dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the judicial review provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA” or the “Act”) deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the present action. I dissent as well from the majority’s alternative refusal, on ripeness grounds, to entertain the appellees’ challenge to the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (“INS”) policy excluding from the IRCA legalization program nonimmigrant aliens whose unlawful status prior to 1982 stemmed from their failure to file quarterly reports with the INS as required by § 265 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). Because I find neither of the majority’s grounds a bar to jurisdiction, I also address the standing issue and find that the organizations that brought the present action have standing to do so. On the merits, I agree with the district court that the treatment of § 265 violators in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) was contrary to law.1
I. Introduction
In enacting IRCA, Congress sought not only to curtail illegal immigration but also to eliminate a subclass of undocumented aliens already living illegally within this *1347country’s borders. The legalization program was designed to accomplish both goals. By legitimizing aliens already resident here for a number of years, Congress wanted to free up the scarce resources of the INS to focus on prevention of new illegal entrants. Legalization was also adopted to put an end to the anomaly of longtime alien residents’ being indefinitely consigned to depressed wages and working conditions because of their weak bargaining position. Congress instituted a generous amnesty program to serve both ends; it affirmatively wanted the greatest number of eligible aliens to avail themselves of the Act.
Recognizing, however, that an alien deciding whether to apply for legalization would fear the risk of deportation if she is ultimately found ineligible, and that many underground aliens, suspicious of authority and not yet acclimated to our culture, might be deterred by that perceived risk, Congress took special pains to encourage illegal residents to step forward during the brief 12-month “window” period in which applications were to be filed. It knew that, if left unallayed, aliens’ normal mistrust and suspicion would severely hamper the legalization program’s effectiveness. Consequently, Congress set up a network of community organizations to provide each potential applicant with confidential advice about her chances of becoming legalized before the alien submits a formal application.
This court’s ruling today ignores all of that background and motivation for the amnesty program; it also distorts the plain words of the Act. The majority concludes that a direct challenge to an INS regulation, brought in district court, is an action seeking “judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” and that district court jurisdiction is therefore barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l), which provides that such review may take place only in a federal court of appeals and only in the context of the review of a deportation order. The majority reasons that an INS-promulgated regulation constitutes “a determination respecting an application” because such rules “embod[y] determinations that will impact” future applications. Majority opinion (“Maj. op.,”) ante, at 1331 (emphasis added). My colleagues speculate, without any support in the text or history of the Act, that Congress adopted such a restrictive review policy to assist the INS in fending off judicial interpretations of IRCA by permitting it to litigate the validity of its regulations in each circuit, even when that would result in a checkerboard of different eligibility policies being enforced in different parts of the country during the brief 12-month “window” period of eligibility. Id. at 1330-1332, 1334-1335. The majority ultimately concludes that INS regulations that illegally exclude entire categories of aliens from the legalization program cannot be challenged except through filings by individual aliens of applications certain to be rejected initially under the plain terms of the existing regulations. This runs afoul of Congress’ documented intention that aliens be given as much accurate information as possible about their legalization prospects before deciding whether to submit applications. I find no basis for the majority’s reading of IRCA.
Alternatively, the majority denies the availability of judicial review on the grounds of ripeness, concluding that the INS has not arrived at a final decision on the eligibility for legalization of nonimmi-grant aliens whose unlawful status prior to 1982 stemmed from their failure to meet the INA § 265 requirement of filing quarterly reports with the INS. Id. at 1341-42, 1345-46. I find this holding to be totally at odds with the record in the case before us.
My reading of the text and legislative history is at one with the trial judge’s: 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l)’s jurisdictional bar applies only to lawsuits that involve a court in reviewing (or undertaking for itself) the fact-finding and law-application functions that determine a specific individual’s eligibility or ineligibility for legalization. While such a fact-specific lawsuit (whether filed before or after the filing of a legalization application) would seek “judicial review of a determination respecting an application,” *1348a suit such as the present one challenging the INS’ rules on their face assuredly does not challenge such a “determination” and thus does not fall under IRCA’s jurisdictional bar. Since 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l) does not preclude jurisdiction, the district court has its usual federal question jurisdiction to entertain a statutory or constitutional challenge to INS regulations. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (federal question jurisdiction); 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (jurisdiction over “all cases arising under any of the provisions of this subchapter”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (review available under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) unless statutes preclude judicial review or agency action is committed to agency discretion by law). This construction of IRCA is compelled not only by the language of § 1255a(f)(l) and of the subsections surrounding it but also by the background and purpose of the Act as a whole. Because Congress took special care to ensure that aliens would receive accurate advice from designated community organizations before having to decide whether to file an application, my colleagues’ contention that Congress’ purpose would best be served by permitting review of INS rules only in the context of individual deportation reviews long after the 12-month application period had lapsed is, to put it charitably, counter-intuitive.
Similarly, the majority’s position on ripeness is based on a faulty understanding of the procedural history of this case. The plaintiffs have challenged, from the outset, the INS’ restrictive definition of “known” within the meaning of IRCA’s requirement that an alien’s pre-1982 unlawful status must have been “known to the Government.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B). The INS has had a formal policy on § 265 violators from the beginning, and it was embodied in a formal regulation that did constitute final agency action and was ripe for review.
I would also find that the organizations that brought the present lawsuit have standing to do so. The alleged injuries to them as organizations include not only “confusion” about how they should advise aliens, but also frustration of their mission of helping aliens to avail themselves of the benefits of legalization under IRCA. I consider this case controlled by Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), and its progeny in this court, all of which have found standing in similar situations.
On the merits, I would affirm the district court’s ruling as to the inclusion of § 265 violators within the “known to the Government” category of aliens. A § 265 violator’s unlawful status was “known to the Government” as of January 1, 1982, if the alien can show that his INS files do not contain the reports he was required to file under § 265. Each nonimmigrant alien had to inform the INS of any change of address, including a change of residence to a foreign country, and had to file a statement of his address for each three-month period in which he remained in the United States (even if his address were unchanged). Consequently, the INS must be deemed to have “known” of the alien’s unlawful status if the alien’s INS records are missing a quarterly report for a pre-1982 quarter and do not contain any record of the alien’s having changed his address to another country. I therefore would affirm, in substantially all respects, the district court’s Supplemental Order V.
II. IRCA’s Judicial Review Provisions
IRCA provides that “[tjhere shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section [governing applications for legalization] except in accordance with this subsection.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l). The subsection authorizes the establishment of a single level of administrative appellate review of legalization applications, id. § 1255a(f)(3)(A), and provides that “[tjhere shall be judicial review of such a denial [of adjustment of status] only in the judicial review of an order of deportation under [§ 106 of the INA].” Id. § 1255a(f)(4)(A). Section 106 of the INA provides that judicial review of deportation orders can take place only in U.S. Courts of Appeals after the alien has exhausted his administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(f)(4)(A), 1105a(a) (re*1349view in courts of appeals); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255a(f)(4)(A), 1105a(c) (exhaustion of remedies). These appellees obviously do not challenge any deportation orders; rather, they brought this action in district court to invalidate the INS rule excluding § 265 violators from the pool of aliens eligible for legalization. The crux of my disagreement with the majority is that I do not view the present action as seeking “judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” at all, and so I do not find it comes within the bar of § 1255a. That section on its face does not apply to this suit and was conceived for a different purpose altogether.
A. Language, Structure and Background of the Statute
Either a rulemaking is “a determination respecting an application” or it is not. If, as I maintain, a rulemaking is not, in itself, “a determination respecting an application,” then the jurisdiction preclusion provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l) simply does not apply to this case; IRCA’s bar to district court judicial review attaches only to “a determination respecting an application.”
If, on the other hand, as the majority seems to say, Maj. op. at 1331, a rulemak-ing is “a determination respecting an application,” then several anomalies are presented by the statutory scheme, none of which is adequately explained by the majority. First, there is the obvious linguistic difficulty in stretching the term “a determination respecting an application” to cover the promulgation of general rules. Second, interpreting “a determination respecting an application” to encompass rules compels the odd conclusion that the administrative appellate review board set up under IRCA actually has the power to entertain a facial attack on the validity of a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General. Third, the majority’s reliance on the word “respecting” to explain the broad reach of “a determination respecting an application” is undermined by Congress’ interchangeable use of that phrase with “the determination on the application.” Against the background of a normal presumption in favor of reviewability of agency rulemaking, Congress’ decision to preclude jurisdiction only over “a determination respecting an application” must be seen as a conscious decision not to preclude preenforcement review of rules.
