Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc.

I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
New Mexico Compilation
Commission, Santa Fe, NM
'00'04- 13:46:56 2011.08.22

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number: 2011-NMSC-033

Filing Date: July 27, 2011

Docket No. 32,340

KIM RIVERA,

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.

AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
a/k/a AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE, INC.,
AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
a/k/a AMERICAN SECURITY GROUP, LINDA
CALLAHAN, and JANE DOE,

Defendants-Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS ON CERTIORARI
William F. Lang, District Judge

Martinez, Hart & Thompson, P.C.
Bruce Evan Thompson
Albuquerque, NM

Public Justice, P.C.
F. Paul Bland, Jr.
Melanie Hirsch
Washington, DC

Treinen Law Office
Robert Dale Treinen
Albuquerque, NM

for Petitioner

Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.
Charles K. Purcell
Albuquerque, NM

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for Respondents

Michael B. Browde
Albuquerque, NM

Law Office of William E. Snead
William E. Snead
Albuquerque, NM

for Amicus Curiae
New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk P.A.
Kenneth L. Harrigan
Albuquerque, NM

for Amici Curiae
American Financial Services Association and Consumer Bankers Association

OPINION

DANIELS, Chief Justice.

{1} We granted certiorari in this case to review a Court of Appeals opinion upholding a
district court’s order compelling arbitration of Petitioner Kim Rivera’s claims against a title
loan lender, American General Financial Services, Inc., and its affiliated insurance agency,
American Security Insurance Company. We base our reversal of those decisions on our
holding that the arbitration provisions in the title loan contract cannot be enforced because
the involvement of the now-unavailable National Arbitration Forum (NAF) to arbitrate
contract disputes was an integral requirement of the parties’ agreement. Although no longer
technically necessary to our disposition of this appeal, we correct the analysis in the
published opinion of the Court of Appeals that imposes an overly narrow construction on
New Mexico’s unconscionability jurisprudence and misapplies this Court’s holding in
Cordova v. World Finance Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} On August 15, 2000, Rivera obtained a car title loan from American General in the
amount of $6,517 in cash plus $1,931 in life, disability, and unemployment insurance
premiums. As collateral, Rivera gave American General the title to her 1995 truck, which
had a value of $15,500 at the time.

{3} The form title loan contract used by American General is three pages long. The first

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page includes the particularized data about Rivera’s loan, including figures for payments,
interest, and principal, inserted in preprinted blanks. Preprinted language at the bottom of
the page explicitly requires that “ARBITRATION WILL BE CONDUCTED PURSUANT
TO THE RULES OF THE [NAF].” Page two includes nine preprinted provisions, including
repayment rules, default provisions, and a requirement that the borrower must maintain
physical damage insurance on the collateral. Page three, titled “ARBITRATION
PROVISIONS,” specifies again that “[a]rbitration will be conducted under the rules and
procedures of the [NAF] or successor organization” and provides additional arbitration rules
and procedures. Page three also details claims covered by and excluded from the arbitration
agreement. The binding arbitration agreement encompassed “any and all claims” that Rivera
could conceivably have against American General, including,

without limitation, all claims and disputes arising out of, in connection with,
or relating to [Rivera’s] loan from Lender today or any previous loan from
Lender (including all amendments, modifications and refinancings); any
previous retail installment sales contract or loan assigned to Lender; all
documents, actions, or omissions relating to this or any previous loan or retail
installment sales contract; whether the claim or dispute must be arbitrated;
the validity of the Arbitration Provisions, [Rivera’s] understanding of them,
or any defenses as to the enforceability of the Loan Agreement or the
Arbitration Provisions; any negotiations between [Rivera] and lender; any
claim or dispute based on the closing, servicing, collection, or enforcement
of any transaction covered by the Arbitration Provisions; any claim or
dispute based on an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation; any claim or
dispute based on or arising under any federal or state statute or rule; any
claim or dispute based on a contract or an alleged tort; and any claim for
injunctive or equitable relief.

Although the arbitration provisions require Rivera to arbitrate any claims she may have
against American General, the arbitration provisions exempt from binding arbitration certain
claims that the Lender might have against Rivera:

[Rivera] cannot elect to arbitrate Lender’s self-help or judicial remedies
including, without limitation, repossession or foreclosure, with respect to any
property that secures any transaction described under the definition of
“Covered Claims.” In the event of a default under those transactions, Lender
can enforce its rights to [Rivera’s] property in court or as otherwise provided
by law, and [Rivera] cannot require that Lender’s actions be arbitrated.

{4} Because Rivera did not provide American General with proof of physical damage
insurance, American General obtained from its own affiliate, American Security, twelve
months of “creditor-placed insurance” for Rivera’s truck and added an additional $2,197
insurance premium to the balance of the loan. The insurance policy covered direct and
accidental loss of or damage to the truck. In the case of loss or damage, the insurance

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contract stated that American Security would, subject to a deductible, pay the lesser of (1)
the cost of repairing or replacing the truck, (2) the unpaid balance of Rivera’s loan, or (3)
the actual cash value of the truck immediately prior to the loss or damage.

{5} According to Rivera’s district court complaint, after an accident in 2000 that left her
truck unusable, neither American General nor American Security ever adjusted the claim,
even though Rivera immediately made a claim for the loss of her truck, personally went to
American General’s office multiple times, and filled out several claim forms and proof-of-
loss forms.

