dissenting.
In 1982, the Government filed a complaint to denaturalize petitioner. It set out three reasons why this action was justified. First, it tried to show that petitioner assisted in the arrest and execution of more than 2,000 civilians in Kedainiai, Lithuania, during a 2-month period in 1941. The Government offered three videotaped depositions taken in the Soviet Union as proof of this claim. Although the District Court observed that these depositions would strongly tend to prove the Government’s case if they were admitted as evidence *802without qualification, it admitted them only for the purpose of showing that the atrocities took place. Without the excluded evidence, the District Court held that the Government failed to prove this claim.
The Government also showed that petitioner had made certain false statements in applying for his visa and in his naturalization petition. These false statements concerned his date and place of birth, his wartime occupations, and his wartime residence: petitioner added two years to his age and misstated the city in which he was born, listed various occupations that he was engaged in from 1942 to 1947 without listing that he was a bookkeeper for several of those years, and swore that he had resided in another city rather than in Kedainiai at the time these atrocities occurred, The District Court found that petitioner had indeed made these misrepresentations, but that they were immaterial under 8 U. S. C. § 1451(a) because the true facts, if known, would not themselves have warranted denial of a visa and would not have led to an investigation. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U. S. 350 (1960). It therefore did not inquire into what an investigation might have uncovered.
Finally, the Government asserted that petitioner’s false representations, whether or not material, were in themselves sufficient to show that petitioner did not have good moral character and that therefore he did not qualify for naturalization under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1427(a) and 1101(f)(6). The District Court rejected this claim also, ruling that because the false statements at issue were not material, they were not in themselves sufficient to prove that petitioner lacked good moral character.
The District Court accordingly entered judgment for petitioner. The Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Initially, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that misrepresentations must be material in order to constitute sufficient grounds for finding lack of “good moral character” under § 1101(f)(6). It disagreed with *803the District Court, however, with respect to the materiality of the false statements in the visa application and the naturalization petition, holding that the misrepresentations about birth and age would have triggered an investigation that probably would have led to the discovery of facts disqualifying petitioner for a visa and for naturalization. It did not rule on the Government’s further submission that the District Court erred by not admitting the videotaped depositions into evidence without qualification.
This case has been argued and now reargued before this Court. The Court today reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remands for further consideration of several issues. Although I agree with Parts I, II-A, and III-A of the Court’s opinion, I disagree with other parts and with the result it reaches. I therefore dissent.
I
I would affirm the judgment below and grant the Government’s petition for denaturalization. The Court holds, and I agree, that there was error in the holding below that petitioner’s misrepresentations must be material in order to constitute sufficient grounds for finding that petitioner lacks “good moral character” under § 1101(f)(6). As the Court states, the statute “does not distinguish between material and immaterial misrepresentations,” but instead “denominates a person to be of bad moral character on account of having given false testimony if he has told even the most immaterial of lies with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits.” Ante, at 779-780. In addition to the language of § 1101(f)(6), which in itself compels this conclusion, the legislative history of the 1961 amendments to the statute, Pub. L. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656, shows that Congress sought to broaden, not restrict, the grounds upon which naturalization could be revoked.1
*804In this connection, we must bear in mind the necessity of striking an appropriate balance between the serious consequences that attend loss of citizenship and the need for “strict compliance with all the congressionally imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship.” Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490, 506 (1981). We need not decide in this case whether § 1101(f)(6) would bar naturalization of an individual who offered a single piece of false testimony in only one instance or who later offered a reasonable explanation for why misstatements were made; we also need not decide whether such a construction of the statute would be inconsistent with a proper balancing of the two important but opposing considerations set out above. There may well be cases in which a single willful but immaterial misrepresentation would be insufficient to establish lack of good character, but would constitute grounds for denaturalization if it were material. Similarly, there are cases like this one in which repeated and numerous willful misrepresentations justify a *805finding of lack of good moral character notwithstanding that the misrepresentations may not involve material facts.
