No. 01-885
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 260
TODD and SUSAN SATTERFIELD,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RAY MEDLIN d/b/a ULTIMATE CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula,
The Honorable Douglas B. Harkin, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Edward A. Murphy, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, P.C., Missoula,
Montana
For Respondent:
John E. Bohyer, Fred Simpson, Phillips & Bohyer, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 9, 2002
Decided: November 22, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellants Todd and Susan Satterfield (“Satterfields”) filed a
complaint against Respondent Ray Medlin (“Medlin”), doing business
as Ultimate Construction, in the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County, to recover damages as a result of Medlin’s
construction of a small log home. The Satterfields brought claims
for breach of contract, breach of the implied warranty of
habitability, and negligence. After a trial, the jury returned a
verdict for Medlin. The Satterfields filed a motion for a new
trial based on the District Court’s refusal to instruct the jury on
their claim for breach of implied warranty of habitability and
further claim there was not substantial credible evidence to
support the jury’s verdict. The District Court denied the motion
and Satterfields appeal. We affirm the District Court.
¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:
¶3 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it
refused to instruct the jury on the implied warranty of
habitability?
¶4 2. Did substantial credible evidence exist to support the
jury’s verdict?
BACKGROUND
¶5 In December of 1996, Todd and Susan Satterfield entered into a
written agreement with Medlin to construct a log home. The
Satterfields already owned the land on which the house was to be
built. Medlin and the Satterfields agreed to a purchase price of
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$78,055. The contract between Medlin and the Satterfields states,
in part:
All material is guaranteed to be as specified, and the
above work to be performed in accordance with the
drawings and specifications submitted for above work and
completed in a substantial workmanlike manner . . . .
¶6 On June 5, 1998, the Satterfields filed a complaint against
Medlin in the District Court alleging a multitude of problems with
the house. While the Satterfields allege many other errors and
omissions by Medlin, central to the dispute is the absence of a
six-by-six support column which was called for in the house plans.
The support column was to run from a crawl space to the ridge
beam, but was never installed. The parties agree that the house is
not sound without the support column.
¶7 Most other facts are sharply disputed by the parties. Medlin
testified that Todd Satterfield directed him not to install the
column because it would block the view of the living room from the
loft. According to Medlin, Medlin advised Todd to consult an
engineer about the support column, but Todd refused because it
would cost additional money. At trial, Medlin testified that
several days later, Todd instructed Medlin to eliminate the support
column from the plans. The jury heard evidence that by that point
Medlin had already constructed a 3' x 12" concrete pad on which the
column would have been installed. Todd denies ever having
discussed the support column with Medlin, much less having ordered
Medlin not to install it.
¶8 The parties agree that the structure is not sound without the
support column. However, expert witnesses for both the
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Satterfields and Medlin testified that the home was safe to live in
once a temporary support column was installed at a cost of
approximately $500.
¶9 The Satterfields moved into the home in June of 1997 while
construction was still underway. They continued to live in the
home until summer of 1999. A friend of the Satterfields then moved
into the home and lived there until April 2000.
¶10 We note that the Satterfields complained of other problems, in
addition to the absent support column, including inadequate
fasteners on the north gable wall.
¶11 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Medlin. Satterfields
appeal the District Court’s refusal to grant their motion for a new
trial. They argue that the District Court wrongfully refused to
instruct the jury on the implied warranty of habitability and
further that there is not substantial credible evidence in the
record to support the jury’s verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 The standard of review for a district court’s refusal to give
a proposed jury instruction is whether the district court abused
its discretion. Finstad v. W.R. Grace & Co., 2000 MT 228, ¶ 37,
301 Mont. 240, ¶ 37, 8 P.3d 778, ¶ 37.
¶13 The Court’s scope of review of jury verdicts is necessarily
very limited. We will not reverse a jury verdict which is
supported by substantial credible evidence. Evidence may still be
considered substantial even if it is inherently weak and
conflicted. It is within the province of the jury to determine the
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weight and credibility to be afforded the evidence. This Court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Lee v. Kane (1995), 270 Mont. 505, 510, 893 P.2d
854, 857.
