(on reassignment).
[¶ l.jDeloris E. Wagner appeals the dismissal of her negligence action and a summary judgment for Clifford Truesdell on the grounds of defective service of process. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
[¶ 2.]In 1993, Wagner slipped and fell in a parking lot owned by Truesdell in Rapid City, South Dakota. She alleges the fall was the result of Truesdell’s negligent maintenance of the lot and that she sustained various injuries and damages as a result thereof. She attempted to commence a negligence action against Truesdell in 1996.
[¶ 3.]Truesdell suffered from Alzheimer’s Disease and was, practically speaking, incompetent.1 However, he had never been legally adjudicated incompetent and there was no judicially appointed guardian for him. Rather, his wife took care of him and conducted all of his business affairs under a power of attorney. Truesdell and his wife owned homes in both Rapid City and Las Vegas, Nevada. This required Mrs. Truesdell to make periodic visits to Las Vegas. During these visits, she would sometimes leave her husband in Rapid City in the care of a close friend named Gordon Richmond. Richmond, who was not related to Truesdell, also owned a home in Rapid City. However, when Richmond cared for Truesdell, he stayed with him in Truesdells’ home.
[¶ 4.]Wagner attempted to commence the action against Truesdell on January 15,1996, through service of a summons and complaint by a Pennington County constable. Mrs. Truesdell was on one of her trips to Las Vegas when the constable attempted service, and Richmond was staying with Truesdell in Truesdells’ home. Richmond answered the door and, when the constable asked for Truesdell, he told the constable Truesdell was mentally incompetent. The constable then asked for a family member, but was told that Mrs. Truesdell was in Nevada. Richmond also informed the constable that Trues-dell was in his care until Mrs. Truesdell *629returned. At that point, the constable indicated that, since Truesdell was in Richmond’s custody, he would leave the papers with Richmond. Richmond said he would see to it the papers got to Truesdell’s attorney.
[¶ 5.]Counsel for Truesdell subsequently filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing defective service of process. A hearing was held and the trial court granted Truesdell’s motions. Due to expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, Wagner did not have a new summons and complaint served, but instead brought this appeal.
DECISION
Was service of the summons and complaint on Truesdell defective?
[¶ 6.]We hold that service of process in this case was not defective because there was substantial compliance with the personal service mandates of SDCL 15-6-4(d)(10), which' requires that the summons be served “to the defendant personally.”
[¶ 7.]We have held that:
“Substantial compliance” with a statute means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. It means that a court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it was adopted. Substantial compliance with a statute is not shown unless it is made to appear that the purpose of the statute is shown to have been served. What constitutes substantial compliance with a statute is a matter depending on the facts of each particular case.
State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418, 420 (S.D.1982) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Larson v. Hazeltine, 1996 SD 100, ¶ 19, 552 N.W.2d 830, 835; Rans v. State, 390 N.W.2d 64, 66 (S.D.1986).
[¶ 8.]This Court has held that the purpose of service of process is to “advise the defendant that an action or proceeding has been commenced against' him by plaintiff, and warn him that he must appear within a time and at a place named and make such defense as he has[.]” Hartley v. Jerry’s Radio & Elec. Shop, 74 S.D. 87, 90, 48 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1951) (citation , and internal quotation omitted). We hold that, in this case, the purpose of the statute was met.
[¶ 9.]While we emphasize the purpose of SDCL 15 — 6-4(d)(10) as being that of notice, it is equally important to state that notice alone is not enough. This is the issue that the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with in Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580 (Minn.1988). In Thiele, the court held that a service of process statute requiring a defendant to be served personally or by leaving a copy of the papers at the defendant’s abode was not satisfied by leaving the papers with the defendant’s receptionist at his place of work. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that “actual notice” alone is not enough. The court phrased its holding as: “Actual notice will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction absent substantial compliance with Rule 4.” Id. at 584 (citing Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982)) (emphasis added). We agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that actual notice coupled with substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy personal service of process requirements and we hereby adopt that holding as the law of our state.2
*630[¶ 10.]The realities of a case must be considered when proper service of process is questioned. To follow the strict reading of SDCL 15-6-4(d)(10) urged by Truesdell would be an absurdity. The constable could have handed the papers to Truesdell and then Richmond would have immediately taken them away from Truesdell to give to Truesdell’s attorney. There logically is no need in this case for that “middle-person” step to fulfill the purpose of SDCL 15-6-4(d)(10).
[¶ ll.]In this case, what more could Wagner have done? The' constable went to Truesdell’s home and asked for Truesdell. Richmond informed him that Truesdell was mentally incompetent and was in his care. When the constable asked for Mrs. Trues-dell, he was informed that she was in Nevada. He then presented the papers to Trues-dell’s caretaker who assured him that he would see to it that Truesdell’s attorney received the papers. The entire time, Trues-dell, who it is not disputed was mentally incompetent, was present in the house, and for all practical purposes could not have comprehended what was happening when he was handed the service of process papers. Wagner substantially complied with SDCL 15-6-4(d)(10), and that was enough to satisfy the service of process requirements in this case.
[¶ 12.]We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[¶ 13.]AMUNDSON and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur. [¶ 14.]SABERS and GILBERTSON, JJ., concur in result.. Truesdell was, at the time, completely unable to manage his own personal or business affairs. As a result of his illness or its complications, he has passed away since the trial court proceedings on this matter.
. To further support our adoption of a substantial compliance rule, it should be noted that it is well settled in other jurisdictions that strict compliance with personal service rules is not required when a party that is to be served attempts to avoid service. See Carlson v. Cohen, 302 Minn. 531, 223 N.W.2d 810 (1974) (holding that the placement of process papers under the windshield wipers of defendant’s car as defendant tried to drive off and avoid service was sufficient); Flex Credit, Inc. v. Winkowitsch, 428 N.W.2d 236 (N.D.1988) (holding that proper service was effected by placing the papers in the entryway of defendants’ house when defendants refused to answer their door in an attempt to avoid service). These exceptions to a strict reading of service of process statutes are allowed because the objective of giving notice is attained and nothing else could really have been done to ensure proper service. See 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1095 (2d Ed. 1987). However, it should be noted, the present case does not address instances of attempts to avoid service. Our holding in this case is a narrow one.