concurring in part and dissenting in part:
To a large extent I agree with the opinion of the panel and I agree that the government is not entitled to summary judgment. However, for reasons to be stated, I would reverse and remand for dismissal without prejudice.
Here, the government takes the position that the property is worth $150,000.00. The appellants assert in their answer that the property is worth “in excess of ten times” $12,427.30. Thus, so far as we are concerned in this summary judgment proceeding, the property must be considered as worth more than $100,000.00 and we must face squarely the question whether we will void the state court’s foreclosure judgment and sale by reason of lack of authority in the Assistant United States Attorney to waive or settle the government’s statutory right of redemption. See 28 C.F.R. § 0 Appendix to Subpart 4, Directive No. 145-81.
Assuming the waiver is a “settlement,” an assumption that may not be entirely warranted, I conclude that in present circumstances we may not relitigate in the federal courts the ultimate question of redemption.
At this juncture it should be made clear that those who deal with an agent of the government are bound by limitations on that agent’s authority. See United States v. R & D One Stop Records, Inc., 661 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir.1981). Although federal appellate courts in general seem not to have dealt directly with the limitation at issue here, at least one such court saw fit not to reverse a district court’s holding that the United States Attorney had no authority to waive the statutory right of redemption provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2410. United States v. Sizemore, 747 F.2d 470, 472 (8th Cir.1984); cf. United States v. Florida, 482 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir.1973) (government is not estopped by unauthorized acts of its agents). .1 agree with the district court in Sizemore1 as well as with Judge Nesbitt2 here that the alleged waiver was ineffectual.
But that does not end the matter. In enacting § 2410 the Congress was making an effort to bring some finality and uniformity, at least within any given state, to mortgage foreclosure proceedings and as Judge Kravitch has observed was willing to waive federal sovereignty to a degree in order to permit state adjudication of federal liens. 28 U.S.C. § 2410(a), (c). See supra p. 1522.
Waiver of sovereignty is to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign when conflict of federal waiver and state procedures arise. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980); cf. United States v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 364 U.S. 301, 304-05, 81 S.Ct. 1, 3-4, 5 L.Ed.2d 1 (1960) (federal statute overrides state law due to Supremacy Clause). This, however, does not mean that in present circumstances we should entertain an attack on a Florida judgment of foreclosure. Here, the United States chose to litigate in *1525the Florida court when it could have removed to the United States District Court. Absent some unusual circumstances not here apparent, the government should be required to live with its choice, and attack the Florida judgment or attempt redemption in the Florida courts. After all, redemption from a foreclosure sale is in a large sense adjunctive or ancillary to the judicial foreclosure and ordinarily should be pursued in the court that conducted the sale in the first place. Cf. Smith v. Simpson, 129 Ark. 275, 195 S.W. 1067 (1917) (stating difference between equity of redemption and statutory right of redemption).
We are told that in Florida a judgment may be reopened for mistake only within a year, and that the government does not claim fraud for which Florida will permit reopening without time limitation. Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.540(b). However, we are cited to no case in which Florida courts have considered the question whether in light of facts as here alleged a constructive fraud may have been practiced on the court or the question whether in light of lack of authority to waive the redemption right under § 2410 the Florida judgment is void or voidable.
After all, the courts of Florida are fully competent to decide federal questions and are uniquely qualified to interpret or declare the law of Florida. On principles of comity, without especially addressing res judicata or full faith and credit, I would remand this case with directions to dismiss without prejudice to any action the government might seek to bring in an appropriate court of the State of Florida.
. Unreported order and judgment of The Honorable Elsijane T. Roy, United States District Judge, Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, United States v. Sizemore, No. PB-C-83-47 (E.D.Ark. June 17, 1983).
. The Honorable Lenore C. Nesbitt, United States District Judge, Southern District of Florida.