Dahl v. Bonta CA2/3

Filed 8/3/23 Dahl v. Bonta CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JEANETTE DAHL et al., B316892

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19SMCV00782)
v.

ROB BONTA, as Attorney General, et
al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Yvette Palazuelos, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ron Bochner and Ron Bochner, for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas Patterson, Assistant
Attorney General, Anya Binsacca, Jose Zelidon-Zepeda and
Christina R.B. Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant
and Respondent Rob Bonta as Attorney General.
Logan Mathevosian & Hur and Elise Hur, for Defendant
and Respondent County of Los Angeles.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

In their suit against the State of California (the State) and
the County of Los Angeles (the County), plaintiffs Jeanette Dahl
and Danny Ryker challenge the validity of Code of Civil
Procedure section 700.160, subdivision (b) (hereafter
section 700.160(b)),1 which allows a judgment creditor to levy on
the deposit account or safe-deposit box of a judgment creditor’s
spouse without a court order. The trial court sustained a
demurrer to plaintiffs’ third amended complaint without leave to
amend and dismissed the complaint. We find no error and affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In February 2017, the Superior Court for the County of
Santa Barbara entered a judgment against Robert Dahl.
Jeanette Dahl is Robert Dahl’s ex-wife. The two divorced in
2002. Jeanette Dahl (Dahl) is now married to Danny Ryker.
Andrew Larson became the assignee of the judgment
creditor. In April 2018, Larson obtained a writ of execution
authorizing a levy against Robert Dahl’s property. He then filed
the writ of execution with the Los Angeles County Sheriff,
seeking to levy on Dahl’s property. In support of the writ of

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

2
execution, Larson declared: “I have full knowledge and believe to
be true that judgment debtor, Robert James Dahl is married to
Jeanette A. Dahl. [¶] As permitted by California Code of Civil
Procedure 700.160(b)(2), I hereby request a levy on All Deposit
Accounts and All Safe Deposit Boxes of Jeanette A. Dahl, whom I
believe to be married to and the spouse of debtor, Robert James
Dahl.”
On or around April 24, 2018, Dahl’s Wells Fargo bank
account holding approximately $25,000 was levied upon. The
funds were unavailable for Dahl or Ryker to use. Dahl provided
Larson and the County documentation establishing that she and
Robert Dahl were divorced, but the County asserted “it needed
personal service of a certified order from the Santa Barbara
Superior Court.” Dahl filed an exemption claim and a motion to
recall and quash the writ of execution. On June 11, 2018, the
Superior Court for the County of Santa Barbara granted the
exemption claim. Dahl served the order on the County by
overnight mail on June 16, 2018.
According to plaintiffs’ complaint, on June 22, 2018, the
County “authorized non-party Wells Fargo to release [her] funds,
but deducted $125 for a purported service of Wells Fargo charged
to [her].” On July 3, 2018, the trial court granted Dahl’s motion
to recall and quash the writ of execution.
On July 25, 2018, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint
against Larson, the County, and the Attorney General in his
official capacity.2 In October 2018, plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint asserting claims for negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, trespass to chattels, violations of the federal

2 The original complaint is not included in the record.

3
and California Debt Collection Practices Acts, malicious
prosecution, Business and Professions Code section 17200, and
violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (Section 1983).
The complaint alleged the levy procedures set forth in
section 700.160(b) are unconstitutional. Specifically, the
complaint alleged that levying on a writ based solely on the
affidavit of the judgment creditor’s assignee violates the “Fourth,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as in violation of the
prohibition of unreasonable seizures, rights of due process clause
and the Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution. . . .” The complaint also alleged the County and the
State wrongfully charged Dahl a $125 service fee, and that the
$25 fee required to file a government tort claim is
unconstitutional. The remainder of the complaint asserted
claims against Larson.
The State demurred to the complaint. Larson filed a
special motion to strike the complaint as an anti-SLAPP suit,
pursuant to section 425.16. The County filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. In the demurrer, the State argued
plaintiffs failed to state an equal protection claim because
marital status is not a suspect class and section 700.160(b)
satisfies a rational basis review. The State further argued
section 700.160(b) comports with due process by providing notice,
time for a third party to contest the levy, and a process for parties
to claim exemptions from the levy, thus the facial due process
claim failed. The State contended a levy does not constitute a
seizure under the Fourth Amendment because it involves no
physical intrusion, and a $25 filing fee to file an administrative
tort claim did not violate the constitutional right to petition the

