#24924-aff in pt & rev&rem-KERN, Circuit Judge
2009 SD 23
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
CARLEEN ANN MUENSTER, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT MUENSTER, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
HONORABLE KATHLEEN K. CALDWELL
Judge
****
MARY H. BURD
Burd Law Office Attorneys for plaintiff
Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellee.
MARK F. MARSHALL
Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, LLP Attorneys for defendant
Sioux Falls, South Dakota and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
FEBRUARY 17, 2009
OPINION FILED 4/8/09
#24924
KERN, Circuit Judge
[¶1.] Theodore Roosevelt Muenster (Ted) appeals from a judgment and
decree of divorce granted to Carleen Ann Muenster (Carleen) challenging the trial
court's division of property, the determination of child support and the finding that
he was in contempt of court. We affirm the property division and contempt finding
and reverse and remand for recalculation of Ted's child support.
BACKGROUND
[¶2.] Ted and Carleen were married on October 19, 1996. At the time of the
marriage, the parties were living in a home owned by Ted on St. Paul Street in
Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Carleen had obtained a bachelor's degree in business
administration and was working for Specialized Card Services, earning $32,000 per
year. Ted had not yet earned his bachelor's degree and was working for his mother,
Karen Muenster, maintaining her rental properties. Ted had previously bought and
sold several real properties in Sioux Falls. In 1997, Ted completed his
undergraduate degree and the parties' first child, Emily, was born September 14,
1997.
[¶3.] In August 1998, the parties moved to Vermillion so Ted could pursue a
law degree. In October 1998, Carleen obtained a job at the law school in the Dean's
Office, earning a salary of $32,000 per year and the job provided medical insurance
for the children. The parties lived with Carleen's mother for the first eight months.
The parties sold the house on St. Paul Street in Sioux Falls for approximately
$79,000. With the proceeds they paid off marital debts, including some of Ted's
undergraduate expenses, and purchased two rental properties in Vermillion: 217
and 225 N. University (University) and 515 E. Clark (Clark) in which they resided.
#24924
The parties sold the University property to clear debt and purchased a duplex at
200 and 202 N. Pine Street (Pine). All the properties were titled jointly by the
parties. The parties received about $2,000 per month in net income from the rental
properties.
[¶4.] The parties' second child, Alexander, was born October 22, 2000.
Carleen enrolled in graduate school in 2001. Ted graduated from law school in
2003, and elected not to take the bar exam but continued to manage the rental
property on Pine Street and work with his mother in real estate ventures. In 2003,
the parties moved to Sioux Falls as Carleen obtained a paid internship at "West
Central" as a counselor. The parties lived rent-free in a furnished home located on
Harriet Lee belonging to Ted's parents. The parties' third child, Olivia, was born
January 1, 2004. Carleen obtained her master's degree in the spring of 2004.
[¶5.] As the couple now had three small children, they decided Carleen
should remain at home with the children. Alex had ADHD and she began home
schooling him. Ted worked at Wells Fargo and Home Depot, earning between $10
and $13 per hour. He later obtained employment as the director of the Chiesman
Foundation at a salary of $38,000 per year. His position was eliminated after three
months and he collected unemployment benefits for eight months. Ted obtained his
real estate license and worked at Century 21 but never sold a house.
[¶6.] On June 13, 2007, Carleen filed for divorce, interim custody of the
parties' children, child support and interim spousal support. At the time of the
divorce proceeding, Carleen was unemployed and Ted indicated he was working full
-2-
#24924
time as a real estate agent and managing the rental properties the parties owned in
Vermillion. Their only income was the $1,300 per month they were now receiving
as net income from the rental properties. The trial court ordered Ted to pay
Carleen her one-half share of the rental income ($650) and the court ordered both
parties to obtain employment. Carleen promptly obtained employment with Capital
Card Services at a salary of $47,705 per year.
