Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Armand Beaudry v. Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance Director/Treasurer for the Town of Smithfield

June 9, 2023
Supreme Court

No. 2021-279-Appeal.
(PC 09-843)

Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as :
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Armand Beaudry

v. :

Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance :
Director/Treasurer for the Town of
Smithfield.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
 Supreme Court

No. 2021-279-Appeal.
(PC 09-843)

Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as :
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Armand Beaudry

v. :

Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance :
Director/Treasurer for the Town of
Smithfield.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

OPINION

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. The plaintiff, Erin Beaudry, in her

capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Armand Beaudry (Beaudry),1

appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Randy Rossi, in

his capacity as Finance Director/Treasurer for the Town of Smithfield (Smithfield

or the town), following the grant of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment

and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s amended complaint without prejudice. The

1
Armand Beaudry filed his complaint, initiating this action, on February 11, 2009.
He litigated the case until his death in December 2018. In November 2019, Erin
Beaudry, Armand’s widow, filed a motion in the Superior Court to substitute herself,
in her capacity as the personal representative of her husband’s estate, to continue the
litigation. A justice of the Superior Court granted the motion and the case continued.
Throughout this opinion, we refer to Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as personal
representative of her husband’s estate, and Armand Beaudry collectively as
“Beaudry.” No disrespect is intended.

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plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the hearing justice’s decision on the motion for

summary judgment and remand this matter to the Superior Court for further

proceedings. For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the judgment of the Superior

Court.

I

Facts and Travel

This matter arises from a dispute over the calculation of plaintiff’s pension

benefits; however, the merits of that dispute are not before this Court. We include

only those facts necessary to address the issues presented on appeal. The essential

facts are not disputed.

Armand Beaudry worked as a firefighter for the town from 1983 to 2004. On

July 28, 2004, the town placed Beaudry on disability retirement. Beaudry’s

retirement benefits were governed by a pension system that the town had made

effective for its firefighters in July 1977. Smithfield’s pension system constituted

“an amalgamation of various documents”—the collective bargaining agreement

(CBA) between the town and the firefighters’ union, a general annuity contract (the

plan) administered by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company (John

Hancock), and a series of amendments to the plan.

The most salient document with respect to the case at bar is the eighth

amendment to the plan (Amendment 8), specifically the language found in

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Amendment 8, Section 21.2 Section 21 provides that the “[p]lan [a]dministrators

shall have the exclusive right to interpret the [p]lan and to decide any matters arising

thereunder * * *.”3 (Emphasis added.) Amendment 8 was initially proposed around

1996, but the town council never signed the amendment or voted on it, as required

by the Smithfield town charter. In a series of letters exchanged between 1996 and

1997, John Hancock continually requested that the town sign Amendment 8 and

repeatedly reminded the town that Amendment 8 “ha[d] been unsigned for some

time” and was “still outstanding.” From the time Amendment 8 was originally

proposed until Beaudry’s retirement in 2004, the town council executed several other

amendments to the plan, but never Amendment 8.

In October 2004, Beaudry received a notice from John Hancock confirming

the amount of his disability retirement benefits, which Beaudry disputed. Over the

next few years—from roughly October 2004 to April 2006—Beaudry, the town, and

John Hancock attempted to resolve the dispute over the calculation of Beaudry’s

benefits.

2
Amendment 8 was designed to “restate[] and summarize[] the [plan] and all
subsequent amendments” up to that point in time. Although Beaudry correctly
points out that, technically, there were two versions of Amendment 8—the original
from 1996 and a revised version from 1997—the pertinent language is identical, so
we do not distinguish between them for the purpose of this appeal. The plan
administrator provision can be found in Section 21 of the revised version and
Section 20 of the original.
3
The plan administrators are the members of the Smithfield town council.