4
government. The trial court sustained the State’s demurrer with
leave to amend.3
Plaintiffs filed a second, then a third amended complaint.
The third amended complaint asserts individual and class claims
against Larson for violation of the federal Debt Collection
Practices Act, and individual claims against Larson for violations
of section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code. The
complaint asserts individual and class claims against the County
and the State for violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and
Article I, Section 1 of the California Constitution. Plaintiffs also
assert individual claims for negligence pursuant to Government
Code section 815.2 against the County and the State. The
complaint also includes a cause of action for “Violation of 42 USC
1983 Against State of California for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief re Constitutionality of Anti-SLAPP Act, Individually
and/or as a Class.”
The State and the County demurred to the complaint. Both
argued that the complaint failed to state a viable claim, and the
court should allow no further amendments. Plaintiffs opposed
both motions. The trial court sustained the demurrers without
leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.

3 The record does not include the trial court’s ruling on
Larson’s special motion to strike or the County’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. However, it is undisputed that the
trial court granted the motion to strike in part. Larson is not a
party to this appeal.

5
 DISCUSSION
On appeal, plaintiffs identify no specific error in the trial
court ruling, but instead re-state several of the arguments they
made below. We conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining
the demurrers without leave to amend.
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing a trial court order sustaining a demurrer
for failure to state a cause of action, “we accept as true the well-
pleaded allegations in plaintiffs’ . . . complaint. ‘ “We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but
not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “[W]e may affirm the sustaining of a demurrer
only if the complaint fails to state a cause of action under any
possible legal theory.” (Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 992, 998.)
“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.’ [Citation.] Plaintiff has the
burden to show a reasonable possibility the complaint can be
amended to state a cause of action. [Citation.]” (Hamilton v.
Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602,
1609.)

6
II. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrers
Without Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs’ operative complaint asserts two “causes of
action” against the County and the State.4 The third cause of
action is titled “Violation of 42 USC 1983 and California
Constitution Art 1, Section 1 Against [the County] and [the State]
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Only, Individually and/or as
a Class.” Under this heading, plaintiffs allege that as to the
County, a levy pursuant to section 700.160(b): 1) violates the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures;
2) violates due process; and 3) violates equal protection
principles. Within the same section of the complaint, plaintiffs
allege that as to the State, section 700.160(b): 1) allows for an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy; 2) impermissibly delegates
judicial powers and duties to non-judicial authorities; and 3) is
vague and overbroad.
The fourth cause of action is titled “Negligence/Govt. Code
815.2 Against [the County] and/or [the State].” Under this
heading, plaintiffs allege the County “by and through employees
of its sheriff department (which may be deemed a state entity
and would include [the State] if so), and in reliance of the
aforementioned spousal affidavit of the assignee of the judgment
taking of a $125 service fee from amounts wrongfully seized
without hearing and/or refusing to return it after a seizure is
shown to be wrongful. In point of fact, the law requires the party
seeking the levy to deposit sufficient funds to perfect the levy and

4 The first and second causes of action are asserted against
Larson only.

7
such fees are not chargeable to the levied party unless the levy is
in fact completed and not wrongful.”
We address these claims in turn.5
A. Section 700.160(b)
Section 700.160 is one provision within California’s
Enforcement of Judgments Law, “a ‘ “comprehensive and
precisely detailed scheme” governing enforcement of money
judgments’ in California. [Citation.] ‘As a general rule, the Law
authorizes a creditor holding a “money judgment” to “enforce”
that judgment against “all property of the judgment debtor”. . . .’
[Citations.] [¶] . . . When a creditor has a judgment in its favor
against a debtor, the creditor seeking to enforce that judgment
against the debtor’s property must (1) obtain a writ of execution
from the trial court, which is directed to the sheriff or other
levying officer and authorizes them to enforce the judgment
(§§ 699.510, subd. (a), 699.520), and (2) complete and serve a
notice of levy, which is directed to the judgment debtor or third
person holding the debtor’s property and notifies them of their
duties and rights (§ 699.540). [Citation.] [¶] When the debtor’s
property is in the possession of a third person (such as a financial
institution), the judgment creditor may serve the writ of
execution and the notice of levy upon the third person; once it
does, the third person ‘shall’ ‘at the time of the levy or promptly
thereafter’ ‘deliver to the levying officer any of the [judgment
debtor’s] property levied upon that is in the [third person’s]

5 We conclude all of plaintiffs’ claims fail on their substantive
merits. We therefore need not and do not address the parties’
arguments regarding the County’s alleged liability under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 and quasi-judicial immunity.

