Filed 7/28/23 P. v. FuentesFlores CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B319175
(Super. Ct. No. 18F-11711)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
CARLOS FUENTESFLORES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Carlos FuentesFlores appeals a judgment following
conviction of first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder, with findings that he committed the murder during the
commission of rape and residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 189, 261, 460, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C), (G).)1 We affirm.
This appeal concerns the murder of Nancy W., the owner of
a rural property with horses in Paso Robles. FuentesFlores was
an employee of a painting contractor whom Nancy W. had hired
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
to paint her home. During police interviews, FuentesFlores
admitted to raping and killing Nancy W. and showed detectives
where he had disposed of her remains. FuentesFlores was later
convicted of murder by a slow plea. On appeal, he raises issues
concerning the voluntariness of his police interview statements
and the relevance of his recorded jail telephone conversations.
He also requests that we independently examine the trial court’s
review of the personnel file of San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s
Detective Clint Cole. We review the court’s in camera proceeding
regarding Cole’s personnel file, but reject FuentesFlores’s other
contentions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 5, 2018, Nancy W.’s daughter and neighbor became
concerned when Nancy W. did not appear for her usual morning
walk. The neighbor went to Nancy W.’s residence and noticed
that the porch lights and television were on and there were no
linens on the bed. Nancy W.’s horses had not been fed. Nancy
W.’s daughter also checked the residence and saw blood splatter
on the wall, the floor, and a pillow.
Later that day, San Luis Obispo County Sheriff’s Deputies
entered the residence and saw dried blood on the floor and
bloodstains on the carpet and a pillow. Nancy W.’s vehicle keys,
purse, and computers were inside the residence. Her vehicles
were parked outside.
A sheriff’s detective obtained a search warrant for the
records of Nancy W.’s landline telephone. The records revealed
that a call was made to police emergency dispatch shortly after
midnight on May 5, 2018, but the call did not connect.
Detective Cole spoke with the owner of the painting
company that was working at Nancy W.’s residence. The owner
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provided FuentesFlores’s telephone number. On July 12, 2018,
Cole telephoned FuentesFlores and spoke with him for
approximately 13 minutes in the English language.
FuentesFlores stated that Cole could contact him again and that
he would return telephone calls.
A deputy obtained a search warrant for information from
Google regarding the electronic devices that were in Nancy W.’s
residence on May 5, 2018. The data indicated that a device
associated with the e-mail of “carlofuentes0576” was inside her
residence at 1:33 a.m. and 1:52 a.m.
December 18, 2018, Police Interviews
On December 18, 2018, Detective Devashish Menghrajani
called FuentesFlores to ask further questions. FuentesFlores
initially did not answer the call but returned the call quickly.
FuentesFlores stated that he “was more than happy to come
down” to the sheriff’s station. At the station, Cole and
Menghrajani did not frisk or search FuentesFlores for weapons
but asked him to leave his cellular telephone in his vehicle. The
detectives made arrangements for a Spanish language
interpreter to be present if FuentesFlores requested one. The
interview room door was unlocked and Menghrajani informed
FuentesFlores that he was not detained or arrested, the door was
not locked, and he could leave at any time. Several doors
between the interview room and the outside were locked,
however.
FuentesFlores stated that the detectives should “feel free”
to ask him questions. Menghrajani asked that FuentesFlores let
him know if he had any questions or did not understand the
detectives’ questions. FuentesFlores agreed. FuentesFlores
stated that he has been living in the United States since 2001.
3
During the interview, FuentesFlores stated that he “made
a mistake.” FuentesFlores then stated that he went to Nancy
W.’s home to retrieve a ladder and accidentally struck her with
his truck. He later disposed of her body on the Carrizo Plain.
FuentesFlores offered to show the detectives the location of her
remains.
When the detectives asked FuentesFlores for more detail,
FuentesFlores responded that he had sex with Nancy W. after he
struck her with his truck. FuentesFlores then agreed to take the
detectives to the location of Nancy W.’s body. At that point, Cole
read FuentesFlores his Miranda rights in the English language.
