dissenting.
I agree with Mr. Justice White that even under the standards articulated in our prior decisions, it is clear that no private action should be implied here. It is evident from the legislative history reviewed in his dissenting opinion that Congress did not intend to create a private action through Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. It also is clear that Congress deemed the administrative enforcement mechanism it did create fully adequate to protect Title IX rights. But as mounting evidence from the courts below suggests, and the decision of the Court today demonstrates, the mode of analysis we have applied in the recent past cannot be squared with the doctrine of the separation of powers. The time has come to reappraise our standards for the judicial implication of private causes of action.1
Under Art. Ill, Congress alone has the responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. As the Legislative Branch, Congress also should determine when private parties are to be given causes of action under legislation it adopts. As countless statutes demonstrate, including Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 Congress recognizes that the creation of private actions is a legislative function and frequently exercises it. When Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts should *731not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and thereby enlarge their jurisdiction.
The facts of this case illustrate the undesirability of this assumption by the Judicial Branch of the legislative function. Whether every disappointed applicant for admission to a college or university receiving federal funds has the right to a civil-court remedy under Title IX is likely to be a matter of interest to many of the thousands of rejected applicants. It certainly is a question of vast importance to the entire higher educational community of this country. But quite apart from the interests of the persons and institutions affected, respect for our constitutional system dictates that the issue should have been resolved by the elected representatives in Congress after public hearings, debate, and legislative decision. It is not a question properly to be decided by relatively uninformed federal judges who are isolated from the political process.
In recent history, the Court has tended to stray from the Art. Ill and separation-of-powers principle of limited jurisdiction. This, I believe, is evident from a review of the more or less haphazard line of cases that led to our decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975). The “four factor” analysis of that case is an open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress. It is an analysis not faithful to constitutional principles and should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.
I
The implying of a private action from a federal regulatory statute has been an exceptional occurrence in the past history of this Court. A review of those few decisions where such a step has been taken reveals in almost every case special historical circumstances that explain the result, if not the Court’s analysis. These decisions suggest that the doctrine of *732implication applied by the Court today not only represents judicial assumption of the legislative function, but also lacks a principled precedential basis.
A
The origin of implied private causes of actions in the federal courts is said to date back to Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33 (1916). A close look at the facts of that case and the contemporary state of the law indicates, however, that Rigsby’s reference to the “inference of a private right of action,” id., at 40, carried a far different connotation than the isolated passage quoted by the Court, ante, at 689 n. 10, might suggest. The narrow question presented for decision was whether the standards of care defined by the Federal Safety Appliance Act’s penal provisions applied to a tort action brought against an interstate railroad by an employee not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of his injury. The jurisdiction of the federal courts was not in dispute, the action having been removed from state court on the ground that the defendant was a federal corporation. See Moore v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 291 U. S. 205, 215 n. 6 (1934). Under the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), then in force, the Court was free to create the substantive standards of liability applicable to a common-law negligence claim brought in federal court. The practice of judicial reference to legislatively determined standards of care was a common expedient to establish the existence of negligence. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914). Rigsby did nothing more than follow this practice, and cannot be taken as authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not legislated by Congress. Moore v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., supra, at 215-216; Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 206 F. 2d 153, 157-158 (CA1 1953) (Magruder, C. J.), aff’d per curiam, 347 U. S. 909 (1954).
*733For almost 50 years after Rigsby, this Court recognized an implied private cause of action in only one other statutory context.3 Four decisions held that various provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926 could be enforced in a federal court. The case for implication of judicial remedies was especially strong with respect to this Act, as Congress had repealed its predecessor, Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920, after Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Railroad Labor Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1923), and Pennsylvania Federation v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 267 U. S. 203 (1925), had held that judicial enforcement of its terms was not available. Convinced that Congress had meant to accomplish more through the 1926 Act, and faced with the absence of an express administrative or judicial enforcement mechanism, the Court in Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930), upheld an injunction enforcing the Act’s prohibition of employer interference in employees’ organizational activities. Buttressed by 1934 amendments to the Act that indicated congressional approval of this step, the Court in Virginian R. *734Co. v. Railway Employees, 300 U. S. 515 (1937), extended judicial enforcement to the Act’s requirement that an employer bargain with its employees’ authorized representative. Finally, in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944), and Tunstall v. Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944), the Court further held that the duty of a union not to discriminate among its members also could be enforced through the federal courts.4 In each of these cases enforcement of the Act’s various requirements could have been restricted to actions brought by the Board of Mediation (later the Mediation Board), rather than by private parties. But whatever the scope of the judicial remedy, the implication of some kind of remedial mechanism was necessary to provide the enforcement authority Congress clearly intended.5
*735During this same period, the Court frequently turned back private plaintiffs seeking to imply causes of action from federal statutes. See, e. g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647 (1963); T. I. M. E. Inc. v. United States, 369 U. S. 464 (1959); General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U. S. 338 (1943); General Committee v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 320 U. S. 323 (1943); Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943). Throughout these cases, the focus of the Court’s inquiry generally was on the availability of means other than a private action to enforce the statutory duty at issue. Even in cases where the statute might be said to have been enacted for the benefit of a special class comprising the plaintiff, the factor to which the Court today attaches so much importance, ante, at 689-693, and n. 13, the Court refused to create a private action if Congress had provided some other means of enforcing such duties. See, e. g., Switch-men v. National Mediation Board, supra, at 300-301.