I begin with the language of the allegedly exclusionary section itself. The words “application for adjustment of status” clearly describe a written dociiment submitted by a particular alien applicant for a change of his status. Consistent with this view, other provisions of IRCA inform us that an “application[ ] for adjustment of status” is a concrete piece of paper that “may be filed” with various entities, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(c)(l), may be “forward[ed]” by those entities to the Attorney General, id. § 1255a(c)(3), and must “contain” certain information. Id. § 1255a(a)(l)(C). The majority conveniently ignores this everyday meaning of “an application” by stressing instead the words surrounding it: “review of a determination respecting an application.” Id. § 1255a(f)(l) (emphasis added). To the ordinary reader, however, this phrase too appears to cover only the determinations that are made with respect to each application: rulings that go into an ultimate determination of whether a particular application is approved or disapproved. The majority, however, places the entire weight of its argument on the word “respecting,” which it interprets to encompass anything having any relation to or impact on any legalization applications present or future. I find that reading overbroad and misguided; the context of the phrase “respecting an application” conveys an altogether different meaning: i.e., that a review of any aspect of an individual’s application must be channeled through the deportation proceeding. Note that Congress did not say that “any claim arising under the legalization program,” nor that “any action taken or decision made with respect to the legalization program” must be so channeled. Rather, the preclusion provision of § 1255a(f) is addressed only to “a determination respecting an application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l) (emphasis added).
*1350The entire subsection dealing with administrative and judicial review, of which § 1255a(f)(l) is a part, makes clear that Congress used the phrase “a determination respecting an application” as a catch-all for any and all aspects of an individual’s petition — i.e., ascertaining the facts of the individual’s case and applying the law to those facts. The Act requires the Attorney General to establish “a single level of administrative appellate review of a determination described in paragraph (1).” § 1255a(f)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Such review shall be based solely “upon the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the application" and upon newly-discovered evidence that was unavailable “at the time of the determination.” § 1255a(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
None of these provisions dealing with administrative appellate review makes sense if, as the majority insists, the promulgation of a general rule concerning eligibility for legalization is also construed as a “determination described in” § 1255a(f)(l). See Maj. op., ante, at 1332. Certainly Congress did not envision that the Legalization Appeals Unit of the INS (the “LAU”) would undertake administrative review of the Attorney General’s regulations. Yet that must follow if a regulation is “a determination described in” § 1255a(f)(l), as the majority insists it is. The majority contends that there is nothing odd or unusual about administrative review of rulemaking, nor about a requirement that a challenge to a rule be raised first before the LAU; they argue that, while the LAU probably would be bound by the Attorney General’s regulations, the LAU would be free to interpret the regulations in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the statute. Maj. op., ante, at 1332. Even if that were true (I remain skeptical), other consequences of the majority’s position are more ominous. If, for instance, the majority’s view is correct, then § 1255a(f)(3) does not merely authorize aliens whose applications have been denied to raise a challenge to a rule before the LAU and receive a saving interpretation of that rule. The majority’s reading of “a determination respecting an application” compels a far stranger result: the issuance of the rule itself would be “a determination,” and the LAU would be empowered to conduct “administrative appellate review of [that] determination” — that is, appellate review of the rule’s facial validity. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3)(A). In short, if the majority wants to stretch the term “a determination respecting an application” to bar district court jurisdiction over the present case, it must explain the absurd consequence of empowering an administrative appellate review board to strike down the Attorney General’s regulations.
The majority denies that its reading of the Act would empower the LAU to entertain a facial challenge to a regulation, because the LAU can only hear cases involving challenges to the INS’ disposition of individual legalization applications. Maj. op., ante, at 1332 n. 7. The majority grounds this argument on the premise that Congress attached entirely different meanings to the § 1255a(f)(l) phrase “a determination respecting an application” and the § 1255a(f)(3)(B) phrase “the determination on the application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f) (emphasis added). Yet subsection (f)(3) clearly uses the two terms interchangeably.2 Either both terms encompass rulé-*1351making as well as adjudication — in which case the majority’s strained reading of IRCA results in the LAU being given the power to entertain facial challenges to regulations — or neither term encompasses rulemaking within its scope — in which case the preclusion provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l) is no bar to district court jurisdiction over the present case. The majority cannot have it both ways.
On the basis of an all-embracing definition of the word “respecting,” my colleagues wipe away the general presumption of reviewability of agency rulemaking. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510-11, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (preenforeement review of regulations is available, so long as ripeness standards are met, unless “there is persuasive reason to believe” Congress intended to cut off review); National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 733 F.2d 114, 117 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1984) (rejecting suggestion “that a detailed scheme of administrative adjudication impliedly precludes preenforcement judicial review of rules”). Yet Congress gave no indication it envisioned any such drastic curtailment here, although it knows well how to excise normal review procedures when it puts its mind to it. Thus, for example, where Congress intended to foreclose review of all rulemakings and adjudications of the Veterans’ Administration, it provided that “the decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors” would be immune to review. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (emphasis added). That kind of preclusion clause obviously would apply to, inter alia, suits alleging that Y.A. regulations were based on an impermissible interpretation of a benefits statute. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 1379-80, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988).3 In IRCA, by contrast, Congress did not apply its exclusive review procedure to any “decision of the Attorney General on any question of law or fact under IRCA,” but only to “a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status.”
The location of the judicial review provision within the structure of the Act also bolsters a more limited interpretation of § 1255a(f)(l)’s intended effect. It follows immediately after several subsections dealing with adjudication of applications; the general rulemaking authority under which the challenged INS regulation was promulgated appears in the following subsection, which has no review provisions in it. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g). Were the structure otherwise — with the limits on judicial review following the sections authorizing adjudications and rulemaking — the majority’s reading of the Act would be more plausible. But the actual sequence strongly suggests that only review of individual applications, not rulemaking, is limited by § 1255a(f).4
*1352B. Legislative History and Statutory Purpose
Certainly the ordinary meaning of the text does not permit a conclusion that INS regulations are immunized from the normal avenues of challenge in district court. Furthermore, IRCA’s legislative history contains no evidence at all that this is so: quite the contrary.
The majority spends little time on the Act’s legislative history. Instead, it propounds a circular argument. It assumes (not proves) that Congress intended to preclude district court jurisdiction over this case, and comes up with a packet of its own reasons why. Then, it goes on to conclude stunningly that this court cannot flout the will of Congress by holding otherwise. See Maj. op., ante, at 1330-32, 1334-35.
Thus my colleagues argue that an action seeking a speedy judicial determination of the validity of an INS rule would defeat Congress’ imputed intent to have such determinations made piecemeal, by different circuit courts of appeals, in challenges to deportation orders. See Maj. op., ante, at 1330-32. Congress — they say — must not have cared about intercircuit splits and even intracircuit nonacquiescence despite its attendant legal uncertainties and nonuniform practices for the acknowledged “long time” before the Supreme Court eventually settled key questions about eligibility standards. Id. at 1330-31 n. 4, 1334-35. According to the majority, Congress was content to let the INS pursue its chosen policies in as many jurisdictions as possible for as long as possible despite contrary judicial rulings. The problem with this ingenious interpretation of Congress’ intent is that the majority can point to absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Congress in fact valued nonuniformity, uncertainty and slowness in getting major legalization questions settled. The majority merely infers that intent from the fact that those consequences would follow if § 1255a(f) were construed as precluding district court jurisdiction over this action. The majority’s “evidence” of congressional intent on this issue is nothing but a creature of its own conjuring.5
1. Congress’ Adoption of the House Provision on Judicial Review
The majority proffers only one argument based on IRCA’s legislative history. My colleagues say that, since the Senate conferees abandoned a strict Senate provision precluding all judicial review of all aspects *1353of the legalization program and acceded to the House provision allowing a narrowly-channeled judicial review procedure for adjudications, it is unlikely that the Senators meant to permit independent district court review of rulemaking as well. See Maj. op., ante, at 1334-35. The rejected Senate version would have precluded review of any “decision or determination under this section.” S. 1200, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(f)(1) (1985). Since “this section” in that bill included a provision authorizing the Attorney General to promulgate regulations necessary for the legalization program, id. § 202(g)(1), the Senate restriction would clearly have precluded review of rulemaking as well as adjudication.6 That scenario suggests, however, quite a different conclusion from the panel’s: when the Senate agreed to House language which, on its face, limited only the judicial review procedure for determinations respecting applications, it must be assumed to have known that it was receding from a broadly worded preclusion to a much narrower one, and to have consciously made that choice. This bit of history in fact adds to the credibility of my interpretation that § 1255a(f)(l) bars judicial review outside of deportation proceedings only of determinations about specific legalization applications.7
Indeed, there is further evidence that the Senate understood the term “determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” to mean an adjudication. The Senate bill had also limited applicants to a single level of administrative appellate review “of a final determination respecting an application for adjustment of status.” S. 1200, supra, § 202(f)(4). Like the House version ultimately adopted, such review would be based solely upon “the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the application.” Id. That Senate bill provision, however, was in addition to the one earlier discussed, in the same bill, which precluded review of any “decision or determination under this section.” Id. § 202(f)(1). Thus, when the Senate dropped its comprehensive preclusion and agreed to retain only the more limited one involving “determination[s] respecting an application,” it must surely have known that the abandonment would have some effect — i.e., ordinary agency rulemaking review would continue outside of the adjudication format.