{6} Rivera alleged that American General continued to send her monthly billing
statements and that she continued to submit payments. When Rivera finally defaulted on the
loan, American General notified credit reporting bureaus of her delinquency and hired a law
firm to recover the remaining debt from her. Although Rivera never repaid the loan in full,
in August 2004, nearly four years after her truck was destroyed, American General mailed
the truck title back to Rivera in an unmarked envelope without any cover letter or
explanation.

{7} In September 2006, Rivera filed suit against Defendants American General and
American Security in the Second Judicial District Court, alleging breach of contract, breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insurance bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, constructive fraud, and violations of statutory protections in the Insurance Practices
Act, the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. Defendants
removed the case to the United States District Court and filed a motion to compel arbitration.
After Rivera voluntarily dismissed her only federal claim, the federal court remanded the
case back to state court. In April 2008, the Second Judicial District Court granted
Defendants’ motions to compel arbitration and stay the judicial proceedings.

{8} Rivera appealed the order compelling arbitration to the Court of Appeals, which
rejected her contentions that (1) the arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable, (2)
the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable, (3) American General’s promise to
arbitrate was illusory, (4) equitable relief was inappropriate because of American General’s
unclean hands, and (5) American Security, which was neither a party to nor mentioned in the
arbitration agreement, had no right as a third-party beneficiary to enforce the arbitration
provisions. Rivera v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 2010-NMCA-046, ¶¶ 1, 6, 10, 16, 19-20,
148 N.M. 784, 242 P.3d 351.

{9} Rivera also raised a new issue before the Court of Appeals in a motion for rehearing.
After this case had been submitted to the Court of Appeals, the NAF, in response to a lawsuit
filed by the Minnesota Attorney General challenging NAF’s suspect ties to the consumer
loan and debt collection industries, stipulated to a consent judgment in which the NAF
agreed not to administer, process or “[i]n any manner participate” in any arbitration of
consumer disputes after July 24, 2009. Rivera argued that the NAF’s unavailability rendered
the arbitration provisions in American General’s form title loan contract unenforceable. The

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Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.

{10} Rivera argues in this Court that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable because
(1) arbitration before the NAF was integral to the agreement to arbitrate but is now
impossible and (2) the arbitration agreement is unconscionable under Cordova, 2009-
NMSC-021. In addition to opposing Rivera’s arguments on their merits, Defendants make
a procedural claim that her petition for writ of certiorari was untimely. We (1) reject
Defendants’ untimeliness arguments, (2) hold on the merits that the arbitration provisions
are unenforceable because of the unavailability of the NAF to perform as contemplated in
the parties’ agreement, and (3) correct the Court of Appeals’ overly narrow construction of
our holding in Cordova.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rivera’s Certiorari Petition Was Timely Filed.

{11} Defendants take the position that we should decline to reach the merits of Rivera’s
appeal because she arguably was late in filing her petition for writ of certiorari. The time
limits for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court are found in Rule 12-502(B)
NMRA:

The petition for writ of certiorari shall be filed with the Supreme Court clerk
within thirty (30) days after final action by the Court of Appeals . . . . Final
action by the Court of Appeals shall be the filing of its decision . . . unless
timely motion for rehearing is filed, in which event, final action shall be the
disposition of the last motion for rehearing that was timely filed.

{12} Under Rule 12-404(A) NMRA, a party must file a motion for rehearing within fifteen
days of the appellate court’s disposition of a case “unless the time is shortened or enlarged
by order.” The time period is not jurisdictional because the rule explicitly permits the court
to enlarge or shorten the fifteen day period. Rivera filed a motion for rehearing on March
8, 2010, eighteen days after the Court of Appeals issued its February 18, 2010, opinion.
Although the Court of Appeals did not enter a separate order addressing the time for filing
the motion for rehearing, its written order denying Rivera’s motion for rehearing explicitly
stated: “Appellant having filed a motion for rehearing which has been considered by the
Court. IT IS ORDERED that the motion for rehearing is denied.” (Emphasis added.)

{13} In the absence of an indication from the Court of Appeals that the motion for
rehearing was rejected as untimely, we look to the order denying rehearing as the “final
action by the Court of Appeals” under Rule 12-502(B). We have “consistently followed a
policy of construing [procedural] rules liberally, to the end that causes on appeal may be
determined on the merits where it can be done without impeding or confusing administration
or perpetrating injustice.” Olguin v. State, 90 N.M. 303, 305, 563 P.2d 97, 99 (1977)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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{14} The Court of Appeals superintends its own docket and has the discretion to indicate
in an order whether a motion for rehearing has been denied on grounds of late filing. The
Court of Appeals’ order did not state that Rivera’s motion had been denied for untimely
filing; to the contrary, it explicitly represented that the Court of Appeals had “considered”
the motion before denying it. Because Rivera filed her petition for writ of certiorari in this
Court within thirty days after the Court of Appeals’ final action, as required by Rule 12-
502(B), we accept Rivera’s petition for writ of certiorari as properly invoking this Court’s
certiorari jurisdiction and address the merits of this case.

B. Arbitration Provisions in a Contract Must, If Possible, Be Enforced According
to Their Terms, Subject to Established Principles of Contract Law.

{15} “While the interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state
law, the [Federal Arbitration Act] imposes certain rules of fundamental importance.” Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1773 (2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The arbitration provisions in the form title
loan contract between Rivera and American General state that the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), “applies to and governs the Arbitration Provisions.” To
determine whether the arbitration provisions are enforceable, we therefore must consider not
only general principles of New Mexico contract law but also substantive federal caselaw
interpreting the FAA.