A break in this pattern occurred in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964). There the Court held that a private party could maintain a cause of action under § 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in spite of Congress’ express creation of an administrative mechanism for enforcing that statute. I find this decision both unprecedented6 and *736incomprehensible as a matter of public policy. The decision’s rationale, which lies ultimately in the judgment that “[p]rivate enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to Commission action,” 377 U. S., at 432, ignores the fact that Congress, in determining the degree of regulation to be imposed on companies covered by the Securities Exchange Act, already had decided that private enforcement was unnecessary. More significant for present purposes, however, is the fact that Borak, rather than signaling the start of a trend in this Court, constitutes a singular and, I believe, aberrant interpretation of a federal regulatory statute.
Since Borak, this Court has upheld the implication of private causes of actions derived from federal statutes in only three extremely limited sets of circumstances. First, the Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 (1969); and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975), recognized the right of private parties to seek relief for violations of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1982. But to say these cases “implied” rights of action is somewhat misleading, as Congress at the time these statutes were enacted expressly referred to private enforcement actions.7 Furthermore, as in *737the Railway Labor Act cases, Congress had provided no alternative means of asserting these rights. Thus, the Court was presented with the choice between regarding these statutes as precatory or recognizing some kind of judicial proceeding.
Second, the Court in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544 (1969), permitted private litigants to sue to enforce the preclearance provisions of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As the Court seems to concede, this decision was reached without substantial analysis, ante, at 690, and n. 12, and in my view can be explained only in terms of this Court’s special and traditional concern for safeguarding the electoral process.8 In addition, as Mr. Justice White notes, the *738remedy implied was very limited, thereby reducing the chances that States would be exposed to frivolous or harassing suits.9
Finally, the Court in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6 (1971), ratified 25 years of lower-court precedent that had held a private cause of action available under the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5. As the Court concedes, ante, at 692 n. 13, this decision reflects the unique history of Rule 10b-5, and did not articulate any standards of general applicability.
These few cases applying Borak must be contrasted with the subsequent decisions where the Court refused to imply private actions. In Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964), the Court refused to permit private suits in derogation of administrative remedies to enforce Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, in spite of that statute’s command, inter alia, that “every member in good standing . . . shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 481 (e).10 In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453 (1974), the Court reversed a lower court’s implication of a private action to challenge violations of the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, in light of the Attorney General’s express enforcement authority. And in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412 (1975), we refused to allow private actions under the Securities Investor Protection Act *739of 1970, which also was enforceable by administrative proceedings and Government suits.11
B
It was against this background of almost invariable refusal to imply private actions, absent a complete failure of alternative enforcement mechanisms and a clear expression of legislative intent to create such a remedy, that Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), was decided. In holding that no private action could be brought to enforce 18 U. S. C. § 610 (1970 ed. and Supp. Ill), a criminal statute, the Court referred to four factors said to be relevant to determining generally whether private actions could be implied. 422 U. S., at 78.12 As Mr. *740Justice White suggests, ante, at 718-719, and n. 1, these factors were meant only as guideposts for answering a single question, namely, whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action. The conclusion in that particular case was obvious. But, as the opinion of the Court today demonstrates, the Cort analysis too easily may be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement.