2. Purpose of the Judicial Review Provisions
The majority misreads IRCA’s legislative history in two basic ways. First, it concludes, surprisingly, that Congress’ purpose in providing so narrow a channel for *1354judicial review was to afford the INS more leeway in fending off adverse decisions by the federal judiciary, presumably even at the expense of substantial delays and disruption of the operation of the legalization program. See Maj. op., ante, at 1330-32, 1334-35. I find that interpretation of Congress’ purpose most extraordinary. My reading suggests the opposite, that Congress’ primary reason for limiting judicial review of adjudications was to prevent delays and uncertainty. The Senate report explained that purpose as follows:
The Committee is concerned that efforts will be made, on behalf of many persons who are ineligible for the legalization program, to delay the final determinations of their applications. This would prevent not only their own deportation but the expeditious operation of the program for others.
It is for the purpose of helping to insure reasonably prompt final determinations that subsection (f) provides that there will be no judicial review of a decision or determination made with respect to the legalization program.
S.Rep. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1985) (emphasis added). As noted above, IRCA as enacted retreated from the total review preclusion of the Senate version. The Senate report does, however, illustrate the true underlying purpose for Congress’ decision to restrict judicial review.
The language and legislative history of IRCA indicate that what Congress really intended by the preclusion section was to foreclose aliens from flooding the courts with suits seeking premature review of individual applications — i.e., review of the INS’ determination of the facts of each case and its application of the law to those facts before deportation hearings were concluded. Congress legislated against a background in which individual aliens were often permitted to bring actions in district court — long before the start of deportation proceedings — seeking declaratory or in-junctive relief to redress the INS’ disposition of their various applications and petitions under the immigration laws. See, e.g., Navarro v. District Director, 574 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir.) (review of denial of adjustment of status), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct. 182, 58 L.Ed.2d 170 (1978); Acupuncture Center of Washington v. Dunlop, 543 F.2d 852 (D.C.Cir.) (review of denial of labor certification), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 62, 50 L.Ed.2d 78 (1976). In enacting IRCA’s provision barring pre-deportation-order review of “a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section,” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l), Congress obviously decided to create, for the IRCA legalization program, a narrow channel for judicial review of the INS’ factfinding and law-application functions. The exercise of jurisdiction over this case is in no way inconsistent with that goal.
While partial insulation of the INS’ adjudication actions from scattershot judicial review was a logical means to the end of finality, speed, and the smooth operation of the system, cf. Maj. op., ante, at 1330-32, 1334-35, it is intuitively implausible to attribute to Congress a conscious desire to spur the INS on to fight any major rule challenge to the bitter end in each of a dozen circuits. The best evidence of what Congress did want goes in exactly the opposite direction. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988) (finding no bar to judicial review of certain decisions of the Veterans’ Administration, noting that “[p]er-mitting these cases to go forward will not undermine the purposes of” the review-preclusion provision). As the majority itself acknowledges, a suit such as this one directly challenging INS rules is by far the superior vehicle to achieve a swift and decisive resolution of the law nationwide without the need for ultimate settlements of intercircuit conflict by the Supreme Court itself, followed by reopening of thousands of appeals in the courts whose views are rejected. Maj. op., ante, at 1330-32. My interpretation of § 1255a(f) as allowing direct review of rules, coupled with limited judicial review of individual adjudications, is the most consistent method of accomplishing what Congress clearly intended.
3. Purpose of the Legalization Program Generally
The majority also fails to consider the judicial review provisions in the context of *1355the entire legalization scheme. It reduces the legalization program to merely “part of a legislative compromise” necessary to engineer passage of the statute's main goal of penalizing employers who hire illegal aliens. Id. at 1326. Thus — the majority argues — Congress would not likely have worried about an individual alien’s fear that coming forward in order to challenge an invalid INS rule denying him eligibility would entail a risk of deportation. See id. at 1345-46.
My colleagues’ dismissal of the legalization component of the bill is inaccurate, as a careful reading of the history will show. Congress saw legalization as one of the central components of immigration reform. See H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1986, p. 5653 (legalization is “an essential part of any immigration reform legislation”). Legalization had always been a critical feature (along with employer sanctions and improved border control) of immigration reform proposals advanced by the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations and debated by Congress for over a decade. See S.Rep. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-24 (1985); H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 53-56; see also id. at 103 (employer sanctions and legalization are the “core elements” of the Reagan administration program) (quoting Attorney General Edwin Meese, III). Legalization was motivated in part by the belief that long-standing resident aliens deserved it,8 but there were more pragmatic concerns as well. First, legalization would enable the INS to focus its resources on the illegal entry of new aliens, thereby giving the United States more “enforcement for its dollar.” S.Rep. No. 132, supra, at 16; see H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 49. Second, legalization would “eliminate the illegal subclass now present in our society,” whose members’ weak bargaining position (stemming from their illegal status) was eroding U.S. wages and working conditions. S.Rep. No. 132, supra, at 16; see H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 49. To be effective in those goals, however, the legalization program had to attract a large majority of the approximately one million illegal aliens estimated to be eligible. See S.Rep. No. 132, supra, at 64 (estimate based on proposed 1980 cutoff date, rather -than 1982 date adopted in IRCA). To this end, Congress intended a “generous program” that would be “implemented in a liberal and generous fashion” to “ensure true resolution of the problem and ... ensure that the program [would] be a one-time-only program.” H.R. Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 49, 72, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1986, pp. 5653, 5676.
Congress naturally recognized that illegal aliens would initially be suspicious of any amnesty program. A plethora of witnesses told them so, if they had not known it already. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 1510 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 783, 789 (1983) (statement of Dale DeHaan, American Council for Voluntary Agencies); id. at 844-45, 855-56 (statement of John Huerta, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund). Because failure to apply on the part of a significant number of aliens could defeat a major purpose of the bill, Congress took special steps to encourage apprehensive aliens to come out of the shadows and apply for an adjustment of status. It required the Attorney General to widely disseminate information about the legalization program and the requirements for obtaining adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(i); H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 93 (1986). Congress also told the Attorney General to name as “qualified designated entities” (“QDEs”) community organizations with whom the aliens had friendly relations to advise and assist them in the preparation of applications. Id. § 1255a(c)(2). A QDE could forward an application to the Attorney General only if authorized by the applicant to do so, id. § 1255a(c)(3), and even more important, the Attorney General and the INS could not obtain access to any alien’s QDE *1356file without that alien’s consent. Id. § 1255a(c)(4). The QDEs were to be honest counselors for suspicious aliens. If an alien seeking their help found she was not eligible, she would not automatically be reported to the INS.
Congress fashioned such unusual measures in response to legislators’ expressed concern about a “low rate of participation among the eligible candidates.”
At least part of the reason is distrust of authority and lack of understanding among the undocumented population. The Committee hopes that by working through the voluntary agencies, the Attorney General might be able to encourage participation among undocumented aliens who fear coming forward.... The confidentiality of the records [of QDEs] is meant to assure applicants that the legalization process is serious, and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to come forward only to be snared by the INS.