The officers then drove FuentesFlores to the Carrizo Plain where
he eventually found the area where he had disposed of Nancy
W.’s body. Cole found a skull and some bones near a rock
formation. The remains were later identified through DNA
testing as those of Nancy W.
The detectives and FuentesFlores returned to the station
for further questioning. During this second interview, Cole
disputed FuentesFlores’s account and informed him that blood
evidence revealed that Nancy W. was struck inside her residence.
FuentesFlores then admitted that he believed Nancy W. was
attracted to him; he entered her unlocked door, struck her in the
face, and raped her.
Once again, Cole read FuentesFlores his Miranda rights in
the English language. FuentesFlores then admitted that he
smothered Nancy W. with a pillow. FuentesFlores stated that he
was “makin[g] sure [he] didn’t leave . . . any proof what [he] was
doing.” Following the interview, FuentesFlores wrote a lengthy
apology letter in the English language to Nancy W.’s family.
FuentesFlores asked for forgiveness from Nancy W.’s family and
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God and asked that the family not harm FuentesFlores’s family.
FuentesFlores closed the letter stating, “Please pray for my
family, to give them strength and deal with this situation.”
Laboratory DNA analysis of the bloodstains and handprint
on the pillow found in Nancy W.’s bedroom revealed that Nancy
W. was a contributor to the stains. FuentesFlores could not be
excluded as a contributor to DNA found on the pillow.
On August 4, 2020, October 13, 2020, February 16, 2021,
and December 23, 2021, FuentesFlores filed various motions to
challenge the voluntariness of his police interview statements.
The trial court denied each motion.
On January 18, 2022, FuentesFlores stipulated to a court
trial, slow plea, and evidentiary submissions. (People v. Brown
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 530, 535 [under the slow plea procedure, “a
defendant waives the right to jury trial and allows the court to
decide the case based on . . . agreed-upon evidence”].) The
stipulation provided that FuentesFlores would be found guilty of
murder but would preserve his right to appeal.
On January 20, 2022, the trial court found FuentesFlores
guilty of first degree willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder, and that he committed the murder while engaged in the
commission of rape and residential burglary. (§§ 187, subd. (a),
189, 261, 460, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C), (G).) The court sentenced
FuentesFlores to life imprisonment without possibility of parole,
imposed various fines and fees, and awarded him 1,468 days of
presentence custody credit.
FuentesFlores appeals and requests that we independently
review Cole’s personnel file pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior
Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). He also contends that the
trial court erred by 1) permitting his police interview statements
5
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda),
and 2) allowing evidence of his recorded jail conversations with
his wife. These errors, FuentesFlores argues, are cumulative and
compel reversal of the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
FuentesFlores requests that we independently review the
in camera hearing and sealed personnel records of Detective Cole
to determine whether the trial court failed to disclose all relevant
and discoverable information contained within the files pursuant
to Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531.
A defendant must establish good cause for discovery of a
police officer's confidential personnel records that contain
information relevant to the defense. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d
at pp. 537-538.) Good cause is a “ ‘relatively low threshold’ ” and
requires a showing that 1) the personnel records are material to
the defense, and 2) a stated reasonable belief that the records
contain the type of information sought. (People v. Thompson
(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1316.) Good cause contemplates “a
logical link between the defense proposed and the pending
charge.” (Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011,
1021.)
When the trial court finds good cause and conducts an in
camera review pursuant to Pitchess, it must make a record that
will permit future appellate review. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26
Cal.4th 1216, 1229-1230.) A court reporter should memorialize
the statements made by the custodian of the police personnel
records and any questions asked by the court. (Id. at p. 1229.)
The court is afforded “wide discretion” in ruling on a motion for
access to law enforcement personnel records. (People v. Yearwood
6
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 180 [decision will be reversed only on
a showing of abuse of discretion]; People v. McDaniel (2021) 12
Cal.5th 97, 134.)