[¶7.] On August 16, 2007, Carleen filed motions to compel answers to
interrogatories, to hold Ted in contempt for failing to pay the $650 per month and
for modification of support. A hearing was held on September 24, 2007, at which
time the parties agreed that the answers to interrogatories had been received and
that the accounting regarding the rental income would be produced in two weeks.
Prior to the hearing, Ted satisfied the child support arrearages generated by the
court's prior order of $650 per month. The trial court ordered Ted to immediately
seek gainful employment and ordered that the remaining $650 in equity from the
parties' rentals would be given to Carleen to assist with her child care expenses,
which now exceeded $840 per month, and as temporary support. The court also
ordered that on or before October 8, 2007, Ted would comply with Carleen's
discovery request to provide a full accounting of the rental income received.
[¶8.] On October 31, 2007, Carleen filed a second motion seeking to have
Ted held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the court's order directing
him to produce the financial information and for failing to pay 100 percent of the
rental income to Carleen.
-3-
#24924
[¶9.] A hearing was held on December 10, 2007, and counsel for the parties
again agreed that an accounting of the rental income would be made within two
weeks to Carleen's counsel. Counsel also obtained clarification from the court
regarding the September 24, 2007, order which provided that Ted would pay
Carleen 100 percent of the net income from the rental property.
[¶10.] On December 12, 2007, Karen Muenster delivered to the sheriff a
notice to quit and vacate the property at 2304 Harriet Lee, thereby beginning
eviction proceedings against Carleen and the children who were still residing in the
Muenster residence. Carleen vacated the property voluntarily and obtained an
apartment for herself and the couple's three children. On January 8, 2007, Karen
Muenster filed mechanic's liens totaling $44,910 against the Pine Street property
($33,563) and against the Clark Street property ($11,347) for taxes paid, repairs,
improvements and property management fees beginning in 2002 and ending
December 31, 2007. At the time of the divorce, the Clark Street property was
valued at $70,152 and had a mortgage of $60,185. The Pine Street property was
valued at $109,087 and had a mortgage of $70,496. The parties' combined equity in
both properties was $48,558. Thus, the mechanic's liens were nearly equal to the
parties' equity in the two properties.
[¶11.] The case proceeded to a trial before the court on March 6, 2008. At
trial, Ted testified and produced some evidence that he brought into the marriage
approximately $177,000 in premarital assets obtained from the sale of several
properties he had purchased prior to marriage and the proceeds from the sale of the
St. Paul Street residence in Sioux Falls in 1998. Carleen testified that Ted had not
-4-
#24924
paid her the $1,300 per month ordered by the court. Ted testified that he was
working for his brother but not receiving any income. He also testified that the
expenses on the rentals had increased and that they were now only netting $650 per
month.
[¶12.] The trial court awarded the parties' only income producing property,
the Vermillion rentals, to Carleen and set Ted's child support at $1,000 per month.
The court held Ted in contempt of court for failing to comply with the court's
October order requiring Ted to pay Carleen $1,300 per month. The court also found
that Ted colluded with his mother in the filing of the mechanic's liens to tie up the
parties' equity in the property. The court determined the liens were not filed in
good faith and ordered Ted to pay Carleen's attorney's fees associated with her
defense of the mechanic's liens and to reimburse Carleen for the equity in the
properties if the liens were upheld.
[¶13.] On appeal, Ted raises the following issues:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dividing
the marital estate?
Whether the trial court erred in determining the amount
of child support by imputing a prior income?
Whether the trial court erred in its finding of contempt of
court?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶14.] On appeal a trial court's division of property and award of child
support is reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. Billion v. Billion, 1996
SD 101, ¶ 14, 553 NW2d 226, 230 (citations omitted). "Abuse of discretion refers to
a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against,
-5-
#24924
reason and evidence." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2005 SD 101, ¶ 11, 705 NW2d 77, 80
(citing Pellegrin v. Pellegrin, 1998 SD 19, ¶ 10, 574 NW2d 644, 646). The correct
inquiry "is not whether we would have made the same ruling, 'but whether a
judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could
reasonably have reached such a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting DeVries v. DeVries, 519
NW2d 73, 75 (SD 1994)).