H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 73. See also S.Rep. No. 312, supra, at 47, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1986, p. 5677 (QDEs provision aims “to assure applicants that they may apply to such entities without fearing that their applications will be forwarded to the INS even if in the view of such entities they do not qualify for legalization”). Senator Simpson, IRCA's main sponsor in the Senate, acknowledged that the program could work only if it were widely publicized in such a way as to overcome aliens’ natural distrust. In a speech on the Senate floor urging the adoption of the Conference version, he stated:
So when they legalize they will have to know, as that call goes out, that this legalization period is existent, that they must come forward because this is the last call. This is the first call, and the last call, a one-shot deal. Come on out. Go to your church. We are not trying to fool you this time.
132 Cong.Rec. S16888 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986).
Congress then provided for a one-time-only legalization program with a 12-month “window” period for filing applications. For the program to work, literally hundreds of thousands of aliens had to be induced to come forward and find out if they were eligible during that brief period. They had to be given the correct information about legalization requirements if the maximum number were to apply. By providing for a network of QDEs, Congress meant to permit aliens unsure of their status to step forward tentatively, obtain accurate and confidential advice about legalization, and only then decide whether to submit an application to the INS.
In light of this carefully crafted scheme, the majority’s tortured reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l) to deny any avenue for challenging INS rules restricting eligibility except through individual aliens’ applications is untenable. An illegal alien told that he is ineligible under INS regulations must decide which regulations may be unauthorized and step forward to submit his application anyway and become a test-case. And not just one such courageous act would be required; all aliens wishing to avail themselves of the benefits of a ruling against the regulation must submit applications to the INS. They would not be allowed to wait on the sidelines until the first test case came to closure since the window period was only 12 months long and judicial review of the first wave of applications would almost certainly not take place until long after the 12-month period had lapsed. Although the majority dismisses the aliens’ understandable fear of the INS as being “inherent in their position,” Maj. op., ante, at 1346, the fact is that Congress made one of IRCA’s chief purposes the diminution of that fear. A Congress expressly desirous of seeing that aliens are accurately advised of their eligibility for legalization would hardly choose the course the majority stakes out. Certainly it is presumptuous to impute to that Congress such a scheme, as the majority does, when it runs counter to all the signals Congress actually sent, yields a harvest of distrust and subverts the major goals of the Act. It makes infinitely more sense to assume that in the absence of any specific bar, Congress meant to keep in place the ordinary avenues of direct review for eligibility regula*1357tions so that egregious misinterpretations could be quickly corrected for all aliens in all jurisdictions before the 12-month period for applications ran out. That intent was at the base of the district court’s restricted interpretation of § 1255a(f)(l), and I agree with it.
C. Prior Cases
The majority’s flamboyant reading of § 1255a(f) is also out of step with the rulings of other federal courts. It is at odds with three sister circuits’ interpretation of § 106 of the INA, which governs review of deportation orders. IRCA’s judicial review provision for denials of legalization applications requires that such review take place only in the course of § 106 deportation proceedings. Section 106, in turn, has its own “sole and exclusive procedure for [] the judicial review of all final orders of deportation,” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and “[a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.” Id. § 1105a(e). Notwithstanding that language, three circuit courts have held that challenges to official INS policy — whether in the form of regulations or of an officially approved program, pattern or scheme followed by immigration officials and approved by those in charge — can be directly attacked in a district court proceeding brought against the agency. See Salehi v. District Director, 796 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir.1986) (challenge to validity of regulations and to the INS’ application of them in denying plaintiffs’ applications for asylum); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 979-81 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc) (challenge to an INS policy of detaining aliens pending disposition of their petitions for asylum, as being discriminatory and as having been adopted without notice and comment), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (expressing no view on jurisdictional issues); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir.1982) (challenge to an alleged INS program of unlawfully discriminatory treatment of Haitians’ petitions for asylum). Four district courts have already extended the logic of those cases to the judicial review provisions of IRCA. See Doe v. Nelson, 703 F.Supp. 713, 720-22 (N.D.Ill.1988); Immigration Assistance Project v. INS, No. C88-379R, slip op. at 10-11 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 1988); Haitian Refugee Center v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864, 873-74 (S.D.Fla.1988); Zambrano v. INS, No. S-88-455, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 9, 1988).
The majority evidently believes that these courts have all misinterpreted § 106 of the INA and § 1255a of IRCA, and cites other cases in support of its restrictive approach to both sections: Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). In Foti, an alien appearing at a deportation hearing conceded his deportability and requested discretionary relief, in the form of a suspension of deportation, which was denied. He was granted the right to voluntary departure at his own expense, but that grant was coupled with a contingent deportation order directing that he be deported if he failed to depart voluntarily within the prescribed time. 375 U.S. at 219 n. 1, 84 S.Ct. at 308 n. 1. The Court held that review of a denial of suspension of deportation fell within the court of appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction under § 106, since the statutory term “final orders of deportation” included “all determinations made during and incident to the administrative proceeding conducted by a special inquiry office and reviewable together by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. at 229, 84 S.Ct. at 313. In Chadha, an alien was granted a suspension of deportation but the House of Representatives vetoed the suspension; the alien was then ordered deported. The Court held that the alien’s constitutional challenge to the statute authorizing the one-house veto fell within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals under § 106. The Court held that “the term ‘final orders’ in § 106(a) ‘includes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing.’ ” 462 U.S. at 937-38, 103 S.Ct. at 2777 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408, 423 (9th Cir.1980)).
*1358In both Foti and Chadha, the alien seeking court of appeals review was subject to an outstanding final order of deportation. Foti, 875 U.S. at 219 n. 1, 84 S.Ct. at 308 n. 1; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928, 103 S.Ct. at 2772. Thus, both were primarily seeking “judicial review of [a] final order[] of deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). The Supreme Court predictably held that an alien who is subject to a final order of deportation can challenge all matters on which the validity of that final order is contingent in his appeal of the order under § 106; those other matters are “included” or “encompassed” within the term “final order[].” This is quite different, however, from a holding that under no circumstances can the legality, or presumably even the constitutionality, of INS regulations or policies be directly challenged outside the § 106 procedure. The Supreme Court did not intimate any view in either Foti or Chadha as to whether the exclusivity feature of § 106 attaches not only to the actual deportation process itself, but also to matters which the individual might conceivably raise in such a deportation proceeding. The circuits are presently divided on the issue; ours has not yet chosen sides. Compare Jaa v. INS, 779 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1986) (denial of application for adjustment of status reviewable in district court) with Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818, 826-27 (7th Cir.) (denial of application for asylum not reviewable in district court but must be renewed in deportation proceeding), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 644, 93 L.Ed.2d 701 (1986). Compare Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union Local 25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1506 (D.C.Cir.1988) (en banc) (equally divided court) (exhaustion requirement of § 106 does not apply to “general challenge to the INS’ entire framework for processing [asylum] applications”) (opinion of Mikva, J.) with id. at 1518-19 (stating, without deciding, that “it is likely that a denial of asylum is appealable under the APA”) (opinion of Sil-berman, J.). In short, this court has not yet decided whether an individual alien could bring a direct, district court challenge to a denial of asylum or denial of adjustment of status; moreover, there is no precedent in any circuit for the proposition that § 106 bars a suit challenging a regulation or agency-wide practice on statutory or constitutional grounds, and at least one case goes the other way. In sum, none of the panel’s § 106 case citations offers any meaningful support for my colleagues’ interpretation of § 1255a(f)(l).
The majority also analogizes this case to Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984), involving appeals under the Medicare Act. In that case, plaintiff Ringer sued in district court for a declaratory judgment invalidating a ruling of the Secretary of Health and Human Services that precluded Medicare reimbursement for a particular surgical procedure. Judicial review of “any claim arising under” the Medicare Act is available only after a claimant undergoes the procedure, seeks payment and exhausts administrative remedies. Ringer, who wished to undergo the procedure but said he could not do so without assurance of repayment, argued that he did not yet have a “claim” and so the exhaustion requirement did not apply to him. The Supreme Court rejected Ringer’s arguments, holding that he was “clearly seeking to establish a right to future payments should he ultimately decide to proceed” with the surgery, and that his lawsuit was therefore a “claim arising under” the Medicare Act within the meaning of the jurisdiction-preclusion provision. 466 U.S. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 2024. The majority contends that IRCA, like Medicare, provides only one defined channel for judicial review — in this case, a legalization application — and that all other fronts of attack on agency policy are prohibited. If Ringer’s challenge was a “claim arising under” the Medicare Act, the majority believes, then the present action seeks “judicial review of a determination respecting an application” for legalization.