8
possession’ or ‘control’. . . . [¶] When the third person is a
‘financial institution’ and the property to be levied is a deposit
account with that institution, the procedures to be followed turn
on whose name is on the account.” (Bergstrom v. Zions
Bancorporation, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 387, 397–398
(Bergstrom).)
Under section 700.160, subdivision (a), a court order is
required before a judgment creditor may levy upon the deposit
account or safe-deposit box in the name of a person other than
the judgment debtor. However, section 700.160(b) provides
several exceptions. As relevant here, a court order is not
required to levy on a deposit account or safe-deposit box in the
name of “[t]he judgment debtor’s spouse or registered domestic
partner, whether alone or together with other persons, provided
an affidavit is delivered to the financial institution at the time of
levy showing that person is the judgment debtor’s spouse or
registered domestic partner.” (§ 700.160(b)(2).)
B. The Complaint Fails to State a Due Process Claim
Plaintiffs argue section 700.160(b) violates the procedural
due process rights of a judgment debtor’s spouse because there is
no provision for a pre-levy hearing for the spouse; the statute
does not require a judicial determination that the property to be
levied upon is in fact community property; and the burden is on
the judgment debtor’s spouse to seek an exemption. The trial
court properly rejected these arguments.
“The state and federal Constitutions prohibit the
government from depriving persons of property without due
process. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7,
subd. (a).) In line with this constitutional bedrock, an
adjudicative governmental action that implicates a significant or

9
substantial property deprivation generally requires the
procedural due process standards of reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard.” (Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 613, 622.) “ ‘ “[D]ue process,” unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances.’ [Citation.] ‘[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.’ [Citation.]” (Matthews v. Eldridge (1976)
424 U.S. 319, 334.)
As illustrated by the facts of this case, the Enforcement of
Judgments Law provides a judgment debtor’s spouse notice and
an opportunity to be heard with respect to a levy upon the
spouse’s deposit account or safe-deposit box. Pursuant to
section 700.140, subdivision (c), the levying officer must serve a
copy of the writ of execution and a notice of levy “on any third
person in whose name any deposit account described therein
stands.” (§ 700.160, subd. (a); Bergstrom, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 398.) Under section 700.160, subdivision (c), the “levying
officer may not require the financial institution to pay the
amount levied upon until the expiration of 15 days after service
of notice of levy on the third person.” Section 703.510, et seq. sets
forth detailed procedures for a party to file a motion for an
exemption from the levy, obtain a hearing on the motion, and to
appeal an adverse decision. Dahl availed herself of these
procedures and succeeded in having the levy terminated less
than two months after the account was levied upon.
Plaintiffs assert these provisions are insufficient to comply
with due process requirements because there is no notice or
opportunity to be heard prior to service of the levy on the
financial institution and the execution lien that follows.

10
(Bergstrom, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 398 [“Once the financial
institution is properly served . . . an execution lien ‘arises’ as to
the ‘amounts in [the] deposit account at the time of service on the
financial institution.’ (§ 700.140, subds. (b) & (c).)”].) However,
none of the authorities plaintiffs cite support their argument that
such pre-deprivation notice or hearing is required in a
postjudgment context. For example, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337, concerned a Wisconsin statute that
allowed a creditor to garnish the debtor’s wages, prior to any
judgment being issued. The wages could be unfrozen only if the
debtor eventually won the underlying suit. (Id. at pp. 338–339.)
Connecticut v. Doehr (1991) 501 U.S. 1, similarly concerned a
prejudgment attachment statute. North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc. (1975) 419 U.S. 601, also involved a prejudgment
garnishment procedure, available while litigation was pending.
Section 700.160 is a fundamentally different procedure.
The provision comes into play only after a court has issued a
judgment and the indebtedness is established. Section 700.160(b)
allows the levy procedure based on an affidavit only as to the
judgment debtor’s spouse or registered domestic partner, a
person whose assets, under California law, are presumed to be
equally available to the judgment debtor.
Postjudgment collection procedures involve legal questions
and due process concerns different from those attendant to
prejudgment garnishment or attachment procedures. Thus, in
Raigoza v. Sperl (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 560, the court rejected the
judgment debtor’s argument, relying on Sniadach and its
progeny, that California’s post-judgment garnishment procedures
are unconstitutional because there is no opportunity for a hearing
to determine whether garnished wages are exempt before they