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 During this period, Amendment 8 became relevant because it defined the

firefighters’ compensation favorably for the town. But the town manager expressed

some concern that Amendment 8 had never been signed. In an email dated April 3,

2006, from the town solicitor to the town treasurer, the town solicitor advised, “Even

though [Amendment 8] was not signed by the Town, it accurately reflects the terms

of the policy. We don’t want to raise any questions as to the validity of the

amendment at this point.” The town consulted with John Hancock to ascertain

whether Amendment 8 was, in fact, in effect and controlling as to Beaudry’s claim.

After consulting with John Hancock, the town informed Beaudry of its final

determination that the plan indeed did not provide the benefits he claimed.

Beaudry contacted the town about his claim two more times but received no

response. Then, on June 13, 2008, Beaudry filed a notice of claim with the town

pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 45-15-5, which provides a statutory remedy for claimants

proceeding against municipalities for monies owed.

The town did not respond to Beaudry’s notice of claim, so he proceeded to

file a complaint in the Providence County Superior Court against Randy Rossi, in

his capacity as Finance Director/Treasurer for the town. The town filed an initial

answer to Beaudry’s complaint; thereafter, the case went to court-annexed

arbitration. On April 7, 2016, an arbitration award entered in favor of Beaudry. The

town filed a rejection of the award the next day.

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 About two years later, on January 12, 2018, the town moved to amend its

answer to Beaudry’s original complaint. Beaudry objected, and a justice of the

Superior Court held a hearing on the motion. After the hearing, the Superior Court

granted the town’s motion to amend its answer. The town filed its amended answer

to Beaudry’s original complaint the same day.

The town’s amended answer raised four affirmative defenses, including

Beaudry’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the plan.

Beaudry amended his complaint in turn. The amended complaint raised two counts

against the town, one for breach of contract seeking money damages and another for

declaratory judgment regarding the parties’ “rights, status, and legal relations”

arising under the CBA and the plan with respect to the calculation of Beaudry’s

disability benefits. The town then filed an answer to Beaudry’s amended complaint,

asserting the same affirmative defenses as set forth in its previously filed amended

answer.

On February 26, 2020, the town filed a motion for summary judgment as to

all counts in Beaudry’s amended complaint. Beaudry filed a cross-motion for

summary judgment on count two of the amended complaint for declaratory

judgment.

A second justice of the Superior Court (the hearing justice) ultimately held

three separate hearings to resolve the town’s motion for summary judgment and

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Beaudry’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The hearings and memoranda

yielded the following factual assertions and arguments from the parties.

Overall, the town argued that Amendment 8, Section 21 required Beaudry to

exhaust the administrative remedy with the plan administrators before seeking

adjudication of his claim in court. Beaudry challenged the validity of Amendment 8

because the town council never formally signed or voted on it pursuant to the

procedures set forth in the Smithfield town charter. According to Beaudry, no

administrative remedy existed at the time of his retirement because the town council

had never enacted Amendment 8.

The town did not dispute that Amendment 8 was never formally enacted.

Instead, the town argued that Amendment 8 had become effective through the CBA

because the CBA incorporated the entire plan by reference. The evidence presented

at the hearings established that the town council and the firefighters’ union bargain

for and approve new iterations of the CBA “from time to time[,]” about every three

years. The town posited that, because Amendment 8, Section 21 was incorporated

by reference into the CBAs from 1997 to 2006—which were all properly adopted by

the town council—the town enacted Amendment 8 derivatively through the CBAs.

The town further contended that, even though Amendment 8 was never

signed, subsequent amendments, which presupposed the effectiveness of

Amendment 8, were properly passed, specifically Amendments 9 and 10. The town

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argued that Amendments 9 and 10 “necessarily ratified” Amendment 8 because they

were “built upon and dr[e]w their essence from Amendment 8” and therefore “do[]

not make any sense without Amendment 8.” The town submitted a slew of affidavits

from various town and union officials, which attested to a collective assumption that

Amendment 8 was in effect. Beaudry did not rebut these affidavits.

In fact, Beaudry did not dispute any of the facts submitted by the town.

