No. 01-460
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 108
CITY OF GREAT FALLS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, LORI
EKANGER, and MONTANA STATE HOSPITAL
WARM SPRINGS, RANDY VETTER,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade,
Honorable Julie Macek, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Tony Lucas (argued), Assistant City Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Michelle J. Maltese (argued), Special Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Heard: January 10, 2002
Submitted: January 15, 2002
Decided: May 23, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The City of Great Falls (Great Falls) appeals from the Eighth
Judicial District Court’s denial of its motion for declaratory
judgment. We reverse.
¶2 The following issue is raised on appeal:
¶3 May a municipal court commit a criminal defendant if it
determines that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or
defect and lacks the fitness to proceed to trial?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 Following a disturbance in a bar on September 21, 1999, D.A.
was charged with violation of § 45-8-101, MCA, disorderly conduct,
and § 45-5-201, MCA, misdemeanor assault against a police officer.
Upon the State’s motion, the Great Falls Municipal Court
(Municipal Court) ordered D.A. to attend a mental health evaluation
conducted by Dr. Mark H. Johnson. D.A. attended the evaluation,
Comment [COMMENT1]: Report
and Dr. Johnson issued a report concluding that D.A. suffered from p. 6
a serious mental illness which would substantially interfere with
his capacity to proceed to trial. Dr. Johnson recommended
psychiatric evaluation and treatment for D.A.’s illness, and he
stated that with successful treatment there was a reasonable chance
that D.A. could be restored to competence.
¶5 The Municipal Court held a hearing regarding D.A.’s fitness to
proceed. Based on Dr. Johnson’s evaluation and the hearing
testimony, the Municipal Court found D.A. incompetent to stand
trial. On August 3, 2000, it ordered D.A. committed to the custody
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of the Director of the Department of Public Health and Human
Services (DPHHS) to be placed in an appropriate institution.
¶6 The Directors of DPHHS and Montana State Hospital Warm Springs
refused to comply with the Municipal Court’s order. Great Falls
filed a Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus in District
Court seeking enforcement of the Municipal Court’s August 3, 2000,
commitment order.
¶7 In the meantime, D.A. remained at large in Great Falls and was
charged in District Court with a subsequent felony offense. The
District Court found D.A. unfit to proceed to trial on this
offense and ordered D.A.’s commitment to the custody of the
Director of DPHHS to be placed in an appropriate institution for as
long as his unfitness endured. As a result of D.A.’s commitment,
the District Court in the mandamus action determined that Great
Falls’ request for relief had been granted, and it vacated further
mandamus proceedings.
¶8 Great Falls then filed a motion for declaratory judgment in
District Court. It requested a determination that a municipal
court judge has the authority under Montana law to place a
defendant charged with a criminal offense in municipal court in an
appropriate institution of DPHHS in order to cure a defendant’s
unfitness to stand trial. In response, DPHHS filed a cross motion
for declaratory judgment maintaining that a municipal court judge
lacks the authority to commit unfit defendants to DPHHS. In an
order dated April 19, 2001, the District Court agreed that
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municipal courts lack such authority under Montana law. Great
Falls appeals.
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DISCUSSION
¶9 May a municipal court commit a criminal defendant if it
determines that the defendant suffers from a mental disease or
defect and lacks the fitness to proceed to trial?
¶10 Our standard of review pertaining to a district court’s
conclusions of law, in rendering a declaratory judgment, is to
determine if the court’s interpretation of the law is correct.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Court,
2000 MT 153, ¶ 12, 300 Mont. 123, ¶12, 2 P.3d 834, ¶ 12.
¶11 The District Court and the parties agree that the Due Process
Clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions prohibit
convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is incapacitated
due to a mental disease or defect. They also agree that
prosecutors and the courts have an ethical and legal obligation to
ensure the protection of a criminal defendant’s constitutional
rights. Yet, the District Court and the parties disagree as to
whether municipal courts have the authority to commit a criminal
defendant suffering from a mental disease or defect to DPHHS.
¶12 The District Court’s April 19, 2001, order and the parties’
appellate arguments pit two statutes against one another. Great
Falls relies upon § 3-6-104, MCA, in support of its position that a
municipal court has the same authority as a district court to
commit a criminal defendant who is unfit to proceed to trial.
