dissenting.
This case arises out of Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant Laura Zinious evicted them from Augusta House in retaliation for lodging a complaint with the Board of Health. Plaintiffs allege that the eviction violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by depriving them of an opportunity to be heard prior to the eviction as required by Kentucky law. This Court previously denied Defendants qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ due process claim, holding that the Kentucky Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“KURLTA”), Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 383.505-383.705 (West 2005), provided the tenants at Augusta House with an interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this right was clearly established. Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d *664563 (6th Cir.2002). Defendants now claim that Plaintiffs, are not entitled to due process because Plaintiffs are not tenants under KURLTA Specifically, Defendants contend that Augusta House is a “transitional women’s shelter,” and thus excluded from KURLTA’s coverage by § 383.535(1), which provides that KURLTA does not apply to living arrangements that are “incidental” to the provision of certain specified services. Additionally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are not “tenants” as that term is defined by KURLTA. Because I believe that Defendants cannot evade KURLTA’s statutorily mandated eviction procedures simply by labeling Augusta House a “transitional shelter” and Plaintiffs’ monthly rent a “shelter fee,” I would reverse the order of the district court and remand for trial.
I.
BACKGROUND
Before delving into the legal arguments presented in this appeal, I find it necessary to briefly clarify the nature of the issue before this Court. The question this Court decides today is not, as the majority claims, whether residents of traditional shelters are “tenants” entitled to KURLTA’s protections, but rather whether KURLTA permits landlords to deprive residents of low-income housing of statutorily mandated eviction procedures simply by labeling low-income housing a “shelter.” Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House was not transient; they lived at Augusta House for several months pursuant to a rental agreement and Defendant Zinious indicated that she anticipated Plaintiffs would reside at Augusta House for “a couple of years.” (J.A. at 179.) Additionally, each Plaintiff paid $140 a month in exchange for his or her own room, which no other resident had the right to enter. Finally, no supervisory staff resided at Augusta House. Plaintiffs lived at Augusta House as independent adults.
This distinction is crucial to the instant appeal because residents at typical shelters clearly are not entitled to KURLTA’s protections. As will be discussed later, typical shelter residents, unlike Plaintiffs, do not live at shelters pursuant to rental agreements. Defendants attempt to classify Augusta House as a shelter in order to escape compliance with Kentucky’s statutory eviction procedures. The majority errs in accepting Defendants’ characterization of Augusta House without analysis.
II.
DISCUSSION
Whether Plaintiffs are tenants under KURLTA presents a factual dispute that should not be resolved on summary judgment. As will be more fully explained below, Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that their residency at Augusta House was not incidental to the provision of any services and thus that § 383.535(1) does not exclude Plaintiffs’ living arrangement from KURLTA’s coverage. Similarly, Plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that they were “tenants” as that term is defined by KURLTA. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
A. Standard of Review
This case comes before us as an appeal of a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Kalamazoo Acquisitions v. Westfield Ins. Co., 395 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment shall be granted when “the pleadings, deposi*665tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and judgment is proper as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). “The district court, and this court in its review of the district court, must view the facts and any reasonable inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.” Kalamazoo Acquisitions, 395 F.3d at 342 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Neither court may weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Logan v. Denny’s Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 570 (6th Cir.2001).
B. Plaintiffs’ Residency at Augusta House is Not Incidental to the Provision of Services
Section 383.535(1) of the Kentucky Revised Code does not exclude Plaintiffs’ living arrangements from KURLTA’s coverage. Section 383.535 provides that KURLTA shall not extend to “[rjesidence at an institution, public or private, if incidental to detention or the provision of medical, geriatric, educational counseling, religious, or similar services.” Ky.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 383.535(1). To fall within this exclusion, a residence must meet the following three criteria: (1) the residence must be at an institution; (2) the institution must provide medical, geriatric, educational counseling, religious, or similar services; and (3) the residence must be incidental to the provision of such services. See id. Although Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House likely satisfies the first two criteria, Plaintiffs’ residency is not incidental to the provision of services. Therefore, § 383.535(1) does not exclude Plaintiffs from KURLTA’s coverage.
Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House was not “incidental” to any provision of services because Plaintiffs’ landlord, Mission House, provided Plaintiffs with housing primarily to ensure that Plaintiffs were provided a place to live and not to further any other service provided by Mission House. As the majority opinion recognizes, no Kentucky court has interpreted the term “incidental” in the context of § 383.535(1). At least two other state courts, however, have interpreted identical provisions in their own landlord tenant acts. These courts have recognized that a person’s residency is “incidental” to the provision of services when it is “subordinate or attendant to the [relevant] institution's] purpose.” See Sunrise Group Homes, Inc. v. Ferguson, 55 Wash.App. 285, 777 P.2d 553, 555 (1989); see also Burke Oxford House of Oregon, 196 Or. App. 726, 103 P.3d 1184 (2004) (en banc) (citing Sunrise). In this case, Mission House, the relevant institution, identifies its primary goal to be the provision of housing and shelter for the poor. Because one of Mission House’s primary goal is to provide housing, the provision of housing is not subordinate or attendant to Mission House’s provision of other services. Indeed, it is entirely possible that Mission House’s other services are actually attendant to the goal of providing housing.
Even if the so-called transitional living services were not incidental to the housing provided at Augusta House, it does not follow that the housing at Augusta House is incidental to these services. See Gray v. Pierce County Hous. Auth., 123 Wash. App. 744, 97 P.3d 26 (2004) (holding that a housing authority’s provision of housing to individuals with low income, bad credit, criminal history, and/or history of past evictions was not excluded from the protections of Washington’s Landlord Tenant Act simply because the housing authority conditioned the residency on life skills *666classes). The comment to § 1.202 of KURLTA makes clear that § 383.535(1) was intended to exempt housing that facilitates the provision of some primary service. Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act, Nat’l Conference of Comm’r on State Laws, available at Rental Housing Online, http://www.rhol.org /rental/KURLTAhtm (last visited March 6, 2006). This is evidenced through the comment’s list of housing that is incidental to the provision of sendees: prisons, nursing homes, hospitals and college dormitories. Id. In all of these examples, housing is provided to facilitate services that the relevant institution was created to provide. Prisons provide housing to segregate prisoners from the public at large. Nursing homes and hospitals provide attendant housing so that doctors and nurses are able to continuously care for the sick, elderly, and disabled. Colleges provides dormitories so that students can attend college classes. In contrast, Mission House’s provision of residency at Augusta House does not facilitate Mission House’s ability to provide any of the so-called “transitional living services.” According to the majority these services include, 1) help obtaining food stamps and social security, 2) assistance in finding employment, and 3) Bible study classes. First, food stamps and social security can be obtained in a matter of hours. Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House, however, was permanent. Thus, it seems clear that Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House was intended to continue long after Plaintiffs obtained food stamps and social security. If Plaintiffs already had food stamps and social security, their continued residency at Augusta House could not facilitate Mission House’s ability to help them obtain food stamps and social security. Similarly, Plaintiffs were required to have employment prior to living at Augusta House. Thus again, it would seem that Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House could not have facilitated Mission House’s ability to assist Plaintiffs in obtaining employment. Finally, the Bible study classes were optional. If Plaintiffs were not required to attend these classes, their residency at Augusta House could not be for the purpose of facilitating such attendance. Therefore, it seems fairly clear that Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House was not intended to facilitate Mission House’s provision of transitional services and that Defendants are simply seeking away to avoid following KURLTA’s eviction procedures.
The majority erroneously characterizes Burke and Sunrise as having rejected my position. This is simply not the case. Burke and Sunrise rejected the position that housing was not incidental to the provision of services simply because housing was a primary service. Burke, 103 P.3d at n. 9; Sunrise, 777 P.2d at 555. Here, however, the issue is not simply that housing is a primary service but that housing is the primary goal. Because providing housing is the primary goal, the provision of housing cannot be incidental to any other service. This distinction is important because in some cases, as in Burke, housing may be a primary service without being a primary goal. As the Burke court explained that while housing was “central” it was nonetheless “incidental” because it existed to facilitate the institution’s sole purpose — assisting drug addicts with recovery. Burke, 103 P.3d at n. 9. In other words, the housing was a means to an end. Id. Here, that is not the case. Housing is not being provided to further any service or goal. In contrast to Burke, where the housing facilitated a peer counseling system for recovering drug addicts, or Sunrise, where the housing facilitated the defendants’ provision of medical services, Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House did not facilitate the provision of any services. Id. at 1192; Sunrise, 111 P.2d at 555. *667This is made clear by the majority’s complete inability to point to any specific service that Mission House provided to Plaintiffs’ at the time of their residency at Augusta House, let alone any service facilitated by the residency.