Beaudry’s entire argument rested on the legal conclusion that Amendment 8 could

not be constructively ratified by the CBA or other amendments, as the town

contended.

After the first two hearings, the hearing justice found that Amendment 8 was

in effect at the time of Beaudry’s retirement. In reaching this conclusion, she agreed

with the town that this Court’s holdings were instructive, citing Elliott v. Town of

Warren, 818 A.2d 652 (R.I. 2003), and O’Connell v. Bruce, 710 A.2d 674 (R.I.

1998). Following our caselaw, she reasoned that, even though “procedural niceties”

were not followed, the intention and substance of the town’s actions were clear.

Specifically, the hearing justice noted, Amendments 9 and 10 were both signed and

“would not have come into existence but for Amendment 8; and, in fact, were built

on and presupposed the existence of Amendment 8.”

Further, she noted that the 1997 to 2000 CBA, which contained language from

Amendment 8, was adopted by a vote of the town council. “In the same vein,” the

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hearing justice observed, “the town council itself ratified the 2000 to 2003 CBA,

which again incorporated at that point Amendments 8, 9, 10.” She recognized that

the 2003 to 2006 CBA, covering the period of Beaudry’s retirement, also

incorporated Amendment 8. Finally, the hearing justice was persuaded by

Beaudry’s failure to rebut the town’s affidavits, which showed that town officials

operated as though Amendment 8 had been in force for decades. As such, the

hearing justice ruled that Amendment 8 was incorporated into the plan and created

an administrative remedy for Beaudry’s claim.

At the third and final hearing, the hearing justice granted the town’s motion

for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint without prejudice so that

Beaudry might raise it before the plan administrators. Although she acknowledged

that the town had waited until 2018 to raise its affirmative defenses, “years and years

after the complaint had been filed, and after * * * years of communication and

correspondence[,]” she did not find the delay to be dispositive. Rather, the hearing

justice concluded, the Superior Court

“having allowed the affirmative defense to be raised and
having ruled that Amendment 8 is effective, that means
that the plan administrator does have the exclusive right to
determine issues regarding the plan, and it’s irrefutable
that the plaintiff did not present the claim to the plan
administrator and has not exhausted the administrative
remedies.”

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 An order and judgment entered on September 13, 2021,4 granting the town’s

motion for summary judgment and dismissing Beaudry’s complaint without

prejudice. Beaudry filed a timely notice of appeal on September 21, 2021.

II

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Coccoli v. Town

of Scituate Town Council, 184 A.3d 1113, 1117 (R.I. 2018) (brackets omitted)

(quoting Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404, 406 (R.I. 2013)). “It is a fundamental

principle that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and a motion for summary

judgment should be dealt with cautiously.” Botelho v. City of Pawtucket School

Department, 130 A.3d 172, 176 (R.I. 2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting The Law

Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 601 (R.I. 2013)).

Accordingly, we will affirm the hearing justice’s decision “only if, after reviewing

the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we

conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Andrews v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 1108, 1127

4
The final order and judgment that entered are captioned as “Amended Order” and
“Amended Judgment,” respectively. The amended order and judgment changed the
case caption to reflect that the party in interest on appeal is Erin Beaudry, in her
capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Armand G. Beaudry, Jr.

-9-
(R.I. 2020) (quoting Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee v. City of Cranston,

208 A.3d 557, 580-81 (R.I. 2019)).

“In a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party bears the burden

of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact

and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, mere conclusions

or mere legal opinions.” Quattrucci v. Lombardi, 232 A.3d 1062, 1065 (R.I. 2020)

(quoting Cranston Police Retirees Action Committee, 208 A.3d at 581). “However,

it is not an absolute requirement that the nonmoving party file an affidavit in

opposition to the motion” to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Capital

Properties, Inc. v. State, 749 A.2d 1069, 1080 (R.I. 1999).