Here, petitioner’s false testimony was not confined to one occasion, nor did it concern only a single piece of evidence. And at no time before or during the naturalization process did petitioner voluntarily step forward and attempt to ex- ■ plain the reasons for his various misrepresentations. To the contrary, the facts as found by the District Court demonstrate clearly, unequivocally, and convincingly that petitioner engaged in a pattern of repeated misrepresentations and nondisclosures at both the visa application stage and during his naturalization proceedings. The District Court found: *806The congressional mandate expressed in § 1101(f)(6) speaks clearly to such a pattern of falsehoods, and that statute would have precluded a determination in 1954 that petitioner possessed “good moral character.” Accordingly, petitioner lacked an essential prerequisite to becoming a naturalized citizen, and he is now subject to denaturalization for having “illegally procured” his citizenship. § 1451(a).
*805“Throughout his visa and citizenship proceedings [petitioner] misrepresented the date and place of his birth. In addition in his application for a visa [petitioner] failed to disclose (and therefore concealed) his presence in Kedainiai during the 1940-42 period and he failed to disclose (and therefore concealed) that he had been a bookkeeper-clerk in the Kaunas brush and broom establishment during the 1941-44 period. [Petitioner] in effect perpetuated these non-disclosures or concealments throughout his naturalization proceedings by representing that the information contained in his visa application was correct.” 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1139 (NJ 1983).2
*806Despite its recognition that materiality is not required by § 1101(f)(6), the Court declines to uphold the judgment below, and remands the case for further consideration of one point of law and one point of fact. Neither point is at all substantial. The point of law is whether petitioner’s misrepresentations constituted “testimony” within the meaning of the statute. As the Court notes, the term “testimony” in § 1101(f)(6) has been construed as referring only to oral evidence, and thus as excluding the written documents submitted by petitioner in his naturalization petition. Yet petitioner in this case did make oral misrepresentations: he testified falsely when he swore under oath before a naturalization examiner that the contents of his naturalization forms were true. Deposition of Julius Goldberg, App. 145-162. See also Matter of Ngan, 10 I. & N. Dec. 725 (1964). Furthermore, he had testified falsely in order to obtain his visa into this country.
The point of fact is whether petitioner-made these misrepresentations “for the purpose of obtaining any benefits” under the immigration and naturalization laws. There is no difficulty about this point either. The willful misrepresentations at issue here were made in the context of petitioner’s naturalization petition and were made earlier at the visa *807stage. The fact that the misrepresentations were willful, coupled with the fact that they were made during proceedings and on documents required for immigration and naturalization purposes — indeed, the very proceedings and documents that petitioner was required to complete in order to “obtai[n]” the “benefits” he sought of gaining naturalization— satisfies the elements of § 1101(f)(6). The District Court itself found that petitioner’s naturalization petition was false in particular because it “stated that defendant had not previously given false testimony to obtain benefits under the immigration and naturalization laws.” 571 F. Supp., at 1138.3 In light of this specific finding by the District Court, there is no justification for remanding this issue to be resolved again by the trier of fact.
II
Because the Court declines to affirm the decision below on the basis of § 1101(f)(6), it finds it necessary to revisit the definition of the term “material” as it is used in § 1451(a). The Court today holds that the proper test of materiality is whether the misrepresentations “had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization *808Service.” Ante, at 772. I do not disagree with this definition, but the Court’s application of the definition in this case is flawed.