Section 3-6-104(1), MCA, states that, except as otherwise provided,
“the municipal court shall have in matters within its jurisdiction
all the powers and duties of district judges in like cases.”
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¶13 The District Court and DPHHS, however, focus on § 46-14-
202(1), MCA, regarding the examination of a criminal defendant when
mental disease or defect is an issue. This statute provides that
“[i]f the defendant or the defendant’s counsel files a written
motion requesting an examination or if the issue of the defendant’s
fitness to proceed is raised by the district court, prosecution, or
defense counsel, the district court shall appoint at least one
qualified psychiatrist or licensed clinical psychologist . . .”
Section 46-14-202(1), MCA (emphasis added).
¶14 As a result, the District Court held, and DPHHS now argues,
that only district courts can commit a criminal defendant who is
unfit to proceed to trial since the term “district court” is
specifically used in § 46-14-202(1), MCA. The District Court
reasoned that “because the municipal court judge does not have
jurisdiction over competency matters, the municipal court judge
does not have the same powers and duties as a district court judge
when commitment of a criminal defendant appears warranted.”
¶15 The District Court then presented two options to the municipal
court in dealing with cases involving mental incapacity: a
municipal court prosecutor may (1) bind the fitness issues over to
the district court for a competency determination; or (2) suspend
the criminal proceedings, refer the case to the county attorney’s
office for civil commitment, and recommence prosecution when a
defendant has been determined competent to proceed. On appeal,
DPHHS and Great Falls disagree as to whether these are viable
options.
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¶16 In interpreting a statute, we first look to the plain meaning
of the words it contains. Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 2002 MT 8,
¶ 20, 308 Mont. 111, ¶ 20, 39 P.3d 697, ¶ 20 (citation omitted).
Moreover, this Court is required to simply ascertain and declare
what is in terms or in substance found in the statute, neither
inserting what has been omitted nor omitting what has been
inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. Bearing this in mind, we conclude
that the District Court incorrectly interpreted § 3-6-104(1), MCA,
in this case.
¶17 A plain reading of § 3-6-104(1), MCA, provides that municipal
courts shall have in matters within its jurisdiction all the powers
and duties of district judges in like cases. Municipal courts have
jurisdiction over select criminal cases. Section 3-6-103, MCA
(municipal court jurisdiction generally); § 3-10-303, MCA
(coordinate jurisdiction with justices’ courts over misdemeanors
punishable by a fine less than $500 or imprisonment for less than
six months); § 3-11-103, MCA (exclusive jurisdiction over
violations of city ordinances). These criminal cases are,
unquestionably, matters within the jurisdiction of municipal
courts. Accordingly, under § 3-6-104(1), MCA, municipal courts are
vested with all the powers and duties of district judges in these
cases–including the power and the duty to commit mentally
incapacitated criminal defendants to DPHHS pursuant to the
procedures and requirements set forth in Title 46, MCA. This
stands to reason since a municipal court judge, like a district
court judge, must be an attorney. Section 3-6-202, MCA. In
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addition, municipal courts are courts of record, and if there is a
question as to the municipal court’s commitment of a criminal
defendant, the issue may be appealed to the District Court under §
3-5-303, MCA.
¶18 Moreover, the District Court’s options for municipal courts in
mental disease and defect cases are not wholly viable. As set
forth above, municipal courts have exclusive and coordinate
jurisdiction over select misdemeanor criminal cases. District
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in these cases. Section 3-
5-302(1)(d), MCA. As such, it is both unnecessary pursuant to § 3-
6-104(1), MCA, as well as imprudent, to send a competency
determination to a district court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction over the underlying charge.
¶19 Furthermore, involuntary civil commitment in the district
court may not be a viable solution if a criminal defendant, while
meeting the standard of criminal commitment articulated in § 46-14-
103, MCA (whether the defendant, as a result of mental disease or
defect, is unable to understand the proceedings against him or
assist in his defense), does not at the same time meet the more
stringent standard for involuntary civil commitment under § 53-21-
126(4), MCA (whether an individual, because of a mental disorder
and through an act or omission, caused self-injury or injury to
others or an imminent threat of injury).
¶20 We therefore hold that a municipal court may commit a criminal
defendant if it determines, in accordance with Montana law, that
the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect and lacks the
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fitness to proceed to trial. To conclude otherwise would
contravene the plain language of § 3-6-104(1), MCA.
¶21 We reverse.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
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We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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