III

Discussion

The travel of this case through the Superior Court has amassed a voluminous

record containing over a decade’s worth of correspondence, motions, exhibits, and

memoranda. From a global perspective, this case encompasses complex matters of

municipal, arbitration, administrative, and contract law, all of which were

thoroughly briefed and argued before a justice of the Superior Court. The matter

before this Court, however, boils down to two discrete issues.

First, we are asked to review whether the hearing justice erred by finding that

Amendment 8 was enforceable at the time of Beaudry’s retirement, thus creating an

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administrative remedy that Beaudry failed to exhaust. Second, we are asked to

review whether the hearing justice erred by finding that the town did not forfeit its

affirmative defense relative to Beaudry’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

We review these claims of error in turn.

The import of Amendment 8 is that, if the amendment were in place at the

time of Beaudry’s retirement, then it created an administrative remedy for Beaudry’s

claim that he failed to exhaust.5 The language in Amendment 8, Section 21 is clear.

It grants the town council, sitting as plan administrators, exclusive authority to

review all claims arising thereunder. The issue before this Court is whether

Amendment 8 was incorporated into the plan such that the administrative remedy

existed at the time of Beaudry’s retirement.

On appeal, the town “readily acknowledges that Amendment No. 8 * * * was

not executed in a traditional sense * * *.” The town notes, however, that the plan

provided, “subject to the laws of the State of Rhode Island[,]” that it “may be

modified at any time by written agreement between * * * John Hancock and the

Contract Holder[,]” the contract holder being the town. The town contends that an

agreement in writing “can be readily seen from the series of letters that [John

Hancock] sent to the Town seeking the Town’s signature on Amendment No. 8.”

5
It is undisputed that Beaudry never brought his claim before the town council prior
to initiating this action in the Superior Court.

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Additionally, the town avers, the fact “that the Town agreed in writing to

Amendment No. 8 can be readily seen from the letter it sent to the Union in which

it sought to obtain the Union’s acceptance of Amendment No. 8.” This reasoning is

consistent with the town’s broader assertion that Amendment 8 was validly enacted

by ratification.6

It is clear that the town may amend the pension plan only according to the

process established in the town charter. See Kells v. Town of Lincoln, 874 A.2d 204,

211 (R.I. 2005) (“The provisions of a town charter are the organic law of the town

with respect to municipal affairs.”) (quoting Borromeo v. Personnel Board of

Bristol, 117 R.I. 382, 385, 367 A.2d 711, 713 (1977)). The parties do not dispute

that the town charter controls, and so we begin there.

The Smithfield town charter provides in relevant part: (1) “[a]ll powers of the

Town shall be vested in the Town Council, except as otherwise provided by law or

this Charter”; (2) “[n]o action of the Council * * * shall be valid or binding unless

6
The town stated in its brief that “the Town had the power to ratify Amendment
No. 8[,]” referencing the town manager’s powers under the town charter, § 3.04(11),
and this Court’s general principles concerning ratification. See Smithfield Town
Charter, Art. III, § 3.04(11) (Dec. 18, 2014). We perceive this to be a rather specious
application of the ratification doctrine. The caselaw upon which the town relies is
distinguishable and inapposite to the case at bar. See Buonanno v. DiStefano, 430
A.2d 765, 769 (R.I. 1981) (discussing ratification in the context of a personal agency
relationship); Murphy v. Moies, 18 R.I. 100, 104, 25 A. 977, 978-79 (1892) (“The
doctrine of ratification is often applied to municipal corporations, * * * [b]ut the
doctrine has its limitations, and cannot be applied to the same extent in public, as in
private, matters * * *.”) (emphasis added).

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adopted by the affirmative vote of three (3) or more members of the Council”;

(3) acts of the town council “other than those [which may only be done by

Ordinance] may be done either by Ordinance or by Resolution”; and (4) “[t]he Town

Manager shall be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Town, responsible to the

Council for the administration of all Town affairs placed in the Manager’s charge by

or under this Charter. The Town Manager shall * * * [p]erform such duties as are

specified in this Charter or which may be required by the Town Council.” Smithfield

Town Charter, Art. II, §§ 2.01, 2.11(c), 2.12(9), Art. III, § 3.04(11) (Dec. 18, 2014).