Ringer of course presents a very different fact situation and arises under a very different statute than IRCA. The Court held that Ringer’s cause of action — namely, that the Secretary’s ruling barring reimbursement for a certain medical procedure was invalid under the Medicare Act — con*1359stituted a “claim arising under” the Act and must be pursued as such. Ringer cannot, however, be stretched out of its own shape to say that the claim here — that the INS’ eligibility rules are invalid under IRCA — is an action seeking “judicial review of a determination respecting an application” for legalization. Unlike the Medicare Act, IRCA nowhere attempts to define and prescribe the method of review for all “claims arising under” the Act. Indeed, as we discussed, Congress rejected a Senate proposal that would have done just that. Congress in IRCA merely laid down a single uniform procedure for judicial review of “a determination respecting an application” for legalization. The word “application” as used in IRCA denotes the written document that is filed by the alien. IRCA said nothing at all about similarly regulating challenges to other kinds of agency actions. Far from providing a model for how IRCA should be construed, the Medicare Act illustrates that Congress knows how to draft a comprehensive jurisdiction-preclusion provision when it wants to.
The background and purposes of the two Acts, moreover, could not be more disparate. Congress, in enacting IRCA, set up a one-shot finite-period crash program to legalize undocumented aliens. It was intent on making sure those undocumented aliens would not be deterred from filing for legalization due to uncertainty about the rules; it created the QDEs for that purpose and mandated that accurate information about the program be broadly disseminated. In IRCA, aliens were encouraged to come forward on a confidential basis to obtain advice about legalization eligibility from the QDEs; only then need they decide whether to present a concrete claim for legalization. To the extent that uniformity of interpretation of eligibility requirements and prompt correction of erroneous administrative rulings can be achieved by direct judicial review of key INS regulations, Congress’ aim will be enhanced, not denigrated. In the Medicare Act, by contrast, Congress had no reason to fear applicants would not file claims for reimbursement; in fact, it sought to establish a permanent scheme for the orderly processing of anticipated millions of claims every year; for that purpose, it “set up a scheme that requires the presentation of a concrete claim to the Secretary.” Ringer, 466 U.S. at 625, 104 S.Ct. at 2027. The Medicare Act, according to the Ringer Court, was intent on balancing the individual hardship caused by uncertainty as to reimbursability “against the potential for overly casual or premature judicial intervention in an administrative system that processes literally millions of claims every year.” Id. at 627, 104 S.Ct. at 2028. Congress’ foci in the two Acts was very different: in IRCA to encourage applications, in Medicare to regulate their flow.
The very dissimilar circumstances of the two lawsuits illustrate this point. Here, the QDEs are seeking to redress the harm caused them in their statutory obligation to provide accurate information to aliens about legalization requirements by the government’s misconceived regulations. These organizations cannot themselves file applications for adjustment of status, so their only redress is to bring an action challenging the regulations in district court. Ringer, on the other hand, was seeking an advance guarantee that his later “claim” for reimbursement for an operation would be successful. There is no parallel. The QDEs are not submitting a request for advance approval of an “application”; they are suing to stop the INS from acting in a way so as to hinder their basic purpose of disseminating accurate information about the legalization program and encouraging all eligible applicants to apply. The majority’s asserted analogy to Ringer is inapposite. The statutory text in the two cases is different; the statutory schemes are different; the purposes of the two laws in regulating judicial review are altogether different. The majority strives mightily to squeeze its elephant into the proverbial phone booth, but ultimately it fails.
Indeed, a Supreme Court case interpreting the Medicare Act more recently than Heckler v. Ringer best points up the majority’s strained logic in interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1). In Bowen v. Michigan *1360Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), an organization of family physicians and several individual physicians filed suit in district court challenging a Health and Human Services Department regulation authorizing the payment of Medicare “part B” benefits in different amounts for similar physicians’ services. The government argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction, contending that the Medicare Act impliedly forecloses judicial review of any action taken under part B of the Medicare program, because it fails to authorize such review while simultaneously authorizing judicial review of “any determination ... as to ... the amount of benefits under part A.” 476 U.S. at 673, 106 S.Ct. at 2137 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(C) (1982 ed., Supp. II)). The government also pointed to a provision in the Act requiring private insurance carriers furnishing part B coverage to afford claimants a “fair hearing” on any claimant’s challenge to “the amount of ... payments” under part B, but making no provision for judicial review of those fair hearings. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C).
The Supreme Court rejected the government’s arguments, holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenge to the reimbursement regulation. The Court reasoned that the provisions detailing how and in what forum an individual can obtain review of a determination as to the amount of benefits under parts A and B “simply [do] not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves.” 476 U.S. at 675, 106 S.Ct. at 2138 (emphasis in original).
[A]n attack on the validity of a regulation is not the kind of administrative action that we described in [United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 1650, 72 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982) ] as an “amount determination” which decides “the amount of the Medicare payment to be made on a particular claim” and with respect to which the Act impliedly denies judicial review.
476 U.S. at 676, 106 S.Ct. at 2138-2139. The Court distinguished Ringer as a case seeking review of an amount determination, id. at 677-78 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2139-2140 n. 7, and rejected the argument that its ruling would open the floodgates of litigation.
Unlike the determinations of amounts of benefits, the method by which such amounts are determined ordinarily affects vast sums of money and thus differs qualitatively from the “quite minor matters” review of which Congress confined to hearings by carriers. In addition, as one commentator pointed out, “permitting review only [of] ... a particular statutory or administrative standard ... would not result in a costly flood of litigation, because the validity of a standard can be readily established, at times even in a single case.”
Id. at 680-81 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2140-41 n. 11 (emphasis in original) (quoting Note, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 778, 792 (1984)).
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians demolishes the majority’s broad reading of the IRCA term “determination respecting an application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(l). Application of this panel’s logic to the Michigan Academy case would dictate a result 180 degrees opposed to that reached by the Supreme Court. The majority here argues that a regulation is a “determination respecting an application” because it impacts on the outcome of future determinations on applications. Maj. op., ante, at 1331. That same logic would have required the Supreme Court to deem the HHS regulation in Michigan Academy to be an “amount determination” because it would surely have impact on future amount determinations; the Supreme Court, however, refused to do so.
Michigan Academy also shows the limited applicability of the Heckler v. Ringer holding, on which the majority relies. After Michigan Academy, the proposition Ringer stands for is, at the most, that individual Medicare claimants must follow the narrow statutory path of limited administrative and judicial review rather than challenge regulations in federal dis*1361trict court. Michigan Academy found that the narrow review provisions simply do not apply to an organization of physicians bringing a facial challenge in district court. A similar logic should prevail in this case: just as the Michigan Academy organization was not challenging an “amount determination,” the organizations bringing this lawsuit are not seeking review of “a determination respecting an application.” Thus, even if the logic of Ringer were to dictate that individual aliens could not bring an action in district court directly challenging the INS regulations challenged in the present case — a proposition in itself dubious 9 — Michigan Academy makes clear beyond peradventure that Ringer’s logic is no bar to a challenge brought by alien-assistance organizations who (like the physicians in Michigan Academy) will never have claims capable of being processed through the standard statutory review procedure.
Finally, Michigan Academy adopts a pragmatic interpretation of a narrow statutory judicial review scheme by focusing — in a way this panel has failed to — on Congress’ purpose for limiting judicial review. The Michigan Academy Court recognized a distinction between challenges to agency determinations on individual applications, on the one hand, and challenges to the validity of a regulation establishing the method by which such determinations will be made, on the other. In the present case, just as in Michigan Academy, permitting direct judicial review of a regulation “would not result in a costly flood of litigation, because the validity of a standard can be readily established, at times even in a single case.” 476 U.S. at 680-81 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2140-41 n. 11.10 The majority’s quest for Supreme Court support for its reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1) is doomed: Michigan Academy has knocked its Ringer out of the box.
III. Ripeness
Alternatively, the majority rules that the INS policy on § 265 cases was not yet finalized so as to be ripe for review; because it still reflected only the decisions of lower level agency officials and had not yet been approved or adopted at the top policy-making level, it was not an “agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), not “final” within the meaning of the APA, id. § 704, and not “ripe” for purposes of the familiar test enunciated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). I disagree.