11
are seized and made unavailable. The court found there was no
“ ‘arbitrary deprivation’ in requiring the debtor to apply for and
prove” garnished funds are exempt (id. at p. 568), and cases
regarding prejudgment garnishment procedures considered
“significantly different legal issues.” (Id. at p. 567.)
Likewise, in Phillips v. Bartolomie (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d
346, the judgment debtors, a married couple, argued a
postjudgment levy executed on their joint checking account
containing exempt funds was unconstitutional because they were
entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the levy. (Id. at p. 349.)
The court rejected this argument, concluding the postjudgment
procedure that placed the burden on the judgment debtor to
claim an exemption was not unconstitutional or a violation of due
process. (Id. at pp. 350–351, 354.)
The court in Taylor v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 943,
similarly concluded that after a judgment is rendered,
constitutional due process does not require that the judgment
debtor receive a second notice of the existence of the homestead
exemption prior to levy by the judgment creditor. (Id. at pp. 963–
964.) The court was guided in part by reasoning from the
Supreme Court: “ ‘[T]he established rules of our system of
jurisprudence do not require that a defendant who has been
granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court,
should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a
further notice and hearing before supplemental proceedings are
taken to reach his property in satisfaction of the judgment. Thus,
in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that
he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his
tangible property; after the rendition of the judgment he must
take “notice of what will follow,” no further notice being

12
“necessary to advance justice.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 964, quoting Endicott
Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc. (1924) 266 U.S. 285,
288.)
Plaintiffs contend section 700.160(b) is different because it
is the spouse, not the judgment debtor, who is affected. We
disagree, and note at least one other court has considered, and
persuasively rejected, a similar argument. In Lind v. Midland
Funding, LLC (8th Cir. 2012) 688 F.3d 402 (Lind), after a default
judgment was obtained against one of the plaintiffs, the
judgment creditor used a Minnesota garnishment procedure to
attach funds from a joint checking account shared by the
judgment debtor plaintiff and his wife. The bank provided notice
to the judgment debtor only. (Id. at p. 404.) The plaintiffs filed
suit and, among other claims, alleged the judgment debtor
plaintiff’s wife was deprived of due process because she did not
receive notice and a hearing before the account funds were
attached. (Id. at p. 405.) The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the argument.
The Lind court reasoned that Sniadach and similar cases
did not control, and instead relied on the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. (1974) 416 U.S. 600
(Mitchell), that pre-deprivation notice and hearing are not always
required for attachment statutes to provide adequate due
process. (Lind, supra, 688 F.3d 402 at pp. 406–407.) While the
Court in Mitchell considered the procedural safeguards against
wrongful deprivation that were part of the statute at issue, such
as judicial involvement in the process, the Lind court rejected the
argument that such protections are necessary to the same degree
in all attachment cases. The court explained: “The attachment
in this case occurred after the defendants had already secured a

13
judgment on Steve Lind’s debt. Courts have noted that, when
balancing the due process interests of a creditor and a debtor, the
creditor’s interest should be accorded more weight in a
postjudgment context than it should be accorded in a
prejudgment attachment. [Citations.] Indeed, the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Fuentes [v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67]
that its conclusion that a debtor could not be deprived of property
without prior notice and hearing absent ‘extraordinary
situations,’ [citation], applied only narrowly to the context of
prejudgment deprivations, [citation]. [¶] In both the
prejudgment and postjudgment contexts, postponing notice
and hearing until attachment has occurred generally serves a
creditor’s interest in preventing the waste or concealment of a
debtor’s assets. [Citations.] In the postjudgment context,
however, there is less risk of an erroneous deprivation because
the creditor’s claim to the debtor’s property is supported by a
judgment on an existing debt. Thus, when the creditor’s interest
is weighed against a judgment debtor’s interest in the continued
use and possession of his property, other circuits have found that
postdeprivation notice and hearing can satisfy due process so
long as it is ‘prompt’ or ‘expeditious.’ [Citations.]” (Lind, at
pp. 407–408.)
While the Lind court acknowledged the due process
analysis was affected by the fact that the wife was not a debtor,
the court noted that under Minnesota law, “the owners of a joint
account bear the burden to prove that funds in the account do not
belong to the debtor.” (Lind, supra, 688 F.3d 402 at p. 408.)
Further, “[a]lthough Tracy’s interest in a predeprivation hearing
may be greater than her husband’s, the risk to a creditor is the
same. A requirement that a non-debtor joint account holder