A plain reading of the Smithfield town charter indicates that the power to

change the pension plan was reserved for the town council. See Foster Glocester

Regional School Building Committee v. Sette, 996 A.2d 1120, 1126 (R.I. 2010)

(“When the language of the charter is clear and unambiguous, the court must

interpret it literally, giving the words of the charter their plain and ordinary

meanings.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Stewart v. Sheppard, 885 A.2d 715, 720 (R.I.

2005))); Middle Creek Farm, LLC v. Portsmouth Water & Fire District, 252 A.3d

745, 751 (R.I. 2021) (“[I]t is the accepted rule that the provisions of city charters

should be construed so as to give, so far as possible, reasonable meaning and effect

to all parts of the section in question.” (quoting Felkner v. Chariho Regional School

Committee, 968 A.2d 865, 870 (R.I. 2009))).

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 Under the charter, the town council had two paths available to amend the plan:

(1) by an action adopted by an affirmative vote in accordance with § 2.11(c) or (2)

by authorizing an agent of the town to act on its behalf, as provided, for example, in

§ 3.04(11). There is no evidence in the record that the town council authorized any

town official to act on its behalf.7 Accordingly, we conclude that the only option

whereby the town council might have enacted Amendment 8 was through an action

adopted by an affirmative vote of three or more members of the town council. See

Smithfield Town Charter, § 2.11(c).

Before this Court, Smithfield does not dispute that the town council never

voted on Amendment 8. Rather, the town postulates that votes taken on other related

matters ratified Amendment 8 implicitly. We examine this proposition carefully.

Although our caselaw accords municipalities a wide berth to comply with the

procedural formalities set forth in their charters, we have also stated that a line must

be drawn where the municipality’s actions amount to “a radical departure from

accepted municipal practice.” Elliott, 818 A.2d at 656-57. Here, we must decide

where the town’s actions fall on the spectrum ranging from permissible, accepted

practices to impermissible, radical departures.

7
For example, the town council authorized Alberto J. LaGreca, Jr., the then-town
council president, to authorize Amendment 9 on its behalf.

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 As to the former, in O’Connell v. Bruce, this Court upheld a pension plan that

the town charter required to be enacted by ordinance, even though the town, instead,

effectuated it by resolution. O’Connell, 710 A.2d at 677-78, 680. We rejected the

plaintiff’s argument that the town’s technical error invalidated the pension fund ab

initio because it was “clear that the town council intended to regulate the affairs of

the municipality” and that “the resolution it passed to that end was in substance and

effect an ordinance[.]” Id. at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added).

We reached a similar conclusion in Elliott v. Town of Warren. Elliott, 818

A.2d at 656. In Elliott, the plaintiff challenged whether a municipal plan properly

governed his disability benefits. Id. at 654. He argued that the town’s enrollment in

the municipal plan was faulty because it enrolled through an affirmative vote by the

town council, rather than by an ordinance or a resolution, as required under the

applicable statute. Id. at 654, 656. We held that “the fact that the Town Council

opted to accept by an affirmative vote the provision of the police contract * * * is of

no moment to the validity of the town’s participation in [the municipal plan].” Id. at

656. There again, this Court prioritized the substance of the town council’s action

over adherence to formalities. See id.; O’Connell, 710 A.2d at 679.

By contrast, our opinion in Casa DiMario, Inc. v. Richardson, 763 A.2d 607

(R.I. 2000), illustrates that this Court looks with disfavor upon municipal actors who

- 15 -
egregiously violate formal procedures. Casa DiMario, 763 A.2d at 610. In Casa

DiMario, this Court declined to affirm a consent order executed by a town solicitor

acting without proper authority from the town. Id. Critically, we reasoned that

“[the plaintiff’s] professed reliance upon private
discussions with and alleged statements by individual
members of the council, the town clerk, and/or the solicitor
to representatives of [the plaintiff’s] and upon the town’s
alleged past practices of allowing the solicitor to settle
certain cases * * * without a formal prior vote of the
council were misplaced and unjustified.” Id. at 610-11
(emphasis added).

