearing. Finally, Johansen provides no
analysis
as to how the Department allegedly violated his constitutional rights.
¶24 Johansen must cite authority for the position he advances. Rule 23, M.R.App.
P. It
is not this Court's job to conduct legal research on his behalf, to guess as to his
precise
position, or to develop legal analysis that may lend support to that position.
State v. Carter
(Mont. 1997), ___ P.2d ___, ___, 54 St.Rep. 1235, 1240; State v. Fina (1995), 273
Mont.
171, 181, 902 P.2d 30, 38. Johansen has failed to establish that the Montana State
Constitution required the Department hold a formal, trial-type hearing prior to
canceling his
lease. We hold that such a hearing was not "required by law" prior to terminating
his lease,
and the District Court did not have jurisdiction pursuant to MAPA to review his
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petition.
II.
¶25 Simply because an administrative decision is not a "contested case," however,
does
not mean that Johansen has no avenue to seek review of the Department's decision.
Indeed,
the Department itself admits that the courts have the inherent power to review its
decisions,
whether or not they involve "contested cases." Citing Langen and North Fork Pres.,
the
Department contends that the District Court may review any informal administrative
decision
to determine whether the Department used a fair procedure, whether questions of law
were
properly decided, and whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Johansen does not directly respond to the Department's argument, other than to argue
that
the District Court has jurisdiction to review its decision pursuant to MAPA. He
does not
challenge the Department's interpretation of the correct standard of review for non-
MAPA
agency decisions.
¶26 In North Fork Pres., this Court addressed its power to review a non-MAPA
administrative decision. That case involved a challenge to the Department of State
Lands'
approval of an operating plan on an oil and gas lease on school trust lands. North
Fork
Preservation Association filed a complaint, alleging that the Department of State
Lands had
failed to prepare an environmental impact statement as required by law. North Fork
Pres.,
778 P.2d at 863. Upon reviewing the case, this Court noted that § 2-4-704, MCA, the
standard of review for judicial review of contested case hearings under MAPA was
inapplicable, because that section deals with review of "contested cases," and that
case did
not involve a contested case. North Fork Pres, 778 P.2d at 865-66. We thus
addressed the
standard of review the district court should use in that non-MAPA case and stated:
The review by the district court is only for the purpose of determining
the legal rights of the parties involved. This is so because of the division of
governmental powers under the Constitution, neither the district court nor the
Supreme Court may substitute their discretion for the discretion reposed in
boards and commissions by the legislative acts.
The appeal from the commission to the district court is for the purpose
merely of determining whether upon the evidence and the law of the action of
the commission is based upon any error of law, or is wholly unsupported by
the evidence or clearly arbitrary or capricious. On such review courts will
only inquire insofar as to ascertain if the board or commission has stayed
within the statutory bounds and has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously or
unlawfully.
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North Fork Pres., 778 P.2d at 866 (citing Langen, 234 P.2d at 470).
¶27 We further stated that in reaching its decision, the Department of State Lands
was
carrying out a statutory duty assigned to it and not to the courts and that its
decision involved
expertise within its province. Accordingly, we held that the standard of review to
be applied
by the trial court and this Court was whether the record established that the agency
acted
"arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully." North Fork Pres., 778 P.2d at 867.
¶28 In this case, the Department is charged by the legislature with managing state
trust
lands, including the leasing of agricultural lands. Section 77-1-301(1), MCA,
provides in
part:
Under the direction of the board, the department has charge of the
selecting, exchange, classification, appraisal, leasing, management, sale, or
other disposition of the state lands.
The Department thus has jurisdiction in the first instance to determine whether to
cancel
a lease. We agree with the Department that it is the courts' function to review
its decision
to determine whether its decision is arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or unsupported
by
substantial evidence.
¶29 The Department additionally argues that when conducting its review, the District
Court should afford its decision great deference. The Department is correct in
noting that
the courts defer to an agency's decision where its resolution implicates substantial
agency
expertise. However, whether Johansen timely mailed his rental payment, whether the
U.S.
postal service "accepts" letters for mailing without postage on rural routes
serviced by a
contract carrier where a person has provided money for the postage, or whether
mailing takes
place upon placing a letter in a mailbox or only upon the receipt of a postmark are
not
disputes that invoke any particular expertise within the Department's province.
They do not
involve the high level of technical expertise that is required, for example, when the
Department cancels a lease due to mismanagement of State land. Thus, although the
reviewing courts will conduct a limited review of the Department's decision, it is
not
necessary that they accord any particularly special deference to the decision in
this case.
¶30 We hold that the District Court did have jurisdiction to review the Department's
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decision to cancel Johansen's lease for failing to make timely lease payments. We
reverse
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶31 Reversed and remanded.
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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