{16} Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration provisions in contracts involving
interstate commerce are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized “the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter
of contract” and that “courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts . . . and enforce them according to their terms.” AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

{17} Despite the policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, under the FAA
an arbitration agreement is not enforceable where “grounds . . . exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Agreements to arbitrate may accordingly “be
invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct.
2772, 2776 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[S]tate law, whether of
legislative or judicial origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the
validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 492-93 n.9 (1987). But states cannot invalidate arbitration agreements through the
application of “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct.
at 1746. State law is preempted “to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law—that is, to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of

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Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

{18} With this interplay of federal and state law in mind, our evaluation of the meaningful
enforceability of the arbitration provisions turns on consideration of generally applicable
principles of New Mexico contract law.

C. The Arbitration Provisions in This Case Could Not Be Enforced As Written
Because Involvement of the NAF Was Integral to the Contract.

{19} As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that we should not consider whether the
NAF’s unavailability renders the arbitration provisions unenforceable because Rivera did
not raise this issue until after the Court of Appeals had filed its opinion. In general, “[t]o
preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court
was fairly invoked.” Rule 12-216(A) NMRA. But because the NAF became unavailable
more than a year after the district court had issued its order compelling arbitration, Rivera
was unable to raise this claim before the district court.

{20} Our published rules specifically recognize that this Court has the discretion to
consider legal matters of “general public interest,” even if not technically preserved below.
Rule 12-216(B)(1). Amici curiae, American Financial Services Association and Consumer
Bankers Association, have explained that the NAF’s withdrawal from all consumer
arbitrations affects millions of arbitration provisions currently in force. Given the
prevalence of arbitration provisions designating the NAF, we conclude that the unavailability
of the NAF to arbitrate any consumer disputes presents a legal matter of general public
interest, and we exercise our discretion to consider this issue, which the parties have had a
full and fair opportunity to brief and argue. See id.

{21} On the merits, Defendants concede that the NAF is unavailable to resolve Rivera’s
claims, but they argue that the arbitration provisions remain enforceable despite the
unavailability of the NAF, on the theory that § 5 of the FAA authorizes a court to select a
substitute arbitrator.

{22} Under § 5 of the FAA,

[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing
an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but
if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party
thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason
there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire,
or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the
controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators
or umpire . . . .

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9 U.S.C. § 5.

{23} Rivera argues that § 5 of the FAA does not apply in cases where the sole designated
arbitrator is no longer available, citing Weiner v. Gutfreund (In re Salomon Inc.
Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation), 68 F.3d 554 (2nd Cir. 1995). In re Salomon addressed
an arbitration provision that required all disputes to be resolved by the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) “and only the NYSE, ‘in accordance with the [NYSE] Constitution and
Rules.’” Id. at 557 (alteration in original). “The NYSE declined to arbitrate the dispute, and
the defendants went back to the district court, seeking the appointment of substitute
arbitrators under § 5 of the FAA.” Id. at 555-56. The defendants argued that another
arbitration provider could be appointed to arbitrate the dispute using the NYSE’s rules. Id.
at 558. Looking “to the text of the arbitration agreements themselves,” id., the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “the parties had contractually agreed that only the
NYSE could arbitrate any disputes,” id. at 559. The court held that a district court cannot
“use § 5 [of the FAA] to circumvent the parties’ designation of an exclusive arbitral forum”
because the unavailability of the parties’ named arbitration provider does not constitute “‘a
lapse in the naming of an arbitrator’” within the meaning of § 5. Id. at 560-61. “[T]he lapse
referred to in § 5 means a lapse in time in the naming of the arbitrator or in the filling of a
vacancy on a panel of arbitrators or some other mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator
selection process.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Grant
v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 438 (S.C. 2009) (perceiving “great
merit in the Second Circuit’s view that [§ 5 of the FAA] does not apply in cases where a
specifically designated arbitrator becomes unavailable”).

{24} A number of other jurisdictions, including the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
have taken a less rigid approach to the question of whether § 5 of the FAA allows a court to
appoint a substitute arbitration provider to replace an unavailable provider. See Brown v.
ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). Like In re Salomon,
Brown focused its analysis on the intent of the transacting parties as evidenced by the plain
language of the contract. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222. Brown recognized that a court cannot
appoint a substitute arbitration provider if doing so would be contrary to the transacting
parties’ intent expressed in the terms of their agreement. If the parties’ designation of a
particular arbitration provider was integral to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, then § 5 of
the FAA cannot be used to circumvent the parties’ intent to arbitrate before that specific
forum. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222. But if the parties’ designation of a provider was merely
an “ancillary logistical concern,” a court can appoint a substitute under § 5 of the FAA.
Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Brown rejected
In re Salomon’s conclusion that § 5 of the FAA never applies in cases where the arbitration
provider designated in the contract is unavailable. Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222 (explaining that
§ 5 of the FAA “provides a mechanism for appointment of an arbitrator” unless the NAF was
“an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate”).