Our review of the sealed personnel file and the transcript of
the in camera hearing reveals that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by not disclosing any matters within the personnel
file. The court properly conducted the Pitchess hearing and
prepared a sufficient record for appellate review. The sealed
personnel documents within Cole’s file are not subject to
disclosure. (Warrick v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1011,
1021 [information in personnel file must be relevant to the
litigation].)
II.
FuentesFlores contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motions to suppress the evidence of his interview
statements. He contends that he was in custody for Miranda
purposes, his invocation of counsel was ignored, and he should
have been provided a Spanish language interpreter.
FuentesFlores first contends that Miranda warnings were
required at the beginning of his police interview because he was
in police custody. He points out that the interview room was
small, the detectives sat near the door, other doors within the
station hallway were locked, and the investigation was focused on
him.
Miranda warnings are required only when a suspect
interrogated by police is “ ‘in custody.’ ” (Thompson v. Keohane
(1995) 516 U.S. 99, 107.) Custodial interrogation means
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436,
7
444.) Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes
is a mixed question of law and fact. (People v. Kopatz (2015) 61
Cal.4th 62, 80.) A reviewing court accepts the trial court’s
findings of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence,
but independently determines whether interrogation was
custodial. (Ibid.) The test for Miranda custody is whether a
reasonable person would have felt he was not at liberty to
terminate the interview and leave. (Ibid.)
We agree with the trial court that Miranda admonitions
were not required at the outset of the interview. FuentesFlores
was not arrested or detained, was informed that he was not
under arrest and was free to leave, and was not subject to
coercive questioning. (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492,
495 [no custody where defendant came voluntarily to police
station and told immediately he was not under arrest]; People v.
Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 541-542 [no custody where
defendant voluntarily went to police station, was not restrained
or handcuffed, interview room door not locked, and questioning
not particularly confrontational].) When called by Menghrajani,
FuentesFlores stated that he “was more than happy to come
down” to the sheriff’s station.
FuentesFlores was not frisked or searched for weapons. He
was informed that he was free to leave anytime and that the
interrogation room door was unlocked. FuentesFlores responded
that the detectives should “feel free” to ask their questions and
later expressed a desire to confess because Nancy W.’s death
haunted him. Although the first interview was approximately
two hours, it was low-key, partly biographical, and not
particularly confrontational. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th
386, 402 [“police expressions of suspicion, with no other evidence
8
of a restraint on the person’s freedom of movement, are not
necessarily sufficient to convert voluntary presence at an
interview into custody”].) During the drive to the Carrizo Plain,
FuentesFlores was not handcuffed; the conversation was casual.
The three men discussed golf. FuentesFlores’s interrogation was
not custodial within the meaning of Miranda because a
reasonable person in his situation would not have believed that
he was not free to terminate the interrogation and leave. (People
v. Kopatz, supra, 61 Cal.4th 62, 80.)
FuentesFlores also argues that Missouri v. Seibert (2004)
542 U.S. 600 (Seibert) precludes admissibility of his interview
statements.
Seibert applies to situations where a suspect is interviewed
both before and after the giving of Miranda warnings. (Seibert,
supra, 542 U.S. 600, 605-606 [interrogation technique of question
first, then warn, repeat questions until receiving same answers
given prior to warning].) Generally, “as long as both the initial
unwarned statement and the subsequent warned statement are
voluntary, the warned statement may be deemed the product of a
defendant’s ‘rational and intelligent choice’ to confess and so is
admissible.” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 307.)
Seibert is inapplicable here because FuentesFlores was not
in custody when first interviewed. After offering to take the
detectives to the area where he disposed of Nancy W.’s remains,
FuentesFlores was read and waived his Miranda rights. He
continued to provide information to the detectives, including that
he had sex with Nancy W. Unlike Seibert, there is no evidence
that the detectives intentionally or deliberately withheld
Miranda warnings.
9
FuentesFlores next contends that he invoked his right to
counsel by stating, “[N]ow . . . should I get a lawyer or what
should be . . . next?” Cole responded that he could not give
FuentesFlores legal advice.
