United States v. Under Seal

USCA4 Appeal: 21-7273 Doc: 20 Filed: 06/23/2023 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7273

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

UNDER SEAL,

Claimant - Appellant,

ALAA NIMR GARADA,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00027-AJT-1)

Submitted: February 21, 2023 Decided: June 23, 2023

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, THACKER, Circuit Judge, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Under Seal, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals the district court’s orders denying Appellant’s motion concerning

forfeited property and denying reconsideration. The district court found that Appellant had

neither Article III nor statutory standing to assert claims about the property, since Appellant

did not allege any ownership or possessory interest in the property. We affirm.

“To reach the merits of a case, an Article III court must have jurisdiction. ‘One

essential aspect of this requirement is that any person invoking the power of a federal court

must demonstrate standing to do so.’” Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139

S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019) (quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704 (2013)).

“And when standing is questioned by a court or an opposing party, the litigant invoking

the court’s jurisdiction must do more than simply allege a nonobvious harm.” Id. at 1951.

“To cross the standing threshold, the litigant must explain how the elements

essential to standing are met.” Id. Moreover, the standing requirement “‘must be met by

persons seeking appellate review, just as it must be met by persons appearing in courts of

first instance.’” Id. “As a jurisdictional requirement, standing to litigate cannot be waived

or forfeited.” Id. We review a district court’s decision that the claimant lacked standing

de novo. United States v. Phillips, 883 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2018).

“To establish Article III standing, a party ‘must have (1) suffered an injury in fact,

(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct . . . and (3) that is likely to be redressed

by a favorable judicial decision.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338

(2016)). “To establish injury in fact, a [claimant] must show that he or she suffered ‘an

invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or

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imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339. A litigant “cannot

satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation” that is “divorced

from any concrete harm.” Id. at 341-42; Cawthorn v. Amalfi, 35 F.4th 245, 252 (4th Cir.

2022) (“the ‘deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected

by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create Article III standing’”).

“To meet these requirements, a claimant seeking to challenge a civil forfeiture must

have an ownership or possessory interest in the property, ‘because an owner or possessor

of property that has been seized necessarily suffers an injury that can be redressed at least

in part by return of the seized property.’” Phillips, 883 F.3d at 403. “At the pleading stage,

a claimant in a civil forfeiture case need only allege a possessory or ownership interest in

the property.” Id. “The Fourth Circuit uses a higher ‘dominion and control’ test to

determine Article III standing in criminal forfeiture cases.” United States v. Batato, 833

F.3d 413, 434 n.6 (4th Cir. 2016). Where a claimant asserts a hypothetical “interest in a

claim, not an interest in property,” the claimant lacks Article III standing. Id. at 434-35 &

n.6; see also United States v. Phillips, 185 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 1999) (claimant who

had “an ‘interest in purchasing’” properties but no “legal interest” under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)

“did not suffer an injury-in-fact when he was denied title to the properties at issue”).

“Because criminal forfeiture is an action brought against a defendant as part of the

prosecution of that defendant, there is only a very limited possibility for a third party to

intervene.” Phillips, 883 F.3d at 404. “Section 853(n) provides the exclusive means by

which a third party can assert his interest in forfeited property.” Phillips, 185 F.3d at 186.

“Section (k) further underscores this conclusion by specifically barring third parties from

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intervening except as provided under subsection (n).” Id. For a sufficient legal interest in

forfeited property to show standing under § 853(n), a petitioner must show more than bare

legal title or a property interest under state law, but also dominion and control over the

property at the time of the crime giving rise to the forfeiture, or that he was a bona fide

purchaser without cause to believe it was subject to forfeiture. In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284,

290-91 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Morgan, 224 F.3d 339, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2000).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

the district court’s orders. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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