Of the four factors mentioned in Cort, only one refers expressly to legislative intent. The other three invite independent judicial lawmaking. Asking whether a statute creates a right in favor of a private party, for example, begs the question at issue. What is involved is not the mere existence of a legal right, but a particular person's right to invoke the power of the courts to enforce that right.13 See n. 1, supra. Determining whether a private action would be consistent with the “underlying purposes” of a legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the goals of a scheme should be, and how those goals should be advanced. See Note, 43 Ford. L. Rev. 441, 454-455, 458 (1974). Finally, looking to state law for parallels to the federal right simply focuses inquiry on a particular policy consideration that Congress already may have weighed in deciding not to create a private action.
That the Cort analysis too readily permits courts to over*741ride the decision of Congress not to create a private action is demonstrated conclusively by the flood of lower-court decisions applying it. Although from the time Cort was decided until today this Court consistently has turned back attempts to create private actions, see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, ante, p. 281; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1 (1977), other federal courts have tended to proceed in exactly the opposite direction. In the four years since we decided Cort, no less than 20 decisions by the Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes. Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1978) (§ 13 (c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F. 2d 223 (CA7 1978) (§ 1007 (a) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958), cert. pending, No. 78-1398; Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F. 2d 617 (CA2) (§17 (a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert. granted, 439 U. S. 979 (1978); Lodge 1858, AFGE v. Webb, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 233, 580 F. 2d 496 (§ 203 of National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958), cert. denied sub nom. Government Employees v. Frosch, 439 U. S. 927 (1978); Riggle v. California, 577 F. 2d 579 (CA9 1978) (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act); Lewis v. Transamerica Corp., 575 F. 2d 237 (CA9) (§ 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940), cert. granted, 439 U. S. 952 (1978); Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F. 2d 1158 (CA4 1978) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973), cert. granted, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F. 2d 913 (CA2 1978) (Art. 28 (1) of Warsaw Convention), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1114 (1979); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F. 2d 862 (CA2 1977) (§ 206 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940), cert. denied, 436 U. S. 913 (1978); Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 568 F. 2d 478 (CA6 1977) (§ 11 (e) of Federal Home Loan Bank Act); Wilson v. First Houston Investment Corp., 566 F. 2d 1235 (CA5 1978) (§ 206 of Invest*742ment Advisers Act of 1940), cert. pending, No. 77-1717; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Bloom, 183 U. S. App. D. C. 217, 562 F. 2d 736 (1977) (§§ 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall Act), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 942 (1978); Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 F. 2d 1223 (CA7 1977) (§ 17 (a) of Securities Act of 1933), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U. S. 551 (1979); United Handicapped Federation v. Andre, 558 F. 2d 413 (CA8 1977) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Nedd v. United Mine Workers, 556 F. 2d 190 (CA3 1977) (§ 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 1947), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 554 F. 2d 377 (CA9 1977) (39 U. S. C. § 3009); Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F. 2d 296 (CA2 1977) (§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F. 2d 1277 (CA7 1977) (same); McDaniel v. University of Chicago and Argonne, 548 F. 2d 689 (CA7 1977) (§ 1 of Davis-Bacon Act), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1033 (1978); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F. 2d 156 (CA9) (§ 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 896 (1976). It defies reason to believe that in each of these statutes Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action. Indeed, the accelerating trend evidenced by these decisions attests to the need to re-examine the Cort analysis.
II
In my view, the implication doctrine articulated in Cort and applied by the Court today engenders incomparably greater problems than the possibility of occasionally failing to divine an unexpressed congressional intent. If only a matter of statutory construction were involved, our obligation might be to develop more refined criteria which more accurately reflect congressional intent. “But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear” and compels us to abandon the implication doctrine of Cort. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
*743As the above-cited 20 decisions of the Courts of Appeals illustrate, Cort allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch. It also invites Congress to avoid resolution of the often controversial question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private litigation. Rather than confronting the hard political choices involved, Congress is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide.14 When this happens, the legislative process with its public scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to everyone concerned. Because the courts are free to reach a result different from that which the normal play of political forces would have produced, the intended beneficiaries of the legislation are unable to ensure the full measure of protection their needs may warrant. For the same reason, those subject to the legislative constraints are denied the opportunity to forestall through the political process potentially unnecessary and disruptive litigation. Moreover, the public generally is denied the benefits that are derived from the making of important societal choices through the open debate of the democratic process.
The Court’s implication doctrine encourages, as a corollary to the political default by Congress, an increase in the govern*744mental power exercised by the federal judiciary. The dangers posed by judicial arrogation of the right to resolve general societal conflicts have been manifest to this Court throughout its history. See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 222 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 188-197 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U. S. 426, 432 (1948); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 362 (1911); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718 (1879) (“One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule”); Rayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). As the Court observed only last Term:
“Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is equally — and emphatically — the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.
“Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process *745comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194-195 (1978).
See also United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 179 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The principle of limited federal jurisdiction is fundamental . . .”).15
It is true that the federal judiciary necessarily exercises substantial powers to construe legislation, including, when appropriate, the power to prescribe substantive standards of conduct that supplement federal legislation. But this power normally is exercised with respect to disputes over which a court already has jurisdiction, and in which the existence of *746the asserted cause of action is established.16 Implication of a private cause of action, in contrast, involves a significant additional step. By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve. Cf. Jacobson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 206 F. 2d 153 (CA1 1953) (Magruder, C. J.), aff'd per curiam, 347 U. S. 909 (1954); Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 285, 286-287 (1963).17 This *747runs contrary to the established principle that “[t]he jurisdiction of the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation . . . American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951), and conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. Ill to set the limits of federal jurisdiction. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850); United States v. Nourse, 6 Pet. 470 (1832); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1004-1008 (1965).
The facts of this case illustrate how the implication of a right of action not authorized by Congress denigrates the democratic process. Title IX embodies a national commitment to the elimination of discrimination based on sex, a goal the importance of which has been recognized repeatedly by our decisions. See, e. g., Caban v. Mohammed, ante, p. 380; Orr v. Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Gold-farb, 430 U. S. 199 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971). But Because Title IX applies to most of our Nation’s institutions of higher learning, it also trenches on the authority of the academic community to govern itself, an authority the free exercise of which is critical to the vitality of our society. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 311 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); Murphy, Academic Freedom — An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 447 (1963); Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 879 (1979). Arming frustrated applicants with the power to challenge in court his or her rejection inevitably will have a constraining effect on admissions programs. The burden of expensive, vexatious litigation upon institutions whose resources often are severely limited may well compel an emphasis on objectively measured academic qualifications *748at the expense of more flexible admissions criteria that bring richness and diversity to academic life.18 If such a significant incursion into the arena of academic polity is to be made, it is the constitutional function of the Legislative Branch, subject as it is to the checks of the political process, to make this judgment.19
Congress already has created a mechanism for enforcing the mandate found in Title IX against gender-based discrimination. At least in the view of Congress, the fund-termination power conferred on HEW is adequate to ensure that dis*749crimination in federally funded colleges and universities will not be countenanced. The current position of the Government notwithstanding,20 overlapping judicial and administrative enforcement of these policies inevitably will lead to conflicts and confusion; our national goal of equal opportunity for men and women, as well as the academic community, may suffer. A federal court should resolve all doubts against this kind of self-aggrandizement, regardless of the temptation to lend its assistance to the furtherance of some remedial end deemed attractive.
Ill
In sum, I believe the need both to restrain courts that too readily have created private causes of action, and to encourage Congress to confront its obligation to resolve crucial policy questions created by the legislation it enacts, has become compelling. Because the analysis suggested by Cort has proved inadequate to meet these problems, I would start afresh. Henceforth, we should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist. Where a statutory scheme expressly provides for an alternative mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties created, I would be especially reluctant ever to permit a federal court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes. Because the Court today is enlisting the federal judiciary in just such an enterprise, I dissent.
The phrase “private cause of action” may not have a completely clear meaning. As the term is used herein, I refer to the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another’s violation of a legal requirement. In the context of legislation enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory duty.
See 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (Title II; limited to preventive relief); §§ 2000e — 5 (f), (g) (Title VII; administrative preclearance required).
During this period, the Court did uphold the implication of civil remedies in favor of the Government, see Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U. S. 191 (1967); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482 (1960), and strongly suggested that private actions could be implied directly from particular provisions of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946). See also Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933). Both of these issues are significantly different from the implication of a private remedy from a federal statute. In Wyandotte and Republic Steel, the Government already had a “cause of action’’ in the form of its power to bring criminal proceedings under the pertinent statutes. Thus, the Court was confronted only with the question whether the Government could exact less drastic civil penalties as an alternative means of enforcing the same obligations. And this Court’s traditional responsibility to safeguard constitutionally protected rights, as well as the freer hand we necessarily have in the interpretation of the Constitution, permits greater judicial creativity with respect to implied constitutional causes of action. Moreover, the implication of remedies to enforce constitutional provisions does not interfere with the legislative process in the way that the implication of remedies from statutes can. See Part III, infra.
