file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm
No. 99-204
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1999 MT 235
296 Mont. 145
988 P.2d 302
JANICE LINN, M.D.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CITY COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Russell C. Fagg, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Janice Linn, M.D., Pro Se; Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Dennis Paxinos, Yellowstone County Attorney; Casey Heitz, Deputy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm (1 of 5)4/9/2007 11:34:56 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm
County Attorney; Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 22, 1999
Decided: September 30, 1999
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
1. ¶The Plaintiff, Janice Linn, M.D., brought this action in the District Court for the
Thirteenth Judicial District in Yellowstone County to recover damages for breach of
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing from the
Defendant, Yellowstone City-County Health Department (YCCHD). The District
Court awarded summary judgment to the Defendant. Linn appeals from the
judgment of the District Court. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
2. ¶Although the Appellant raises a number of issues, we limit our consideration to the
following issue:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it awarded summary judgment without
affording the Plaintiff a hearing?
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. ¶Dr. Linn and YCCHD executed a written agreement on April 24, 1996. The
agreement provided that YCCHD would pay Dr. Linn an hourly rate for her services
which were to be "mutually scheduled" by the parties. The agreement did not
guarantee a minimum number of hours or a specific length of service. However, it
did require that either party must provide 30-days' notice of an intention to terminate
the agreement.
2. ¶YCCHD did not schedule Dr. Linn to work after October 15, 1996. YCCHD
asserts that pursuant to the agreement, it had no obligation to schedule Dr. Linn and
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm (2 of 5)4/9/2007 11:34:56 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm
that it did not give Dr. Linn 30-days' notice because the agreement was still in
effect. Dr. Linn asserts that YCCHD had no intention of using her services after
October 15; and that in effect she was terminated without 30-days' notice in
violation of her contract.
3. ¶In November 1998, YCCHD filed a motion for summary judgment. The District
Court scheduled a summary judgment hearing for February 5, 1999. Dr. Linn then
moved to have the hearing rescheduled. The District Court rescheduled the hearing
for February 12, 1999. Before the hearing was held, however, and without prior
notice, the District Court granted YCCHD's motion for summary judgment on
January 26, 1999.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. ¶We review discretionary trial court rulings for an abuse of discretion. May v. First
Nat'l Pawn Brokers, Ltd. (1995), 270 Mont. 132, 134, 890 P.2d 386, 388. In
Montana Rail Link v. Byard (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 337, 860 P.2d 121, 125, we
held that "[t]he standard of abuse of discretion is applied to discretionary rulings,
such as trial administration issues, post-trial motions and similar rulings." (Citing
Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601,
603.) Since we have previously held that in extraordinary circumstances, a hearing
is not necessary prior to an order granting summary judgment, we will review the
District Court's decision to deny a hearing for an abuse of discretion.
2. ¶Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it granted summary judgment
without affording the Plaintiff a hearing?
3. ¶Summary judgment is only proper when there are no issues of material fact
revealed in the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
and affidavits, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R.
Civ.P. 56(c). In the ordinary case, the parties have a right to a summary judgment
hearing unless the hearing is explicitly waived. In Cole v. Flathead County (1989),
236 Mont. 412, 418, 771 P.2d 97, 101, we stated that:
In view of the language of Rule 56(c), and having in mind that the granting of such a
motion disposes of the action on the merits, with prejudice, a district court may not, by
rule or otherwise, preclude a party from requesting oral argument, nor deny such a request
when made by a party opposing the motion unless the motion for summary judgment is
denied.
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm (3 of 5)4/9/2007 11:34:56 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm
In fact, we have held that "a district court may allow a party to testify at a summary
judgment hearing in order to establish the existence of genuine factual issues." See Konitz
v. Claver, 1998 MT 27, ¶ 31, 287 Mont. 301, ¶ 31, 987 P.2d 1138, ¶ 31. We have also
made allowance for the unusual case, however, by holding that, "[t]here may be an
occasion when under the law and the facts adduced, the movant would be so clearly
entitled as a matter of law to a summary judgment that a district court might by order
dispense with the necessity of a hearing." Cole, 236 Mont. at 419, 771 P.2d at 101.
1. ¶In this case, both parties cite Cole v. Flathead County in support of their respective
positions. Dr. Linn concludes that she was entitled to a hearing. YCCHD concludes
that because this is an extraordinary case, no hearing was required. Its position, with
which the District Court agreed, is that for practical purposes, it had no obligation to
provide work to Dr. Linn, and that, therefore, it could neither have breached the
contract nor the covenant of good faith by failing to do so. However, the
Defendant's argument and the District Court's decision were made prior to this
Court's decision in Larson v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 1999 MT 157, 56 St.Rep.
618, 983 P.2d 357.
2. ¶We conclude that based on that decision, as applied to the facts in this case, that the
Defendant was not so clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to make this
case the exception to the general rule that a party is entitled to a hearing before
having her claim dismissed by summary judgment.
3. ¶For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion and the consideration of this case in
light of our Larson decision.
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
We Concur:
/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm (4 of 5)4/9/2007 11:34:56 AM
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
Justice James C. Nelson specially concurs.
1. ¶I concur in our decision. Hopefully, the remand hearing will resolve another
problem with the District Court's decision. At page 4, lines 17 through 26 of its
January 26, 1999 order and memorandum, the court concludes that the subject
contract is unenforceable because the parties' performance is optional. At page 6,
line 23, however, the court concludes that the contract is still in place. Both of these
are legal conclusions, as opposed to factual determinations. Thus, we are presented
with an unenforceable contract that is still in place -- two legal conclusions that
appear to me, at least, to be at odds with one another. I am not persuaded that an
unenforceable contract is still "in place." Likewise, I am not persuaded that if the
contract is still "in place" that it is not enforceable.
2. ¶My reading of Dr. Linn's position on appeal is that she wants to present factual
matters that go to breach via a summary judgment hearing. However, because of the
aforementioned legal conclusions (and without passing on the correctness of either,
one way or the other), a summary judgment hearing as to the facts is pretty much
beside the point. If the contract is truly unenforceable breach is irrelevant. On the
other hand, if the contract is "in place," then Dr. Linn is entitled to present evidence
regarding breach in opposition to summary judgment.
3. ¶I agree with our decision to remand this case for a summary judgment hearing.
Frankly, I am at a loss as to how else these legal issues are going to be otherwise
resolved
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/99-204%20(09-30-99)%20Opinion.htm (5 of 5)4/9/2007 11:34:56 AM