{25} Many jurisdictions have likewise declined to apply In re Salomon’s bright-line rule
and have instead concluded that Brown’s “integral” versus “ancillary logistical concern” test

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is a proper way to determine whether a court may appoint a substitute arbitration provider.
See, e.g., Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App’x 174, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2010) (looking to the plain
language of the arbitration agreement to determine whether the parties intended for the NAF
to be an integral part of contract); Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.
2006) (concluding that the naming of a particular arbitrator was not “so central to the
arbitration agreement that the unavailability of that arbitrator brought the agreement to an
end”), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Atlantic Nat’l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley
Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2010); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327, 336-37
(Ill. 2011) (holding that § 5 of the FAA could “not be utilized to select a substitute
arbitrator” because “the designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum was integral to the
parties’ agreement to arbitrate”); Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 221 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2010) (concluding that “the plain language of the arbitration agreement [w]as the
sole evidence of the parties’ intent” and “delineat[ing] the NAF . . . as the exclusive
arbitrators”); Grant, 678 S.E.2d at 439 (concluding that the parties’ decision to submit to the
rules of a particular arbitrator “reflects their specific intent to arbitrate exclusively before that
body” when that arbitrator “may substantially affect the substantive outcome of the
resolution”).

{26} We disagree with Rivera’s contention that § 5 of the FAA never applies in cases
where the designated arbitration provider is no longer available. We agree with the
jurisdictions that have focused on the parties’ intent, as expressed in the contract, to
determine whether § 5 of the FAA permits a court to substitute a different arbitration
provider. The “integral” or “ancillary logistical concern” test articulated by the Eleventh
Circuit in Brown, 211 F.3d at 1222, is consistent with New Mexico’s general principles of
contract law in requiring courts to “give effect to the intent of the parties.” Continental
Potash, Inc. v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 115 N.M. 690, 704, 858 P.2d 66, 80 (1993); see
Carr, 944 N.E.2d at 329 (applying Illinois contract law principles to interpret an arbitration
agreement); Stewart, 9 A.3d at 221-22 (applying Pennsylvania contract law principles to
determine whether the designated arbitration provider was integral to the agreement to
arbitrate). This approach also best complies with the admonition of the United States
Supreme Court that a fundamental purpose of the FAA is to require that courts enforce
arbitration agreements “according to their terms.” Volt Info., 489 U.S at 479.

{27} We conclude that whether the NAF is integral to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
is a matter of contract interpretation. Contract interpretation is a matter of law that we
review de novo. See W. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Carter, 1999-NMSC-012, ¶ 4, 127 N.M.
186, 979 P.2d 231. “The purpose, meaning and intent of the parties to a contract is to be
deduced from the language employed by them; and where such language is not ambiguous,
it is conclusive.” Continental Potash, 115 N.M. at 704, 858 P.2d at 80 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). If the plain language of a contract evidences the parties’
intention to resolve disputes solely through a specific arbitration provider, the parties’ intent
would be frustrated if a court appointed a different arbitration provider. The determinative
issue is whether arbitration before the NAF is integral to the agreement to arbitrate. See
Summit Props., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 2005-NMCA-090, ¶ 32, 138 N.M. 208, 118

9
P.3d 716 (explaining in a non-arbitration context that enforcement of a contract term may
be rendered impossible by the occurrence of a supervening event that is contrary to “a basic
assumption on which the contract was based”).

{28} Courts have concluded that the identity of the arbitration provider is an ancillary
logistical concern in contracts where the arbitration provisions do not specifically designate
a provider or where a provision gives transacting parties a choice of providers. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Payday Loan Store of Ill., No. 09 C 4189, 2010 WL 1031590, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 17, 2010) (concluding that where “the arbitration agreement offers a choice of
arbitrators, the selection of a single particular arbitrator cannot logically be so central to the
agreement as to merit voiding it”); Premier Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Butch, 24 So. 3d
708, 709-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that the choice of arbitrator was not
integral because the contract had an unfilled blank space for designating an arbitrator). But
see QuickClick Loans, LLC v. Russell, 943 N.E.2d 166, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding
unenforceable an arbitration agreement that specified arbitration before one of two
arbitration providers, both of which were unavailable).

{29} On the other hand, an arbitration agreement’s express designation of a single
arbitration provider weighs in favor of a finding that the designated provider is integral to
the agreement to arbitrate. For example, the arbitration provision in Ranzy contained terms
strikingly similar to the terms in this case:

[A]ny and all claims . . . shall be resolved by binding individual (and not
class) arbitration by and under the Code of Procedure of the [NAF] . . . . This
agreement to arbitrate all disputes shall apply no matter by whom or against
whom the claim is filed. Rules and forms of the NAF may be obtained and
all claims shall be filed at any NAF office, [or by contacting the NAF via the
internet, phone, or mail].

393 F. App’x at 175 (second and third alterations in original). Ranzy concluded that the
district court had properly denied the motion to compel arbitration in a substitute forum
because “the parties explicitly agreed that the NAF shall be the exclusive forum for
arbitrating disputes.” Id. at 176; see also Reddam, 457 F.3d at 1060 (“[C]ourts . . . have
decided that a clause which adopts the rules of an organization like the [NAF] implicitly
chooses that organization as the, or a, forum.”). But see Carr, 944 N.E.2d at 335 (“[T]he
mere fact [that] parties name an arbitral service to handle arbitrations and specify rules to
be applied does not, standing alone, make that designation integral to the agreement.”).