My colleagues begin their analysis by pointing out that the INS “acquiesced in the district court’s interpretation” of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) — which the majority paraphrases as holding “that ‘known to the Government’ meant that a nonimmigrant qualified for legalization if he could show that the federal government as a whole had documentation that established his illegal status before 1982.” Maj. op., ante, at 1341 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B)). But — they say — after acquiescing in the court’s interpretation, the INS never focused on what to do about § 265 cases, in which the government’s knowledge of the alien’s unlawful status must derive from the absence of a required document, rather than the presence of a document, in the alien’s files. Evidence that some INS field personnel took the position that § 265 violators were not eligible for legalization even after the INS’ acquiescence in the district court’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) is not sufficient to show *1362any final agency action on the issue. In their view, only a rule, policy statement, or perhaps official litigation position in a deportation proceeding would make a challenge ripe.
My reading of the record in the trial court convinces me that the INS was implementing an official policy of refusing legalization to § 265 violators even after it had acquiesced in the trial judge’s “known to the Government” ruling, and so the § 265 challenge was ripe for review. I find that such a policy was embodied in an agency regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d).11 Judge Sporkin’s March 30, 1988, decision invalidated that regulation not only because it defined “Government” too narrowly as limited to the INS, but also because it contained an overly restrictive definition of the sort of information the INS must have in its own files to constitute “knowledge]” under the “known to the Government” provision of IRCA.12 The logic and language of Judge Sporkin’s March 30 and April 6 rulings compelled the INS to drop its regulation-based policy against legalizing § 265 aliens,13 yet at least some INS officials persisted in interpreting his order otherwise.14 As a result, the plaintiffs sought *1363and received from Judge Sporkin a subsequent court order (Supplemental Order V) clarifying that § 265 aliens were covered by the logic of his earlier ruling and that the INS must act accordingly.15
These circumstances, along with the extreme urgency of the plaintiffs’ plight (aliens had literally two days left to file applications at the time of the ruling), severely undercut the majority’s ripeness arguments. Their insistence that the cited actions of scattered INS officials discouraging § 265 violators from filing in the weeks following the March 30 ruling did not constitute final agency action is beside the point: it was the original regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d), not the scattershot application of it after March 30, that constituted final agency action. Supplemental Order V, clarifying the application of the earlier order to § 265 violators, simply reiterated that the entire regulation had been struck down — not merely that aspect of it which defined “Government” solely as the INS, but also the portion defining what kind of information constituted “knowledge].” When Judge Sporkin became aware that the INS was continuing to follow the policy embodied in a regulation he had already struck down, and that the INS was doing so in reliance on a misconstruction of his prior rulings, he was warranted in issuing a new order clarifying what his other rulings had already stated: that 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) was invalid both in its interpretation of “Government” and in its interpretation of “known.”
The majority contends that (even assuming the original 8 C.F.R. § 254a. 1(d) did exclude § 265 aliens) the appellees’ original complaint in district court contained no “concrete” legal claim against the regulation’s interpretation of the statutory term “known.” Maj. op., ante, at 1342 (“Their only specific argument, so far as we can tell, was that ‘Government’ must mean the entire federal Government and not merely the INS.”). This is fallacious. The complaint challenged the INS’ definition of “Government” and then went on to allege that “[t]he regulations further restrict the statutory provision by specifically enumerating the limited circumstances under which the INS is deemed to know of an alien’s unlawful status.” Complaint, App. 35 (emphasis added). Quite plainly, the complaint asserted that even assuming the INS must know of the alien’s unlawful status, the regulation defined “known” in an impermissibly narrow fashion. The complaint’s prayer for relief, moreover, requested the establishment of a broad evi-dentiary standard: an alien would meet the test whenever any federal agency “has or had evidence that, separately or in combination, shows that such alien had violated his or her nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982.” Complaint, App. 39. Clearly, the plaintiffs sought the invalidation of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) as a whole, not just as it defined “Government.” For the majority to assert that “[t]he focus of the proceeding” was on the one issue rather than the other is not only a weak retort to the reality of the record; it is wrong: the complaint advanced a theory that included § 265s, the district court’s opinion adopted it; this court cannot post-hoc wish it out of existence.
The majority argues, however, that even if the plaintiffs had initially challenged 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) on the basis of its interpretation of “known,” the INS had not yet *1364taken a position on the § 265 issue. Maj. op., ante, at 1342-1345. This is contradicted by the plain terms of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(d) itself. See supra note 11. The regulation on its face excludes § 265 violators from the legalization program. Given the clarity of the regulation, it cannot be argued that the issue here is not yet fit for judicial decision. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149-52, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-16, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (preenforcement review available where “[t]he regulations are clear-cut,” presenting a “purely legal” issue, and constitute the agency’s formal and definitive statement of policy); Eagle-Picher Industries v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 917-18 & n. 68 (D.C.Cir.1985) (“the validity of a rule can be ripe for review whether or not it has actually been improperly applied and enforced in a concrete factual setting”). In short, the majority’s ripeness arguments ignore the fact that the INS had a formal, final policy on § 265 violators and at least some of its officers continued to pursue that policy after misconstruing the district court’s ruling striking down the challenged INS regulation. Only a fundamental misreading of the procedural history of the case can sustain a finding that the § 265 issue was not ripe for judicial review.
IV. The Standing of the Plaintiff Organizations
Although the majority does not base its negative outcome on standing grounds, it does intimate that the plaintiffs’ standing in this case is doubtful. Since I find no statutory bar to jurisdiction, and since the government raised the standing issue, I must discuss it briefly.
A plaintiff challenging agency action in federal court must, in order to meet the Article III test of standing, demonstrate (1) some actual or threatened injury that (2) fairly can be traced to the challenged action and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C.Cir.1988). Additionally, there is the prudential requirement that the asserted injury be “arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the law on which the complaint is founded.” Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C.Cir.1986).
These plaintiff organizations did allege a concrete injury to their organizational activities, caused by the INS’ promulgation of 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d), and redressable by the court’s invalidation of that regulation. Their allegations fall into three broad categories: (1) that their ability to provide accurate information concerning legalization eligibility requirements has been impaired by the legal confusion generated by the INS’ alleged misconstruction of IRCA, Complaint, App. 20; (2) that their fundamental organizational purpose of assisting aliens to avail themselves of the benefits of legalization has been directly harmed by the INS’ regulations because those regulations have deterred the organizations’ clients from filing applications, Complaint, App. 21-23;16 and (3) that they have had to devote significant resources to counteract the effects of the INS’ allegedly unlawful interpretation. Complaint, App. 20, 23. These allegations — especially the latter two — are indistinguishable from the allegations held to be sufficient to convey standing on the plaintiff organizations in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). There, it was sufficient that the plaintiff organization, whose purpose was to help minorities buy available housing, was frustrated in that purpose by illegal “racial steering” practices and consequently had *1365to devote significant resources to counteract the effects of those practices. Id. at 378-79, 102 S.Ct. at 1124. This case is, in all material respects, identical to Havens Realty.
The interests at stake in this case also satisfy the prudential “zone of interests” requirement. The complaint alleged that 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) made it more difficult for aliens eligible for legalization under IRCA to exercise their statutory right to obtain legalization, and that the organizations’ interest in helping the aliens obtain legalization was thereby injured. App. 21-22. Congress clearly had in mind the interests of alien-assistance organizations, like the plaintiffs here, when it designed and adopted IRCA. See Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 939-40 n. 11. Congress not only recognized but indeed institutionalized in the Act itself those organizations’ ability to render accurate legal advice about legalization requirements. Given Congress’ express recognition of the key role played by alien-assistance organizations, the organizations’ own interests fall squarely within the zone of interests protected by IRCA. Action Alliance held, as a general matter, that such organizational interests as “promotion of the knowledge, enjoyment, and protection of the rights created by a statute are securely within the ‘zone of interests’ protected by that statute.” Action Alliance, 789 F.2d at 939. The interests of the organizational plaintiffs in this case fall precisely into such a category and meet the prudential as well as the Article III requirements for standing.