14
receive predeprivation notice and hearing would likely increase
the risk that the debtor joint account holder might conceal or
transfer the property that is subject to attachment. [¶] Although
we are mindful of the hardship such a process imposes on a
nondebtor to prove her funds are not subject to garnishment, we
believe that these practical difficulties of jointly held bank
accounts lend weight to a creditor's interest.” (Id. at p. 409.)
We find this reasoning persuasive, particularly in light of
an additional factor here that plaintiffs dismiss: California is a
community property state. (Fam. Code, § 760.) There is a
presumption that property acquired during marriage by either
spouse is community property (In re Marriage of Ciprari (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 83, 91), and “ ‘the community estate is liable for a
debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage’ except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute. ([Fam. Code], § 910,
subd. (a).)” (In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903, 917.)
In sum, section 700.160(b) is a postjudgment procedure
that is available only after a judgment has been issued. As to a
judgment debtor’s spouse, it operates in a context in which there
is a presumption that property acquired during marriage by
either spouse is community property and therefore liable for the
debts of both the judgment and non-judgment debtor spouse. The
statute provides for immediate post-deprivation notice and
prompt hearing. Even more than in Lind, here, where an account
in a spouse’s name may be community property, a requirement
that a non-debtor spouse receive pre-deprivation notice and
hearing would increase the risk that the debtor spouse might
conceal or transfer the property that is in fact subject to levy.
Plaintiffs fail to show that, in light of these circumstances, post-
deprivation notice and hearing is insufficient to provide

15
constitutionally adequate due process. (Buckingham v. Secretary
of U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (9th Cir. 2010) 603 F.3d 1073, 1082–1083
[procedural due process can be satisfied through combination of
pre- and post-deprivation procedures or with post-deprivation
process alone, citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill (1985)
470 U.S. 532, 547–548].)
We additionally reject plaintiffs’ subsidiary due process
arguments. Plaintiffs assert that “to the extent the levying
officer is required to engage in judicial conduct, that power is
unconstitutionally delegated to it.” It is well established that a
sheriff’s conduct in carrying out functions such as executing a
levy does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of judicial
power. (Robinson v. Kerrigan (1907) 151 Cal. 40, 49 [“The sheriff
must often determine, for his own guidance in making a levy, the
ownership of property. . . . The exercise of such powers by
ministerial officers is a necessary function of the executive
department, and although it may require similar deliberation to
that involved in the exercise of judicial power, the bestowal of
such powers upon the executive department does not violate the
provisions of the constitution forbidding that department to
exercise the functions of any other department”].)
Further, as discussed above, the post-deprivation
procedures afforded by the Enforcement of Judgments Law are
sufficient to meet the requisites of due process, and plaintiffs
provide no authority to support their argument that the lack of
judicial involvement in verifying affidavits prior to service of the
levy renders section 700.160(b) unconstitutional.
Indeed, the cases plaintiffs cite all concern laws alleged to
be vague, and the principle that “a law that is ‘void for vagueness’
not only fails to provide adequate notice to those who must

16
observe its strictures, but also ‘impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on
an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.’ [Citation.]” (People ex
rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1116 (Acuna);
Williams v. Garcetti (1993) 5 Cal.4th 561, 567–568.) While
plaintiffs also argue “[section] 700.160’s vagueness renders it [a]
violation of due process,” they have pled no facts to state a claim
that the law is vague. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2
Cal.4th 962, 967 [court does not assume the truth of contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law].) Plaintiffs cite no language
that is ambiguous, unclear, or “ ‘either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application. . . .’ ” (Acuna, at p. 1115, quoting Connally v.
General Construction Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391.)
The trial court properly found plaintiffs fail to state a due
process claim.
C. The Complaint Fails to State a Fourth Amendment
Claim
Plaintiffs further contend section 700.160(b)(2) permits an
unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the
California Constitution. Yet, the United States Supreme Court
has held that a levy pursuant to a valid writ of execution and
court-issued judgment does not constitute an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. (Blackmer v. United
States (1932) 284 U.S. 421, 441–442 [levy on the property of
witness to satisfy judgment of contempt; levy “provided by law or
rule of court. . . . is not within the constitutional prohibition” of