[¶15.] "We review a trial court's findings as to contempt under a clearly
erroneous standard." Driscoll v. Driscoll, 1997 SD 113, ¶ 10, 568 NW2d 771, 773
(citing Taecker v. Taecker, 527 NW2d 295, 298 (SD 1995)).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
Division of Property
[¶16.] "South Dakota Codified Law 25-4-44 authorizes [trial] courts to
equitably divide the marital estate in a divorce proceeding." Terca v. Terca, 2008
SD 99, ¶ 20, 757 NW2d 319, 325. "All property may be divided, regardless of its
title or origin." Christians v. Christians, 2001 SD 142, ¶ 13, 637 NW2d 377, 381 n1
(citing Radigan v. Radigan, 465 NW2d 483, 486 (SD 1991)). This includes property
with premarital origins. Strickland v. Strickland, 470 NW2d 832, 836 (SD
1991)(noting that "[t]his Court has consistently held that the trial court has
discretion in determining how to consider premarital assets")(citation omitted). A
court is not required to "give both divorcing parties credit for all their premarital
assets in order to make an equitable division of property." Pellegrin, 1998 SD 19, ¶
19, 574 NW2d at 648.
-6-
#24924
[¶17.] Ted first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
deemed the Vermillion rental properties part of the divisible marital estate. His
assertion is premised on the fact that the properties were purchased with proceeds
from the sale of his premarital property and that Carleen did not contribute
financially to the acquisition of the Vermillion rentals or their management. Ted
testified that he entered the marriage with a net worth of $177,000. During trial,
however, it became clear that this figure was somewhat inflated. Ted reported
capital gains of $10,000 on his tax returns in 1996 and $34,500 in 1997. The parties
sold the unmortgaged St. Paul Street residence in 1998 for $79,000 when they
moved to Vermillion. The parties used these funds to pay living expenses and debts
and to purchase the Vermillion rental properties which they titled jointly in their
names. Although Carleen did not have premarital funds to contribute to purchase
the properties, her valuable contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of the
properties may not be ignored. Courts are directed to consider a party's indirect
contributions, especially where, as here, one spouse's efforts permit the other spouse
to acquire and maintain property with "assets that otherwise would be required for
the support and maintenance of the family." Terca, 2008 SD 99, ¶ 25, 757 NW2d at
326. "Only in the case where one spouse has made no or de minimis contributions
to the acquisition or maintenance of an item of property and has no need for
support, should a court set it aside as non-marital property." Billion, 1996 SD 101,
¶ 21, 553 NW2d at 232.
[¶18.] Carleen earned $32,000 per year in 1996 and 1997. In 1998, she
worked for the Dean of the Law School and again earned $32,000 per year while
-7-
#24924
Ted attended and completed law school. She also provided primary care for the
parties' children and maintained the household. Carleen's consistent income and
contributions as mother and wife were substantial, well beyond de minimis and,
thus, the property was appropriately considered marital property subject to
equitable division.
[¶19.] In making an equitable division of property, "there is no rigid formula
that must be followed, nor any fixed percentage to which either party is entitled."
Clement v. Clement, 292 NW2d 799, 801 (SD 1980)(internal citations omitted).
However, "[w]e have identified certain factors for a trial court to consider when
dividing marital property." Novak v. Novak, 2006 SD 34, ¶ 4, 713 NW2d 551, 552.
These include: "(1) the duration of the marriage; (2) the value of the property
owned by the parties; (3) the ages of the parties; (4) the health of the parties; (5) the
competency of the parties to earn a living; (6) the contribution of each party to the
accumulation of the property; and (7) the income-producing capacity of the parties'
assets." Id. (citing Billion, 1996 SD 101, ¶ 21, 553 NW2d at 232).
[¶20.] The trial court considered each of the required factors and awarded
Carleen the Vermillion properties. Ted claims that the trial court's consideration of
the factors was precursory and that the award of all income earning property to
Carleen was an abuse of discretion. At the time of trial both parties were 42 years
of age and in good health. Ted had suffered from a thyroid condition which was
under control and not an impediment to employment.