¶14 The standard of review of a district court’s denial of a
motion for a new trial is manifest abuse of discretion. The
decision to grant or deny a new trial is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent a
showing of manifest abuse of that discretion. C. Haydon Ltd. v. MT
Min. Properties, Inc. (1997), 286 Mont. 138, 153, 951 P.2d 46, 55.
DISCUSSION
ISSUE ONE
¶15 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it refused to
instruct the jury on the implied warranty of habitability?
¶16 The Satterfields argue the District Court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury on the implied warranty of habitability. Under
Montana law, an implied warranty of habitability with respect to
the sale of a new home is imposed on a builder-vendor. In this
case, however, the parties agree that Medlin was not a builder-
vendor; Medlin was a builder-contractor. The Satterfields already
owned the land on which the home was built when they contacted
Medlin about constructing the home. The home was not a “spec”
home.
¶17 At trial, the debate about whether the implied warranty of
habitability instruction should be given was focused on whether the
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warranty should be extended to a builder-contractor. We need not
address that issue to resolve the present appeal. Instead, our
discussion shall focus on whether an implied warranty of
habitability jury instruction would have been justified at all in
this case.
¶18 This Court has held that “[t]he implied warranty of
habitability of a dwelling house is limited to defects which are so
substantial as reasonably to preclude the use of the dwelling as a
residence.” Samuelson v. A.A. Quality Construction, Inc. (1988),
230 Mont. 220, 223, 749 P.2d 73, 75. For example, in Chandler v.
Madsen (1982), 197 Mont. 234, 642 P.2d 1028, due to problems caused
by a condition of the soil upon which the house was built, doors
and locks failed to operate, walls cracked, floors bulged, windows
broke, plumbing bent, fixtures and walls separated, and the
foundation lowered as much as 3.6 inches in spots. In that case we
affirmed the determination of the District Court that the house was
uninhabitable.
¶19 Here, Satterfields’ house was not uninhabitable. In fact,
Todd and Susan Satterfield moved into the house in June of 1997
and lived there until summer of 1999. After they moved out, a
friend of the Satterfields moved into the house and lived in it
until April of 2000.
¶20 Furthermore, two engineers testifying as expert witnesses on
behalf of the Satterfields and Medlin, respectively, stated that
the house was safe to live in with temporary modifications.
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¶21 In light of the testimony of the engineers, combined with the
fact that the Satterfields, and then their friend, lived in the
house for almost three years, we conclude that the District Court
did not abuse its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury
regarding implied warranty of habitability. The Satterfields did
not present enough evidence at trial to justify an implied warranty
of habitability instruction, even if we assume that the theory
extends beyond a builder-vendor.
ISSUE TWO
¶22 Did substantial credible evidence exist to support the jury’s
verdict?
¶23 After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Medlin,
Satterfields moved for a new trial based on insufficiency of
evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The District Court denied
the motion. Because we are limited in our review of the jury’s
verdict, we may only consider whether or not the verdict was
supported by substantial credible evidence. This Court has defined
substantial credible evidence as evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Morgan v. Great
Falls School District No. 1, 2000 MT 28 ¶ 14, 298 Mont. 194, ¶ 14,
995 P.2d 422, ¶ 14.
¶24 The jury heard a great deal of conflicting evidence from the
Satterfields and Medlin. Medlin testified that Satterfield
continually interfered with the construction process. For example,
Medlin contends that during one stage of construction, Satterfield
only allowed him to work when Satterfield was present, which was
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evenings and Sundays; that Todd Satterfield instructed him not to
install the crucial support column, as discussed above; and that
for a period of time, Medlin had to halt construction because
Satterfield did not have the money to pay for Medlin’s labor and
expenses.
¶25 Satterfields, on the other hand, tried to persuade the jury
that Todd never instructed Medlin not to install the support column
and that Medlin lied in his testimony. The Satterfields also argue
that they presented substantial evidence to support their claims
for emotional distress. In their appellate brief, Satterfields
summarily state, “Medlin had contracted to build a sound house. He
did not do so and that is a breach of his contract with the
Satterfields.”
¶26 Both the Satterfields and Medlin presented evidence to support
their own case. To Satterfields’ chagrin, the jury evidently put
more stock in Medlin’s version of the events than it did
Satterfields’. We conclude that the record contains substantial
credible evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
¶27 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
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