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No. 99-643
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2000 MT 262
302 Mont. 11
11 P.3d 116
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RONALD LaTRAY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Fergus,
The Honorable John R. Christensen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
William F. Hooks, Montana Appellate Defenders Office,
Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
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Thomas Meissner, County Attorney, Lewistown, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 25, 2000
Decided: September 28, 2000
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Ronald LaTray (LaTray) was convicted of five separate charges arising out of a hit and
run incident and subsequent high-speed chase. As part of his sentence, the District Court
ordered him to pay restitution for ambulance and towing fees related to this incident.
LaTray appeals this order of restitution claiming that the District Court had no authority to
order payment of restitution for these services. We affirm the District Court's sentencing
order.
Factual Background
¶2 On April 24, 1999, LaTray was driving down U.S. Highway 87. He had been drinking
and was driving with a suspended license. During the course of his drive, LaTray overtook
a 1974 Jeep pickup driven by Douglas Bingeman (Bingeman) and, while attempting to
pass, clipped its rear bumper. LaTray did not stop.
¶3 Since his Jeep pickup had sustained only minor damage, Bingeman drove after LaTray
in an attempt to stop him or get his licence plate number. Bingeman testified at trial that he
observed LaTray weaving between the shoulder and the median, sometimes crossing over
into the oncoming lane of traffic. Other drivers called the police from cellular phones to
report LaTray's erratic driving.
¶4 When sheriff's deputies caught up with LaTray he ignored their flashing lights and
sirens and continued driving at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour. LaTray drove into a
hayfield, nearly hit one of the deputy's cars and fled down a dirt road. The chase ended
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when LaTray lost control of his car, went into a ditch and rolled.
¶5 Although LaTray did not appear to be seriously injured, deputies called an ambulance
as a precautionary measure. They also called a tow truck to remove LaTray's overturned
vehicle from the ditch and take it to Lewistown.
¶6 Because LaTray appeared to be unconscious when the ambulance crew arrived,
medical personnel called for an Advanced Life Support (ALS) ambulance to meet them en
route to Great Falls. Paramedics prepared LaTray for transport by immobilizing him and
applying a cervical collar. After meeting the ALS ambulance, paramedics took additional
measures to assess and stabilize LaTray's condition. Doctors at the hospital ultimately
determined that LaTray had no significant injuries but a blood screening revealed a blood-
alcohol content of .156.
Procedural History
¶7 LaTray was charged by information with driving under the influence of alcohol, a
felony; operating a motor vehicle without proof of liability insurance; operating a motor
vehicle while a habitual traffic offender; leaving a vehicle accident scene; and felony
criminal endangerment. He was convicted of all charges. The District Court sentenced him
to ten years in prison and four years of supervised probation. In addition, the court ordered
LaTray to pay restitution of $1,561.80 to Superior Towing for towing and storage fees and
$317.50 to the Stanford Ambulance Service for ambulance services incurred as a result of
the incident. LaTray appeals this sentence and asks this Court to strike the restitution
requirement.
Issue
¶8 Did the District Court err when it ordered LaTray to pay restitution for ambulance and
towing services?
Standard of Review
¶9 This Court reviews a criminal sentence for legality. State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, ¶
15, 295 Mont. 288, ¶ 15, 983 P.2d 937, ¶ 15. Thus, our review is confined to whether the
sentence is within the parameters provided by statute. Montoya, ¶ 15.
Discussion
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¶10 LaTray argues that the court's statutory authority to order restitution is limited to pecuniary losses
suffered by direct victims, defined in terms of the offense for which he was convicted. He asserts that,
while the driver of the pickup struck by LaTray may be a victim, neither the towing service nor the
ambulance company qualify as victims of any of the offenses of which he was convicted. He concludes,
therefore, that the court exceeded its authority when it ordered him to pay restitution for these services.
We disagree. LaTray's interpretation is neither implied by the plain words of the controlling statutes nor
is it supported by our case law.
¶11 Our role in construing statutory language is clear. We must "ascertain and declare
what is in terms or in substance contained therein . . .;" we may not insert what has been
omitted or omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. If the intention of the
legislature can be determined from the plain meaning of the words used, a court may not
go further and apply other means of interpretation. State v. Curtis (1994), 266 Mont. 231,
235, 879 P.2d 1164, 1166 (citing State v. Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 111, 649 P.2d
1331, 1333). Where the statutory language is "plain, unambiguous, direct and certain, the
statute speaks for itself and there is nothing left for the court to construe." Curtis, 266
Mont. at 235, 879 P.2d at 1166.
¶12 Under Montana law, sentencing courts must order offenders to make full restitution to
"any victim of the offense who has sustained pecuniary loss as a result of the offense,
including a person suffering an economic loss as a result of the crime." Section 46-18-241
(1), MCA (emphasis added). The plain language of this statute does not limit restitution to
victims defined in terms of the offense for which the defendant was convicted or to losses
arising directly from the defendant's criminal conduct.
¶13 LaTray argues, in essence, that "any victim" means "only those victims legally related
to the convicted offense" and "as a result of the offense" means "as a direct result of the
offense." LaTray would have us interpret the word "any" as somehow restrictive or
limiting. But, clearly, the term any is not limiting in any way.