{30} The parties’ designation of the rules of a specific arbitration provider may indicate
that arbitration pursuant to those rules is an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate. In
Grant, the South Carolina Supreme Court focused on the significance of the transacting
parties’ agreement to arbitrate using the rules of the American Health Lawyers Association
(AHLA). 678 S.E.2d at 437. Under AHLA rules, “the parties may not vary the rules on
communications, service, counting of days, publication and form of the award, release of

10
documents, or administration. The parties are bound by a panel of arbitrators selected by the
[AHLA].” Id. at 439. Grant explained that adherence to a specific set of rules can have
“wide-ranging substantive implications that may affect,” among other things, “the
arbitrator-selection process, the law, procedures, and rules that govern the arbitration, the
enforcement of the arbitral award, and the cost of the arbitration.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Grant concluded that, where the designation of a particular set
of rules “has implications that may substantially affect the substantive outcome of the
resolution,” the parties’ selection of those rules is integral to the agreement to arbitrate. Id.

{31} Mandatory, as opposed to permissive, contractual language further demonstrates that
a specifically named arbitration provider is integral to the agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g.,
NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997) (“‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation,
requirement or condition precedent.”); Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation
Comm’n, 2009-NMSC-013, ¶ 22, 146 N.M. 24, 206 P.3d 135 (“‘[S]hall’ indicates that the
provision is mandatory[.]”). Ranzy emphasized the portions of the contract that said the
parties “‘shall’ submit all claims to the NAF for arbitration” and that NAF rules “‘shall’
govern the arbitration.” 393 F. App’x at 176. In Khan v. Dell, Inc., No. 09-3703 (JAP),
2010 WL 3283529, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010), the arbitration agreement provided that
“ANY CLAIM, DISPUTE, OR CONTROVERSY . . . SHALL BE RESOLVED
EXCLUSIVELY AND FINALLY BY BINDING ARBITRATION ADMINISTERED BY
THE [NAF] under its Code of Procedure then in effect[.]” Khan found that the mandatory
language, “‘shall be resolved’” by the NAF, “evince[d] the parties’ intent to arbitrate
exclusively before a particular arbitrator, not simply an intent to arbitrate generally.” Id. at
*4.

{32} In this case, American General’s form title loan contract names the NAF specifically
and exclusively throughout and states that “[a]rbitration will be conducted under the rules
and procedures of the [NAF] or successor organization that are in effect at the time
arbitration is started and under the rules set forth in the Arbitration Provisions.” The “rules
set forth in the Arbitration Provisions” state that, in order to initiate arbitration, the borrower
must obtain a “Demand for Arbitration” form from the NAF, complete the NAF form, send
three copies of the completed form to the NAF, and pay the NAF an initial filing fee. The
rules further state that, once arbitration has been initiated, the NAF will provide the parties
with a list of seven NAF arbitrators. Each party then strikes three people from the NAF list,
and the remaining NAF-designated person serves as arbitrator. Finally, the rules provide
complete contact information for the NAF so that the consumer can obtain more information
about NAF arbitration procedures.

{33} In addition to naming the NAF exclusively throughout the arbitration provisions of
the agreement, the parties mandated that “[a]rbitration will be conducted under the rules and
procedures of the [NAF].” The published NAF Code of Procedure exemplified the
importance of designating the rules of a particular organization to govern dispute resolution.
See NAF, Code of Procedure (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/CodeofProcedure2008-print2.pdf. The

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seventy-four page code states that it is “incorporated by reference into every Arbitration
Agreement” that refers to the NAF. Id. at 1. Among other things, the code governs the
manner in which claims can be brought, id. at 18-25, the selection and powers of the
arbitrator, id. at 28-33, the type of hearing afforded to the parties, id. at 34-51, the entry of
a final binding order by the arbitrator, id. at 52-58, and the payment of fees by the parties,
id. at 59-63.

{34} Additionally, as in Ranzy and Khan, the arbitration provisions in this case use
mandatory rather than permissive language: (1) “[a]rbitration will be conducted under the
rules and procedures of” the NAF, (2) to start arbitration “you or Lender must . . . complete
a Demand for Arbitration (contact NAF for a copy),” (3) the “NAF will provide” a list of
potential arbitrators, and (4) “NAF rules shall determine what portion of the costs you or
Lender will pay.” (Emphasis added.) The pervasive references to the NAF, selection of the
NAF rules, and mandatory language of the contract all support our conclusion that the NAF
was integral to the agreement to arbitrate.

{35} Defendants argue that several features of the contract before us indicate that the NAF
was merely an ancillary logistical concern. Because the contract requires arbitration under
the NAF “rules and procedures . . . that are in effect at the time arbitration is started,”
Defendants argue that a court-appointed substitute arbitrator can be ordered to apply the
NAF Code of Procedure that is currently available online. See Levy, D.D.S. v. Cain, Watters
& Assocs., P.L.L.C., No. 2:09-cv-723, 2010 WL 271300, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 15, 2010)
(finding “no apparent reasons why the NAF rules cannot be applied by a substitute
arbitrator”). Pursuant to the consent decree, however, the NAF cannot arbitrate any
consumer disputes initiated after July 24, 2009, so there cannot be any NAF rules that remain
“in effect” for administering consumer disputes. See Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No.
C06-1772JLR, 2009 WL 3485933, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009) (“[B]ecause NAF does
not arbitrate consumer disputes filed after July 24, 2009, there are simply no NAF rules
currently in effect for such arbitrations.”). And even if we were to assume that the August
1, 2008, NAF Code of Procedure were somehow still in effect, the code itself states that it
“shall be administered only by the [NAF] or by any entity or individual providing
administrative services by agreement with the [NAF].” NAF Code of Procedure, supra, at
1. Rivera asserts that there is no “entity or individual providing administrative services by
agreement with” the NAF at this time. See Carr, 944 N.E.2d at 335 (“[I]t is unclear whether
a substitute arbitrator could use NAF rules.”). Defendants have not provided this Court with
any information to the contrary.