-8-
#24924
[¶21.] "The trial court is clearly authorized and directed to consider the
contribution of each party to the accumulation of assets" when dividing marital
property. Korzan v. Korzan, 488 NW2d 689, 692 (SD 1992). As determined by the
trial court, Carleen's contribution to the parties' accumulation of assets was
substantial. She worked full time for all but three years of the parties' marriage,
enabling Ted to finish his undergraduate degree and attend and graduate from law
school. Her efforts also assisted him in managing the couple's Vermillion
properties. Carleen's employment ended only after the parties' agreed that she
would stay home with the children. This shift did not lessen her contributions to
the marital estate. Instead, as this Court has repeatedly concluded, the duties of
mother and homemaker "constitute a valuable contribution to marital property."
Billion, 1996 SD 101, ¶ 30, 553 NW2d at 233 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 471
NW2d 156, 160 (SD 1991)).
[¶22.] In contrast, despite a law degree and a real estate license, Ted
maintained formal employment for approximately one year of the parties' ten-year
marriage. His contributions were made through the management of the rental
properties. (However, Ted's mother testified she was significantly involved in the
management of the properties since 2001.) Despite the fact both parties have
similar earning potential due to their advanced degrees, Ted has been and remains
chronically under-employed. At trial, Ted testified that he currently works for his
brother renovating buildings, receives no income and lives with him rent free. He
estimated the value of the compensation received from his brother at $10 to $12 per
hour. Ted testified that he could not pay Carleen the $1,300 per month rental
-9-
#24924
income from the Vermillion properties because the expenses for the properties had
increased and thus the net income was now only $650 per month. This was not
established by the evidence at trial and the court found him in contempt.
[¶23.] Carleen and the three children were left in a precarious situation as a
result of the divorce. As Ted and Carleen were living in a furnished home belonging
to Ted's parents at the time of the divorce, her subsequent eviction left her with no
home or furniture and uncertain support from Ted. Her daycare expenses alone for
three children exceeded $840 per month. From this set of facts, the trial court
determined that, notwithstanding Carleen's higher income, an unbalanced property
division was necessary to provide adequate assets and a reliable source of support
for Carleen and the children. This type of analysis is not entirely unprecedented.
For example, in Morrison v. Morrison, we concluded that "the trial court was
justified in awarding [the] appellee a substantial share of the assets to put her in a
stable financial condition" in part because of "appellant's unreliability in repaying a
loan from the appellee and his failure to maintain child support payments." 323
NW2d 877, 879 (SD 1982).
[¶24.] In addition to the aforementioned factors, courts are also permitted to
consider a party's intentional depletion of a marital asset when making an equitable
division of property. See, e.g., Johnson, 471 NW2d at 161 (finding that if a
"husband fraudulently dissipated marital assets, they should be included in the
marital estate and charged against him"). The trial court, in the present case,
concluded that the mechanic's liens filed by Ted's mother were not filed in good
faith and were initiated to deprive Carleen of any equity in the Vermillion
-10-
#24924
properties. The court ordered Ted to pay the legal fees incurred in the defense of
the lien claims and to assume any debt owed to his mother. Ted alleges that the
mechanic's liens against the Vermillion properties were improperly considered and
that the order was improper.
