dissenting.
[¶ 17] The majority concludes “Rose has raised an issue of material fact whether Boe was acting in ‘good faith’ when he executed the purchase agreement.” Because Rose did not raise the good-faith issue in the trial court, I would affirm.
[¶ 18] “ ‘ “[W]e do not consider questions that were not presented to the trial court and that are raised for the first time on appeal.”’” Messer v. Bender, 1997 ND 103, ¶ 10, 564 N.W.2d 291 (quoting Eastburn v. B.E., 545 N.W.2d 767, 773 (N.D.1996), quoting American State Bank and Trust Co. v. Sorenson, 539 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D.1995)). This rule applies with equal force to an. appeal from a summary judgment. See American State Bank and Trust Co. at 63 (“Soren-son, however, did not resist the motion for summary judgment on any other grounds. As we have consistently said ... we do not consider questions that were not presented to the trial court and that are raised for the first time on appeal.”); State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n v. Harlan, 413 N.W.2d 355, 357 (N.D.1987) (applying rule to appeal from summary judgment); see also 11 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.41[3][c]. (3d ed. 1997) (“As a general rule, arguments and evidence not presented in the district court in connection with a summary judgment motion are waived on appeal....”); United States v. Rode Corp., 996 F.2d 174, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying rule to appeal from summary judgment).
[¶ 19] The majority quotes the affidavits of Rose, Attorney Boyum, and Boe to indicate a factual dispute existed as to the “consent, or lack thereof, of the devisees to the sale.... ” The majority concludes “evidence of discussions about the need for the devisees’ consent *838raises a material issue of fact about Boe’s actual knowledge and whether he was acting in good faith in dealing with the personal representative when he signed the contract.” A careful review of the record reveals Rose never raised the issue of good faith in the trial court — not in any pleading, not in his brief, and not at the hearing.
[¶20] The vague allegations contained in the affidavits may indicate the presence of a factual dispute about the devisees’ consent. The issues in the trial court were the necessity of the devisees to consent to the sale, and whether Rose had breached a fiduciary duty to the devisees to get the highest price he could for the land. Rose never raised the issue of good faith, or lack thereof, before the trial court. See Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 178 (N.D.1993) (affirming summary judgment where issue had been raised only vaguely, briefly, and without citation, in the trial court); Harlan at 357 (reviewing grant of summary judgment and holding “[njowhere in the briefs accompanying the motions for summary judgment below do we see that these arguments were made. Because these issues were not properly addressed to the court below, they are not reviewable on appeal”); see also Rode at 178 (holding “it was incumbent upon Rode to present enough information to alert the district court that there existed a genuine issue of material fact and to present the legal theories upon which it was relying ”) (emphasis added).
[¶ 21] I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶ 22] NEUMANN, J., concurs.