{36} Defendants also argue that because the arbitration provisions require “[a]rbitration
. . . conducted under the rules and procedures of the [NAF] or successor organization that
are in effect at the time arbitration is started,” a “successor” to the NAF can be appointed by
a court pursuant to § 5 of the FAA. (Emphasis added.) We doubt that a substitute arbitrator,
not selected by the parties but imposed instead by order of a court, could be considered in
law a “successor organization” as contemplated by the plain language of the contract. In
corporate law, the term “successor” is a legal term of art meaning a “corporation that,

12
through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, is vested with the
rights and duties of an earlier corporation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1569 (9th ed. 2009).

{37} Finally, Defendants point to the severance clause in the contract as support for the
proposition that the parties’ designation of the NAF was merely an ancillary logistical
concern. See Jones v. GGNSC Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167-68 (D.S.D. 2010)
(“The existence of [a] severance clause in the arbitration agreement is evidence that the
parties did not intend for the entire agreement to fail if one portion was invalid or
unenforceable.”). The boilerplate severance clause in this contract provides simply that “[i]f
any term of the Arbitration Provisions is unenforceable, the remaining terms are severable
and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law.” Given the number of references to
the NAF as the only named arbitrator and the substantial reliance on the NAF Code of
Procedure throughout the contract, we could not sever the unenforceable terms of the
arbitration provisions without substantially rewriting the contract. Where the NAF
involvement in the arbitration provisions is so integral to the agreement itself, for us to
change those core provisions would violate our duty to enforce the agreement according to
its terms. See Stewart, 9 A.3d at 221 (concluding “that the severability clause cannot . . .
override the fact that the NAF and the NAF Code were an integral part of the Agreement”);
John R. Ray & Sons, Inc. v. Stroman, 923 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex. App. 1996) (“[W]hen the
severed portion is integral to the entire contract, a severability clause, standing alone, cannot
save the contract.”).

{38} The pervasive references to the NAF in the contract compel our conclusion that the
parties intended for the NAF to be the exclusive arbitrator in any out-of-court dispute
resolution. The parties explicitly specified that arbitration would proceed under NAF rules
and procedures. Arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion,” and the parties “may . .
. specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.” Volt Info.,
489 U.S. at 479. We conclude that “[t]he unavailability of NAF as arbitrator . . . threaten[s]
to eviscerate the core of the parties’ agreement.” Carideo, 2009 WL 3485933, at *6. We
hold that arbitration before the NAF was integral to the agreement to arbitrate and that § 5
of the FAA does not allow a court to select and impose on the contracting parties a substitute
arbitrator inconsistent with the plain terms of their contract.

D. The Court of Appeals Construed Too Narrowly This Court’s Opinion in
Cordova.

{39} Rivera has argued throughout this litigation that the arbitration provisions are
unenforceable under the generally applicable contract defense of unconscionability because
the title loan contract requires the borrower to arbitrate any and all claims but allows the
lender to go to court for its preferred remedies. Although the district court made its ruling
without the benefit of our opinion in Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, holding a similar
arbitration provision of a small loan agreement void for unconscionability, Cordova had
been decided before the Court of Appeals issued its opinion rejecting Rivera’s argument.
One of the issues on which we granted certiorari was whether the Court of Appeals

13
misapplied our Cordova holding by upholding a clause that required a borrower to arbitrate
all her claims, but reserved to the lender the right to a judicial determination of its most
important claims. Rivera argues in this Court that the Court of Appeals misstated Cordova’s
holding as requiring “complet[e] one-sidedness” before an arbitration clause can be found
unconscionable. Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals was correct and that the
arbitration provisions are enforceable under New Mexico law.

{40} A threshold issue we must address is whether Rivera’s challenge to the Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of Cordova and resolution of the unconscionability issue are now
moot in light of our holding that there is no longer an arbitrator eligible to arbitrate either the
substance of the dispute or the threshold issue of unconscionability under the terms of the
agreement by the parties. While as a prudential matter we normally will not address moot
issues that will have no practical impact on the parties before us, we will address issues of
substantial public interest or issues that “are capable of repetition yet evading review.” Cobb
v. State Canvassing Bd., 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498 (deciding issues
of election recount and recheck even though it was no longer possible to affect the election
results); Howell v. Heim, 118 N.M. 500, 503-04, 882 P.2d 541, 544-45 (1994) (addressing
legality of a superseded regulation where similar issues could arise in future cases yet evade
appellate review).

{41} The issues regarding the Court of Appeals’ published interpretation of Cordova in
the context of one-sided arbitration clauses represent the kinds of issues that are capable of
repetition yet likely to evade our appellate review. This is particularly so in light of the
inevitable jurisprudential effect of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Rent-A-Center, which held that where a delegation clause within the arbitration agreement
clearly and unmistakably delegates the issue of unconscionability to the arbitrator, that issue
should be decided by the arbitrator, instead of by a court, unless the party opposing
arbitration has specifically challenged the validity of the delegation clause. 561 U.S. at ___,
130 S. Ct. at 2775-76, 2780-81; see, e.g., Momot v. Mastro, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2011 WL
2464781, at *5 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying Rent-A-Center to hold that general language giving
the arbitrator authority to determine “the validity or application of any of the provisions of”
the arbitration clause was sufficient to take that issue away from a court of law (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Given the predictable result that arbitration clauses
in form contracts between large corporations and individual consumers will assign such
unconscionability determinations to arbitrators, this Court and other courts will have few,
if any, future opportunities to participate in the development of our published common law
related to unconscionability doctrines in those contexts. Because arbitrators will have to rely
on the common law that was developed before Rent-A-Center, it is particularly important
that we correct a judicial misinterpretation of our caselaw that may otherwise remain on the
books as an erroneous precedent. We therefore will address the correctness of the
interpretation of Cordova contained in the Court of Appeals opinion in this case.