17
the Fourth Amendment].) Many courts since have followed this
reasoning. (Patel v. City of Los Angeles (C.D.Cal. Feb. 9, 2022,
No. SA CV 21-01707-DOC-KES) 2022 U.S.Dist. Lexis 56222, *4
[collecting cases], affd. per curiam (9th Cir. 2023) 72 F.4th 1103.)
Moreover, even when a levy turns out to be erroneous, when it is
served pursuant to a valid writ of execution the seizure is not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Johnson v.
Outboard Marine Corp. (8th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 531, 537 [deputy
erroneously levied boat pursuant to valid writ of execution; “[T]he
fact that [the deputy] was in error does not in itself make the
seizure unreasonable”].)
Plaintiffs disagree with the procedure authorized by section
700.160(b)(2). Their disagreement does not render a levy
effectuated pursuant to that procedure, performed in reliance on
a facially valid writ of execution as required by the statute, a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
D. The Complaint Fails to State an Equal Protection
Claim
Plaintiffs contend section 700.160(b)(2) violates the equal
protection clause because it abridges the fundamental right to
marry. Neither plaintiffs’ complaint nor their briefing provides
any support for this claim. Indeed, a case plaintiffs cite, Smith v.
Shalala (7th Cir. 1993) 5 F.3d 235, is on point and undermines
their claim entirely. In Smith, the court found that a statute
deeming individuals “married” for purposes of calculating social
security benefits did not interfere with a fundamental right to
marry. (Id. at p. 239.) As here, the statute did not compel
marriage, impose the “married” classification for all legal
purposes, prevent entry into other intimate relationships, or
otherwise interfere with the decision to marry. (Ibid.) “Because

18
this classification based on marital status [did] not involve a
suspect class and [did] not impact a fundamental interest,” the
court applied rational basis review. (Ibid.)
Section 700.160(b)(2) survives rational basis review. As
explained above, California is a community property state and
the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either
spouse. There is thus a clear rational basis for a statute treating
an account in a judgment debtor spouse’s name similarly to that
of the judgment debtor. (In re Talmadge (9th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d
1120, 1125 [community property presumptions and principles
may be reasonable bases for making distinctions between
married and unmarried couples in legislation].) The distinction
between the property of a judgment debtor spouse and that of a
third party unrelated to the judgment debtor is reasonable.
Statutes and regulations are “not rendered invalid simply
because some persons who might otherwise have married were
deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were
burdened thereby.” (Califano v. Jobst (1977) 434 U.S. 47, 54.)
E. The Complaint Fails to State any Constitutional
Privacy Claim
Plaintiffs contend section 700.160(b)(2) unlawfully invades
a judgment debtor spouse’s federal and state constitutional right
to privacy. Not so.
“The federal Constitution does not create a right of privacy
for bank records.” (People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192,
222.) Although plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that there is no
federal or state case holding there is a federal constitutional right
to privacy in bank records, they also suggest that the absence of
authority does not mean “the right does not exist.” We must
reject this argument as contrary to existing case law regarding

19
the federal constitutional right to privacy. Not only has the
federal constitutional right to privacy been described as
“extremely narrow” and “limited to those personal rights which
are ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
[citations]” (Yorkshire v. IRS (C.D.Cal. 1993) 829 F.Supp. 1198,
1202, affd. per curiam (9th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 942), courts
considering financial records such as tax returns have concluded
there is no federal constitutional right to privacy in such
documents. (United States v. Miller (1976) 425 U.S. 435, 442–443
[no legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records]; Couch v.
United States (1973) 409 U.S. 322, 335–336 [no constitutional
right to privacy or confidentiality in tax records]; Weingarten v.
Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 268, 274 [there is no
recognized federal constitutional right to privacy of tax returns].)
With respect to the California Constitution, plaintiffs
correctly note that to establish a violation of the right to privacy,
they must show “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and
(3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of
privacy.” (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 1, 39–40 (Hill).) However, plaintiffs have not alleged any
facts to establish the first element: that there is a legally
protected privacy interest affected by section 700.160(b)(2).
“Just as the right to privacy is not absolute, privacy
interests do not encompass all conceivable assertions of
individual rights. Legally recognized privacy interests are
generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the
dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information
(‘informational privacy’); and (2) interests in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without

20
observation, intrusion, or interference (‘autonomy privacy’).”
(Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 35.)
Section 700.160(b)(2) allows a judgment creditor to have a
notice of levy served on a financial institution holding a judgment
debtor’s spouse’s deposit account, and an execution lien arises as
to the amounts in the account. Plaintiffs identify no
dissemination or misuse of sensitive or confidential information
related to the deposit account that occurs as a result of the
section 700.160(b)(2) procedure. The procedure bears no
resemblance to the discovery order in Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, the primary case on which
plaintiffs rely in their appellate briefing. Valley Bank considered
“under what circumstances a litigant may, through ordinary civil
discovery procedures, obtain from a bank information disclosed to
it in confidence by a customer.” (Id. at p. 654.) Section
700.160(b)(2) is not a discovery statute. It does not authorize
disclosure of information, rather it is a means for an execution
lien to be placed on funds. Plaintiffs do not allege that the
financial institution is forced to disclose confidential information
to anyone; indeed, the judgment creditor must provide a
description of the property to be levied upon to the levying officer.
(§ 687.010(a)(1).)
Similarly, plaintiffs offer no argument to explain how
section 700.160(b)(2) implicates autonomy privacy, except to say
that autonomy privacy interests are “clearly implicated by
seizure of a bank account,” and “[w]hat is in [a bank account] and
what it is for is private.” This is insufficient. “[W]e may
disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to