To begin with, the Court finds it proper under § 1451(a) to consider only the misrepresentations petitioner made in his naturalization proceedings but not those made in his earlier visa proceedings. The view of the United States is much more persuasive: the misrepresentations made by petitioner at the visa stage were instrumental to his procuring naturalization, for by obtaining the visa petitioner obtained lawful admission to residence in this country, which is one requirement for naturalization under § 1429. See also Fedorenko, 449 U. S., at 518-520 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). The Court responds that by that logic, any misrepresentation that helps an individual to obtain any prerequisite to naturalization, such as English literacy, would be considered material. These two things, however, are not the same, and the Court’s supposed extension of its logic is merely foolish. The visa proceedings and the naturalization proceedings are intimately related not only because they both are proceedings governed by the same provisions of the immigration and naturalization laws, but also because the visa and the certificate of naturalization are obtained as part of the same process for obtaining citizenship, and both must be lawfully procured. For example, it is not mere residence in this country that is a prerequisite to naturalization, but residence after being “lawfully admitted.” § 1429. It makes no sense, on the other hand, to speak of proceedings to attain “lawful” literacy skills or a “lawful” understanding of American history and government, as required under § 1423, and the statute does not speak in these terms but instead manifests complete and understandable indifference as to how the individual came by those proficiencies. Thus the visa proceedings can accurately be regarded as one crucial stage in the naturalization proceedings themselves, yet the time spent acquiring literacy skills or an understanding of Ameri*809can history and government obviously cannot be regarded as a stage in those proceedings.
Even if I were to accept the proposition that we should consider only the materiality of the misrepresentations that petitioner made in the naturalization proceedings, those misrepresentations surely had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS. As an initial matter, there is no requirement that the Court focus only on petitioner’s misrepresentations about his date and place of his birth and leave aside his other potentially more significant misrepresentations that were also identified by the District Court.4 But even limiting the focus as the Court does, I would find these statements to be material. In reaching this conclusion I would ask not only whether these misrepresentations of fact would have a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS, but also whether the fact of these misrepresentations itself would have had such a tendency. In other words, the proper inquiry is not only whether the true date and place of birth, in isolation, would have aroused suspicion, but also whether an investigation would have ensued had petitioner revealed the true facts and thereby disclosed the discrepancy between them and the false statements in his supporting documents. Former Ambassador Seymour Maxwell Finger, Vice Consul in Stuttgart in January 1947, testified that if there were discrepancies between the visa application and the supporting documents an investigation certainly would have occurred, a view that is consistent with the regulations then in effect. See 22 CFR § 61.329 (Supp. 1946).
*810The Court of Appeals arrived at the-same conclusion, and the United States supports this construction of the statute, which is a sound one. The materiality of misrepresentations may be, but need not be, established by considering the true facts alone. It also may be shown by a comparison between those true facts and the false assertions made about those same matters. Therefore, when the plurality states that “[w]hat must have a natural tendency to influence the official decision is the misrepresentation itself. . . the failure to state the truth,” ante, at 776 (emphasis added), it is wrong to limit its consideration to whether those true facts alone, if known, would have had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS. Instead, it should also consider whether “the misrepresentation itself. . . the failure to state the truth” would have had such a tendency; this inquiry also encompasses the INS’ knowing the fact that the true facts do not match the false assertions that the individual seeking naturalization has made about those same matters. For whether a misrepresentation has actually been made is itself a matter of fact, and in certain circumstances this fact alone may possess great significance. Unless a court is to pretend that petitioner’s lies themselves are not facts, it defies reality to conclude that “official knowledge of the misrepresented fact,” ante, at 775, means-only that the INS now knows how to correct the lies but must not take into account the fact that those lies have been told.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision below on this ground also. At the very least I note that it is open to the trier of fact on remand to consider whether knowledge of petitioner’s repeated and numerous misrepresentations would have had a natural tendency to influence the decisions of the INS.
Ill
As a final point, it should be emphasized that the Court of Appeals never passed on the correctness of the District Court’s determination that the videotaped depositions could *811not be admitted into evidence unqualifiedly because they were inherently unreliable.5 On remand, this issue should be resolved definitively. If the depositions are found to be admissible without qualification, rather than merely for the limited purpose allowed by the District Court, then the petition for denaturalization would be granted regardless of how the other issues are resolved, for it is undisputed that if petitioner were shown to have participated in the mass arrests and executions at Kedainiai, he never would have qualified for naturalization and thus now would be properly subject to denaturalization.