{42} Whether a contract provision is unconscionable and unenforceable is a question of
law that we review de novo. See Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 11. Although we have

14
already concluded that the arbitration provisions are unenforceable due to the unavailability
of the NAF to arbitrate the dispute, we agree with Rivera that the Court of Appeals in this
case misapplied the central holding of Cordova. We formally reverse the Court of Appeals
opinion and hold that the arbitration provisions are unfairly one-sided and substantively
unconscionable.

{43} “Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine, rooted in public policy, which allows
courts to render unenforceable an agreement that is unreasonably favorable to one party
while precluding a meaningful choice of the other party.” Id. ¶ 21. “The doctrine of
contractual unconscionability can be analyzed from both procedural and substantive
perspectives.” Id.

{44} “Procedural unconscionability . . . examines the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract, including the relative bargaining strength,
sophistication of the parties, and the extent to which either party felt free to accept or decline
terms demanded by the other.” Id. ¶ 23. When assessing procedural unconscionability,
courts should consider whether the contract is one of adhesion. An adhesion contract is a
standardized contract offered by a transacting party with superior bargaining strength to a
“weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without opportunity for bargaining.” Id. ¶ 33.
Adhesion contracts generally warrant heightened judicial scrutiny because the drafting party
is in a superior bargaining position. See Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d
155, 170 (Wis. 2006). Although not all adhesion contracts are unconscionable, an adhesion
contract is procedurally unconscionable and unenforceable “when the terms are patently
unfair to the weaker party.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 33; see also Guthmann v. La Vida
Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 509, 709 P.2d 675, 678 (1985), disapproved of on other grounds by
Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 31.

{45} “Substantive unconscionability concerns the legality and fairness of the contract
terms themselves,” and the “analysis focuses on such issues as whether the contract terms
are commercially reasonable and fair, the purpose and effect of the terms, the one-sidedness
of the terms, and other similar public policy concerns.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 22.
A contract provision is substantively unconscionable if it “is grossly unreasonable and
against our public policy under the circumstances.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 31.

{46} “Contract provisions that unreasonably benefit one party over another are
substantively unconscionable.” Id. ¶ 25. For example, where a lender imposes on a
borrower a contract that requires the borrower to settle all claims it may have against the
lender through arbitration “while reserving for the lender the exclusive option of access to
the courts for all remedies the lender is most likely to pursue against the borrower,” the
contract “is against New Mexico public policy and is therefore void as unconscionable.” Id.
¶ 1; see also Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-NMSC-011, ¶ 10, 133 N.M.
661, 68 P.3d 901 (striking down a facially neutral contract provision because application of
the provision benefitted only the insurer, not the insured).

15
{47} Under New Mexico principles of contract law, a finding of unconscionability may
be based on either procedural or substantive unconscionability, or a combination of both.
“While there is a greater likelihood of a contract’s being invalidated for unconscionability
if there is a combination of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, there is no
absolute requirement in our law that both must be present to the same degree or that they
both be present at all.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 24. “The more substantively
oppressive a contract term, the less procedural unconscionability may be required for a court
to conclude that the offending term is unenforceable.” Id.

{48} The arbitration provisions analyzed in Cordova “broadly stated that the parties must
arbitrate all disputes,” id. ¶ 3, but also provided that if the borrower defaulted on the loan,
the lender could “‘seek its remedies in an action at law or in equity, including but not limited
to, judicial foreclosure or repossession,’” id. ¶ 4. Cordova concluded that the arbitration
clause was “so unfairly and unreasonably one-sided that it [wa]s substantively
unconscionable.” Id. ¶ 32. This Court determined that the substantive unconscionability of
the one-sided contract provisions was “so compelling” that we found it unnecessary to
address whether the provisions were also procedurally unconscionable. Id.

{49} Other jurisdictions have concurred that unfairly one-sided contract provisions are
unconscionable. See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1139-40
(D. Ariz. 2006) (concluding that a one-sided provision was substantively unconscionable
under Arizona law); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 995-96 (Mont. 1999) (holding
a contract provision unconscionable where “the weaker bargaining party ha[d] no choice but
to settle all claims . . . through . . . arbitration, whereas the more powerful bargaining party
and drafter [of the agreement] ha[d] the unilateral right to settle a dispute . . . in a court of
law”); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866-67 (Ohio 1998) (refusing to enforce
a provision in a consumer loan that allowed the finance company to obtain the judicial
remedy of foreclosure but required the borrower to arbitrate all claims); Taylor v. Butler, 142
S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tenn. 2004) (“[T]he arbitration clause . . . is unconscionable and therefore
void because it reserves the right to a judicial forum for the defendants while requiring the
plaintiff to submit all claims to arbitration.”); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511
S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1998) (holding unconscionable and unenforceable a contract
provision that waived the borrower’s right to access the courts while preserving the lender’s
right to obtain relief in a judicial forum); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc., 714 N.W.2d at 172-73
(holding that a contract provision that unfairly limited the debtor’s remedies, as compared
to those available to the creditor, was substantively unconscionable).