The Act did not refer expressly to an obligation not to discriminate, but in light of its structure, especially its vesting in an authorized union the power to exclude all others from representing employees, the Court felt compelled to imply this duty. This construction of the Act was necessary to avoid a difficult constitutional question, namely, the applicability of the Constitution’s prohibition of racial discrimination to a private party enjoying a statutorily created status as an exclusive bargaining agent. See Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S., at 202-203; id., at 208-209 (Murphy, J., concurring).
The Court states that a private cause of action also was implied in Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U. S. 682 (1963), a case involving an amendment of the Railway Labor Act applicable to airlines. Ante, at 692-693, n. 13. A careful reading of that case suggests that it presented a somewhat different question. Under § 204 of the 1936 amendments to the Act, boards of adjustment were established to resolve labor grievances. The Court held that a claim based on a collective-bargaining agreement that had been interpreted by such a board presented a federal question under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. The cause of action came directly from the agreement, not from any provision of the Act, and the only issue was whether this already existing private cause of action could be brought in a federal court. See Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 166 (1953). Cf. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921). Although as a practical matter this result entails many of the same problems involved in the implication *735of a private cause of action, see n. 17, infra, at least analytically the problems are quite different.
None of the authorities cited in the opinion supports the result. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942), and Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940), held that federal law could limit a state-law defense to a state-law cause of action. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282 (1940), held that a federal judge could devise equitable remedies to supplement an expressly created private action for damages. Similarly, Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U. S. 288 (1960) ; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948); and Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U. S. 395 (1946), upheld various equitable remedies devised under an express equitable cause of action. As already noted, Bell v. Hood involved the implication of a private action from a constitutional provision, and Tunstall v. Locomotive *736Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210 (1944), was grounded on a statute that provided no express means of enforcement. None of these cases condoned the implication of a private action in circumstances where alternative means of enforcement were available. Although I do not suggest that we should consider overruling Borak at this late date, cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258 (1972), the lack of precedential support for this decision militates strongly against its extension beyond the facts of the case. Cf. Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 477 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 737 (1975).
Both § 1981 and § 1982 are derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was re-enacted in pertinent part in §§ 16 and 18 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Section 3 of the 1866 Act provided:
“[T]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have . . . cognizance ... of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied . . . any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this *737act ... . The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters hereby conferred on the district and circuit courts of the United States shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where such laws are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offences against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of the cause ... is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern said courts in the trial and disposition of such cause . . . .” 14 Stat. 27.
Section 18 of the 1870 Act made this section applicable to § 16 of the later Act. Subsequently Congress, through § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, indicated in even more explicit terms that private actions would be available to prevent official interference with the rights guaranteed by § 1 of the 1866 Act. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., ante, at 627-628 (Powell, J., concurring). Although one might conclude, in light of the 1871 Act, that the 1866 and 1870 Acts did not provide for private actions but merely permitted federal courts to entertain state-law actions affecting the denial of civil rights, an equally plausible reading of those statutes is that Congress created a federal cause of action to enforce § 1 of the 1866 Act.
See, e. g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va. L. Rev. 945, 956-976 (1975). Cf. United *738States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153 n. 4 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 195 n. 17 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
See ante, at 728-729.
Section 402 of the Act created an administrative procedure for investigating violations of Title IV and permitted the Secretary of Labor to sue in federal court to obtain relief. Section 403 of the Act stated that the administrative remedy was the exclusive means of challenging “an election already conducted” but did not limit attempts to obtain prospective relief, the object of the suit in Calhoon.
Since Borah, the Court also has entertained several cases involving challenges to various state welfare programs based in part on the Social Security Act. See, e. g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968). Most of these decisions did not confront the cause-of-action issue at all; none of them addressed the question whether a private cause of action could be implied. In some instances there were conclusory, and in my view incorrect, statements to the effect that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 might provide a basis for asserting these claims. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., ante, at 644-646. (Powell, J., concurring.) The silence of these decisions with respect to inferring a private cause of action cannot be taken as authority for the implication of one.
The Court stated its analysis as follows:
“First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especié, benefit the statute was enacted,' Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39 (1916) (emphasis supplied) — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? See, e. g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U. S. 453, 458, 460 (1974) (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? See, e. g., Amtrak, supra; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U. S. 412, 423 (1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964). And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action *740based solely on federal law? See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 652 (1963); cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 434 (1964); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 394-395 (1971); id., at 400 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).” 422 U. S., at 78.
