In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-22-00241-CR
TRAVIS HEITH BATEMAN, JR., APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 50th District Court
Cottle County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2980, Honorable Jennifer Ann Habert, Presiding
July 12, 2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.
Travis Heith Bateman, Jr., Appellant, appeals his conviction for the third-degree
felony offense of evading arrest or detention in a motor vehicle1 and sentence of four
years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. By his appeal,
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting Appellant’s video-recorded
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A).
statements in contravention of article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
and there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In April of 2021, an indictment issued alleging that on February 5, 2021, Appellant,
while using a vehicle, intentionally fled from Mark Box knowing that he was a peace officer
who was attempting to lawfully arrest or detain him. In July of 2022, a trial on the merits
was held.
The State’s evidence established that on the evening of February 5, 2021, Cottle
County Sheriff Mark Box received a call concerning a possible intoxicated driver of a
motorcycle. The Sheriff headed in the direction indicated on the call in his marked patrol
vehicle. The Sheriff encountered the motorcycle travelling in the opposite direction and
matching the description he was given. The Sheriff immediately turned his vehicle around
and activated his emergency lights and siren. As he did so, he noticed that there were
two people on the motorcycle and the motorcycle’s taillights were not functioning. As the
Sheriff attempted to catch up to the cyclist, the cyclist accelerated. In the one-to-two-mile
pursuit that ensued, the Sheriff topped off his speed at 112 miles per hour. Texas
Department of Public Safety Trooper Cody MaGaha assisted in bringing the motorcycle
to a stop. The Trooper’s body and vehicle cameras captured the events and Appellant’s
statements the night of his arrest.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made at the scene. After a
pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress and issued findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
2
The Sheriff testified that once Appellant was detained and he had him in custody,
he read Appellant his Miranda2 rights. The Sheriff asked Appellant if he understood his
rights and Appellant replied, “Yes, sir.” The Trooper’s body camera footage and in-car
recordings were played for the jury. The first conversation between the Sheriff and
Appellant was recorded on the side of the road and, a few minutes later, a second
conversation was recorded in the patrol vehicle. During the first conversation, after the
Sheriff informed Appellant of his Miranda rights, he asked Appellant why he fled.
Appellant replied, “To tell you the truth, I got a laugh out of it.” During the second
conversation, Appellant told the Sheriff that the reason that he fled was because “he just
wanted to see how hot his bike would run.” The Sheriff understood this statement as an
admission that Appellant was fleeing from him. Further, Appellant told the Sheriff that
“[The pursuit] gave [Appellant] an adrenaline rush.” The Sheriff testified that it is
dangerous to drive more than 112 miles per hour with a passenger on a motorcycle. He
opined that a motorcycle can be a deadly weapon when travelling at speeds of 112 miles
per hour.
Appellant’s girlfriend, Dorian Turner, was the passenger on Appellant’s motorcycle
when it was stopped by the Sheriff and the Trooper. Turner testified she had no idea how
fast Appellant was driving. According to Turner, Appellant told the Sheriff “He was just
seeing what [the motorcycle] had in it.” Turner testified that she did not hear a siren and
she did not hear either officer read Appellant his Miranda rights.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498–99, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
3
A Cottle County jury found Appellant guilty of evading arrest or detention in a motor
vehicle, and he was sentenced to four years’ incarceration in the Institutional Division of
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant timely filed his appeal.
In two issues on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress and the evidence was insufficient to convict him.
ANALYSIS
Sufficiency of the Evidence–Evading Arrest or Detention
We address Appellant’s second issue first because it affords him greater relief. In
this issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and
amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring). When reviewing
all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether
the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07 & n.26. In our review,
we defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See id. at
4
899. As such, even if we would have resolved the conflicting evidence in a different way,
we must defer to the jury’s findings that are supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 901–
02 (discussing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
A person commits the offense of evading arrest or detention if he intentionally
flees, in a vehicle, from a person that he knows is a peace officer lawfully attempting to
arrest or detain him. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A); Rodriguez v. State,
799 S.W.2d 301, 302–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); Guillory v. State, 99 S.W.3d
735, 741 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). The intentionally fleeing party
need only know that a peace officer was trying to lawfully arrest or detain him. See
Jackson v. State, 718 S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Proof of the attempt of
an officer in a police vehicle to arrest or detain a person generally consists of the officer
displaying authority by the use of overhead emergency lights and a siren. Duvall v. State,
367 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d); Stewart v. State, No. 07-
17-00007-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 7792, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 25, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “‘Fleeing’ is anything less than prompt
compliance with an officer’s direction to stop.” Hernandez Fernandez v. State, No. 07-
16-00420-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5315, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 12, 2017,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting Horne v. State, 228 S.W.3d
442, 446 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)). When evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence to establish an appellant’s intent for evading arrest or detention, the speed,
distance, and duration of a pursuit are factors to be considered. Avila v. State, No. 07-
19-00139-CR; 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4145, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 27, 2020, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
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Here, Appellant contends that the evidence did not establish that he had the
requisite intent to evade arrest. He argues the evidence establishes reasonable doubt
as to whether Appellant “heard the sirens on Sheriff Box’ (sic) vehicle, or if the sirens
were even on, and whether or not Appellant saw any emergency lights until Trooper
MaGaha was coming at Appellant head-on, at which time Appellant pulled over.” He
points to testimony from the Trooper that, during a pursuit, if a vehicle is moving fast and
is far enough away, the driver may not be able to hear a siren. The Trooper could not
recall if he heard the Sheriff’s siren, and Turner testified that she did not hear a siren.