21
adopt.” (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
266, 287.)
F. A Filing Fee Does Not Violate the Right to Petition
On appeal, plaintiffs claim the assessment of a fee to file a
government tort claim “chills the right of petition.” We note that
the third amended complaint did not include any allegations
regarding the payment of a filing fee. Although the first
amended complaint alleged that when plaintiffs attempted to file
a tort claim with the State they were informed there was a $25
fee to file, the same allegation was not included in the third
amended complaint. However, even if the allegation were
included, it would fail to provide a viable basis for a claim.
Government Code section 905.2 requires that a party
seeking to assert a tort claim against the state file a claim with
the Department of General Services and pay a $25 filing fee.
(Gov. Code, § 905.2, subds. (a) & (c).) The fee is not required of
several groups of claimants, including, for example, persons
receiving government benefits and certain incarcerated
individuals. (Gov. Code, § 905.2, subd. (c)(1).) Any claimant may
also seek a fee waiver. (Gov. Code, § 905.2, subd. (c)(2).) Without
citing any legal authority, plaintiffs argue on appeal that the fee
chills the right to petition.
“[T]he failure to provide legal authorities to support
arguments forfeits contentions of error.” (Ewald v. Nationstar
Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948.) Yet, even
considering the merits of plaintiffs’ argument, we must reject it.
As explained in Chorn v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2016) 245
Cal.App.4th 1370, 1385, the right to petition is not absolute and
reasonable costs and restrictions may be imposed under both the
federal and state Constitutions. (Id. at p. 1386 [$150 lien filing

22
fee in workers’ compensation cases was valid restriction on right
to petition].) Plaintiffs assert generally that “filing fees” are not
comparable to the $25 fee required under Government Code
section 905.2, subdivision (c), because they “do not involve a right
to petition against the government entity causing the harm.”
However, they offer no factual or legal support for the distinction
they seek to draw, or to support a contention that a $25 fee is an
unreasonable restriction on the right to petition. (Wolfgram v.
Wells Fargo Bank (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 43, 57 [right to petition
subject to reasonable restrictions].) This court will not develop
appellants’ arguments for them. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates,
Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn.1.)
G. Section 425.16 is Constitutional
Plaintiffs contend section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute,
is unconstitutional because it chills the right to petition.
Specifically, plaintiffs argue they are “challenging the propriety
of the statute in that it chills the right to petition solely due to
the . . . application of the litigation privilege with an award of
fees if it turns out it was founded in privileged conduct.” The
trial court properly rejected this argument.
“To combat lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free
speech and petition rights (typically known as strategic lawsuits
against public participation, or SLAPPs), the Legislature has
authorized a special motion to strike claims that are based on a
defendant’s engagement in such protected activity.” (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1060.) “Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-
step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e]
from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.

23
(§ 425.16, subd. (b); see [id.], subd. (e) [defining protected
activity]; [Citations.] If the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal
merit.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1061.) “The anti-SLAPP statute
entitles a prevailing anti-SLAPP movant in most cases to recover
his or her attorney fees and costs as of right. (§ 425.16,
subd. (c)(1); [citation].)” (Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith
Law Firm, Inc. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 764, 773.)
“ ‘For well over a century, communications with “some
relation” to judicial proceedings have been absolutely immune
from tort liability by the [litigation] privilege’ set forth in Civil
Code section 47, subdivision (b). [Citation.] The privilege has ‘an
expansive reach’ [citation] and applies to claims such as
interference with contractual relations [citation], interference
with prospective economic relations [citation], and fraud
[citation]. . . . [¶] The litigation privilege bars liability for ‘any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings;
(2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to
achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that ha[s] some
connection or logical relation to the action.’ [Citation.] It is
‘relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it
may present a substantive defense [the nonmoving party] must
overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’ [Citation.]”
(Bowen v. Lin (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 155, 165.)
As we understand their argument, plaintiffs contend that a
party’s ability to recoup attorney fees, when that party
successfully moves to strike a complaint that lacks merit because
the litigation privilege bars the claims, creates a great risk to the
non-moving party. Plaintiffs thus argue section 425.16
impermissibly chills the non-moving party’s own right to petition