The Court attempts to avoid the question-begging nature of this inquiry by emphasizing the precise phrasing of the statute at issue. Ante, at 689-693, and n. 13. Aside from its failure to contend with relevant decisions that do not conform to the perceived pattern, see, e. g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134 (1964); Switchmen v. National Mediation Board, 320 U. S. 297 (1943), the Court’s approach gives undue significance to essentially stylistic differences in legislative draftsmanship.
Mr. Justice RehNquist, perhaps considering himself temporarily bound by his position in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 418-421 (1978) (opinion of SteveNS, J.), concurs in the Court’s decision today. But writing briefly, he correctly observes “that Congress, at least during the period of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights Act, tended to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of action, rather than determining this question for itself,” ante, at 718. It does not follow, however, that this Court is obliged to indulge Congress in its refusal to confront these hard questions. In my view, the very reasons advanced by Mr. Justice RehNquist why “this Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action” absent specific direction by Congress, ibid., apply to this case with special force.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter described these dangers with characteristic eloquence:
“Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court’s ‘judicial Power’ . . . may well impair the Court’s position as the ultimate organ of ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce. The Court’s authority — possessed of neither the purse nor the sword — ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S., at 267 (dissenting opinion).
Alexander JBickel identified the practical difficulties in judicial exercise of governmental power:
“The judicial process is too principle-prone and principle-bound — it has to be, there is no other justification or explanation for the role it plays. It is also too remote from conditions, and deals, case by case, with too narrow a slice of reality. It is not accessible to all the varied interests that are in play in any decision of great consequence. It is, very properly, independent. It is passive. It has difficulty controlling the stages by which it approaches a problem. It rushes forward too fast, or it lags; its pace hardly ever seems just right. For all these reasons, it is, in a vast, complex, changeable society, a most unsuitable instrument for the formation of policy.” The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 175 (1970).
See, e. g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715 (1979); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, Hart and Weehsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 756-832 (1973); Friendly, In Praise of Erie — And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383 (1964).
Because a private action implied from a federal statute has as an element the violation of that statute, see n. 1, supra, the action universally has been considered to present a federal question over which a federal court has jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Thus, when a federal court implies a private action from a statute, it necessarily expands the scope of its federal-question jurisdiction.
It is instructive to compare decisions implying private causes of action to those cases that have found nonfederal causes of action cognizable by a federal court under § 1331. E. g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921). Where a court decides both that federal-law elements are present in a state-law cause of action, and that these elements predominate to the point that the action can be said to preseñt a “federal question” cognizable in federal court, the net effect is the same as implication of a private action directly from the constitutional or statutory source of the federal-law elements. Compare Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, 582 F. 2d 444 (CA8 1978), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 1090 (1979); Local 619, Amalgamated Transit Union v. LaCrosse Municipal Transit Utility, 585 F. 2d 1340 (CA7 1978), with Local 619, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 F. 2d 1 (CA1 1978). To the extent an expansive interpretation of § 1331 permits federal courts to assume control over disputes which Congress did not consign to the federal judicial process, it is subject to the same criticisms of judicial implication of private actions discussed in the text.
Although the burdens of administrative regulation applied to colleges and universities through Title IX are not insubstantial, that process is at least under the control of Government officials whose personal interests are not directly implicated and whose actions are subject to congressional oversight. Private litigation, by contrast, is subject to no such checks.
We have recognized in other contexts that implication of a private cause of action can frustrate those alternative processes that exist to resolve such disputes and, given the costs of federal litigation today, may dramatically revise the balance of interests struck by the legislation. See Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U. S., at 478-479; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 739-744. That this concern applies fully to litigation under Title DC is borne out by the facts of this case. Petitioner’s undergraduate grade-point average in basic sciences was 3.17, far below the 3.70 overall average of the University of Chicago’s entering class, and her medical college admission test scores were in the bottom half of the applicant group. More than 2,000 applicants for the 104 positions at Chicago had better academic qualifications than petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner’s age exceeded restrictions at both Chicago and Northwestern. If Title IX prohibits only purposeful discrimination such as would violate the Constitution were state action involved, a conclusion that seems forgone in light of our holding with respect to Title "VT of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 284-287 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at 328-350 (opinion of BrenNan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.), then the chances of petitioner’s proving that the neutral age requirements used by Chicago and Northwestern are unlawful seem infinitesimal. Yet these schools have been forced to use their scarce resources to defend against this suit at three levels of our federal judicial system, and in light of the Court’s holding today they must contend with at least one more round of proceedings.
See Brief for Federal Respondents 58-60, n. 36.