[¶25.] The trial court based its finding of fraud largely upon the testimony of
Ted and his mother. "Trial courts are [] required to determine the credibility of
witnesses that testify." Grode v. Grode, 1996 SD 15 ¶ 21, 543 NW2d 795, 801
(internal citation omitted). The trial court had the opportunity to judge the
credibility of those before it and found Ted and his mother not credible. This
finding is afforded due regard and will not be interfered with on appeal. Id. The
trial court noted that Ted, despite holding a law degree, made no answer to the suit
and testified that, although the parties were both named as defendants, he thought
Carleen could answer for him as well. The court found that he acquiesced in the
filing of the liens by his mother to deprive Carleen of any equity in the properties
and thereby perpetrated a fraud upon the court. The court considered the filing of
the liens to be a "deliberate attempt to make an end run around an equitable
division of property in this divorce case." The court also found that the mechanic's
liens had little likelihood of prevailing at trial given that they were not timely filed
and that the alleged agreement between Ted and his mother for the payment of a
management fee and taxes was not made in writing. The trial court did not render
judgment on the validity of the liens but rather, after determining the liens were
brought in bad faith, issued orders to protect Carleen's equity in the property. Such
consideration is within the ambit of a trial court charged with dividing the marital
-11-
#24924
estate in an equitable manner. See, e.g., Pennock v. Pennock, 356 NW2d 913, 915
(SD 1984)(noting that a party's transfer of properties "appear suspect in the way
that they were" made, in part because they were concluded "shortly before the
divorce trial[,] made with inadequate documentation[, and] were transfers to blood
relatives").
[¶26.] The trial court was faced with determining what was equitable under
these unique circumstances. In light of Carleen's substantial contributions, Ted's
inconsistent support and his attempt to deplete the Vermillion properties' value, we
cannot conclude that the division of property was inequitable. The trial court's
division of property is affirmed.
Child Support
[¶27.] "The statutory scheme in SDCL Chapter 25-7 governs child support
calculations" and sets forth a procedure "wherein the initial step is to determine the
current net income of the parties and scheduled support amount." Kauth v.
Bartlett, 2008 SD 20, ¶¶ 11, 13, 746 NW2d 747, 751. Only after this step is
completed may a deviation, under SDCL 25-7-6.2, enter into the child support
obligation computation. Id. ¶ 12. This "procedure for child support calculation is
mandatory." Hollinsworth v. Hollinsworth, 2008 SD 102, ¶ 15, 757 NW2d 422, 427
n6 (citing Kauth, 2008 SD 20, ¶ 13, 746 NW2d at 751).
[¶28.] Ted argues that the appropriate procedure was not followed. Carleen
submitted a proposed child support calculation imputing Ted's yearly wages at
$42,000, which produced a base support obligation of $777.38. With additions for
health insurance and daycare expenses, she requested monthly support in the
-12-
#24924
amount of $1,215.89. The trial court noted Ted's education and prior employment
at $38,000 per year and set his support at $1,000 per month without performing a
calculation based on his actual earnings. Carleen's income was calculated without
consideration of income received from the rentals.
[¶29.] In Kauth, the obligor voluntarily took a lower paying job and the
referee utilized his previous wages when calculating child support. Kauth, 2008 SD
20, ¶ 2, 746 NW2d at 749. In that case, we noted that the language of South
Dakota's statutory scheme governing child support calculations "does not authorize
automatically imputing a higher income when someone voluntarily takes a lower
paying job." Id. ¶ 11. The only statute which addresses imputing income to an
obligor is SDCL 25-7-6.4, which merely creates a rebuttable presumption that a
parent is capable of being employed at minimum wage." Id. (emphasis in original).
[¶30.] A proper application of the statutes in this case requires the trial court
to calculate Ted's monthly child support based on his actual earnings. The parties'
net monthly income is then combined to determine the appropriate support
obligation. Only after these calculations have been performed may the trial court
consider any deviation requested by the parties pursuant to SDCL 25-7-6.10.
[¶31.] Ted filed his notice of appeal on June 17, 2008. On June 16, 2008,
Carleen filed a motion for an order establishing custody, visitation and child
support pending appeal. A hearing on the motion was held on August 4, 2008, and
the trial court entered an order again setting child support at $1,000 and
authorizing the defendant to have his child support directly reviewed by filing a
petition for modification without showing any change in circumstances. Ted
-13-
#24924
petitioned for a modification of the child support order and the matter was heard by
a referee. Ted filed a motion with this Court, pursuant to SDCL 15-26A-56 to
supplement the record on appeal to include the report issued by the referee which
adjusted Ted's child support.