We cautioned that “[c]ommunications, representations, and alleged acts of this kind

are insufficient as a matter of law to bind a municipality to future acts or inaction.”

Id. at 611.

Keeping this spectrum of acceptability in mind, we hold that the town did not

properly enact Amendment 8. Much like Casa DiMario, the town impermissibly

relies on the actions and statements of individual town officials—through affidavits,

letters, and correspondence between certain members of the town council, the union,

and John Hancock—as evidence of Amendment 8’s effectiveness. And unlike

O’Connell and Elliott, the matter before us here is not simply a question of substance

over form. See O’Connell, 710 A.2d at 679 (reasoning that “what is done by a

municipal legislative body * * * depends not on what the action is called but on the

reality”) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal

Corporations § 15.02, at 60 (3d ed. 1996)); Elliott, 818 A.2d at 656 (holding that

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“[t]he procedure utilized by [the town] in voting to approve a police contract * * *

did not run afoul of the enabling legislation and was in substance and effect a formal,

public entry into the pension system”) (emphasis added). The error here is that the

town council never took any action at all with respect to Amendment 8, specifically.

Moreover, we reject the town’s argument that affirmative votes and/or

signatures taken on other amendments to the plan and the CBAs implicitly adopted

Amendment 8. First, the town contends that the signatures approving Amendments

9 and 10 ratify Amendment 8 by implication because those amendments “only

make[] sense if Amendment No. 8 was the [p]lan being amended.”

Amendment 10 modified and substituted certain page numbers of different

sections in the plan. The previous page numbers in the plan that Amendment 10

updated were the page numbers used in Amendment 8, and only Amendment 8.

Because the page-number format used in Amendment 8 was unique to that iteration

of the plan, the town concludes, the contracting parties could not have been confused

about which version of the plan Amendment 10 was modifying. This contention is

unavailing. The fact that the town council and John Hancock “were well aware of

the existence * * * of Amendment No. 8 * * * when they executed Amendment No.

10[,]” is not sufficient to evince that Amendment 10, itself, intentionally and

separately authorized Amendment 8. Even assuming arguendo that the town council

did intend for Amendment 10 to enact Amendment 8, the town cannot circumvent,

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wholesale, the procedures outlined in the town charter. See Smithfield Town Charter,

§ 2.11(c).

Similarly, the town contends that “Amendment No. 9 assumed the

effectiveness of, and built on, Amendment No. 8.” Because the town council voted

to pass Amendment 9, the town suggests, Amendment 8 was simultaneously

approved. This assertion is tenuous on its face but, more importantly, is not

supported by the evidence in the record.

Smithfield avers that the town council understood the two amendments to

operate in tandem by virtue of the successive alphabetical ordering of the subsections

contained therein—Amendment 8 ended its definition section with subsection (y);

Amendment 9 added a new definition for rollover contributions as subsection (z).

However, even though the town council approved the substance of Amendment 9 by

a vote in April 1996, the full amendment with the pertinent subsection (z) formatting

was not signed by the town council president and John Hancock until months later.8

This delay is significant because it shows that the town council was unaware of any

connection between Amendments 8 and 9 when the vote on Amendment 9 was held.

Nothing in the meeting minutes from the April vote mentions the alphabetical

formatting or otherwise indicates that the town council understood that any

8
The town council president signed Amendment 9 on August 30, 1996, and John
Hancock signed it on September 17, 1996.

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relationship existed between Amendments 8 and 9. In fact, the April meeting

minutes indicate that the town council did not reference “Amendment 9” as such, it

merely discussed the substance of the amendment to add pension rollover

contributions to the plan. Therefore, we conclude that the passage of Amendment 9

is immaterial to the effectiveness of Amendment 8.

