No. DA 06-0030
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 123N
IN THE MATTER OF A.L.,
A Youth In Need Of Care.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DN-04-18,
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Peter B. Ohman, Public Defender’s Office, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Marty Lambert, County Attorney; Kimberly Dudik and Elizabeth
Ridenour, Deputy County Attorneys, Bozeman, Montana
Leslie C. Taylor, Bozeman, Montana (Guardian Ad Litem)
Submitted on Briefs: May 3, 2006
Decided: June 6, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 The Eighteenth Judicial District Court adjudicated A.L. a youth in need of care as
to the boy’s father, N.L., after determining that probable cause existed to believe that
A.L. was abused or neglected or in danger of being abused or neglected. The court
approved a treatment plan for N.L., which he failed to satisfactorily complete.
Consequently, the court terminated N.L.’s parental rights. N.L. appeals the court’s
adjudication that A.L. was a youth in need of care, arguing that the Department of Public
Health and Human Services failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, pursuant
to § 41-3-437(2), MCA, that N.L. abused or neglected his son.
¶3 We review a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights to determine
whether the court abused its discretion. The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the
trial court acted arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeded
the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. To satisfy the relevant statutory
requirements for terminating a parent-child relationship, a district court must make
specific factual findings, which we review to determine whether they are clearly
erroneous. In Re Custody and Parental Rights of C.J.K., 2005 MT 67, ¶ 13, 326 Mont.
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289, ¶ 13, 109 P.3d 232, ¶ 13. In this case, the District Court specifically found that the
Department presented evidence of a physical altercation that took place between N.L. and
A.L.’s mother, with A.L. in the middle, being forcibly pulled between his parents; the
incident resulted in A.L.’s mother obtaining a restraining order against N.L.
¶4 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d) of
our 1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for
memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us
that the appeal is without merit because the findings of fact are supported by substantial
evidence, the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled Montana law which the District
Court correctly interpreted, and the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that
the Department proved by a preponderance of the evidence that A.L. was abused or
neglected. The District Court did not abuse its discretion.
¶5 We affirm.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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