Supreme Court
No. 2021-318-Appeal.
(PC 15-5627)
Newport and New Road, LLC :
v. :
Steven D. Hazard, in his capacity as the :
Tax Assessor, City of East Providence,
Rhode Island.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical
or other formal errors in order that corrections may be
made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2021-318-Appeal.
(PC 15-5627)
Newport and New Road, LLC :
v. :
Steven D. Hazard, in his capacity as the :
Tax Assessor, City of East Providence,
Rhode Island.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.
OPINION
Justice Long, for the Court. The petitioner, Newport and New Road, LLC,1
(petitioner), appeals from a Superior Court decision granting summary judgment in
favor of the respondent, Steven D. Hazard, 2 in his capacity as the tax assessor for
the City of East Providence (respondent). The petitioner argues that the Superior
Court justice erred in determining that the three-month statute of limitations
contained in G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-26 and 44-5-27 barred its challenge to the
respondent’s assessment of property taxes.
1
The parties to this action, and the trial justice below, listed The Butler Children
Trust 1992 as a party based on its status as a named party in other Superior Court
cases regarding tax assessments of the subject property in this matter. However,
Newport and New Road, LLC is the only petitioner listed in this action.
2
Sarah Frew replaced Steven D. Hazard as the tax assessor for the City of East
Providence during the pendency of this case.
-1-
This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the
parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and
reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may
decide this appeal without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Procedural History
The relevant facts in this matter are undisputed. On December 28, 2015,
petitioner filed a two-count petition in Superior Court pursuant to § 44-5-26(c),
alleging that respondent conducted an illegal property-tax assessment for tax year
2012 and an excessive tax assessment for tax year 2013. The petitioner’s claims of
tax assessment arise out of property it previously owned located in East Providence,
Rhode Island, designated as Parcel 002, Block 08, Map 401 on the tax assessor’s
record for the City of East Providence (the property or subject property).
For tax year 2012, respondent assessed $46,838.89 in taxes against the subject
property based on a full and fair cash value of $2,041,800. The petitioner argued
that this taxable amount constituted an illegal assessment. In tax year 2013,
respondent assessed $53,544.44 in taxes against the subject property based on a full
and fair cash value of $2,123,500. The petitioner contested respondent’s 2013
-2-
determination because it exceeded the 2012 assessment, allegedly constituting an
excessive assessment.
The respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on grounds that
petitioner’s claims fell outside the applicable statute of limitations. In a written
decision dated July 8, 2021, a justice of the Superior Court concluded that
petitioner’s challenge under § 44-5-26(c) was subject to the three-month statute of
limitations contained in §§ 44-5-26 and 44-5-27. The trial justice rejected
petitioner’s argument that § 44-5-26(c) creates a separate track—distinct from
§ 44-5-26(a) and § 44-5-27—for appealing a municipal tax assessment.
Following the trial justice’s decision and entry of judgment, petitioner filed a
timely notice of appeal to this Court. We consider whether petitioner’s challenges
to the 2012 and 2013 tax assessments, filed on December 28, 2015, pursuant to
§ 45-5-26(c), were timely filed.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a trial justice’s decision to grant summary judgment de
novo. Borgo v. Narragansett Electric Company, 275 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2022).
Additionally, a determination regarding the expiration of a statute of limitations is a
question of law. See Anton v. Houze, 277 A.3d 695, 703 (R.I. 2022). Finally, this
Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Waterman v. Caprio, 983
A.2d 841, 844 (R.I. 2009).
-3-
Discussion
The petitioner asserts that the ten-year statute of limitations generally
applicable to civil actions governs its tax assessment challenges brought pursuant to
§ 44-5-26(c).3 The petitioner notes that § 44-5-26(c) does not contain an explicit
reference to the three-month statute of limitations and contends that this silence
requires us to apply the default ten-year statute of limitations; it maintains that the
trial justice’s contrary reading constitutes impermissible “judicial legislation.” We
disagree.
“It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words
of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Waterman, 983 A.2d at 844
(quoting Iselin v. Retirement Board of Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode
Island, 943 A.2d 1045, 1049 (R.I. 2008)). Nevertheless, this Court “must consider
the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context
of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other
sections.” Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, 253 A.3d
858, 861-62 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I.