{50} In this case the Court of Appeals concluded that American General reasonably
excepted judicial foreclosure and repossession from the claims covered by arbitration
because (1) “judicial actions for foreclosure and repossession are highly regulated by the
statutory provisions governing secured transactions of the Uniform Commercial Code” and
(2) “without access to these judicial and extra-judicial procedures, American General would
lose many of the statutory protections it enjoyed as a secured creditor.” Rivera, 2010-
NMCA-046, ¶ 13. We disagree.

16
{51} As a matter of law arbitrators have broad authority and are deemed capable of
granting any remedy necessary to resolve a case. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Law and
Practice of Arbitration 48-49 (3d ed. 2009) (citing, for example, Rodriguez v.
Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1209-10 (D.P.R. 1995)); 4 Am. Jur. 2d
Alternative Dispute Resolution § 193 (2007) (explaining that “[a]n arbitrator’s judgment has
the same effect as a judgment of a court of last resort”). The arbitrator’s power includes the
authority to arbitrate and resolve statutory claims. “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see also Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1987) (explaining that the FAA “mandates
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims” but providing that the “mandate
may be overridden by a contrary congressional command” and that the “burden is on the
party opposing arbitration . . . to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue”).

{52} Both the 2008 NAF Code of Procedure and the contract in this case reflect the
principle that an arbitrator has broad power to resolve claims involving a lender’s security
interest in collateral. The NAF Code of Procedure expressly provides that “[a]ll types of
legal and equitable remedies and relief available in court are available in arbitration. . . .
Parties may effectively pursue any remedy or relief in arbitration including statutory,
common law, injunctive, equitable, and all other lawful remedies and relief.” NAF Code of
Procedure, supra, at 10. And the contract at issue in this case specifically states that the
“Lender can enforce its rights to [the borrower’s] property in court” or “can elect to arbitrate
such claims.” We conclude that an arbitrator can be given the authority to address any
claims a lender may have against a borrower.

{53} In its form loan contract, American General unilaterally chose the forum in which
it wanted to resolve its disputes, ensuring that it could “enforce its rights to [Rivera’s]
property in court or as otherwise provided by law” while extinguishing Rivera’s right to
access the courts for any reason. By excepting foreclosure and repossession from arbitration,
American General retained the right to obtain through the judicial system the only remedies
it was likely to need. If Rivera’s truck had not been destroyed and still had been worth
$15,500, American General easily could have recouped the loan principal of $6,517 through
repossession. American General’s ability under the arbitration clause to seek judicial redress
of its likeliest claims while forcing Rivera to arbitrate any claim she may have is
unreasonably one-sided. See Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846,
854-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that a contract provision that forced the borrower
to arbitrate all claims but allowed the lender to obtain foreclosure, the only remedy the
lender was likely to need, was “so one-sided as to be substantively unconscionable”); Iwen,
977 P.2d at 995-96 (explaining that the more powerful bargaining party unfairly reserved the
right to go to court and obtain the only remedy it was likely to need).

{54} We therefore determine that the arbitration provisions are unfairly one-sided and void

17
under New Mexico law. As in Cordova, the arbitration provisions in this case are so
substantively unconscionable that we need not consider whether the provisions are also
procedurally unconscionable.

E. The Arbitration Provisions Must Be Struck in Their Entirety.

{55} When this Court determines that contract provisions are unenforceable we can either
“strike the . . . provisions in their entirety” or reform the provisions “into a fair and
balanced” agreement. Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 39; see also Padilla, 2003-NMSC-011,
¶ 15 (explaining that where a contract or contract term is unconscionable, a court can “refuse
to enforce the contract,” “enforce the remainder of the contract,” or “limit the application of
any unconscionable term” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{56} The title loan contract in this case contains numerous provisions that are
unenforceable either because they refer to the NAF or because they are unfairly one-sided
and substantively unconscionable. Arbitration before the NAF using the NAF Code of
Procedure was integral to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, and “[t]o appoint a substitute
arbitrator would constitute a wholesale revision of the arbitration clause.” Carideo, 2009
WL 3485933, at *6. Additionally, as in Cordova the unconscionable terms are central to the
arbitration scheme and cannot be severed without substantially altering the method of
dispute resolution contractually agreed on by the parties. See Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021,
¶ 40. This Court’s “duty is confined to interpretation of the contract which the parties made
for themselves.” Continental Potash, Inc., 115 N.M. at 704, 858 P.2d at 80 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We will not perform “judicial surgery” by rewriting
a contract that is laced with unenforceable terms that were “central to the original
mechanism[] for resolving disputes between the parties.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 40.
We hold that the arbitration provisions must be struck from the contract in their entirety.

CONCLUSION

{57} The arbitration provisions in the loan contract are unenforceable. We vacate the
order compelling arbitration, reverse the district court and the Court of Appeals, and remand
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

{58} IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________________________________
CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice

18
____________________________________
PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice

____________________________________
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

____________________________________
EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

Topic Index for Rivera v. American General Financial Services Inc., Docket Number
32,340

AR ARBITRATION

CN CONTRACTS
CN-CO Contracts Against Public Policy
CN-UC Unconscionable

RE REMEDIES
RE-AN Arbitration

19