I respectfully dissent.
Prior to 1952, “illegal procurement” constituted grounds for revoking a citizen’s naturalization. When Congress enacted § 340 of the Immigration *804and Nationality Act of 1952, it dropped, without explanation, the “illegal procurement” provision, adding in its stead the “concealment of a material fact” or “willful misrepresentation” language. The deleted provision was reinserted in § 1451(a) by the 1961 amendments, Pub. L. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656. The House Report accompanying the amendments noted that “[elimination of the illegality ground bars denaturalization under section 340 unless it is proved that the naturalized person has been guilty of wrongdoing amounting to concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation. . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 38 (1961). The Report explained that “[p]roof of concealment of material facts or willful misrepresentation ... is fraught with difficulty,” id., at 39, and that the amendment to § 1451(a) was necessary because “[t]he congressional mandate that no person shall be naturalized unless possessed of certain qualifications is ineffectual unless there is also statutory provision for revoking citizenship where the prerequisites did not in fact exist.” Ibid. These statements evince clear congressional intent that “illegal procurement” be maintained as a separate basis for denaturalization, and do not sanction collapsing § 1101(f)(6) into the willful and material misrepresentation or concealment provision of § 1451(a).
On October 23, 1953, petitioner swore under oath before a naturalization examiner that the contents of his naturalization forms were true. As stated above, this testimony was false in that petitioner supplied an incorrect date and place of birth, and he represented that the information he had supplied in the visa application was true. This false testimony falls within the coverage of § 1101(f) because petitioner offered it “during the period for which good moral character is required to be established.” Although petitioner’s false testimony given at the visa application stage is not, standing alone, similarly covered by this provision, it is directly relevant to the “good moral character” determination. Section 1427(e) provides that in making this determination, a court “shall not be limited to the petitioner’s conduct during the five years preceding the filing of the petition, but may *806take into consideration . . . the petitioner’s conduct and acts at any time prior to that period.” It is also of some interest, though irrelevant to this determination, that petitioner was still lying in 1981, when he tried to explain his previous falsehoods. App. 79-137. The trial court also found that he falsely denied at trial his membership in a local rifleman’s organization that at the time of the atrocities provided military training to its members and on occasion assisted German occupation forces.
The Court phrases this inquiry as whether petitioner made these misrepresentations with “thé subjective intent of obtaining immigration or naturalization benefits,” and finds it necessary to remand on this issue because issues of intent are properly matters for resolution by the trier of fact. Ante, at 780, 782. This approach rests on a recasting of the statutory language, which requires that the misrepresentations be made “for the purpose of obtaining” such benefits, but even if those two linguistic formulations were exactly the same, it is quite clear that when misrepresentations of fact are made in the process of applying for immigration and naturalization benefits, in a very real and immediate sense those misrepresentations are made “for the purpose of obtaining” such benefits, and at least in this case all of this is so clear that we should find it to be established as a matter of law. Although the Court is certainly correct that issues of intent are normally reserved for resolution by the trier of fact, I do not think that we should prolong proceedings unnecessarily by parsing matters in microscopic detail, creating a legion of subissues, and demanding their resolution while losing sight of what is both clear and dispositive about this case.
The District Court found as a matter of fact that petitioner also misrepresented his residence and employment during the time in which the atrocities occurred at Kedainiai. 571 F. Supp. 1104, 1139 (NJ 1983). The correctness of those factual findings has not been challenged. The Government, as respondent, urges us to consider the effect of these other misrepresentations as an additional reason for affirming the decision below, which is entirely proper.
The District Court found the three videotaped depositions to be unreliable largely because they were taken in the Soviet Union, which “has a strong state interest” in this case and which “on occasion distorts or fabricates evidence in cases such as this involving an important state interest,” and because these depositions “were conducted in a manner which made it impossible to determine if the testimony had been influenced improperly by Soviet authorities.” 571 F. Supp., at 1132.