C. Plaintiffs Are “Tenants” as Defined by KURLTA
Similarly, Plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find that Plaintiffs are tenants within the meaning of KURLTA. KURLTA defines tenant as “a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others” Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 383.545(15). The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs lived in Augusta House pursuant to a rental agreement, which arguably granted them the right to live in Augusta House to the exclusion of others. Therefore, a jury should be allowed to determine whether Plaintiffs are tenants within the meaning of KURLTA.
1. Rental Agreement
It is fairly obvious that Plaintiffs and Zinious entered into an oral rental agreement, which allowed Plaintiffs to occupy Augusta House. Section 383.545(11) defines rental agreement as “all agreements, written or oral, ... embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit and premises.” Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 383.545(11). In this case, Plaintiffs allege that they had an oral agreement with Mission House to use and occupy Augusta House. Plaintiffs support these allegations with evidence, namely, Plaintiffs’ residency of Augusta House pri- or to the eviction and Plaintiffs payment of rent to Mission House. Moreover, Laura Zinious, the manager of Augusta House, admits that she had an oral agreement with Plaintiffs permitting them to use and occupy Augusta House. Therefore, Defendants’ assertion that no rental agreement existed is unsupported both by Kentucky law and the record.
Defendants argue that a rental agreement does not exist because Mission House did not believe that it was entering into a rental agreement and Plaintiffs’ “unilateral expectation” is insufficient to create a contract or agreement. This argument runs contrary to the facts. Zinious admits that she agreed to allow Plaintiffs’ to use and occupy Augusta House. Moreover, whether Zinious considered the agreement to constitute a “rental agreement” misses the point. Whether the operative terms and understandings between the parties to the agreement constituted a rental agreement under the applicable law involves a legal determination. Factually, in the instant case, Zinious admitted the agreement embodied certain terms, which rendered it a rental agreement under Kentucky law.
2. Exclusion of Others
Next, Plaintiffs provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the rental agreement granted them the right to occupy Augusta House to the exclusion of others. No Kentucky court has defined the phrase “to the exclusion of others” in the context of KURLTA. However, the Oregon Court of Appeals has interpreted “to’ the exclusion of others” in an identical provision of its landlord tenant act. Torbeck v. Chamberlain, 138 Or.App. 446, 910 P.2d 389 (1996). The Oregon Court of Appeals held that exclusion of others means the exclusion of the public at large and not the exclusion of other tenants, or in some cases, even the landlord. Id. at 392-93. Several considerations render the Oregon court’s interpretation persuasive. First, KURLTA instructs courts to apply its provisions liberally to improve the quality of housing. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. *668§ 383.505. Thus, “tenant” should be interpreted broadly to expand KURLTA’s coverage, not to exclude living arrangements from KURLTA’s protections. Second, the Oregon court’s interpretation is in accord with the common law. At common law, a tenancy was defined as the right to occupy a premises to the exclusion of others, including the landlord. See Richmond v. Standard Elkhorn Coal Co., 222 Ky. 150, 300 S.W. 359, 360 (1927). Nonetheless, common law courts have recognized exceptions to a tenant’s ability to exclude others. Id. For example, in Kentucky, common law courts have upheld the existence of a tenancy despite a landlord’s contractual right to enter the premises for limited purposes. See id. Third, tenant is defined as a person with right to exclude others, not necessarily the right to exclude all others.
In this case, Plaintiffs have offered evidence that they had the right to exclude the public from Augusta House. Plaintiffs each had keys to the house. Plaintiffs’ possession of their own keys to the premises evidence their ability to lock the members of the public out of Augusta House and quintessentially symbolizes their right to exclude others. Additionally, each Plaintiff occupied her own room and had the right to exclude other residents from her space. Finally, the record indicates that Zinious and Mission House staff had only limited rights to enter Augusta House, as opposed to a general occupancy right. That is, they could enter to enforce house rules but did not have a have the right to live at Augusta House. Therefore, whether the rental agreement granted Plaintiffs the right to occupy Augusta House to the exclusion of others is an issue for the jury.
In summary, Plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find both that § 383.535(1) does not render KURLTA inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ residency at Augusta House and that Plaintiffs are tenants within the meaning of KURLTA. Thus, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was not proper.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the district court and remand for trial.