A suspect who is questioned must clearly assert his right to
counsel. (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 659.)
“Ambiguous or equivocal references to an attorney do not require
cessation of questioning.” (Ibid.) Clarifying questions regarding
counsel are not required. (Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S.
452, 461-462; Molano, at p. 660.) “[W]e decline to adopt a rule
requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect’s
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for
counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.”
(Davis, at pp. 461-462.)
FuentesFlores did not unequivocally invoke his right to
counsel and the detectives were under no obligation to clarify his
question. (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 645
[“ ‘Should I have somebody here talking for me, is this the way
it’s supposed to be done?’ ” not an invocation of counsel]; People v.
Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 510 [“ ‘I don’t know if I should
[talk] without a lawyer’ ” deemed equivocal statement that did
not invoke counsel].) “There is no requirement law enforcement
officers interrupt an interrogation to ask clarifying questions
following a suspect’s ambiguous or equivocal responses that
might or might not be construed as an invocation of the right to
an attorney.” (Cunningham, at p. 646.)
Finally, FuentesFlores asserts that the failure to provide
him a Spanish language interpreter during interrogation compels
suppression of his interview statements. He relies upon the
opinion of his expert witness, Doctor Silvia San Martin, a
10
linguistics expert, that he had a low to medium proficiency in
English and was more familiar with informal English. San
Martin explained that native Spanish-speakers had difficulty
with English language vowel sounds, the passive voice, and the
past tense.
A defendant who has limited English language skills may
nevertheless knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights if the totality of circumstances indicates that he
understood those rights when waived. (People v. Salcido (2008)
44 Cal.4th 93, 127-130.)
The totality of circumstances here reflects that
FuentesFlores intelligently understood and waived his Miranda
rights in the English language. FuentesFlores lived in the
United States for at least 17 years and possibly 28 years
(according to his brother). Detectives spoke with FuentesFlores
several times during telephone calls and during the first
interview, FuentesFlores acknowledged that he spoke “pretty
good English.” FuentesFlores did not demonstrate any difficulty
in understanding the detectives during the interviews. He also
used the English language when speaking to his wife during
telephone conversations and in drafting a lengthy apology letter
to Nancy W.’s family. Moreover, the trial court rejected the
opinions of San Martin as conclusory and expressly found her not
a credible witness.
III.
FuentesFlores argues that the trial court erred by
permitting evidence of his recorded jail telephone conversations
with his wife. He contends that the conversations are irrelevant
because they are spoken in informal English.
11
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350.)
Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence, including evidence
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant,
having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
(Id., § 210.) The court, in its discretion, may exclude evidence if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability
that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or
create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. (Id., § 352.)
The trial court possesses “considerable discretion” in
determining the relevance of evidence. (People v. Miles (2020) 9
Cal.5th 513, 587.) Similarly, the court has broad discretion
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 to exclude even relevant
evidence if it determines the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its possible prejudice. (Miles, at
p. 587.) We review a court’s ruling regarding relevancy and
admissibility for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; People v. Hardy
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting
evidence of FuentesFlores’s recorded jail conversations. During
the conversations with his wife, FuentesFlores stated that he
regretted the day (of the murder) and that he was now paying the
consequences. He conceded that he did “the worse thing,” and “a
couple of bad things mixed together.” The recorded conversations
were in the English language; in placing the telephone calls,
FuentesFlores selected English and not Spanish as the language
for directions on using the jail telephones. The conversations
were relevant to both FuentesFlores’s guilt and his English
language ability. Although the probative value of
FuentesFlores’s statements may have been minimal, the
12
statements were not irrelevant. The weight of the statements
was for the trier of fact to determine. Moreover, undue prejudice,
if any, was minimal. (People v. Lopez (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 484,
504-505 [admission made during jail conversation relevant and
not unduly prejudicial].) The court did not exercise its discretion
in an arbitrary, capricious, or absurd manner when it admitted
evidence of the conversations. (People v. Miles, supra, 9 Cal.5th
513, 587-588.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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Timothy S. Covello, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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