2016)).
3
General Laws 1956 § 9-1-13(a) provides the following: “[e]xcept as otherwise
specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next
after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.”
-4-
Section 44-5-26, entitled “Petition in superior court for relief from
assessment[,]” authorizes an aggrieved taxpayer to petition the Superior Court for
relief from either a tax assessor’s decision or a decision of a local tax board of
review. See generally § 44-5-26. Section 44-5-26(a) outlines an administrative
review process that includes a three-month deadline for filing a challenge with the
local tax assessor:
“Any person aggrieved on any ground whatsoever by any
assessment of taxes against him or her in any city or town,
* * *, may within ninety (90) days from the date the first
tax payment is due, file an appeal in the local office of tax
assessment[.] * * * The assessor has forty-five (45) days
to review the appeal, render a decision and notify the
taxpayer of the decision. The taxpayer, if still aggrieved,
may appeal the decision of the tax assessor to the local tax
board of review, or in the event that the assessor does not
render a decision, the taxpayer may appeal to the local tax
board of review at the expiration of the forty-five (45) day
period. Appeals to the local tax board of review are to be
filed not more than thirty (30) days after the assessor
renders a decision and notifies the taxpayer, or if the
assessor does not render a decision within forty-five (45)
days of the filing of the appeal, not more than ninety (90)
days after the expiration of the forty-five (45) day period.
The local tax board of review shall, within ninety (90) days
of the filing of the appeal, hear the appeal and render a
decision within thirty (30) days of the date that the hearing
was held. Provided, that a city or town may request and
receive an extension from the director of the Rhode Island
department of revenue.”
Section 44-5-26(b) designates the form for applications for tax assessment appeals
filed with the local tax assessor and reiterates the three-month filing deadline. See
-5-
§ 44-5-26(b). Section 44-5-26(c), the subprovision at issue on appeal, states the
following:
“Provided, that in case the person has not filed an account,
or filed an appeal first within the local tax board of review,
that person shall not have the benefit of the remedy
provided in this section and in §§ 44-5-27 — 44-5-31,
unless: (1) that person’s real estate has been assessed at a
value in excess of the value at which it was assessed on the
last preceding assessment day, whether then owned by that
person or not, and has been assessed, if assessment has
been made at full and fair cash value, at a value in excess
of its full and fair cash value, or, if assessment has
purportedly been made at a uniform percentage of full and
fair cash value, at a percentage in excess of the uniform
percentage; or (2) the tax assessed is illegal in whole or in
part; and that person’s remedy is limited to a review of the
assessment on the real estate or to relief with respect to the
illegal tax, as the case may be.”
Section 44-5-26(c) permits aggrieved taxpayers to seek the remedies
described in § 44-5-26 and §§ 44-5-17 through 44-5-31 so long as they can
demonstrate that their challenge falls under one of two enumerated exceptions: (1)
that the challenged tax assessment is excessive, or (2) that the challenged tax
assessment is illegal. See § 44-5-26(c). Notably, § 44-5-26(c) begins with the phrase
“provided that” which unambiguously demonstrates its direct relation to the
preceding sections, including the filing deadlines, contained in § 44-5-26(a). Id.
Section 44-5-26(c) plainly serves as a proviso to § 44-5-26(a), and to read it
otherwise would ignore the requirement that we interpret statutes in their entirety, as
opposed to reading each provision in isolation. See Beagan, 253 A.3d at 861-62.
-6-
Moreover, as both parties correctly acknowledge, statutory interpretation
requires this Court “to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent and to
attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious
purposes.” Tiernan v. Magaziner, 270 A.3d 25, 30 (R.I. 2022) (quoting Such v. State,
950 A.2d 1150, 1155-56 (R.I. 2008)). This Court has previously acknowledged that
the three-month statute of limitations period in the municipal tax assessment context
reflects a concern from both the legislature and municipalities for the resolution of
tax assessment disputes “as expeditiously as possible * * *.” Northgate Associates
v. Shorey, 541 A.2d 1192, 1193 (R.I. 1988). This is because real property taxation
provides significant revenue to municipalities and thus creates a need for finality in
assessment disputes. See id.