V. The Merits of the § 265 Question
Finding no bar to the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over this case, I reach — at last — the merits of the dispute. The order challenged in the present appeal held that an alien’s unlawful status was “known to the Government” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B) if that, alien can credibly establish his or her “willful violation of section 265” of the INA, i.e., his or her unexcused failure to file the quarterly reports required by § 265. 687 F.Supp. at 668. The district court held that the absence of a required document in a government file confers “knowledge]” on the government.
Under § 265 of the INA, prior to January 1, 1982, a nonimmigrant alien was required to file a document stating his current address every three months, so long as he remained in the United States, regardless of whether his address changed. 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (amended as of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub.L. No. 97-116, § 11, 95 Stat. 1617). Failure to file such quarterly reports while living in the United States rendered a nonimmigrant’s status unlawful. Moreover, an alien had to notify the Attorney General within ten days of “each change of address and new address,” id., if he departed the United States to live in another country. Thus, the alien’s INS file would have to contain either a quarterly report for each three-month period or a change-of-address report indicating that the alien had left the United States and therefore was exempt from the quarterly report requirement. Consequently, as of January 1, 1982, the INS was able to determine from a nonimmigrant’s INS file, by the absence of quarterly reports, whether the alien was in violation of § 265.
When Congress used the term “the alien’s unlawful status was known to the Government” in 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(B), it obviously contemplated that the INS would be deemed to “know[ ]” of an alien’s unlawful status where an examination of the alien’s file would turn up a document that in itself indicates that the alien’s status is unlawful.17 There is no defensible difference between that circumstance and this one: an examination of the alien’s INS file would turn up the absence of a required document, which absence by itself indicates that the alien’s status is unlawful. In both cases the agency has actual knowledge from its files of the alien’s illegal status. Since perusal of the files produces actual *1366knowledge of illegality, the majority’s point about the various possible definitions of the word “known” is irrelevant. Maj. op., ante, at 1344.18 Thus, the district court’s conclusion that the term “known” unambiguously embraces the circumstance where the absence of a document itself indicates unlawful status seems unimpeachable. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (where congressional intent is clear, court and agency “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”).
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s contention, a § 265 violator’s unlawful status could be determined simply by noting the absence of required documents in his file. The majority argues that the INS could not have known, merely by looking at an alien’s file, that the alien’s failure to file was “willful” and thus rendered the alien’s status unlawful. Maj. op., ante, at 1344. Yet, to begin with, the failure to file a § 265 report was defined in the INA to be a misdemeanor — completely without regard to willfulness. 8 U.S.C. § 1306(b). Moreover, the INA provided that any alien who violated the § 265 filing requirement was to be arrested and deported “unless such alien established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that such failure was reasonably excusable or was not willful.” Id. § 1306(b). Thus, willfulness was not an element of a § 265 violation; instead, an alien threatened with deportation could invoke nonwillfulness as an affirmative defense that the alien would have the burden of establishing. An INS official looking at an alien’s file prior to 1982 would know solely from the absence of one or more required § 265 forms that the alien’s status was prima facie unlawful. Since that official would have known everything needed to bring a deportation proceeding against the nonfiling alien, the alien’s unlawful status was “known to the Government.” I agree with the district court that the treatment of § 265 violators in 8 C.F.R. § 245a. 1(d) was contrary to law.19
VI. Conclusion
In my view, the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the eligibility of § 265 violators for legalization. Neither IRCA’s judicial review provisions, nor ripeness or standing doctrine precluded the district court’s exercise of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 8 U.S.C. § 1329 to invalidate INS legalization rules. With one minor exception, I would affirm Supplemental Order V.
Congress meant by the legalization program to extend a generous hand to longtime resident illegal aliens previously consigned to living in the shadows. Under IRCA’s amnesty dictates, the aliens had to act quickly to apply for legalization in order to meet prescribed deadlines; the QDEs were established to aid them in their quest for legalization. It flouts the text and purpose of this statutory design to interpret § 1255a(f), as my colleagues do, to prevent any prompt judicial testing of INS rules that wrongfully bar legalization to large categories of those aliens, and to relegate those aliens to individual challenges in the course of deportation proceedings. So interpreted, the legalization program is a cruel joke for a compassionate *1367nation to play on those it purports to welcome and redeem. I cannot believe Congress intended such a result, and so I respectfully dissent.
. I do, however, disagree with the district court's decision on the merits in one respect. See infra note 1355.
. A reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3) illustrates Congress’ interchangeable use of the two terms. Paragraph (3)(A) establishes administrative appellate review of "a determination described in paragraph (1),” which is the paragraph containing the term "a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status." Id. § 1255a(f)(3)(A), (f)(1) (emphasis added). Paragraph (3)(B) states that "[s]uck administrative appellate review” — signalling by the word “such” that the review is of a “determination respecting an application" — shall be based on the administrative record "established at the time of the determination on the application.” is?. § 1255a(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added). In short, Congress provided for review of a determination "respecting" an application, based on the record established at the time of the determination “on” the application.
The majority contends that the words "respecting" and “on” signal that the statute is referring to different determinations. Thus, the majority argues, paragraph (f)(3)(A) establishes administrative appellate review of rulemaking and adjudication alike, while under paragraph (f)(3)(B) such review can take place only after an adjudication. Maj. op., ante, at 1332 n. 6, *13511332 n. 7. Yet a common-sense reading of (f)(3)(A) and (f)(3)(B) together indicates that the (B) term refers to the same determination as the (A) term does. This reading is underscored by the use of the definite article in the second reference: “the determination on the application.” Id. (emphasis added). The juxtaposition of the two phrases, coupled with the use of the word "the” to indicate that the same determination and the same application are being referred to, compel the conclusion that Congress saw no difference between a determination "respecting” an application and a determination “on” an application: neither phrase encompasses rulemak-ing.
. The Supreme Court there held that the preclusion was inapplicable to the declaratory judgment action in Traynor v. Turnage not because the action challenged regulations, but because it challenged those regulations as being inconsistent with a federal statute other than a "law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing benefits.” 108 S.Ct. at 1379-80.
. The majority argues that permitting a district court to review an INS rulemaking would circumvent § 1255a(f)(4)(B)'s scope-of-review provision. A court of appeals reviewing a legalization denial in the course of deportation order review must apply an "abuse of discretion” standard of review to the "determinations contained in [the administrative] record,” id.; the majority fears that district court review of rulemaking would permit an end run around that restrictive standard. But this argument relies on what even the majority admits is a slender distinction — the difference between the "abuse of discretion” standard and the standard enunciated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) — i.e., that an agency's inter*1352pretation of ambiguous statutory language must be upheld unless it is unreasonable or manifestly contrary to the statutory purpose. The majority acknowledges that it "may well be” that the two standards "would not differ markedly.” Maj. op., ante, at 1329-30 n. 2.
To the extent that the abuse of discretion standard is more deferential than Chevron, it would be unprecedented to apply such a super-deferential standard to the question of whether an agency's regulations comport with its statutory mandate. Cf. 2 S. Childress & M. Davis, Standards of Review § 17.2 at 335-36 (1986) (citing Chevron as representing the most deferential end of the spectrum in review of agency statutory interpretation); 2 C. Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 9.13 at supp. 40 (1985 & Supp.1987) (agency rules that fill in gaps left in legislation merit "rather strict judicial scrutiny even though it is sometimes identified as discretion”). Nor has the majority offered any example of abuse-of-discretion review of agency rulemaking. I therefore think it unlikely that INS regulations are among the "determinations contained in [the administrative] record” to which the abuse of discretion standard applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(B).
. The majority infers that Congress intended rulemaking review to go court-by-court because “it placed review of agency action in the courts of appeals." Maj. op., ante, at 1334. It is, of course, uncontested that review of agency adjudication was placed exclusively in the courts of appeals, because the Act incontestably says so. On the other hand, whether the same statutory language applies to all "agency action,” including rulemaking, is distinctly not clear from the text. Moreover, the interests of certainty and uniformity apply with much greater force to review of rules than to review of adjudications. The INS regulations were required to be publicized widely, and they are broadly applicable to large categories of aliens. As is discussed, infra, Congress also established a network of community service agencies to advise aliens about the rules and about their individual chances of legalization. From the fact that Congress was willing to tolerate circuit splits on the narrow, fact-specific questions arising in adjudications, it should not be inferred absent statutory text or legislative history to support such an inference that Congress also intended the same uncertainty to dog the validity of the eligibility criteria themselves.