Next, the town contends that Amendment 8 was ratified inherently as part of

the approved CBAs because the 1997 to 2006 CBAs incorporated the plan by

reference. The town also notes that the CBAs were enacted through the town’s

normal administrative and budgetary procedures. Essentially, the town asks this

Court to conclude that Amendment 8 was part of the plan because the plan was part

of the CBA. That reasoning is tautological. We cannot know or assume that

Amendment 8 ever became integrated into the plan, as it was generally incorporated

into the CBAs, without establishing how Amendment 8 became effective to begin

with. Therefore, we do not perceive that the town council’s periodic votes ratifying

the CBAs constituted official actions sufficient to render Amendment 8 effective.

The town also contends that the affidavits it submitted from Rossi and other

town officials offer proof that the parties involved—the town, the union, and John

Hancock—all “considered and treated Amendment No. 8 as effective as if it was

formally signed * * *.” More specifically, the town argues that these parties “have

taken steps to change their respective positions in reliance on [Amendment 8’s]

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validity.” This Court held in Casa DiMario that reliance on “the town’s alleged past

practices”—without a vote of the town council—is unjustified. Casa DiMario, 763

A.2d at 610-11. Further, the 2006 email between town officials warning that it was

in the town’s best interest not “to raise any questions” about Amendment 8’s validity

reveals that the town knew Amendment 8 stood on shaky ground. This expression

of doubt certainly undermines the town’s affidavits, which purport a universal

understanding among town and union officials that Amendment 8 was in effect.9

Finally, the town advances that this Court has looked favorably upon

historical reliance on a pension system and a pension plan’s incorporation by

reference into CBAs under similar circumstances. To be sure, in O’Connell we were

persuaded by the fact that all parties had “previously accepted th[e] pension fund as

completely valid” and that the “pension plan was referenced and incorporated into a

series of formal CBAs.” O’Connell, 710 A.2d at 680. However, O’Connell

contained a dispositive element that this case lacks: authoritative action by the town

9
Likewise, the town references several summary plan descriptions (SPDs) of the
plan that John Hancock authored to explain the plan to pension members. The town
argues that the SPDs offer evidence that Amendment 8 was “considered as being in
effect[,]” particularly because the summaries were available in the town’s and
union’s files. The SPDs, however, were written by John Hancock, not the town
council, and are not a part of the official plan. By the same token, the town council’s
authorization of a request for proposal for actuarial services, that was based on a
report allegedly “drafted in part based on Amendment No. 8[,]” is equally
immaterial. In the meeting minutes, which the town cites, there is no mention of
Amendment 8, specifically, or even a reference to its content or substance.

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council. Id. at 679 (“[A]lthough it may have been preferable for the * * * town

council to have established its * * * pension plan using the formal procedures * * *

it is clear that the town council intended to regulate the affairs of the

municipality[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there was never a vote,

a discussion, or even a mention of Amendment 8, specifically, at a single town

council meeting. Without meaningful evidence to this effect, we cannot hold that

Amendment 8 was properly enacted under the town charter.

Having reviewed the matter de novo, we hold that Amendment 8 was never in

effect and, therefore, was not incorporated into the plan. As such, no administrative

remedy existed for Beaudry’s claim at the time of his retirement in 2004.10

IV

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the amended judgment of the

Superior Court and remand the matter to the Superior Court with instructions to

conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Long did not participate.

10
Our decision on this issue obviates the need for discussion of Beaudry’s argument
regarding the doctrine of forfeiture.

- 21 -
 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Erin Beaudry, in her capacity as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Armand Beaudry v.
Title of Case
Randy Rossi, in his capacity as Finance
Director/Treasurer for the Town of Smithfield.
No. 2021-279-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 09-843)

Date Opinion Filed June 9, 2023

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Lynch Prata, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Melissa Darigan

For Plaintiff:

Robert A. D’Alfonso, III, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:

Vincent F. Ragosta, Jr., Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)