Nevertheless, petitioner emphasizes the absence of a three-month statute of
limitations in § 44-5-26(c), as contrasted with §§ 44-5-26(a), (b), and 44-5-27, which
provides an avenue for taxpayers to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the Superior
Court by filing a complaint within an explicit three-month statute of limitations.4 See
4
Section 44-5-27 states that:
“The remedy provided in § 44-5-26 is exclusive if the
taxpayer owned or possessed any ratable estate at all,
except that, in a proper case, the taxpayer may invoke the
equity jurisdiction of the superior court; provided, that the
complaint is filed within three (3) months after the last day
appointed for the payment, without penalty, of the tax, or
the first installment of the tax, if it is payable in
-7-
§ 44-5-27; see also Lehigh Cement Co. v. Quinn, 173 A.3d 1272, 1278 (R.I. 2017)
(“The ability of a taxpayer to file a suit in equity directly in the Superior Court,
however, is sharply circumscribed by a brief limitations period.”). The petitioner
urges this Court to interpret the absence of an explicit limitations period in
§ 44-5-26(c) as reflecting the General Assembly’s intent to provide a third,
independent avenue for relief that extends the limitations period to ten years.
We will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result. See Shepard v.
Harleysville Worcester Insurance Co., Inc., 944 A.2d 167, 170 (R.I. 2008). We
therefore refuse to interpret the absence of an explicit limitations period in
§ 44-5-26(c) as authorizing the application of the default ten-year statute of
limitations. Doing so would depart from an otherwise consistent statutory
framework and frustrate the General Assembly’s overall objective for a brief and
final tax assessment appeal process. See Lang v. Municipal Employees’ Retirement
System of Rhode Island, 222 A.3d 912, 916 (R.I. 2019) (emphasizing the propriety
of “look[ing] to the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context” of a statute
and avoiding an interpretation that “would defeat the underlying purpose of the
enactment”) (quoting O’Connell v. Walmsley, 156 A.3d 422, 426, 428 (R.I. 2017)).
installments. A taxpayer alleging an illegal or void tax
assessment against him or her is confined to the remedies
provided by § 44-5-26, except that the taxpayer is not
required to file an appeal with the local assessor.”
-8-
We therefore decline to interpret the tax assessment appeals process as providing a
taxpayer with ten years to contest an assessment in one instance, but three months
to assert a challenge in others.
Finally, we wish to address petitioner’s argument that we should apply the
ten-year statute of limitations based on our canon that taxing statutes must be strictly
construed against the taxing authority. It is true that, when reviewing these taxation
statutes, we resolve all doubts in favor of the taxpayer. Balmuth v. Dolce for Town
of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576, 586 (R.I. 2018). However, although we acknowledge
petitioner’s attempt to invoke this canon, our reading of § 44-5-26 leaves us with no
doubts to resolve in petitioner’s favor. Further, we decline to apply this canon when
the practical effect of doing so would frustrate a settled area of law. Our prior
caselaw discussing the taxing statutes at issue here has, in no uncertain terms, closely
adhered to the existing statutory framework. See Bluedog Capital Partners, LLC v.
Murphy, 206 A.3d 694, 700 (R.I. 2019) (“Therefore, any action challenging the
assessment of taxes, for any reason, that does not follow the normal procedures set
forth under § 44-5-26, must be brought pursuant to § 44-5-27.”).
Examination of the entire statutory framework and the unambiguous language
of § 44-5-26(c) leads this Court to conclude that the General Assembly intended for
the three-month statute of limitations to apply to petitions for relief filed under this
provision. We hold that petitioner’s challenges to the illegality and excessiveness
-9-
of the 2012 and 2013 tax assessments pursuant to § 44-5-26(c) were untimely filed
on December 28, 2015, well after the three-month statute of limitations expired.
Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court’s decision.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court and
remand the record in this case.
- 10 -
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET
Newport and New Road, LLC v. Steven D. Hazard, in
Title of Case his capacity as the Tax Assessor, City of East
Providence, Rhode Island.
No. 2021-318-Appeal.
Case Number
(PC 15-5627)
Date Opinion Filed June 22, 2023
Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and
Justices
Long, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Richard A. Licht
For Petitioner:
Robert D. Wieck, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Respondent:
Michael J. Marcello, Esq.
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)