24
(i.e., to file a complaint based on communications made in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings).
Plaintiffs’ argument fails to recognize that, as explained
above, “ ‘[t]he right to petition is not absolute, providing little or
no protection for baseless litigation’ [Citation.]” (Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 64
(Equilon); McDonald v. Smith (1985) 472 U.S. 479, 484 [First
Amendment right to petition does not immunize baseless
litigation].) Plaintiffs identify no legal basis for this court to find
it constitutionally impermissible to place burdens or restrictions
on litigation that is shown to lack even minimal merit, and,
further, arises from the defendant’s constitutionally protected
activity.
Moreover, plaintiffs fail to meaningfully distinguish our
high court’s reasoning in Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th 53, that the
fee-shifting provision of section 425.16 does not render the law
unconstitutional or “inappropriately punish plaintiffs” (id. at
pp. 62–63), and that the law does not impermissibly “bar a
plaintiff from litigating an action that arises out of the
defendant’s free speech or petitioning.” (Id. at p. 63). We
disagree with plaintiffs’ assertion that the Equilon court’s
reasoning does not apply here because their argument involves
the litigation privilege. Whether due to the applicability of the
litigation privilege or any other substantive defense, an action
shown to lack merit may be discouraged or burdened without
implicating constitutional concerns. (Id. at p. 64.)

25
 H. The Complaint Does Not State a Valid Tort Claim
Against the County
The trial court properly sustained the demurrer to
plaintiffs’ cause of action against the County for negligence or
other claims pursuant to the Tort Claims Act.
Plaintiffs allege the County committed a wrongful act by
taking a $125 fee from their account in connection with the levy,
in contravention of section 685.100. However, plaintiffs’ own
complaint alleges Wells Fargo assessed a $125 charge, not the
County, rendering section 685.100 inapplicable.
Under section 685.100, “[a]s a prerequisite to the
performance by the levying officer of a duty under this title, the
judgment creditor shall deposit a sum of money with the levying
officer sufficient to pay the costs of performing the duty.”
(§ 685.100, subd. (a)(1).) Plaintiffs have failed to allege that the
$125 charge was a cost the levying officer incurred in performing
duties with respect to the levy. Plaintiffs’ complaint ambiguously
alleges: “On or about June 22, 2018, [the county] authorized non-
party Wells Fargo to release Plaintiff Dahl’s funds, but deducted
$125 for a purported service of Wells Fargo charged to Plaintiff
Dahl.” In their opening brief on appeal, plaintiffs explain: “Here,
instead of getting money to perfect the levy on Ms. Dahl’s account
with Wells Fargo, it allowed Wells Fargo to deduct $125 from her
wrongfully seized account before returning her money.”
Section 685.100 does not concern fees that may be charged
by a third-party financial institution when an account is levied.
It does not place any responsibility on the levying officer to
ensure that a third-party financial institution does not assess or
collect any fees. Instead, the provision concerns the costs to the

26
levying officer of carrying out the levy instructions, and requires
that the judgment creditor deposit a sum to cover those costs.
Plaintiffs have alleged no facts showing any duty,
mandatory or otherwise, that the County owed to plaintiffs, or
breached, in connection with Wells Fargo assessing a fee on
plaintiffs’ account as a result of the levy.6
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Leave to Amend
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying leave to amend. The court twice granted plaintiffs leave
to amend, yet the complaint continues to fail to allege facts
sufficient to state a claim. On appeal, plaintiffs have not offered
new facts that would remedy the complaint’s defects, nor have
they shown a reasonable possibility the complaint can be
amended to state a valid cause of action. (Blank v. Kirwin (1985)
39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Taliaferro v. Prettner (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d
157, 160.)

6 We deny plaintiffs’ request that we take judicial notice of a
document which is purported to be the County’s “writ policy” and
was produced in discovery. Although plaintiffs reference the
court’s obligation and discretion to take judicial notice of
decisional and statutory law, local agency rules and regulations,
and regulations and legislative enactments, an internal agency
policy is none of those things. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, 452.) Further,
plaintiffs’ description of the document indicates the policy follows
the provisions of section 685.100, which renders the document
irrelevant. (Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717,
737.)

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 DISPOSITION
The trial court judgment is affirmed. Respondents to
recover their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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