. The Senate report accompanying S. 1200 lends support to this view, by stating that the preclusion attaches to “a decision or determination made with respect to the legalization program." S.Rep. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1985) (emphasis added).
. In its competing scenario, the majority treats as crucial a statement made by Senator Cran-ston during a 1983 floor debate over an immigration reform bill that ultimately was fatally stalled in conference in the 98th Congress. See Maj. op., ante, at 1334-35. Senator Cranston advocated a judicial review amendment to the bill then under discussion, S. 529; his amendment would have "merely permitted]” a “very limited form of judicial review” that "would [have been] available only when an improper denial of legalization is raised as a defense in a deportation proceeding already subject to judicial review.” 129 Cong.Rec. 12,810 (1983); see Maj. op., ante, at 1335. Contrary to the impression conveyed by the majority's reference to it, Senator Cranston's amendment differed significantly from the provision ultimately enacted by the 99th Congress. His amendment carved out one exception to a draft provision that precluded review of any "decision or determination made by the Attorney General under this section”; since "this section” included rulemaking authority, preenforcement review of rules was excluded. S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 301(g)(1), (f) (1983) (as reported). While carving out a single exception for deportation proceedings, Senator Cranston’s proposed amendment would have left § 301(g)(1) otherwise intact, which explains why his remarks assumed the unavailability of preenforcement review of rules. See 129 Cong.Rec. 12,810 (text of proposed amendment). By contrast, the conference committee compromise that was ultimately enacted into law in 1986 (fully three years after Senator Cranston’s remarks) changed the wording of the preclusion provision: the Senate dropped its broadly worded version precluding review of any "decision or determination under this section” and acceded to the House version containing the “determination respecting an application” language now at issue.
. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 682, pt. 1, supra, at 49.
. As discussed above, the Ringer preclusion of rule challenges brought by individual Medicare claimants cannot be readily transplanted into IRCA, whose jurisdiction-preclusion provision does not bar all "claims arising under” IRCA but instead bars all suits seeking review of "a determination respecting an application." See supra p. 1359.
. The majority states: “It seems inconceivable that Congress would have wished ... to closely circumscribe judicial review of legalization decisions that applied whatever regulations the INS issued, and at the same time to allow APA challenges to such regulations in almost any district court of the United States.” Maj. op., ante, at 1333. Michigan Academy, however, shows that Congress sometimes does intend to circumscribe (or foreclose) judicial review of case-by-case application of rules while permitting district court challenges to the rules themselves.
. The regulation provided for four circumstances in which an alien’s unlawful status would be considered to have been "known to the Government.” None of the four can possibly be read to include § 265 violators. The four categories are as follows:
(1) The [INS] received factual information constituting a violation of the alien's nonim-migrant status from any agency, bureau or department, or subdivision thereof, of the Federal government, and such information was stored or otherwise recorded in the official Service alien file.... In order to meet the standard of “information constituting a violation of the alien's nonimmigrant status,” the alien must have made a clear statement or declaration to the other federal agency, bureau or department that he or she was in violation of nonimmigrant status; or
(2) An affirmative determination was made by the Service prior to January 1, 1982, that the alien was subject to deportation proceedings....; or
(3) A copy of a response by the Service to any other agency which advised that a particular alien had no legal status in the United States or for whom no record could be foundf; or]
(4) The applicant produces documentation from a school approved to enroll foreign students ... which establishes that the said school forwarded to the Service a report that clearly indicated the applicant had violated his or her nonimmigrant status prior to January 1, 1982.
8 C.F.R. § 245a. 1(d).
. Wholly apart from its discussion of the INS’ interpretation of “Government,” Judge Sporkin’s March 30 order criticized the regulation’s provisions concerning what must be contained in INS files. See Ayuda v. Meese, 687 F.Supp. 650, 664-65 (D.D.C.1988) (opining that those aspects of the regulation “are narrow and operate in practice to prevent some valid claims," and elaborating on bow unlikely it would be for an alien to meet the INS' definition of "known”).
. Judge Sporkin’s order stated without qualification: “I declare INS’ regulation to be contrary to law,” and, again without qualification, it enjoined the INS from "any further application of the regulation." 687 F.Supp. at 666. The order was based not only on the regulation’s narrow definition of "Government” but also on its narrow definition of "knowledge].’’ Id. at 664. Thus, the court invalidated in its entirety the regulation on which the INS’s policy concerning § 265 aliens was based.
Judge Sporkin’s Supplemental Order of April 6 further clarified that the regulation’s invalidity stemmed in part from its narrow definition of "known.” Id. at 666-67. That order stated that an alien’s unlawful status was "known to the Government” if that alien’s documentation in one or more government agencies, "taken as a whole would warrant the finding that the nonimmigrant alien's status in the United States was unlawful.” Id. at 666.
. Affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs reported instances of front-line INS personnel telling § 265 aliens that their applications would be recommended for denial. Moreover, a wire sent by the Associate Commissioner of the INS to all QDEs on April 13, 1988, paraphrased the district court’s ruling in such a way as to foreclose legalization of § 265 aliens. After quoting the language of Judge Sporkin’s April 6 order, the wire stated: “[T]he violation must be able to be induced from evidence submitted to Federal agencies only, and prior to January 1, 1982.” Appendix ("App.”) at 88 (emphasis added). Thus, while the court’s order referred to "documentation taken as a whole,” 687 F.Supp. at 666, which would encompass the absence of documents never submitted, a top official of the INS interpreted the order not to encompass § 265 aliens.
Additionally, counsel for the INS voiced the same interpretation of the March 30 and April 6 orders before the district court. Transcript of Status Call, April 28, 1988, at 20 (plaintiffs’ arguments concerning § 265 violators do not "comport with the Court’s order that there be *1363documents in the file in a Government file showing unlawful residence”) (emphasis added).
. The plaintiffs (who adopted the arguments advanced by several other organizations that tried without success to intervene in the present case) styled their arguments as contending that the March 30 and April 6 orders by their terms and logic already reached the § 265 issue and resolved it in their favor; they therefore sought enforcement and clarification if necessary. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Intervenors’ Motion to Compel Compliance and/or Modify Permanent Injunction, Supplemental Appendix ("Supp.App.”) at 12 & n. 5 ("Now that the INS policy has been judicially rejected ... there is no valid remaining reason for the agency’s denials.”). The putative inter-venors and the plaintiffs sought an order compelling the INS to comply with the district court’s other rulings, id. at 7, 16 n. 8, or, in the alternative, an order modifying the earlier rulings to indicate that § 265 aliens were eligible for legalization. Id. at 16 n. 8. Judge Sporkin’s Supplemental Order V essentially did the latter. 687 F.Supp. at 668-69.
. The original complaint stated that one organization’s potential clients had been “deterred from filing” because of the INS' interpretation of IRCA. App. 21. The complaint stated that the organization’s "extensive counseling campaign to assist Ethiopians and other nationalities to avail themselves of the benefits of legalization under IRCA, which is one of its fundamental organizational purposes, has thus been significantly and directly harmed and frustrated by the INS’ invalid regulations." App. 21-22. See also App. 23 (another organizational plaintiff’s "fundamental goals and purposes of assisting Latino youth to obtain the benefits of legalization under IRCA have thus been significantly and directly harmed and frustrated by the INS’ misconstruction of the 'known to the Government' requirement").
. Even the INS recognized this in 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d)(4), which considers an alien's unlawful status to be known if a school had sent the INS "a report that clearly indicated the appellant had violated his or her nonimmigrant status” before January 1, 1982.
. The majority contends that, while the presence of a document in INS files would convey actual knowledge, the "mere absence of a quarterly report may well not lead to actual knowledge if all files are not monitored closely.” Maj. op. at 1345. I fail to see how this distinguishes an “absence” case from a “presence" case. If an agency’s files are not monitored closely, then agency officials will be equally ignorant of what the files do contain and what they do not contain.
. As discussed in the text, however, I do not read § 265 as requiring any showing of willfulness on the part of the government to make out a prima facie violation. Hence, the absence of the reports would be sufficient to make a violation "known” to the government. Conversely, the alien wishing to show a past violation would only have to point to the absence of the same reports. The government's earlier failure to prosecute the violation and thereby afford the alien an opportunity to plead a nonwillfulness defense cannot result in a heavier burden on the alien to prove a violation now than the government itself would have had then. This is the one respect in which I would modify Judge Sporkin’s order.