¶14 In arguing that courts only have authority to require restitution for losses that occur as
a direct result of an offense, LaTray would, again, have this Court insert a limiting term
into the plain text of the statute. Admittedly, application of § 46-18-241(1), MCA, requires
some interpretation of just how remote a loss can be before it can no longer be considered
to be "a result of the offense." However, the fact that the language is somewhat open does
not imply that "direct" losses are the only ones that qualify.
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¶15 Had the legislature wished to add the limiting terms that LaTray's argument suggest, it
surely could have done so. It is not our role to insert this language in a statute that is
otherwise plain on its face. Section 1-2-101, MCA.
¶16 Our case law also holds that classification of an individual as a victim--for the purpose
of ordering restitution--does not depend on the individual's relationship to the elements of
the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced. State v. Morgan (1982), 198 Mont.
391, 402, 646 P.2d 1177, 1183. In Morgan, the defendant was convicted of negligent
homicide following a motor vehicle accident in which two people were killed and three
others injured. We affirmed the district court's order of restitution to the three injured
passengers, holding that they fell within the class of persons injured by the defendant's
criminal conduct. Morgan, 198 Mont. at 402, 646 P.2d at 1183. That is, for purposes of
restitution, the victims of negligent homicide were not limited to those who died as a result
of the defendant's criminal conduct. Although Morgan was decided before the adoption of
the current statute, it interpreted identical language and we find its reasoning applicable to
the case at hand. LaTray's conviction for criminal endangerment in no way limits
restitution only to those he endangered.
¶17 Given the sentencing authority statutorily granted to courts, the issue in this case boils
down to the question of whether the towing and ambulance services come within the
following language; "victim who sustained pecuniary loss as a result of the offense,
including a person suffering an economic loss as a result of the crime." Section 46-18-241
(1), MCA.
¶18 The statutory definition of "victim" states, in relevant part;
(2)(a) "Victim" means:
(i) a person who suffers loss of property, bodily injury, or death as a result of:
(A) the commission of an offense.
Section 46-18-243(2)(a), MCA.
¶19 Most of our cases that apply this definition deal with situations in which the victim
was the person directly harmed by the defendant's conduct. As such, they provide little
authority, one way or the other, for the situation presented here; where a judge has ordered
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restitution paid to a party other than the one directly injured by the offender. The two
cases that address this issue are somewhat in conflict. In Morgan, cited above, we held
that the court properly ordered restitution to surviving passengers for losses incurred as a
result of the negligent homicide of their parents. Morgan, 198 Mont. at 402, 646 P.2d at
1183. However, in a more recent case, we held that surviving family members were not
"victims" for the purpose of ordering restitution. State v. Brown (1992), 263 Mont. 223,
227, 867 P.2d 1098, 1101. In Brown, the defendant pled guilty to felony criminal
endangerment and negligent homicide after he lost control of his vehicle and struck two
pedestrians. This Court held that, although the families of the pedestrians had incurred
"staggering financial losses" as a result of the accident, the court improperly ordered
restitution to these families. In reaching this conclusion, the court did not analyze the
statutory definition of victim as set out in § 46-18-243(2)(a), MCA. Rather, it seemed to
rely on the State's concession that surviving family members could not be considered
victims. Brown, 263 Mont. at 227, 867 P.2d at 1101.
¶20 In any case, it is not necessary to reconcile these cases here. In 1995, the legislature
expanded the scope of persons entitled to receive restitution to include those "suffering an
economic loss as a result of the crime." Section 46-18-241(1), MCA. That language is
sufficiently broad to cover the ambulance and towing charges in this case.
¶21 Montana's restitution statute does not confine restitution to the amount by which a
defendant enriches himself at the victim's expense but rather, empowers courts to impose
restitution for economic loss as a result of the crime. State v. Brewer, 1999 MT 269, ¶ 21,
296 Mont. 453, ¶ 21, 989 P.2d 407, ¶ 21. In Brewer, the defendant embezzled funds from
his employer over a number of years. Following the theft, the employer paid his
employees, a software company, a locksmith and an accounting firm in excess of $15,000
in an attempt to assess and rectify the damage caused by the theft. We held that such
expenditures, necessary to address and rectify the effect of the defendant's criminal acts,
were "the result of the crime" and properly the subject of a restitution order. State v.
Brewer, 1999 MT 269, ¶¶ 19-23, 296 Mont. 453, ¶¶ 19-23, 989 P.2d 407, ¶¶ 19-23.
¶22 Under the facts of this case, the towing and ambulance services suffered an economic
loss because they incurred out of pocket expenses for which they were not reimbursed.
Moreover, these expenses were a result of LaTray's criminal conduct. Regardless of
whether the services were ordered by the sheriff's deputies on the scene, LaTray's criminal
acts created a situation in which ambulance and towing services were reasonably
necessary for public safety or for the safety of LaTray himself. The expenditures incurred
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by the ambulance and towing services were a result of LaTray's crime.
¶23 We hold, therefore, that the District Court had authority under § 46-18-241(1), MCA,
to order LaTray to pay restitution to the companies that provided these services.
¶24 Affirmed.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ J. A. TURNAGE
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
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