The Sheriff testified that he activated his overhead lights and siren when he
encountered Appellant on a dark farm-to-market road and made a U-turn to follow him.
After the Sheriff was behind Appellant, he was close enough to the motorcycle to see
Appellant and his passenger. The Sheriff testified that he should have been visible in
Appellant’s rear-view and side-view mirrors. As the Sheriff followed Appellant, “the pipes
became loud” and the motorcycle accelerated. The Sheriff pursued Appellant for one to
two miles at a top speed of 112 miles per hour in a marked patrol car. Any doubt about
whether Appellant intentionally fled from the Sheriff is resolved by Appellant’s admissions
recorded by an in-car recording after he was stopped. When the Sheriff asked Appellant
what was going through his mind, Appellant replied, “I just wanted to see what the bike
had in it.” Appellant acknowledged that he was driving the speed limit when the Sheriff
turned around and he recognized that it was the Sheriff behind him. According to
Appellant, the decision to test his bike while being pursued “wasn’t the right decision to
make . . . . I did it just because, man, it felt good to me. It was the dang adrenaline rush
. . . .”
6
Based on the evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn on this
record, a rational factfinder could have reasonably found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant knew he was being pursued by a peace officer who was attempting to detain
him, and that Appellant used a vehicle while in flight. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 38.04(a); Hobyl v. State, 152 S.W.3d 624, 627–28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2004), pet. dism’d, 193 S.W.3d 903 (2006). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Denial of Motion to Suppress
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling his motion to suppress and admitting the trooper’s body camera recordings.
He contends that there is no clear recitation of Miranda warnings on the recording at the
time of his detention and subsequent arrest, prior to his interrogation by law enforcement.
As such, Appellant’s statements were improperly obtained and therefore inadmissible
under article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
In reviewing a challenge to the admissibility of an accused’s oral statement, we
apply a bifurcated standard of review. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (en banc); McCulley v. State, 352 S.W.3d 107, 117 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on mixed
questions of law and fact if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. But when the
resolution of a mixed question of law and fact does not fall within this category, we apply
a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s ruling. Id.
7
Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure establishes procedural
safeguards for securing the privilege against self-incrimination. See TEX. CRIM. PROC.
CODE. ANN. art. 38.22. Among its requirements, it provides that no oral statement of an
accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the
accused in a criminal proceeding unless (1) the statement was recorded and (2) prior to
the statement but during the recording, the accused was warned of his rights and
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. Id. at § 3. The warning must
inform an accused of the following rights:
(1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and
that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and
during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer
appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time . . . .
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2.
At issue here, was whether the Sheriff gave Appellant a clear recitation of Miranda
warnings prior to his interrogation. At the suppression hearing, the State called the Sheriff
to testify and played two recordings for the trial court.
In this case, the trial judge made specific findings that “Miranda warnings were
given to [Appellant] in the first recording, and that they were a ‘fully effective equivalent’
of those prescribed by Article 38.22[.]” We find that the record and reasonable inferences
from that record support this finding. On the first recording, Appellant and his passenger
8
were being handcuffed. Although portions of the audio are difficult to understand, the
unmistakable cadence of the Sheriff reciting the Miranda warnings is evident on the
recording. Further, when the Sheriff concludes the warnings, he asks Appellant if he
understands his rights and Appellant replies, “Yes, sir.”
The trial court found that the interview of Appellant in the in-car recording was a
continuation of the Sheriff’s earlier interview outside of the vehicle. In the second
recording, the Sheriff clearly reminds Appellant, “I already read you your rights.” While
we agree with Appellant that this reminder is not a Miranda admonishment or a fully
effective equivalent, there is no requirement to provide statutory warnings again before
the Sheriff continues his interrogation in the circumstances here. See Bible v. State, 162
S.W.3d 234, 241–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (a subsequent interview may constitute a
continuation of an earlier interview depending on (1) the passage of time, (2) whether the
interrogation was conducted by a different person, (3) whether the interrogation related
to a different offense, and (4) whether the officer asked the defendant if he had received
any earlier warnings, whether he remembered those warnings, and whether he wished to
waive or invoke them.). As relevant here, Appellant was given Miranda warnings by the
Sheriff outside of the patrol vehicle and placed inside the patrol vehicle a few minutes
later. The Sheriff continued to question Appellant about the same offense, and he
reminded Appellant that he had received his warnings. A mere pause in questioning by
law enforcement does not require additional Miranda warnings. See Dunn v. State, 721
S.W.2d 325, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“rewarning is not required where the
interrogation is only a continuation about the same offense”); LaSalle v. State, 923
S.W.2d 819, 825 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, pet. ref’d) (same).
9
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the Miranda warnings
that were given in the first recording satisfy the requirements of article 38.22, section 3(a).
Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
recordings. We overrule issue one.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Do not publish.
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