(concurring specially).
[¶ 38] I write specially to emphasize the distinction between the issue presented by this appeal and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1032, 115 S.Ct. 1393, 131 L.Ed.2d 244 (1995) (Williams II), and our subsequent summary reversal in High Elk v. Class, # 18870.4 Williams II held that the application of SDCL 24-15-24 to reduce good-time credits constituted an ex post facto violation when applied to Williams’ 1981 conviction. 33 F.3d at 1014. The Eighth Circuit limited its holding to the application of SDCL 24-15-24 and expressly declined to consider whether SDCL 24-15-21 was applied ex post facto. Id.
[¶ 39] In the instant case, Lewis appeals the application of SDCL 24-15-21 to toll his parole supervision time. Reduction of good-time credits and tolling parole supervision time are two distinct legal concepts, governed by two different statutes. Good-time credits affect the duration of an inmate’s sentence. SDCL 24-5-1. Parole supervi*67sion time affects the conditions under which an inmate’s sentence is served. SDCL 24-15-1.1. Because this appeal concerns the applicability of SDCL 24-15-21, not SDCL 24-15-24, Williams II is distinguishable and not controlling.
.We summarily ordered that the application of SDCL 24-15-24 to reduce High Elk’s good-time credits be reversed because its application to his 1989 rape conviction was ex post facto under the analysis and holding in Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.1994). High Elk v. Class, # 18870.