[¶32.] "An appeal from a judgment or order strips the trial court's jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the judgment or order except as to certain trivial
matters." Reaser v. Reaser, 2004 SD 116, ¶ 28, 688 NW2d 429, 437 (citations
omitted). Trial courts are "restrained from entering any order that would change or
modify the judgment on appeal or have the effect of interfering with review of the
judgment." Id. Therefore, the trial court improperly referred the matter to a
referee who, in the present case, did not have jurisdiction to consider Ted's child
support obligation during the pendency of the appeal. 1
[¶33.] The trial court, when calculating Ted's child support, failed to follow
the procedures mandated by statute and articulated by this Court. Therefore, the
award of child support is reversed and remanded for recalculation in compliance
with the child support guidelines and consideration of any deviations requested by
the parties. Accordingly, Ted's motion to supplement the record is denied.
Contempt
[¶34.] The trial court found that Ted had willfully and contumaciously
disobeyed its order to pay interim support in the amount of $1,300 per month and
found him in contempt. Ted alleges that the trial court failed to consider whether
1. If a change in circumstances occurred that necessitated review of a child
support order which was the subject of an appeal, a party could move this
Court for an order of partial remand to have that issue returned to the trial
court for consideration.
-14-
#24924
he had the actual ability to comply with the order and requests that the finding of
contempt be vacated.
[¶35.] The four elements of contempt are (1) existence of an order; (2)
knowledge of the order; (3) ability to comply with the order; and (4) willful or
contumacious disobedience of the order. Johnson, 451 NW2d at 295 (citing
Thomerson v. Thomerson, 387 NW2d 509 (SD 1986); Hanisch v. Hanisch, 273 NW2d
188 (SD 1979)). A party cannot be held in contempt if he or she did not have the
ability to pay in compliance with a court's order. Mundlein v. Mundlein, 2004 SD
25, ¶ 7, 676 NW2d 819, 822 (quoting Johnson, 451 NW2d at 295). However, "[w]hen
the defense is inability to pay, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish his
inability to comply with the court's order." Johnson, 451 NW2d at 295 (citations
omitted). This requires a complete and detailed financial position statement for the
court's review. Lampert v. Lampert, 388 NW2d 899, 903 (SD 1986). "Self serving
testimony alone is insufficient and corroboration is necessary to establish a defense
that a party cannot pay child support." Sazama v. State ex rel. Muilenberg, 2007
SD 17, ¶ 20, 729 NW2d 335, 343 (citations omitted).
[¶36.] In August 2007, Carleen and her counsel filed a motion to compel the
production of information regarding the rental receipts and expenditures. A
hearing was held on September 24, 2007, at which the court ordered Ted to provide
by October 8, 2007, a full accounting of the rental income received and expenditures
of monies from the rental income. The accounting was not produced and on October
31, 2007, Carleen filed a second motion seeking to hold Ted in contempt. At a
hearing held on December 10, 2007, Ted again agreed to provide the accounting
-15-
#24924
within two weeks. At the March 6, 2008, trial, Ted introduced Exhibit K, a three-
page handwritten document listing partial expense and income information for
January through March. This exhibit and his testimony was the only proof offered
regarding his alleged inability to comply, which the trial court did not find credible.
Because he "failed to provide the trial court with a complete detailed financial
position, his ability or inability to pay is impossible to determine." Lampert, 388
NW2d at 903. Ted's contention that he could not pay the support as ordered was
simply unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it
concluded that Ted was in willful and contumacious disobedience of the order and
the finding of contempt is affirmed.
Attorney's Fees
[¶37.] Both parties have petitioned the court for an award of attorney's fees
generated as a result of this appeal. Ted's request for attorney's fees is denied.
Carleen is awarded two-thirds of her requested fees in the amount of $3,183.00.
[¶38.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and ZINTER,
Justices, and SABERS, Retired Justice, concur.
[¶39.] KERN, Circuit Judge, for MEIERHENRY, Justice, disqualified.
-16-